MILITARY DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NAVY

BY

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**ABSTRACT**

Report considers the debate over military doctrine and strategy in the final days of the Soviet Union and the first six months of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Russian Federation. Since the direction that the CIS and former Soviet republics will take should be cast in terms of their immediate past, a brief review of recent Soviet history is warranted. The report then shifts to an analysis of the organizational development of the armed forces themselves. Having considered these overall questions, the report then outlines their implications on the Navy. The source material for this report is the open-source literature and statements of authorized spokesmen in the former Soviet Union.
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AUTHOR'S NOTE

This technical report documents the author's incomplete research into the subject matter. The author was originally supposed to conduct research on this subject from October 1, 1992 - September 30, 1994 and indeed did commence the research effort as scheduled -- completing work during the end of 1992 and early 1993 with translations available in the U.S. through mid-1992. The sponsor decided to redirect the researcher's efforts before the researcher commenced working with translations dating from after mid-1992. This report, therefore, documents the initial work that the researcher did prior to having his research efforts redirected and is not complete. The researcher compiled a full set of translations on the subject matter and left them at the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval Postgraduate School for anyone else desiring to complete this research effort.
Military Doctrine and Strategy in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for the Navy

by

James John Tritten

INTRODUCTION

Is the old Soviet threat to the United States and the danger of a European-centered, global, superpower war so remote today that it can be ignored? Can the West safely shift its strategic security planning focus to contingency operations and nonmilitary threats? Do events in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, or the Checheniya Republic cause alarm in the West by raising the specter of a fragmented Soviet empire? Might a fragmented USSR consist of multiple and unpredictable nuclear actors? Could we see, instead, a central core that lashes out from its deathbed? Once the breakup of the old Soviet empire is complete, will a new strong Russian central government take its place? Would such a strong government be just as great a threat to the West as the past one? Will the new Russian military change its fundamental views on strategic nuclear deterrence and deployed nuclear systems?

The profound and evolving changes in the threat have direct bearings on the strategies and forces that the United States and NATO need to develop. The danger of war with the former USSR still exists, but the type of armed conflict that we have all considered the most likely commands not nearly so much interest today as it did even a few years ago.

This report will first consider the debate over military doctrine and strategy in the final days of the Soviet Union and the first six months of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Russian Federation. Since the direction that the CIS and former Soviet republics will take should be cast in terms of their immediate past, a brief review of recent Soviet history is warranted. The report will then shift to an analysis of the organizational development of the armed forces themselves. Having considered these overall questions, the report will then outline their implications on the Navy. The source material for this report is the open-source literature and statements of authorized spokesmen in the former Soviet Union.

The development of new maritime aspects of Soviet and Russian military doctrine and strategy must be interpreted in the context of the debate over doctrine and military reform that have been ongoing since 1985. To fully understand the evolving Russian...

1. The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy.
sian navy, the reader must first review those debates and only then consider their maritime perspective.

The Soviet navy was the last service to be considered in the doctrine and reform debates. It has been a major failing of certain members of the Western analytic community to search for the future of the Soviet navy primarily through an analysis of the Soviet naval literature. My own research over the years has caused me to conclude that a more proper way to view the navy is to first review what the political leadership has to say and then to look at the statements of the marshals and generals who are authorized spokesmen for the ministry of defense and the general staff. Only by setting the navy literature into the context of the views of seniors can one properly appreciate the naval literature as being advocacy or announcement of agreed-upon views.

WARSAW PACT AND SOVIET DEFENSIVE MILITARY DOCTRINE

The Warsaw Pact issued a new defensive military doctrine in 1987 that was supposed to give guidance for both the sociopolitical and military-technical aspects of Soviet military doctrine. Later that same year, then-Soviet Minister of Defense, Army General Dmitry Timofeyevich Yazov appeared to accept that change when he wrote in his book In Defense of Socialism and Peace that "Soviet military doctrine looks upon defense in the quality of basic type of military actions in the repulse of aggression" (emphasis added). Following this passage, however, Yazov stated that:

"However, it is impossible to destroy an aggressor by defense alone. Therefore, after the repulse of the attack, troops and naval forces must be able to mount a decisive offensive. The transition to this takes the form of a counteroffensive, which it will be necessary to conduct in the difficult and tense situation of confrontation with a well-armed enemy."

According to Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin, then-deputy director of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute, in his 1989 testimony before the U.S. Congress (emphasis added): "the Soviet General Staff representatives issued a statement in June, 1987, to the effect that henceforth the actions of the Soviet Armed Forces in the event of countering aggression would primarily consist of defensive operations and combat actions. I would say that this was the biggest change in our strategic thinking since the late 1920s."
Acceptance of the defense as the main form of action for the Soviet Armed Forces was reiterated repeatedly in 1990 by Army General Mikhail Alekseyevich Mgiseyev, then-Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and Marshal Yazov. Defense, as the "main form of combat activity," however, did not mean to these military leaders "a passive defense, but rather an active, decisive one. Defeat of the aggressor will be accomplished using the entire arsenal of arms and equipment in the field, by inflicting powerful counterstrikes and counterattacks."

Some articles indicated that although military doctrine would be defensive, and victory may be ruled out by the political leadership at the strategic-level of warfare, victory may be a justifiable goal at the operational or tactical-levels. Army General Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov, then-Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, stated in 1989 that (emphasis added):

"the present-day Soviet military doctrine envisages defence as the principal type of combat operations in repulsing aggression. The purpose is to check the enemy offensive, enfeeble the enemy forces, prevent loss of a considerable part of territory, and provide conditions for a complete defeat of the enemy troops. This is impossible to achieve by defensive tactics only. That is why, having repelled the enemy attack, the Soviet troops must be ready to launch a decisive counteroffensive."

A great debate took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s within the Soviet Union over what exactly was meant by a defensive military doctrine and a subordinate defensive military strategy. Participating in this debate were military theorists, historians, strategists, civilian academics, and the leaders of the armed forces themselves. Some of the participants indicated that the previously published defensive military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact had not seriously resulted in changes in the military-technical side of doctrine or in operational plans for or the organizational development of the forces themselves. Of course, to properly analyze future directions for the armed forces, one must also include hardware, deployment, and exercise evidence. For the most part, that has not been done in this report. The author is convinced based upon his previous research, however, that there is a benefit from doing literature analysis in the absence of these other significant forms of evidence. When it comes to the views of the Soviet, and then the Russian, military on their new military doctrine and strategy, due to a host of economic, political, and other factors, it will
be some time before we see any significant shifts in hardware, deployments, and exercises that we can attribute to the changes in doctrine and strategy.

During the open period of discussion of military doctrine and strategy, some senior officers openly discussed committing the USSR "to not begin military operations (voyennyye deystviya) at the strategic-level of warfare against any state" except in response to an attack. Paralleling this debate over doctrine and strategy was a debate over the organizational development of the armed forces, largely conducted by a debate over exactly what was meant by the term "sufficiency."12

Due to the demise of the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance, a draft defensive Soviet military doctrine13 and separate draft military reform plan, consistent with the new doctrine,14 were openly published in late 1990. Both were widely discussed in the Soviet and Western literature. Under this draft doctrine, the USSR renounced war and the use or threat of military force to settle any political, economic and ideological differences.

The 1990 draft military doctrine went so far as to state that the USSR: (1) did not regard any people as its enemy, (2) had no territorial claims, and, (3) did not strive for military superiority. The draft stated that the USSR wanted to reduce armed forces to: "a minimum agreed-upon level so that in providing for its defense, no side would have the means and capabilities for a surprise attack on the other side and for conducting large-scale offensive operations." The draft doctrine appeared to accept that defense of the USSR would consist of defensive military operations originating from within its own territory. It did not say that the USSR armed forces have any defensive mission external to the homeland. The draft doctrine, however, also reserved the right of the USSR to make maximum use of any military capabilities for stopping aggression aimed against it or any state allied with it.

To understand the subsequent debates that occurred over the military doctrine of the Soviet Union (in its last days), the newly formed CIS, and later in Russia, it is first necessary to understand that there was a great debate ongoing. In this debate, the major bureaucratic actors - the military services, the Soviet General Staff, and the Soviet Ministry of Defense - had previously taken positions which would affect their positions in the subsequent debate. The positions of these actors largely predicted how they would interpret the lessons of the Persian Gulf war and how they would react to the breakup of the Soviet empire. It is to these subjects that this report will now turn.

Notes

(1) Yuriy Pinchukov, "15 Aspirants for a Nuclear Legacy?" Moscow Moscow News in English, no. 51, December 30, 1990-January 6, 1991, p. 12 (FBIS-SOV-91-002, January 3, 1991, pp. 30-31) makes the very early pre-coup suggestion that republics of the then-
Soviet Union where nuclear weapons are deployed should participate in nuclear decisionmaking.


(11) Army General Petr Georgiyevich Lushev, Commander in Chief


The Soviet view of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM affected what happened to the 1990 draft Soviet military doctrine and draft military reform—neither of which had been fully implemented by the time of the commencement of offensive military operations in the Persian Gulf. This section will first review Soviet commentary during the various stages of coalition military and maritime operations in the Persian Gulf. It will then consider the "quick-look" early lessons learned. Finally, this section will consider subsequent in-depth analyses by the Soviets and Russians.

Commentary on Operation DESERT SHIELD

Comments in the Soviet literature about the coalition response to defend Saudi Arabia generally involved political and foreign policy issues. As a Marxist-Leninist state, the Soviets searched for and found an economic basis for American intervention despite the other reasons that appeared more important to us. There was also obvious concern for Soviet military advisors in the region and discussion on the viability of the economic blockade.

Enforcement of the blockade at sea was a topic of concern specifically by naval officers. Soviet Navy flag officers deployed in the Indian Ocean stressed that their mission included ensuring that Soviet shipping was protected, especially in the areas of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The interdiction of a Soviet merchant ship in the Red Sea in early January 1991 by coalition (U.S. and Spanish) naval forces was a topic of discussion by the Soviet Foreign Ministry and in the civilian literature. The interdiction apparently was not contested by the ship's captain or Soviet warships deployed in the area.

As in the West, there were discussion of whether the appropriate intelligence services had received indications of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait before it actually took place. The Soviet General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) argued that they had two weeks warning of the invasion but that the Defense Ministry did not pass the information on to the nation's leaders. The Committee on State Security (KGB) also said that they had received advance notification.

The late Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev, then-military advisor to the USSR president and former Chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, was free with his opinions on the deterrent phase of coalition operations as well as the coming military combat operations. Akhromeyev expressed concern in early October 1990, that a large grouping of American armed forces was now deployed close to the southern border of the USSR. He implied that this constituted a threat to the Soviet Union. This theme would reappear later from official spokesmen inside the Soviet military and government.
A major analysis of Operation DESERT SHIELD was published in the January 1991 issue of the Soviet journal Foreign Military Review just as the air campaign portion of Operation DESERT STORM broke out. In this analysis, the Soviet author correctly enumerated the steps that had been taken by the American armed forces to respond in the Persian Gulf. The accounting is rather complete and included naval, marine corps, and maritime sealift forces.

Commentary on Planning for Operation DESERT STORM

Soviet press reports included predictions of how Persian Gulf combat operations might evolve. Some of these proved highly accurate descriptions of the eventual overall conduct of the air and air/ground portions of Operation DESERT STORM. None of the initial reports by Soviet civilian authors paid any significant attention to the role of maritime forces.

On the other hand, a Soviet general officer wrote an article in early January 1990 in the Ministry of Defense newspaper Red Star that claimed the coalition hoped to capitalize on its overwhelming superiority in "aviation, naval forces, highly accurate weapons, and electronic warfare." This general officer went on to say that the American command would "give priority at the first stages of an armed conflict to the operations of aviation and the Navy."

Priority was defined in this Red Star article as: taking out Iraqi air defenses and command and control, establishing "domination" in the air and simultaneously destroying Iraqi aircraft, operational-tactical missile launchers, armored forces assault groups, and the military industrial complex. The means of accomplishing these tasks were predicted as aviation and TOMAHAWK sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). According to the general, only following the accomplishment of these tasks, would the Americans employ Army and Marine Corps ground forces offensively to liberate Kuwait.

The article on Operation DESERT SHIELD contained in the January 1991 Soviet Foreign Military Review also had a fairly accurate prediction of the scenario of the impending offensive combat-phase. This version also assumed that a ground forces offensive would be required to achieve the strategic objectives of the campaign.

 Marshal Akhromeyev predicted in early January that Iraq would withdraw in the face of overwhelming coalition forces deployed to the region. He later stated that if offensive combat operations were to begin, it would be extremely dangerous for the Soviet Union because it would be difficult to contain the coalition's contingency response.
This issue of the war spreading occupied the attention of the few naval officers that discussed the impending conflict. One Soviet Navy flag officer deployed in the Indian Ocean stated at the end of December 1990 that the purpose of his task force was: "to prevent aggressive actions against the USSR from the area of the Indian Ocean." He also said that in case of a "stronger war danger" in the Gulf, the task force might be reinforced by ships from the Soviet Mediterranean squadron and Pacific Fleet. This possibility had been previously refuted by the deputy commander of the Indian Ocean Squadron.

The use of the Soviet Navy as a defensive force against forward deployed American aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) was the subject of a debate in the West in the late 1960s and 1970s. Two leading Western analysts of the Soviet Navy, Robert Herrick and Michael MccGwire, argued that the primary reason behind forward deployments of Soviet Navy anti-carrier forces was the deployment of American nuclear-capable CVBGs, primarily in the Mediterranean, within striking range of the USSR.

A major study of Soviet naval diplomacy published in 1979 concluded that the lack of overwhelming response to previous American CVBG deployments, primarily in the Mediterranean, indicated that the Soviets were not serious about a defensive strike against these CVBGs. This study assumed that Soviet naval operational art and tactics would have required a much higher combat capability against the American CVBGs in order to predict mission accomplishment with a sizable degree of probability. Hence this study concluded that the real motivation behind the forward deployments of Soviet warships was politically-motivated military presence and not defensively-motivated military counteraction.

The situation in Operation DESERT SHIELD that resulted in the deployment of six American CVBGs in waters close to the southern border of the USSR was clearly different that previous deployments in the Mediterranean in support of Israel. On the one hand, during the 1990-1991 crisis, the U.S. had also deployed major ground and air forces within striking distance the southern borders of the USSR. These forces were far in excess of the naval forces deployed by the U.S. in the Mediterranean in the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, all of this massive DESERT SHIELD force was tied to a United Nations (U.N.)-mandated mission that had the support of the USSR. American actions and her significant military and naval forces in Southwest Asia were both restricted by this U.N. mandate and the support of the American public only for a limited military campaign against Saddam Hussein and not the USSR.

If the motivation of previous Soviet naval anti-carrier deployments was as a defensive measure, then the lack of Soviet military response to the massive American military, air, and naval presence in Southwest Asia in 1990-1991 might indicate that they had come to view national security as not necessarily requiring an automatic military response. The U.S., or other
potential adversaries, might take military actions near to the borders of the USSR without a knee-jerk reaction by the marshals.

If the previous Soviet naval anti-carrier deployments were primarily acts of naval diplomacy, then the lack of Soviet maritime response to the massive American naval presence in Southwest Asia might indicate that they were turning inward and truly abandoning overseas fraternal international missions. In the past, support of such political goals often led to confrontations at sea with the U.S. On the other hand, economic conditions might also be an explanation for the lack of a politically-motivated military response in 1990-1991.

One of the more interesting topics for discussion in Soviet military science has been whether war takes on a life of its own once combat commences or if it remains subordinate to political directions. In an article published in Red Star just before the outbreak of the air campaign portion of Operation DESERT STORM, the Soviet military author reminded his reader that "a war, once started, develops according to its own laws and its own logic."16 The author only made this point in the context of the spreading of Persian Gulf combat operations to unintended areas rather than in the larger context often argued in the past by the marshals--the military should be free of political constraints when "unleashed" to perform their strategic missions after the failure of deterrence.

Commentary During the Air Campaign

The initial commentary on the outbreak of hostilities, the air campaign, by former-Soviet President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev made specific reference to the need to "localize the conflict and prevent its dangerous escalation."17 Although this theme appeared in subsequent commentary by other Soviet government officials, military officers, and academics, no suggestion was made that the USSR should increase its defensive combat capability as a reaction.18 On the contrary, the two Soviet Navy warships that were in the Persian Gulf were immediately removed from the region.19

The Soviets fully recognized that the air campaign included participation by U.S. naval aviation and TOMAHAWK SLCMs. One interview with an advisor at the Administration for Arms Limitation and Disarmament of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs included the comment that "cruise missiles are capable of fulfilling strategic missions."20 This comment should be interpreted in the context of the on-going Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in which the Soviets were attempting to include SLCMS in a treaty to reduce "strategic" nuclear forces.

On the other hand, commentary by a Soviet military officer indicated that U.S. TOMAHAWK SLCMs fired from missile-armed submarines destroyed "strategically important" targets.21 Per-
haps even more interesting was his recognition that the trajectory for these missiles included the aerospace of nations. Until these attacks, Iraq could predict that the direction of SLCM attacks would come from the relatively narrow waters of the Persian Gulf. This issue must be seen in the context of the larger question of the direction of likely SLCM attack on the USSR in the context of a superpower war. Soviet literature has depicted such attacks routinely violating the airspace of neutral nations along her borders. 22

While the air campaign was on-going, there was relatively little discussion of naval surface forces. One newspaper account acknowledged that the Iraqi navy had been incapable of putting up serious resistance due to total coalition superiority in the air and at sea. 23 This article also stated that the general mood of the Iraqi fleet was one of despair. Small warships were ordered to attempt to slip into Iranian territorial waters in order to preserve them. This tactic was used to preserve units of the Iraqi Air Force but with more success.

The bulk of the Soviet military commentary on the war during the air campaign was whether a ground campaign would be necessary or if the air war would be sufficient. Marshal Akhromeyev was one of the first to enter the fray with a definite prediction that he did not think that "an [Iraqi] army that has nine years of war experience can be paralyzed simply by air attacks." 24

There were a number of articles and media events in which spokesmen argued vehemently that, despite what the world was watching on their television screens, the air war would not lead to the accomplishment of the strategic objectives of the coalition. 25 One of these went so far as to say that [emphasis added]:

"there has never been an occasion yet when either air forces or missiles have determined the outcome of military actions. A navy will not determine it either. The main thing in such operations are the land troops."

Towards the start of the air/ground offensive, the Soviet military turned modest attention to the role that U.S. amphibious forces would play. General-Lieutenant I. Skuratov, chief of the Soviet Navy Shore Forces, wrote a rather in-depth, but short, article on the subject in Red Star on February 12, 1991. 27 Although one must see this article in the context of a chief of a combat arm of the Navy attempting to point out the importance of his own type of force, the Skuratov article did contain some important themes.

The historical surrogates used to discuss amphibious landings were the U.S. Marine Corps landing at Inchon, Korea in 1950; the British landing at Port Sa'id and Port Fu'ad, Egypt in 1956;
and the British landing on East Falklands Island in 1982. Skuratov then labeled each of these landings as operational-strategic, operational, and operational-tactical due to the size of the landing force. In the article, however, Skuratov stressed the Inchon landing, clearly indicating that his assessment that the impending use of U.S. Marine Corps troops in an amphibious operation in the Persian Gulf would be at the operational-strategic level. Skuratov pointed out, correctly, that the Inchon landing "exerted a decisive influence on the outcome of the Korean War as a whole," a very strong theme indicating the importance of both the landing operation and antilanding defenses.28

Just prior to the commencement of the air/ground campaign, there were a number of articles that complemented earlier predictions on how the entire operation would unfold.29 These articles all foretold an amphibious invasion from the Persian Gulf. Given the amount of coalition strategic, operational, and tactical disinformation regarding the planned employment of its ground and amphibious forces, it is hardly fair to fault the Soviets for being taken in.

Commentary During and "Quick-Looks" After the Air/Ground Campaign

The air/ground portion of Operation DESERT STORM barely lasted long enough for the Soviets to react and publish commentary. Then-Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov gave a radio interview on February 26 in which he said that "as soon as ground operations began they made Saddam's [Hussein] defeat inevitable."30 This statement seemingly makes it appear that Yazov was sympathetic in the debate whether a ground offensive was required to the side that felt that it was still required for total victory.

One day after the completion of the air/ground portion of Operations DESERT STORM, Marshal Yazov took the stand at the Soviet Supreme Soviet for his confirmation hearings as Minister of Defense. During the brief hearings, Yazov had to specifically address the value of air defense troops in light of the recent events in the Persian Gulf. Yazov acknowledged the role of the air offensive operation, including the role played by aircraft carriers, and stated that this would require "a review of attitude to both tactical air defense and the country's air defense network."31

The Soviet Navy was one of the first to publish a more in-depth account of the war through its initial stages.32 Until this article, most commentary had referred to combat operations as an air/ground campaign, probably in deference to the U.S. Army's AIRLAND battle doctrine. In the February 1991 issue of the Soviet Navy's journal Naval Digest, Captain 1st Rank K. Kzheb referred to Operation DESERT STORM as an "air-land-sea" (emphasis added) campaign, a term that the U.S. Navy was just beginning to use to underscore the importance of maritime forces in joint
warfare. Captain Kzheb did a thorough job of adding in the missing maritime elements to the picture that had been painted by primarily ground and air forces officers who had dominated the literature to date. His article was signed to press before the start of the air/ground campaign, hence its value is somewhat limited.

Kzheb did provide initial indications of themes that would come to dominate the post-campaign analyses: (1) the failure of the coalition to achieve certain important strategic objectives with an air operation alone, (2) the importance of the initial stage of the campaign, and (3) the value of smart airborne and missile munitions and electronic warfare. Captain Kzheb added one that generally would not be found except in naval journals: (4) the coalition did not have to deploy a majority of their naval forces in order to conduct their operational-strategic level campaign.

The post-campaign discussion of the value of the air campaign was even more heated that the debate that occurred over this issue before the start of the air/ground campaign. Extreme positions were taken by junior air force officers, including: "Soviet military doctrine and the entire model of military building were obsolete," and "huge amounts of armored vehicles, tanks and artillery pieces were absolutely useless." More senior air force officers, such as General-Lieutenant of Aviation A.E. Malyukov, chief of the Air Force Main Staff, were less threatening to the ground forces but still voiced their optimism in the omnipotence of airpower: "there was no 'Air-Land Battle.' Why? ...this is the first time we have witnessed a war where the aviation took care almost entirely of all the main tasks." More subdued versions of the same position were taken by a Soviet civilian academic who specializes in military affairs.

During March 1991, the first substantive analysis of the entire campaign appears in the Soviet press. Marshal Akhromeyev provided an interview to the Moscow news magazine New Times. Akhromeyev attributed Iraq's defeat, in part, due to the lack of naval forces integrated into a national air defense system.

The Navy published a "quick-look" in their March 1991 issue of Naval Digest but failed to pick up on Akhromeyev's theme on the value of naval forces. This article did, however, provide a quantitative assessment of the degree of destruction of command and control, missile capability, facilities for weapons of mass destruction, energy producing facilities, etc. The similarity of the categories of targets to numerous open-source discussions of strategic nuclear targets lead one to speculate that analyses must be on-going to compare the results of a conventional strategic bombing offensive to planned nuclear strikes.

Another Navy initial analysis appeared in the April 23, 1991 issue of Red Star. Rear Admiral A.A. Pauk, chief of a Main Navy Staff directorate, and Captain 1st Rank V. Karandeyev stressed: (1) thorough integration of naval aviation and TOMAHAWK
SLCMs in the air offensive, (2) participation of naval forces in the AIRLAND battle (3) the multi-threat axis posed Iraq by the presence of coalition maritime forces, and (4) the time consuming [and unchallenged] buildup of maritime forces in Southwest Asia. They documented the participation of maritime forces in joint operations and the value of the high technology weapons. Pauk and Karandeyev concluded that the war "convincingly confirmed the role of naval forces in modern warfare."

In April 1991, Naval Digest published an exhaustive analysis of the strategic deployment of U.S. military forces during the Gulf war. The article reminds one of the type of Western articles frequently written about the Soviet merchant marines as a military asset. The Soviet article focused more on the strengths of the U.S. strategic sealift program rather than its weaknesses that adorned the pages of American maritime literature. In both cases, Soviet and American authors use the events of the war to highlight points that they would like to make about the need to improve sealift programs associated with the merchant marine.

Non-naval originated initial lessons learned from the Persian Gulf wars tended to reduce the importance of fleet units other than naval aviation and SLCMs. As time went on, questions were raised about the real accuracy of American high-technology weapons.

Commentary by the Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in an April 1991 New Times article recognized the vital importance of host nation support to the outcome of the campaign. Kozyrev suggested that without it, the DESERT STORM would have been "seriously hindered." Kozyrev did not raise the presence of American seapower as an alternative mechanism to stage an operational-strategic combat operations and one must assume that he was aware of their presence.

Indications of an debate over the "quick-look" lessons of the Persian Gulf war were given by former-President Gorbachev in an April 11, 1991 interview broadcast on Japanese television. Responding to a rather general question about post-war international relations, Gorbachev stated that it was not true that the global military balance had been overturned by Operation DESERT STORM. This would have aligned himself with those who said that the USSR did not need to rearm in order to counter the obvious advantages displayed by the coalition.

Andrey Kozyrev told a New Times audience in April 1991 that American weaponry demonstrated in the Persian Gulf war "does not represent any threat to the USSR." The Russian Federation Foreign Minister clearly stated that rather than rebuilding their arsenal to match the West, a minimal nuclear deterrent posture was all that was needed to make sure "that no one will make any encroachments on the Soviet borders."
Political commentary in mid-March 1991 by President Gorbachev following the war included the suggestion that: "in the event of the emergence of a threat to shipping in the Persian Gulf region naval forces should be set up under the UN flag." 45 The United Nations Military Committee was recommended as having a role in future crisis situations.

Substantive and Subsequent Post-Campaign Analyses

Most of the "quick-look" lessons learned either lacked depth or analyzed the contributions of one service or combat arm. More comprehensive analyses were to come. The first major analysis of the war that took a more comprehensive and in-depth look at the Persian Gulf war was the report of a roundtable discussion of general and flag officers published in the May 1991 issue of the journal of the USSR General Staff Academy, Military Thought. 46 Participants in the roundtable included a number of Soviet authors of previous "quick-looks;" General-Lieutenant S. Bogdanov, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Operational-Strategic Research Center; General-Lieutenant of Aviation A.E. Malyukov, chief of the Air Force Main Staff; and Rear Admiral A.A. Pauk, chief of a Main Navy Staff directorate.

General Malyukov was not quite so outspoken this time in his advocacy of airpower but he could not help but compare the success of coalition air efforts with the theories of Italian General Giulio Douhet. Another participant, General-Colonel of Aviation I.M. Maltsev, chief of the Air Defense Forces Main Staff, was perhaps even more of an advocate for airpower, including naval air, when he claimed that coalition aviation groupings were capable of performing "strategic missions." Maltsev pointed out the need for strong air defense forces to oppose the massive strikes of aircraft that will come at the beginning of any future war. Both airpower advocates, however, deferred to the role of the ground forces by adherence to the General Staff party line that one branch of the armed forces is incapable of deciding the course and outcome of war.

The navy's contributions were presented by Admiral Pauk. In this forum, he stressed: (1) the operation of ad hoc coalition forces under a unified plan in nontraditional areas, (2) the contribution of naval forces to the air operation, (3) high technology weapons and surveillance systems, (4) the role that strategic sealift played in facilitating Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, (5) the naval blockade, and (6) the threat to land up to two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs). Pauk concluded that "naval forces are acquiring a leading role in local conflicts as the most versatile and mobile branch of the armed forces capable of accomplishing a wide range of missions at sea, on land and in the air." It is one thing to point out that a given combat arm is increasing in importance, and quite another to state that it is more important than another service. Pauk did not say that navies were more important than anyone else.
The General Staff position was more balanced and did not include significant attention to the contribution of naval forces. General Bogdanov pointed out that Western cruise missiles did not cause sufficient damage. General-Major A. Ya. Gulko, deputy chief of a General Staff main directorate, concluded the roundtable with the assessment that:

"in itself, the offensive air operation and subsequent systemic operations by multinational forces' aircraft were unable to lead to achievement of the political and military-strategic goals set in this reason. Their main purpose was to undermine Iraq's military-economic potential and inflict damage on it which would ensure successful development of ground engagements with minimum losses for coalition armed forces."

One of the next most important public statements on the war was by Army General Mikhail Alekseyevich Moiseyev, then-Chief of the General Staff, at a Ministry of Defense scientific conference on June 6, 1991. Moiseyev delivered the main report at this conference which concerned itself with the lessons learned from the Persian Gulf war. He told the press, after delivering his report, that the lessons of the war should not be used as "'a pretext' for making immediate changes in the military reform in the Soviet Armed Forces." He then added:

"the changed balance of military and political forces in the world, the changes that have happened and continue to take place in the country's domestic and foreign policy and new approaches towards the defense efficiency and security of our state" [require a need to alter military doctrine, strategy, operational art, and tactics]

Moiseyev's remarks are important because they acknowledge that the 1990 draft Soviet military doctrine and reform plans would have to be revised. They are also important because they acknowledge that there had been an altering of the military balance, specifically repudiated by former Soviet President Gorbachev in his April 11, 1991 interview broadcast on Japanese television. Such a substantive difference of opinion would indicate either a rift between the Chief of the General Staff and the Soviet president or that Gorbachev had altered his views.

An excellent substantive overview was published in Foreign Military Review in their July 1991 issue. On the whole, this article pays little attention to naval forces except in the
context of their contribution to the air campaign. The Soviet military authors appeared to suggest that the air power and high technology weapons were decisive. When writing about the military equipment of air forces, they noted that "air forces of the anti-Iraq coalition played a decisive role in destroying Iraq's military-economic potential, inflicting unacceptable damage on the Iraqi Army, and creating conditions for its rapid defeat during the course of the air-land operation." This generally parallels the position of the General Staff at the roundtable published in the May edition of Military Thought. On the other hand, when discussing the military equipment employed by navies, they stated (emphasis added):

"On the whole, the new weapons employed by the United States and its allies in the Persian Gulf zone made it possible to inflict serious damage on the armed forces and military-industrial potential of Iraq and for all practical purposes decided the outcome of the war."

The Soviet authors of this article may have been speaking from the perspective of the West, but the U.S. had yet to issue a definitive statement making such a grandiose claim.

A substantive analysis of the war was published by a senior researcher at the U.S.A. and Canada Institute in the August issue of their journal USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology. Sergey Mikhaylovich Rogov provided an interesting overview of the war, including its military-strategic implications. In the pre-Gorbachev era, such articles were rare, unimportant, and generally ignored. Articles today on military issues by Soviet and Russian academics like Sergey Rogov are important and cannot be ignored. Indeed, General-Colonel Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev, the new Russian Defense Minister, told a conference at the General Staff Academy in May 1992, that such outsiders will be involved in the process of setting up the Russian armed forces.

In his article, Rogov sided with those who were arguing that the war demonstrated the value to modern high technology weapons. Rogov went so far as to state that airpower was decisive and that "combat operations developed almost exactly in line with the classic plan of General Douhet." He claimed that the ground offensive was not a factor in deciding the outcome of the war.

His analysis allowed Rogov to conclude that "given the present technological level, attack systems are superior to defense systems" [emphasis in the original]. He then tied this to the current Soviet debate over a defensive doctrine and concluded that the "war in the Persian Gulf proved that the inability of the defensive side to organize a counterstrike dooms it to defeat." Rogov did not, however, state that this counterstrike needed to be with ground forces. Indeed, one might conclude that
his article implies that they would be of high technology air forces!

In addition to these initial substantive analyses, the individual services and combat arms continued to produce lessons learned that tended to highlight the importance of their own branch or branches. For example, the July 1991 issue of Foreign Military Review also contained an assessment of preparing aviation forces for Operation DESERT STORM. This article played particularly close attention to the integration of naval aviation into the air campaign. The importance of the navy and the TOMAHAWK SLCM was the subject of another article in the same issue.

General-Lieutenant Skuratov wrote another analysis of the Gulf war in the June 1991 issue of Naval Digest that tended to highlight the importance of his own combat arm as a defense against TOMAHAWK SLCMs. Skuratov proposed building a "new operational antiship missile system equal in range to Tomahawk missile capabilities." Subsequent articles appeared in later issues of the main navy journal highlighting the need for new maritime weapons systems that would be able to operate in the new military-technological environment caused by the scientific-technological revolution demonstrated in the Persian Gulf.

In the Summer of 1991, when the U.S. was considering renewing combat operations against Iraq because of its failure to live up to the terms of the cease fire, the Soviets took note that the lead elements for such strikes would consist of aviation units and TOMAHAWK SLCMs.

The first consolidated U.S. lessons learned from the Persian Gulf war appeared in July 1991. Assuming that this report was purchased by the Soviet Ministry of Defense, and other Soviet researchers, it would have been available in translation for their use no later than August 1991.

After the publication of the initial series of substantive analyses, we began to see deliberate uses of the lessons of the Persian Gulf to make points in commentary on other related issues. For example, Army General Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareyev, a serious Soviet military intellectual, wrote a major contribution in the debate over military reform in the August 1991 issue the General Staff Academy's journal Military Thought. In a section of the article dealing with the nature of a defensive doctrine, Gareyev made a case against a passive-only form of defense using the recent war in the Persian Gulf as his proof.

In another article in the same issue, another Soviet general officer offered his contributions on the military reform debate with explicit comments favoring the use of aircraft and other high technology weapons in lieu of ground forces. General-Major Yevgeny G. Korotchenko went as far as saying (emphasis in the original):
"the experience of military operations in the Persian Gulf zone showed that in the vary near future the delivery of a surprise first strike and numerous subsequent massive missile, air-space and electronic strikes in combination with strikes by naval forces may decide the outcome of war without the invasion of enemy territory by ground force groupings."

General Korotchenko's comments above included an endnote to the journal U.S. News and World Report, but one should interpret that as an attempt to allow him to make a controversial point with the aid of a Western surrogate. This is a standard practice in the Soviet literature. Korotchenko spends the remainder of the article essentially justifying this conclusion. Of note, also, is the use of the new term "electronic strikes."

Post-Coup Lessons Learned

With the coup attempt in the Soviet Union, came a new cast of characters involved with the most serious aspects of the debate over military doctrine and reform. Army General Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov, having been the Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces and then head of the Frunze Military Academy, was appointed as Chief of the General Staff after the August 1991 coup attempt. General Lobov was no stranger to the debate over military doctrine and strategy and is a first rate academic in his own right, but his earlier banishment to the Frunze Academy indicated a lack of support from his seniors.

In one of his first interviews, while serving in this new position, in Izvestiya, published on September 2, 1991, Lobov used the opportunity to argue for improved quality of armed forces hardware due to the lessons learned from the Gulf war. Lobov specifically stated that the Persian Gulf war should not be looked on as "merely an episode," implying that he sided with those who viewed the war as the basis for the development of military doctrine and organizational development of the Soviet armed forces. We should not forget that Lobov's appointment was preceded by that of the former Commander-in-Chief (CinC) of the Air Force, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny Ivanovich Shaposhnikov, to the post of USSR Defense Minister. Shaposhnikov was viewed as a supporter of a shift in emphasis to air power.

On August 31, 1991, General-Colonel of Aviation Petr Stepanovich Deynekin was appointed to the position of CinC of the Soviet Air Force. On September 5, 1991, he told a news interviewer that Operation Desert Storm confirmed that a "tank fleet of 40,000 vehicles in our country is pointless in modern warfare since the tanks would be burned by helicopters within hours." Such a statement by the head of a service was unheard of in
earlier days. Support for the position that airpower should dominate the new Soviet military doctrine and reform received added emphasis from additional articles that appeared from time to time.62

The ground forces were not about to take this frontal assault lying down. In an November 28, 1991 interview in Red Star, the chief of the Ground Forces Main Staff responded that although "in the Persian Gulf the situation was such that aircraft played the leading role...this in no way belittles the significance of ground forces' military actions in the attainment of the ultimate goal."63

In what appears to be a major post-coup summary report of the lessons learned from the Gulf War, two Soviet general officers and a colonel wrote a major article in the last USSR issue of the General Staff Academy's journal Military Thought.64 The article is replete with nuances that make it necessary to understand what debates were ongoing at the time for which "lessons" of Operation DESERT STORM were used to support certain positions in that debate.

In this final USSR Military Thought issue article on the Persian Gulf lessons, the Soviet military authors did compare the use of conventional weapons to the use of weapons of mass destruction. Although they acknowledged the importance of the offensive air operation, they did not agree that air forces made the "decisive contribution" toward winning victory in the Persian Gulf. The authors further stated that "only the defeat of the Iraqi Armed Forces main grouping as a result of the land operation by multinational troops forces Saddam's [Hussein] leadership to decide on an unconditional cease fire. The air bombardment did not lead to the Army's defeat."

This article also acknowledged that "conventional weapons were used during the war which are capable of acquiring a strategic character with massive employment." In conclusion, the authors concluded that the "military lessons of the Persian Gulf armed conflict are unique," thereby siding themselves against General Lobov, who had said that it was not "merely an episode." Lobov, incidentally, was fired as Chief of the General Staff on December 7, 1991, five days before the last issue of the USSR Military Thought was signed to press.

In one of the rare commentaries on the Persian Gulf war by the former Navy CinC, Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernavin in early January 1992 took a public stand on these issues. Chernavin stated in an interview (emphasis added):65

"The war in the Persian Gulf convincingly showed the significance of the maritime sector: Iraq was blockaded from the sea, the air force and navy carried out the main, basic strikes from the sea, they effectively
decided the outcome of the hostilities, and only when the resistance of the Iraqi Army had been finally crushed, did the ground troops move forward. This example graphically demonstrates that war today is different, it does not resemble previous ones, which began with soldiers crossing a border and starting to conquer territory and destroy the enemy."

Conclusions

The major discussion point in the Soviet and Russian literature about the Persian Gulf war appears to have been over whether a ground offensive was necessary or not. Related to this major discussion item are subsidiary dialogues relative to the role of high technology, specifically precision guided munitions. Generally speaking, analysis of maritime aspects of the war was less important than these major considerations. Consequently, Western readers should not review only those Soviet and Russian sources that deal with only the maritime aspects of the war in order to understand the true view of those considerations.

Commentary on Operations DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM must be also visualized in the context of what it is that the U.S., and other Western, armed forces were capable of vis-a-vis a Soviet-trained and equipped client state. Comments on the war are invariably comments on how well Soviet equipment and training stacked up against the heretofore most likely enemy of the USSR. Naturally there was a bias in Soviet and Russian literature to use the lessons of the Persian Gulf war to make points, that otherwise were not going to be made, about the author's views on the adequacy of Soviet/Russian military equipment and training and that of the U.S. and the West.

Soviet and Russian commentary about Operations DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM must also be seen in the context of the internal debates that were ongoing over the new military doctrine and strategy. Again, the bias of most authors was to use the lessons of the Persian Gulf war to make points that they otherwise would have made about the future direction of the Soviet and then the Russian armed forces.

Generally, this section has reported on the lessons of the Persian Gulf war as reported by various military and civilian Soviet and Russian authors during discrete time periods. The reader was introduced to the debates over Soviet military doctrine and strategy in the previous section. The subsequent debates and reform movement will be developed in later sections. We must also consider important and subsequent political events in the former Soviet Union and review the changes to traditional elements of military doctrine and strategy. It is to these issues that this report will now turn. The final sections of this report will address implications for the U.S. and the West.
Notes


(6) Vladimir Ostrovskiy interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev, then-military advisor to the USSR president, "Gulf: Where's Way Out?" Moscow IAN Press Release
in English, October 5, 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-211, October 31, 1990, p. 11).


(20) Interview with Oleg Shagov, advisor at the Administration for Arms Limitation and Disarmament of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and with Professor Aleksandr Kostyushin, doctor of military sciences, 'Smart Weapons in the Arabian Sands,' Moscow Novoye Vremya in Russian, no. 4 (January 1991): 24-25 (JPRS-UMA-91-008, March 18, 1991, p. 2).


(42) Andrey Kozyrev, Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs, "New Way of Thinking: Toward Parity in Common Sense,"


Because of the on-going studies of Operation DESERT STORM, the Soviet Union was undergoing a thorough discussion of the military-technical aspects of doctrine prior to the August 19, 1991 coup attempt. With the coup, and the appointment of an Air Force officer as the new minister of defense, the West looked for indications of a shift in military doctrine. The first post-coup indications of the impact of the coup on military doctrine were from Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny Ivanovich Shaposhnikov, the new Soviet Defense Minister. Shaposhnikov stated on August 26, 1991 that Soviet military doctrine would remain defensive and based upon the concept of sufficiency, a concept that had yet to be fully clarified but one that was at the heart of the debate over future strategy and forces.1

Army General Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov was relieved of his duties as the head of the Frunze Military Academy and appointed the new Chief of the USSR General Staff. Within days of his appointment, he gave an interview outlining some possible changes in military thinking in the Soviet Union.2 Lobov stated that the main thrust of his doctoral dissertation had been to "achieve goals for the lowest possible expenditure of forces, resources, and time." Marshal Shaposhnikov echoed this new theme in a parallel interview.3

Shaposhnikov announced later in September 1991 that a fundamental review of military doctrine was on-going and would involve the new republic defense committees.4 In an October 1, 1991 newspaper article, Lobov reiterated that the review was indeed underway and provided some details.5 Lobov's article clearly stated that cost-effectiveness would be a criteria and that the doctrine would truly be defensive that "will not cause anyone any anxiety." Lobov went so far as to say that the Soviet Union did "not regard anyone as an actual enemy."

A Vienna seminar on military doctrine with representatives from 38 members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was the site of an explanation of the basic tenets of Soviet military doctrine. General-Colonel Bronislav Omelichev, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, told his audience that a single coalition military doctrine would govern the post-coup USSR armed forces.6 Omelichev added that "aggression can scarcely be successfully repulsed by means of passive actions."

On October 23, 1991, the Ministry of Defense published a major interview with the Chief of the General Staff.7 In this interview, Lobov stated some new ideas for military doctrine, including: that conflict in the future must be localized, but that "external functions" could not be ruled out. He also admitted that: "there has hitherto been no correlation between our officially proclaimed defensive goals and the offensive thrust of operational-strategic principles in the sphere of military art
and the development and combat training of troops and naval forces."

The most substantive discussion of post-coup Soviet military doctrine was in an October 1991 article by General Lobov, in the General Staff's prestigious journal *Military Thought.* Lobov's article contained a thorough discussion of the need to revise Soviet military doctrine, retaining its defensive character, because of the coup and the "victory by democratic forces."

The new Chief of Staff explained this victory in terms that were more concrete. Although Lobov stated that the republics might "delegate broad rights and obligations to the Center in the sphere of defense and military policy," he also acknowledged that they might not, necessitating a coalition military doctrine rather than an unified doctrine and unified armed forces. Lobov made it clear that under the new sociopolitical, inter-ethnic, and ideological realities, it was "impossible to organize national defense on the previous principles" and that defense decision-making would be shared with new elements of the society.

Even more importantly, Lobov acknowledged that "under the new conditions the economic bases of the country's defense capability do not support Armed Forces's needs and require substantial reform." Lobov stated that national defense must be "economic to the maximum and not difficult for the state." Hence, Lobov's basic argument was that although military doctrine would retain its defensive character, it would have to change due to these rather important sociopolitical and economic factors.

The Chief of the General Staff discussed his concept of military defense in terms that agreed with Shaposhnikov: "any aggressive intentions are alien to us;" "our defensive measures must not generate even the slightest alarm in anyone;" "defense as the basic form of military operations in repelling aggression." To be even more explicit, Lobov stated that:

"We are obligated to convince the world that we never will begin combat operations against anyone whomsoever under any conditions, with the exception of cases either where we ourselves are the object of attack or where armed intervention with other democratic states will be required under UN aegis in a region where a real threat arises to the peace and security of peoples."

The need for a military defense, especially against a conventional attack, of the Soviet Union has not always been understood nor appreciated by Western leaders and analysts. Although most Westerners have never considered large-scale offensive military operations against the USSR as a realistic possibility, there were those in the Soviet Union who really feared an attack
would come if they did not remain armed to the teeth, or at least used this threat of an attack as justification for large military expenditures. This post-coup embrace of defensive defense by Shaposhnikov and Lobov were an attempt to ensure that everyone knew on which side of the debate they had made their stand. It was also a signal of future trends in strategy and force structure for the rest of the military.

The USSR was essentially without a national command authority (NCA) for some few days in August 1991. It was never more vulnerable than during the coup and perhaps more recently during the winter of 1991-92. Yet the only "attack" that came from the West was the massive influx of advisors, politicians, and aid. The lack of attack by the West, which had been warned about by the Soviet military for years, did not go unnoticed, and undermined the efforts of Soviet "hawks" to argue that even more resources needed to be devoted to defense.

Notes


Military doctrine was discussed in November-December 1991, this time in conjunction with efforts to create a Union of Sovereign States and the aborted attempt to sign a new Union Treaty. With the assumption of a continued Union, the Soviet Ministry of Defense rapidly developed another new military doctrine that did not name any nation or block as an external enemy. This new doctrine did not envisage the USSR coming under simultaneous or even sequential attack from several directions. It called for mobile ground defense forces based in peacetime upon corps and brigades rather than offensive ground forces based upon fronts.

The late 1991 doctrine characterized security at three levels: national (security of the sovereign states), regional (cooperation with external blocks and nations), and global (cooperation with the United Nations). A Soviet general officer attempted to add substance to the issue of doctrine by claiming: "Our general Staff understands strategic stability as a condition of interstate relations characterized by resistance to the effect of destabilizing factors."  

Apparently, the entire military did not agree with the directions that the Ministry of Defense were being forced to take because of the new sociopolitical and economic realities. The final two 1991 issues of the USSR General Staff's journal Military Thought, signed to press on December 12 before it was fully apparent that the Soviet Union was going to cease to exist, included a series of articles that directly challenged any wholesale shift to a defensive military doctrine that relied on defensive military operations as their primary form of combat. The following extracts provide the flavor of many of the more outspoken articles.

"The declaration only of defense and only of retaliatory operations in Soviet military doctrine probably will not accomplish the tasks either of educating the people or of deterring aggression against the USSR. "A defense incapable of creating necessary conditions for launching a decisive offensive will not fulfill its mission and will not lead to success in defending the homeland." "In no case should doctrine stereotype of 'castrate' military art." "One should proclaim the right to repel aggression using all kinds, forms and methods of military operations." "It is not precluded that future military operations will extend to the opposing side's full territory."

Trends in warfare were carefully developed with conclusions including that further cuts in the military would require preemptive strikes in order to successfully perform a defensive operation. Although these articles did appear and the journal Military Thought has generally been predictive of trends in the Soviet military, these articles appear to represent the last efforts of the Soviet military to state their case for a strong
defense under what were now totally unrealistic pre-coup sociopolitical conditions.

With the formal demise of the USSR at the end of 1991, the military quickly announced plans for a joint CIS military doctrine. The military's preferred position initially was that the CIS was simply the USSR with another name. The former USSR Ministry of Defense essentially simply reformed itself into the High Command of the CIS Armed Forces. Under initial plans, the chief defense tasks for the CIS in wartime included the "defeat of the aggressor and the creation of conditions for the quickest end of the war and the restoration of a just and lasting peace;" essentially the same words found in the 1990 USSR draft.

When the CIS failed to function as a state, both military and civilian advisors began to agitate for the creation of republic military doctrines in Russia and the Ukraine instead. Russia resisted creating its own republic armed forces hence continued to place a great deal of emphasis on the formulation of a CIS military doctrine and strategy instead. Eventually, the individual republics began to formulate their own views on military doctrine and the Commonwealth was likened to the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The Ukraine took the lead on preparing their own military doctrine. Fears that the Ukraine would prepare for military operations beyond its own borders were specifically refuted by the Ukrainian minister of defense. Belarus, which had indicated that it was in no hurry to form separate armed forces, began to develop the initial concepts of their own military doctrine; one quite different than that which used Belarus as simply a "Cossack encampment on the empire's Western borders." Even Moldava made it clear that "its territory would not be used by foreign forces for the preparation or conduct of offensive action against other countries." Eventually, most former Soviet republics began to formulate their own individual military doctrines.

In early 1992, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny Ivanovich Shaposhnikov, in his new capacity as Commander of the Commonwealth Armed Forces, stated that a new military doctrine for the CIS would remain defensive, although some of its provisions would have to be changed. The military's preferred position was that combat operations cannot be oriented toward passive defense. One major article published immediately upon the demise of the USSR stated that "with the outbreak of aggression, all restrictions in the choice of the forms and methods of military operations should be lifted."

Numerous other articles have followed, indicating that the basic thrust of the strategic defense, being either operationally defensive or offensive, remains a major subject of debate. One possible way to interpret these remarks is that for programming purposes, the military might have to accept that it will plan only for defensive operations, but, if war were to actually
occur, during the execution of plans, no such restrictions need apply.

One multi-authored article advocating a new doctrine was especially critical of politicians who had not yet internalized the lessons of Operation DESERT STORM and only thought of a ground forces invasion with frontal military operations in border and coastal areas.\textsuperscript{20} The military authors of this article advocated, instead, forces necessary to defend against the more likely air invasion as seen in Operation DESERT STORM. They promoted a concept of active combat ready forces designed to support nuclear deterrence and to repel an air attack with active forces. Mobilized reserve general purpose forces sufficient for the conduct of full-scale military operations in all spheres if there were a threat of a land campaign.

Another significant article was prepared by General Konstantin Ivanovich Kobets, then-Russian Federation State Counselor for Defense, and leading proponent for the creation of a separate Russian military doctrine. Kobets stated that a Russian military doctrine should include vigorous defense but not carrying the conflict beyond her own borders.\textsuperscript{21} Russian Vice President Alexandr Rutskoy gave a television interview in mid-February that stated that the emerging strategy would be based upon the "principle of a defensive doctrine."\textsuperscript{22}

The 1990 draft military doctrine specifically identified the principal military danger to the USSR as the high levels of military confrontation, the U.S. military-political policy of "from a position of strength," and the presence of foreign military bases and forces around the territory of the former USSR. These are the same type of words being used by a few holdovers in the Russian military who continued to argue that there was an external threat facing Russia today.\textsuperscript{23}

The leadership of the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada has been quite vocal about whether or not there is an external enemy. The Institute's director, Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, stated in February 1992 that although a threat to security still exists, a threat from within is more likely.\textsuperscript{24} Sergey Mikhaylovich Rogov, Deputy Director of the Institute wrote, in early March, that external events would probably not directly affect Russia's state security and echoed his director that the most important threats are internal.\textsuperscript{25}

Another Deputy Director of the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada gave an important interview in mid-March just prior to his being officially named (on April 3, 1992) as one of the two new Russian Deputy Defense Ministers.\textsuperscript{26} Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin stated that security for Russia was best obtained by a combination of restructured high-technology branches of the armed forces which would be backed up by "centrally based rapid deployment forces, which can be thrown in the shortest possible time into any region of the CIS to repulse external aggression, to end
conflict on favorable terms acceptable to us." He added that the mission would be to rapidly curb the escalation of the conflict.

The Russian Supreme Soviet passed a resolution on April 1, 1992 that gave the priorities for the establishment of an independent military policy for the Russian Federation. Appended to this declaration was an appended statement from the Presidium that provided additional details. Included were the following concepts: (1) formation of a Russian military establishment on the basis of a sufficient level of defense, (2) sufficiency in strategic nuclear forces is to also include the minimal cost, (3) the basic factor in deterring large-scale and local wars against Russia and other CIS states should be forces possessing high-accuracy weapons and means of delivery, (4) the prompt neutralization and localization of local conflicts shall be accomplished by highly mobile general purpose forces, and (5) the need for a collective defense system.

General-Colonel Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev, also about to be announced as a Russian Deputy Defense Minister (on April 3), gave an interview published on April 1, 1992 in which he outlined his view of emerging Russian military doctrine. It included emphasis on rapidly deployable forces, which he defined as airborne troops and marines, to meet any external threat. He added that ground forces with powerful tank components were no longer required by Russia.

Announcements, including one by Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, on April 7, 1992 of a new Russian military doctrine indicated that it would be purely defensive. A statements from Marshal Shaposhnikov, Commander in Chief (CinC) of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, on the same day included that the Russian military needed to be strong enough to accomplish its tasks "independently or in conjunction with the Joint Armed Forces [of the CIS] and to worthily represent a great power in the international system."

Andrey A. Kokoshin, now the Deputy Russian Defense Minister told a Radio Moscow interviewer, on April 6, that the Russian armed forces "will be purely defensive and will never pose a threat to either neighboring or other countries." In a subsequent newspaper interview, Kokoshin stated that "we should not rely too much on nuclear deterrence." In early May, Colonel-General Viktor Nikolayevich Samsonov, Chief of the CIS General Staff, gave an interview that indicated that the general purpose forces of the Russian Army would be based upon the concept of mobile defense without the formation of forward-based strategic echelons. President Yeltsin added in an interview that a mobile Russian Army "should be capable of reacting instantly to any critical situation."

At the mid-May 1992 parliamentary hearings over the new law to create Russian armed forces, one General Staff officer explained that the armed forces would "abandon continuous defense
along the entire perimeter of the state borders. Furthermore, he stated that "infantrymen" must "stop thinking about a future large-scale war requiring districts and fronts."

After the CIS Tashkent summit in May 1992, Russian Acting Defense Minister, General-Colonel Pavel S. Grachev, said that Russia would create "rapid reaction force" that would be sent to whatever sectors were defenses are under threat. Ground forces "located on the defense perimeter will be significantly reduced, and several fully manned divisions will remain in each military district. So a strategic reserve will be established in case of hostilities."

At the end of May, 1992, a four-day conference was held at the Academy of the General Staff on the "Military Security of Russia." Acting Russian Minister of Defense Grachev's concluding speech apparently contained criticism of previous views of nuclear weapons and the "strictly defensive" nature of military doctrine. Grachev stated that in the event of aggression, Russia has the right to choose those means of combat which it deems most effective in the existing situation.

General Grachev told the conference that a draft Russian military doctrine would be prepared and submitted to Russian President Boris Yeltsin by July 1, 1992. In the post-Tashkent environment, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan began to develop their own independent military doctrines. The Baltic republics have apparently signed a protocol setting up a single defense system and cooperation in the military sphere.

It is unlikely that there will be a CIS military doctrine since the CIS is not a state and not all the members are willing to cooperate in a formal defensive arrangement. Instead, each republic will create its own military doctrine, perhaps in the form of a legislative action. Those that join defensive alliances will include in their doctrines provisions for such an eventuality. The November 1991 draft USSR military doctrine discussed such endeavors and the March 1992 draft Russian constitution contains a clause permitting alliances and joint armed forces.

The former Soviet Union is undergoing another thorough discussion of military doctrine. The resulting military doctrines will affect the reformulation of military art: military strategy, operational art, and tactics, and the organizational development of the armed forces. Of interest in the discussions about military doctrine are the general lack of mention of maritime aspects of security.

Notes

(1) Roman Zadunaisky report of international conference "Armed Forces and Military Service in a Law-Governed State" and commentary by Sergey Bogdanov, head of the Soviet Defense Ministry Center for Strategic Research, carried by Moscow TASS in English, 1834 GMT, November 25, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-228, November 26, 1991,


(11) Vitaliy Portnikov, "A '16th Republic' in Uniform," Moscow


(13) Viktor Litovkin, "We are Resigned to the Breakup of the Union, but the Division of the Union Army is Alarming," Moscow Izvestiya in Russian, September 6, 1991, Union ed., p. 1 (FBIS-SOV-91-173, September 6, 1991, p. 58).


(22) Aleksandr Rutskoy, Russian Vice President, interview on the


(27) "'Statement of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Presidium on the Russian Federation's Military Policy Priorities,' Appended to the 1 April 1992 Resolution," Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta in Russian, April 8, 1992, single ed., p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-069, April 9, 1992, pp. 37-38); and in Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, April 15, 1992, p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-075, April 17, 1992, p. 47). Of note is the differences in the translation. The military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda is supposed to have used the term "adequate" rather than the term "sufficient" found in the civilian journal Rossiyskaya Gazeta. Obviously the Russian word used in the statement was identical.


(29) Vadim Solovyev commentary on Radio Moscow World Service in English, 1110 GMT, April 6, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-068, April 8, 1992, p. 25); Speech by Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin to

(30) Speech by Marshal Yevgeny I. Shaposhnikov, CinC of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, at the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies, evening session in the Grand Palace in Moscow, live broadcast by Moscow Radio Rossiia Network in Russian, 1343 GMT, April 7, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-068-S, April 8, 1992, p. 35).


(39) Nursultan A. Nazarbayev, "Strategy of the Formation and Development of Kazakhstan as a Sovereign State," Alma-Ata Kazakh-


SOCIOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

Some aspects of the previous Soviet military doctrine indicate how the Russians think about war. Military doctrine was split, under the Soviet model, into sociopolitical and military technical aspects. Recent discussions of military doctrine in Russia and other republics indicate that this model has been retained. A major sociopolitical characteristic or class of war is a war in defense of the homeland. Wars in defense of national independence were always listed by the Soviets as just wars. Such wars have not been renounced by the leadership of the governments of any of the former Soviet republics and there is no reason to assume that a defense of the new homelands would not be considered just. After all, preparation for wars in defense of the homeland is the objective raison d'être for all national armed forces.

What has changed, however, is the urgency that the former Soviet republics need to apply to their legitimate need to provide for self-defense against an external Western threat. Indeed, there have been a number of statements by the Soviet, CIS, and Russian republic's most senior military officers that any new military doctrine would not view any specific state or alliance as an enemy. One general officer indicated in March 1992 that the military was very concerned that the creation of large republic armed forces will lead to large-scale combat operations and "that neighboring states will be drawn in." Another general officer stated in April that the present danger "is generated by conflicts within the nation." Ukrainian President Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk was vocal about the need for military guarantees for his republic given the territorial claims of Russia against the Ukraine. Russian Vice President General-Major of Aviation Aleksandr Rutskoy told an international conference, in May 1992, that the danger to the security of Russia is posed by the so-called local conflicts which today have a considerable part of the former USSR in their grip: Moldava, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, etc.

With civil wars raging within the former USSR, one can logically conclude that these type of wars, rather than the old external threat, will most likely occupy the attention of the military commands of the newly emerging republics. The CIS states must have agreed because ten republics drew up and signed a pact in March 1992 that renounced the threat or use of force between themselves. A subsequent meeting in April at Bishkek between the heads of state of Central Asian republics resulted in a similar declaration. At the May 15, 1992 CIS summit at Tashkent, six former Soviet republics signed a formal treaty that pledged they would resolve all disagreements between themselves by peaceful means.
The March 20, 1992 CIS Kiev summit resulted in the agreement to form internal peacekeeping forces. These volunteer forces would be brought into areas of interethnic conflict with the consent of all parties. They would be subordinate to the Council of Heads of State and operate outside of the regular armed forces. Following the Tashkent summit, Russian First Deputy Minister of Defense Andrey A. Kokoshin remarked in an interview that the CIS joint armed forces should be judged effective if they minimized conflicts in the CIS [emphasis added].

Another new area for military doctrine concerns the participation of Russian armed forces in cooperation with the other nations of the world. The Soviet Union offered to participate in Operation DESERT SHIELD, but was politely rebuffed. Offers of future, especially maritime, participation can be found in subsequent Soviet literature. Russia provided a 900-man battalion of troops for peacekeeping duty in Yugoslavia in early 1992 and has begun to talk in terms of a role of a regional guarantor of stability.

To fully develop the sociopolitical aspects of military doctrine, Russia, the other republics, and the CIS will need to create, and then debate, criteria for the employment of military forces. The U.S. went through such a debate during the Reagan years and there is some indication that this had begun in the USSR during the post-coup debate over military doctrine.

Figure 1, Character/Classification of War illustrates the various sociopolitical characteristics of war, according to traditional Soviet military science, and their possibility, according to this author, in the near future.
## FIGURE 1

### TRADITIONAL SOVIET SOCIOPOLITICAL CHARACTER/CLASSIFICATION OF WAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of War</th>
<th>Probability of Occurrence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Just</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense of Homeland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Defense of national independence</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-In support of allies</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Defense against internal reactionaries</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for National Liberation Wars</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Freedom &amp; social progress</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Against aggression</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Revolutionary, Civil Wars</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Liberation from exploitation or national oppression</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperialist Wars</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Protection of state sovereignty of capitalist country from imperialist aggression</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Suppressing liberation struggle</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Capture foreign territories</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Enslaving/plundering other peoples</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Defense of reactionary regimes</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Against socialist states</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Between capitalist nations</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The author

---

1. Applies to Russia in support of former Soviet republics today and support of Warsaw Pact and other allies in the past.

2. Reflects author's judgment on probability of imperialist wars by now-capitalist republics of the former USSR—not applicable in the past.
Notes


(4) G. Drugovoyko interview with General-Major Nikolay Sergeyevich Stolyarov, head of the Personnel Work Committee of the CIS


(14) General-Major G.V. Kirilenko and Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Trenin, "Reflections on a Draft Military Doctrine," Moscow Voyen-
MILITARY-TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

The Soviets and Russians also have traditionally characterized war by military-technical attributes. Although many of these aspects have been thoroughly discussed in the past, more recent writings indicate that there may be some new thinking regarding the basic characteristics of warfare.

Warfare Scope and Space

War is principally defined by the space that it occupies. Traditionally, war has been characterized as either global or local. Traditionally, Soviet military doctrine has assumed that a future war with the United States would automatically assume a global character. There have always been differences in opinion (in the USSR and the United States) concerning whether a war with the United States could or should be limited to a single theater of origin, yet in both superpower states, it was the "big" war that occupied the attention of most serious programming planners.

World-class navies have traditionally argued that when a war occurs, it will automatically be extended to the full maritime battle space; i.e. the entire globe. After all, to assume otherwise would be to argue that if a war were taking place in Europe, when the warships of two belligerents passed in the Pacific, they should render honors. Today, global war has been ruled out, for program planning purposes in both Russia and the U.S.

We now generally expect crises to break out in a single region. If both the U.S. and Russia now include the political goal that the crisis should be contained to that single region, it will require navies to forego their traditional option of geographic escalation. This has probably a more direct impact on the U.S. Navy's desires for global offensive actions but will obviously affect the Russian fleet which may only have to face an external threat from the West in one TVD rather than multiple TVDs.

War in the former USSR has been increasingly described as involving the defense of the territory of the individual republics rather than an extended area. Within each republic, there may be single, two, or multiple spheres, with the possibility of cooperative military operations with other nations or joint armed forces.

General-Colonel Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev, Acting Russian Defense Minister, stated in a newspaper interview published on June 2, 1992 that he was concerned that due to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the creation of independent nations with independent armies on Russia's borders, the "Moscow Military District has essentially become a frontline location." Grachev then confessed that he had previously proposed a "swift creation
of a new--Smolensk--military district which, together with the Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts, would comprise the first strategic echelon."

If the Russian military retains its traditional concepts of military doctrine and strategy, they will be predisposed to retaining traditional arrangements for warfare space. Indeed, Grachev stated that his proposal had been not accepted and that he was "dubbed aggressor and militarist" for his efforts.

One relatively new concept for Soviet military doctrine is to consider separate or subordinate military doctrines or military strategies for different geographic portions of one nation or an alliance. For example, in an October 1991 article in Military Thought, a general officer argued that the situation in the European portion of the USSR was significantly different than that in the East or in the South. In another article in this same journal, another general officer suggested that the balance of forces should be created for each individual theater of military operations (TVD) rather than as a whole.

The most significant development of this concept was published by the civilian vice president of the Institute of National Security and Strategic Studies in the ministry of defense's daily newspaper Red Star in March 1992. In this article, A. Savelyev agrees that military doctrine should be "geared toward geographic sectors of probable threat," and that military tasks should "be optimized according to the particular sector."

In the Western TVD, Savelyev concludes that Russia should assume that the "enemy" will have technical superiority. The best option for defense against this enemy is "'islands of resistance' deep inside our own territory." Savelyev views the main objective in this theater as "stopping combat operations at the earliest possible stage" by means of "tactical counter-strikes." The structure of armed forces in this theater should not be "in strategic terms, be regarded as offensive."

In the Eastern and Southern TVDs, Savelyev concludes that Russia will have technical superiority over the assumed enemy. The best option for defense in these sectors is "forward-based" with main defense forces deployed in peacetime in the "Russian heartland." If the threat of an attack arises, they would be rapidly deployed to "forward positions" and their main task would be to "prevent the enemy penetrating deep inside our territory and to 'repulse' it if this is not achieved during the initial stages of the war."

If Savelyev's concepts are accepted as a part of Russian military doctrine, then they would have major implications for the navy. In the Western TVD, the fleet would appear to be relegated to an extremely defensive posture. The Southern TVD would include significantly reduced in size fleet units in the Black and Caspian seas with little opposition. The Eastern TVD does not appear to be one that Savelyev associates with the U.S.
Despite years of rhetoric by the U.S. Navy with its Maritime Strategy.

As the other republics begin to develop their own military doctrines and strategies, we should expect to see warfare space begin to appear on the pages of their journals. For example, the Ukraine is probably ahead of most other former Soviet republics in thinking about war without being simply a part of the center's overall plan. It should not be surprising, therefore, that scenarios, alleged to have been developed by NATO, were discussed in their literature that included: territorial or interethnic within Eastern Europe that intentionally involve the CIS, primarily Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, or Moldova; the inadvertent spread of conflict from Eastern Europe to the CIS or from within the CIS to Eastern Europe; conflict between a republic or group of republics and the CIS Joint Armed Forces.

Makeup of Belligerents

The second major military-technical characteristic or classification of war is by the makeup of the belligerents, i.e. the war is either between coalitions or simply between two belligerents. Soviet literature evidence has indicated that they have traditionally assumed that a future war with the U.S. would be a war between coalitions; i.e. NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Under the new international security environment, this is no longer the case. Wars that involve Russia might still involve NATO, but there is every possibility that warfare might take on a coalition form but that coalition would include the former republics of the USSR.

The Form of Warfare

A third major military-technical characteristic of war is its form. One major category is whether the war is nuclear or conventional. The former Soviet political leadership previously renounced nuclear-rocket war on a scale that would equate to a world war. This was not a renunciation of all forms of nuclear war. Despite pronouncements that nuclear war can serve no political purpose -- implying that it should not be fought -- a just nuclear war fought in defense of the homeland is still possible and must be planned for by the armed forces of any nation that retains or faces such weapons.

Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin reaffirmed the long-standing position of the Soviet Union when he announced on Christmas Day 1991 that the new CIS would "refrain from the first use of nuclear arms." On the other hand, in a subsequent television interview, the deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet's Defense and Security Committee stated that although the CIS would never strike first, a "retaliatory strike must be
inflicted before the nuclear missiles explode on our territory." This suggestion that strategic nuclear weapons might be launched upon receipt of warning of an incoming attack is now new in the Soviet literature and is a theme that we need to follow as CIS and Russian military doctrine are more fully developed.  

The maritime aspects of nuclear war have been an area for much discussion. Clearly the Soviets and other countries have the capability to fight a nuclear war in the maritime theaters. It is extremely unlikely, however, that the decision to use nuclear weapons at sea will be made based upon issues in the maritime theaters. Therefore it is unlikely that the Soviets would risk nuclear war ashore by going nuclear first at sea.

The United States position on nuclear war at sea was made explicitly clear by Caspar W. Weinberger, then Secretary of Defense, when he stated that it is "our policy objective of denying the Soviets the ability to limit a nuclear war to the sea." In other words, although the U.S. might not like to fight a nuclear war at sea, if the Soviets were to initiate one there, it is American declaratory strategy to not allow such operations to be limited to the sea.

Obviously the actions taken by President George Bush at the end of September, 1991, to remove tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. Navy fleet units will have a profound implication for any war planning in Russia. If the Russians were to initiate nuclear war at sea, unless the U.S. had reconstituted its sea-based tactical nuclear war-fighting capability, it would probably have to consider escalation to use of strategic nuclear systems. On the other hand, if Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated that conventional systems can substitute for nuclear warheads, then there might not be a need for this.

Other types of nuclear war that must be planned for include: accidental or inadvertent nuclear wars, local nuclear wars (with China, for example), and nuclear escalation out of a crisis. In addition, the Russians must continue to be interested in nuclear war as a hedge against the possibility that arms control efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons will be unsuccessful.

Although the three other nuclear republics in the CIS (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine) have now indicated their willingness to become non-nuclear states, there were some indications that the Ukraine considered keeping nuclear weapons and relying on nuclear deterrence for their security. Similarly, there were indications that Kazakhstan was considering retaining nuclear weapons for deterrence and "a guarantee for the Turkic world."

Extended deterrence by Russia over allied republics of the former Soviet Union appears to be part of the new security arrangement after the Tashkent CIS summit. Kazakh President Nursultan A. Nazarbayev reportedly used the term "nuclear umbrella
over all signatories" after the signing of a defensive treaty at the summit.16 In a follow-on article, one observer noted that:

"Moscow can provide nuclear guarantees for countries that have joined the 'defense space' with it and by way of security, can site its nuclear bases extraterritorially in Tajikistan or Uzbekistan, for instance. As the Americans did for decades in Europe."

Planning must be done for conventional war, but with due regard for the lessons of Operation DESERT STORM and the new political realities of possible locations of wars; i.e. internal rather than external. Following the major debates that occurred following the Persian Gulf War, one can conclude that Russian war planning will predominantly consider defensive local conventional military operations.

Combat operations in such wars will be combined arms but favor actions that can be taken by air and naval forces first and then highly mobile ground forces fighting a war of maneuver rather than position. Mobile ground forces appear to be required under a new military doctrine based upon mobile defense.17

An assumption that military operations will be essentially conventional in character without the possibility of using nuclear weapons has profound repercussions. The character of military operations, the composition and organization of the armed forces will all be affected.

The Pace of War

The fourth major military-technical characteristic and classification used to describe wars is pace. Whether a war is fast moving or prolonged is somewhat related to the other three previous characteristics. It is usual for the Soviets to break a war into periods (termed the "periodization" of a war) no matter what length there is to the war itself.18 In historical analysis of past wars, great emphasis is placed upon the initial period of a war, indeed this term rates an extremely lengthy entry in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia.19

The initial period of war, as discussed in the Soviet literature until recently, emphasized the speed at which decisions and actions needed to be taken. Indeed, the U.S. intelligence community often stressed how the Soviets felt that there would be little time to generate forces prior to the commencement of hostilities.20 Under the new international political realities, concern over the initial period of war may shift to that of a steady and prolonged period of mobilization.
A cursory review of Soviet military journals published since the announcement of the new defensive military doctrine in 1987 reveals a great deal of interest in the initial period of the Second Great Patriotic War, when the Soviet Armed Forces struggled on the strategic defensive. In the periodization of a war, there always appears to be a turning point or breakthrough period in which the initial defensive operations were replaced by the counteroffensive and finally the strategic offensive.

Before the outbreak of the Second Great Patriotic War, the USSR deployed slightly more than half (56 percent) of its Ground Forces divisions, some 170 divisions and 2 brigades (2,901,000 personnel), to the defense of state borders in the Western Theater of Strategic Military Operations (WTVD). The Soviets deployed 56 divisions and 2 brigades in the first echelon of its border-defense armies. Each first echelon division was responsible for some 100-120 km of the border when it followed mountains or rivers and 25-30 km in the most important axes. There were 52 divisions in second echelons and 62 divisions in reserve deployed some 25-75 km from the state border. The General Staff's May "1941 State Border Defense Plan" also provided for additional reserves in interior military districts. These reserve forces were to be used to deliver counterthrusts and to man defensive lines 100-150 km from the borders.

In a November 1989 interview, the late Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, offered some very specific views about how long the defensive period of a war might last. He implied that the role of the defensive, during the first few weeks of the initial period of a future war, was to allow the political leadership the opportunity to terminate the crisis before it erupted into a major armed conflict and war. If the political leadership failed, Akhromeyev implied that the military would then be unleashed to perform its normal function of crushing and decisively routing the enemy.

The 1990 draft defensive doctrine also attempted to deal with the length of the defensive period. It stated that "defense is the principal form of military operations with the beginning of aggression. Subsequent operations by the USSR armed forces are determined by the nature of the enemy's military operations and depend on means and methods of warfare he is using." The draft also revealed that the defensive mission of the Soviet armed forces in the event of aggression is to repel it, to defend state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to create "conditions for the most rapid cessation of war and the restoration of a just and lasting peace."

A previous debate within the framework of Soviet military science covering the initial period of a war may prove instructive on the topic of initial defensive operations. During 1922-1941, questions arose regarding how long border skirmishes and diplomatic exchanges would last before total mobilization. Marshall of the Soviet Union Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov gives the
interwar years planning interval as "several days" in his memoirs. Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasiley Danilovich Sokolovskiy wrote in his 1960s-era classic book *Military Strategy* that the initial period of a war might have lasted 15-20 days. Subsequent Soviet military textbooks have confirmed that the initial period of a war in this era was assumed to have lasted 15-20 days. During that period, the major military activities were to have been simultaneously - limited combat actions, mobilization and deployment.

Any discussion of the pace of war will have profound implications for the maritime services. Generally, if a war is to be short, then navies are thought to be unable to exert their full influence. In both the U.S. and Russia, it appears that for planning purposes, all wars will be short. Similarly, if the political guidance is to contain a crisis as soon as possible, then navies may not be able to do more than sortie from their bases and take up initial station close to home waters.

Wars of Position or Maneuver

The fifth major military-technical characteristic or classification of wars is whether or not they are wars of position or wars of maneuver. To a large degree, this characteristic results from the previous four. One of the major Soviet lessons of Operation DESERT STORM is that wars of position have become passe. Although this is perhaps new for the Russian ground forces, this is not new for the Russian navy.

Maritime war is automatically a war of mobility. The extended mobility of fleets enables them to temporarily mass otherwise widely dispersed assets in order to concentrate fire for a successful combat strike or battle. Mobility also allows fleets to change rapidly from defensive to offensive formations. On the other hand, natural geographic features can strongly suggest positional behavior by fleets, such as barriers between islands or the mainland and islands.

With so much of the earth covered by water, maritime warfare is pursued in an environment where the surface provides few opportunities for concealment; hence deception is more difficult to achieve. With better knowledge of the ocean's floors, we may find that the naval operational planner will study the terrain of his battlefield much like his land-oriented counterpart. This may give rise to reconsideration of certain aspects of subsurface warfare being more warfare of position than mobility.

Findings

Figure 2, Military-Technical Character/Classification of War, presents all of the military-technical types of war under traditional Soviet military science. The author's judgment of which types of war have received priority by recent political events is indicated by the categories that appear in *bold italics*. 57
FIGURE 2

TRADITIONAL SOVIET MILITARY-TECHNICAL CHARACTER/CLASSIFICATION OF WAR

Source: The author

Notes


(3) General-Major G.V. Kirilenko and Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Trenin, "Reflections on a Draft Military Doctrine," Moscow Voyennaya Mysl in Russian, no. 10 (October 1991): 11-18 (JPRS-UMT-92-


Dmitriy Tabachnik, "Is the 'Ukraine' Group of Armies Attacking? Or are Military Conflicts Possible in Eastern Europe?" Kiev Golos Ukrainy in Russian, no. 73, April 21, 1992, p. 6 (JPRS-UMA-92-017, May 13, 1992, pp. 37-39).


(20) Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, U.S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence, Before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues, March 14, 1990 (transcript as prepared by the Navy), p. 40.


(22) Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev, then-chief of the Soviet General Staff, contained in both "The Doctrine of a New Policy," Warsaw Zolnierz Wolnosci in Polish, November 9, 1989, p. 4 (FBIS-SOV-89-221, November 17, 1989, p. 108), and "Our Military Doctrine," Moscow Agitator Armii I Flota in Russian, no. 24, 1989 (FBIS-SOV-90-021,


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In analyzing what drove Soviet military doctrine we find that in the USSR it was the military policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In other states, and in Russia today, military doctrine is driven by military policy. Discussions of military policy include discussions about what constitutes the defensive capability of a state. According to Soviet authors, we find that the defensive capability of a state was determined by a set of factors of war: (1) the military or combat potential of a state, (2) its economic potential (military-economic potential is a subset), (3) scientific potential (again military-scientific potential is a subset), (4) social potential, and (5) moral-political potential. Further investigation reveals that these same words are used to describe what decides the course and outcome of wars and what is necessary for victory at the strategic-level.

During the armed conflict portion of a war, armed forces have the opportunity to undermine, with new means, the military/combat, military-economic, social, and moral-political potential of their enemy, thus having a great influence on the course and outcome of war and the attainment of victory at the strategic-level. During the pre-armed conflict portion of war or during the war itself, the government of a state has the opportunity to build up one's own potentials in each of these areas and to undermine those of the enemy using economic, diplomatic, ideological, intelligence, or scientific tools.

Figure 3 represents a matrix of these important potentials and how they factor into a number of other aspects of political-military affairs. The factors and potentials are listed on the left and the political-military aspects that they affect are along the top with an "X" marking the correlation according to Soviet military literature.
These factors of war are clearly identified in the appropriate Soviet scientific reference publications and are used widely in military-political writings. It is important to recognize that these factors offer us the possibility of bridging the gap from a discussion of war and its goals into specific military (strategic-level) and combat (operational and tactical-levels) operations/actions that must be undertaken to undermine an enemy's overall potential and therefore attain victory at each level. It is possible to identify the level of warfare or armed conflict which would be effected by tying the military or combat (including naval) operations/actions to the goal to be attained. In the Soviet, and now Russian, literature, one can clearly see not only the use of these terms in setting the requirements for a healthy defense but in also identifying targets for strikes against enemies in time of war.  

The traditional major strategic goals and strategic missions of the Soviet armed forces in armed conflict were openly discussed in the military literature for many years. Some literature evidence indicates that these traditional strategic missions were revised in accordance with the 1987 Warsaw Pact defensive military doctrine. Figure 4 depicts these new strategic missions under a defensive military doctrine and places the combat arms of the armed forces within them. Original Russian words are contained in parentheses where appropriate to ensure that the reader can correctly place key phrases in this diagram.
FIGURE 4

LATE 1980S SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGIC MISSIONS

WAR—Achieves Political Goals by Using

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armed Forces</th>
<th>Econ Means</th>
<th>Dipl Means</th>
<th>Ideolog Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Conflict</td>
<td>Intell Means</td>
<td>Sci/Tech Means</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Military Operations/Actions — Strategic Scale
(Voyennyye Deystviya)

- Repelling Enemy Aerospace Attack
- Forces & Resources (Joint)
- Character
- Destroy missiles
- Destroy aircraft
- Combat naval platforms
  - Anti-SSBN
  - ASW/Anti-surface
- Suppression of Enemy Mil-Econ Potential
- Forces & Resources (Joint)
  - Nuclear Missile
  - Strikes (Udar) SRF/Navy
  - Single/Group/Massive
  - Strategic Aviation
  - Space
  - Navy (Anti-SLOC)
  - Character/Time & Sequence
  - Defensive/Counteroffensive/
    Offensive
  - Initial/Subsequent
  - Simultaneous/Successive
- Destruct of Grouping of Enemy Armed Forces
- Forces & Resources
  - Joint (more than 1 service)
  - Groups of Fronts
- Character
  - Defensive/Counteroffensive/
    Offensive
  - Time & Sequence of Execution
  - Initial/Subsequent
  - Simultaneous/Successive

Combat Operations/Actions—Operational & Tactical Scale

ASW = antisubmarine warfare  SLOC = sealines of communications
SSBN = nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
PVO = Air Defense Troops  SRF = Strategic Rocket Forces

Source: The author
The major changes in these new strategic missions were to increase the priority given to the repelling of an enemy aero-
space attack, similar to the threat seen during Operation DESERT
STORM, and to cast strategic operations in terms of defense
rather than offense. One could, however, still read offensive
combat operations at the operational and tactical-levels of
warfare under such a defensive strategy. For example, an offen-
sive naval operation (operatsii) to seek out and destroy enemy
missiles and other submarines as well as surface forces operating
close to home waters is entirely consistent with a defensive
military doctrine and strategy.

Some offensive combat operations might, however, be incon-
sistent with a defensive military doctrine and strategy. An
example would be first-nuclear strikes against enemy nuclear
missiles. Although such actions were traditionally justified as
defensive, in that they would limit damage to the homeland in the
event the war entered the nuclear phase, under the new concepts
of defensive military doctrine, they would be illogical. The
problem, of course, is that as long as Russian military forces
are capable of actually performing such actions, the other side
must take that into account regardless of stated intentions.
Prompt hard-target capable intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) and open-ocean antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces are
examples of forces formerly justified and viewed by the Soviet
military as defensive but in need of scrapping if the Russians
are interested in sending a signal of intent by a reduction in
capability.

The inclusion of naval forces interdicting the sealines of
communication (SLOCs) as a subset of the suppression of military-
economic potential is another strategic mission that can be
viewed differently by either side. In a short war, the interdic-
tion of mid-Atlantic/Pacific SLOCs might not matter to the out-
come -- hence substantial resources should not necessarily be
developed for this mission. SLOC interdiction has traditionally
been thought as being more relevant during a long war. On the
other hand, a SLOC interdiction capability could, if properly
employed during the initial stages of a war, preclude an enemy
from the option of a long war -- hence serve to meet the new
political goals of ending wars quickly.  

With the types of changes to military doctrine that have
been discussed since the August 1991 coup, it is clear that the
strategic missions of the armed forces will change as well.
Former Chief of the General Staff General Vladimir N. Lobov said
this in October 1991 article in Military Thought. 5 Lobov did not
define the new strategic missions for the armed forces but,
rather, suggested that they might include "disrupting and repel-
ling an aggressor's attack, holding territory, and gaining time
to concentrate necessary forces." These themes will also need to
be watched as the Russian and other republics finalize their
emerging military doctrines and strategies.
Perhaps the most significant changes in strategic missions for Russia and the other republics will involve the ground forces. For a USSR entangled in the Warsaw Pact and forward deployed to Eastern Europe, it was proper to cast ground forces strategic operations in terms of groups of fronts; on par with the most demanding operations undertaken during the Second Great Patriotic War. Even General Lobov's October 1991 Military Thought article contained references to repulsing an invasion by a:

"complex system of interconnected strategic defensive operations in continental and maritime theaters of military operations, within the scope of which front, fleet, air, air defense, airborne, amphibious landing, antilanding and other operations may be conducted."

With the new, less demanding, goals of military doctrine and in the absence of a significant external threat from ground forces, there will be no need to plan for or to field active or maintain a rapidly mobilization capability for ground forces capable of strategic military operations (voyennyye deystviya).

The criteria for successful completion of military strategic missions has undergone significant revision under the new defensive doctrine. Formerly, total defeat of the enemy's armed forces in an armed conflict was demanded as the military's contribution to the overall war effort. Under a defensive doctrine, the revised military requirement is to defeat the invading force and simultaneously to prevent vertical and horizontal escalation or the escalation of the conflict over time.

The political/ideological goal of traditional post World War II Soviet war termination strategy was to ensure that the aggressor could not again threaten the USSR, and that progress was made toward eventual peace ("mir") and a world socialist order. The political goals for war termination shifted during the Gorbachev-era to preventing nuclear holocaust and simultaneously ensuring the survival of the homeland. The ideological means of war would no longer be applicable in the context of a nation that no longer includes domination by one communist political party.

Emerging military doctrine in the former Soviet Union, as of May 1992, did not appear to be offensively oriented in the manner of the old theater strategic offensive operation that worried NATO for many decades. It appears that in a struggle for power, forces aligned with a more cost-effective defensive and high-technology view have gained the ear of the Russian President and been placed in positions of power to create a newly reformed military.
Notes

(1) The Soviet Military Encyclopedia and Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary entries should be consulted for: factors of war, defense capability of the state, potential, military potential, military power/might, combat potential, combat might, combat capabilities, economic potential, scientific potential, moral-political potential, and social potential.


MILITARY REFORM

Strategic Nuclear Weapons

The number of and missions for Soviet strategic nuclear weapons were to change dramatically and will change in the CIS as well. Some spokesmen have suggested a Gaullist force d'frappe as perhaps appropriate under the new international security environment.1 Such a model would indicate abandonment of warfighting as a theory of deterrence and embracing punishment as the alternative. As the strategy for deterrence and warfighting change, the organizational structure for the nuclear forces might change as well.

A significant amount of literature evidence, since 1987, suggests using the U.S. McNamara-era measure of effectiveness (MOE) associated with an assumed percentage of damage afforded to the other's industry and population and an assured destruction deterrence theory. Specifically some suggest that 400 equivalent megatons (EMT) of survivable and deliverable nuclear combat potential, is appropriate for both superpowers today.2 Other articles suggest using numbers of warheads, rather than EMT, and propose about 10 per cent of the force that will survive the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), or about 500-600 warheads.3 A real minimal deterrence posture of "tens" of warheads surfaced early in the debate and gained renewed interest in 1989-1990.4

As far as the former Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov was concerned in late 1989, a fully defensive military doctrine and strategy could only occur in a nuclear-free world!5 Since one could assume that a nuclear-free world would never occur, one could also assume that Marshal Yazov was also signaling that a defensive doctrine and strategy were merely programming ideals and not serious. Apparently the military was forced to take defensive sufficiency seriously enough to define "how much was enough." "Sufficiency" in strategic nuclear forces was defined in the November 1990 Soviet draft military doctrine as:

"the nuclear potential necessary for delivering a retaliatory strike, the consequences of which would wipe out any of the aggressor's advantages."

Obviously, definitions that are as vague as this give a wide degree of latitude for interpretation. Yet in the post-coup environment, the decline of Marshal Yazov's influence could be seen with slight adjustment of previously stated official policies. For example, Soviet General-Colonel Bronislav Omelichev, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, informed an international seminar on military doctrine in Vienna in October 1991 that the USSR would be shifting to a minimal
deterrent nuclear posture. Omelichev specified this minimal posture as being parity with NATO and used the Western term "deterrence" in deference to the new international security environment.

In a October 1991 newspaper article, General Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov, then-chief of the USSR General Staff, declared that the Soviet Union would embrace a "deterrence" strategy that hinted at punishment rather than denial of war aims (warfighting) as the method. Although Lobov did not use this theme in his parallel Military Thought article, another general officer recommended in the October 1991 issue that the draft 1990 Soviet military doctrine be amended to include "mutual assured destruction" (MAD) and:

"The potential for nuclear deterrence should not be provocative or viewed by other countries as an immediate threat to their security. In other words, it should not be perceived unequivocally as oriented toward delivering a nuclear first strike."  

A leading civilian critic of the military published a strong recommendation, in mid-November 1991, to reduce nuclear warheads to around 1,000. Then-Minister of Defense Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny Ivanovich Shaposhnikov and former Soviet President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev responded with their own proposal of 5,000 warheads, or 1,000 below START levels. With the demise of the USSR, the authorized spokesmen for nuclear issues shifted from the military and the head of the union to the military leaders of the republics in which nuclear weapons were deployed.

In early 1992, Russian Federation President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin indicated during a trip to the West that Russia only needed around 2,500 warheads. This was followed by a series of announcements within Russia detailing the cancellation of building programs for ICBMs, sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), and manned bombers. Generally, these announcements have been taken seriously in the West.

The U.S. Department of Defense stated as early as September 1990 that "a short-warning or pre-emptive strategic nuclear attack against the continental United States for the foreseeable future...is judged to be unlikely." The 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States stated: "Despite the threat still posed by the existence of Soviet nuclear weapons, the likelihood of their deliberate use by the Soviet state is declining and the scenario which we frequently projected as the precursor of their use--massive war in Europe--is less likely than at any other time since World War II." Obviously, President George Bush's unilateral actions in September 1991 to reduce America's nuclear
alert rates and operational nuclear forces mean that he has judged the possibility of a "bolt-from-the-blue" attack by the then-USSR to be much lower than before.

Russian Federation President Yeltsin further told an American television audience in January 1992 that nuclear missiles under Russian control would no longer target American cities.\(^\text{14}\) Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev added in mid-March that Russia was not targeting China or Japan either.\(^\text{15}\) Other reports in the Russian media indicated that despite these statements, nothing had really changed.\(^\text{16}\) What had probably happened is that nuclear forces were no longer targeting foreign nations on a day-to-day basis, but such targeting software could quickly be reinserted into the weapons systems if needed.

At the United Nations, Yeltsin also proposed the creation of a world community system of global protection based upon the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).\(^\text{17}\) Follow-on literature evidence indicates that Yeltsin is being advised by civilians that Russia should give up its prompt, hard-target nuclear counterforce forces in favor of those that are non-time urgent, less accurate, and supportive of an assured destruction strategy.\(^\text{18}\)

With the formulation of the CIS, political and military leaders attempted to calm the world with multiple declarations that strategic nuclear offensive forces remained under the control of the center. The CIS, however, originally did not consist of the nuclear-capable Republic of Kazakhstan. This was rectified within a few days. Continued "discussions" of strategic forces became blurred by the military's attempt to include conventional or general purpose forces that were capable of "strategic"-level missions in subsequent formal arrangements for the armed forces.

It appears that the Russians have done away with the "hair trigger" day-to-day alert of its nuclear forces and are slowly working out a new nuclear deterrence strategy based upon punishment and not prompt war-fighting based upon denial of war aims. If this trend continues, it will have major repercussions in the force structures of the Russian, CIS, and Western armed forces.

However, existing offensive former Soviet nuclear forces still far exceed that necessary for delivering a retaliatory strike—even under the worst-case of a surprise attack from the U.S. Defensive systems and a research and development program to improve those defensive systems provide continued evidence that the Russians still have not accepted the mutual vulnerability required under a MAD policy.

Critics of this excessive Russian nuclear capability may have to endure this state of affairs until the Russians are able to reduce their force structure—not an easy undertaking. An offensive-capable Russian nuclear force itself does not automatically indicate an offensive military doctrine or strategy. Critics should remember that once the United States had total

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strategic nuclear superiority over the USSR--within an overall defensive military doctrine and strategy!

Organizational Development of the Armed Forces

During the post-coup era, it became increasingly clear that some of the Soviet republics were not going to remain in the Union and that with such a political change, the question of military command organizations and stationing Union forces on the territory of individual republics was going to have to be addressed. The Ukraine's stand on independence, control of the nuclear "button," and the subordination of Union forces to itself became a major issue during the last days of the USSR and the initial days of the CIS. Instead of a "civilized divorce," we eventually saw acrimony and verbal personal attacks. These more recent discussions over armed forces organizational development must be understood, however, in the context of the debates that preceded and immediately followed the August 1991 coup.

A Spring 1990 booklet provides details on what was visualized by at least one civilian academic as the strategy and military organizational development aspects of a real defensive military doctrine (emphasis added): 19

In the area of conventional arms, defense must be not only and not so much positional as it is mobile. It includes meeting engagements, counterstrikes, flanking strikes and a counteroffensive with the objective of driving an invading aggressor from one's own territory.

At the strategic level (that is, at the level of fronts and groups of forces at the scale of a theater of war) as well, it is quite possible to delimit offensive and defensive orientations. If the forces are spread out along a forward edge, this most likely indicates a defensive strategy. If the forces are concentrated in strike "fists" in individual sectors of the front, then one can conclude that there are offensive plans.

From the point of view of defense, it is optimum to have troops at the forward edge deployed along a front (or in threatened sectors) in fortified defensive lines and an offensive reserve (second echelon) in the rear for a counterattack so as to close a possible penetration and repel the enemy. The stronger the defense at the forward edge and the more serious are the reciprocal
measures of the two alliances to restructure their military potentials under defensive principles, the smaller is the necessary size of the counteroffensive force and the deeper it can be deployed in the rear without causing fear on the other side.

The mission of the armed forces and conventional arms is to carry out not offensive strategic operations in the main theaters of war in Europe and Asia but defensive actions for the purpose of disrupting the offensive operations of the enemy; a prolonged conventional war is impossible and the mission of the armed forces is not to permit a victory of the enemy in intensive short combat actions and not to allow nuclear escalation with impunity.

A startling military reform proposal to implement a defensive military doctrine was made in August 1990 by General-Major V. Ivanov attached to the General Staff Academy. It was so far out of touch with the "norm" of 1990 that it was largely discounted in the West at the time despite the position and rank of the author. The Ivanov proposal was routinely translated by the U.S. government translations service, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), and then reprinted by the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) nearly a year later due to renewed interest. In Ivanov's proposal, the armed forces of the USSR were to restructure themselves into three basic contingents.

The first contingent, in General-Major Ivanov's proposal, were to comprise of forces in a state of permanent high combat readiness. It would have consisted, in part, of new military services. A new Nuclear Forces would comprehend the existing Strategic Rocket Forces, as well as appropriate units from the Air Force and the Navy. Space Forces would include existing Air Defense and Antisatellite Forces. These new services were to remain under the direct control of the USSR Supreme High Command.

The first contingent would also have consisted of highly mobile Ground Forces, whose strength and composition could change depending upon the international politico-military situation and the economic potential of the USSR. This force size would be sufficient to resolve a conflict in an individual region until relieved by forces of the second contingent.

The requirement for the future first contingent of Ground Forces, under General-Major Ivanov's proposal, did not appear to include the capability for offensive military operations at a theater strategic-level. General-Major Ivanov gave estimates for a first contingent force of only 1.2-1.3 million servicemen allocated to all of the armed forces. These forces were to be located in the entire USSR and not just within the Western TVD.
Command and control of the first contingent would remain with the High Command of Forces in the TVDs.

The second contingent, according to General-Major Ivanov's proposal, was to consist of an additional 630,000-man reserve force. Up to one-third of the first contingent would form the nucleus of the second contingent. Hardware and weapons for these reserves were to be stored at depots and bases. This contingent was to form the large strategic formations necessary for major military operations in a war. The second contingent could have probably mounted an offensive theater strategic military operation--but before it was organized, strategic warning would be provided.

The third contingent was to embrace, in part, some 300,000-350,000 additional men undergoing between five and six months training for national service. The men were to then serve for an additional five and six months with either first and second contingent forces, or for a longer period in newly organized republican units, similar to the U.S National Guard. Call-up was to take place twice a year. These forces were to augment troops in the field should war erupt. A second part of the third contingent would consist of these new republican units. The total strength of the third contingent was to be 600,000-700,000 servicemen.

Other military authors tended to tie such drastic reductions to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction; stating that a Soviet military force incapable of conducting offensive strategic operations should not occur until weapons of mass destruction are destroyed worldwide. Perhaps one of the reasons that the Ivanov proposal generated so little interest in the U.S. was that it was quickly followed by a formal set of similar proposals from the Ministry of Defense itself.

In a November 1990 interview, Army General Mikhail Alekseyevich Moiseyev, then-Chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR First Deputy Defense Minister, announced a formal series of significant military structural reforms that gave the military's official version of how a defensive military doctrine would be implemented. Publication of a draft defensive military doctrine paralleled Moiseyev's interview. Neither of these official proposals did not go nearly as far as those suggested by General-Major Ivanov.

The first stage of the Ministry of Defense November 1990 reform plan was to last until 1994 and consist of the complete redeployment and resettlement of Soviet troops based on foreign soil. The second stage (1994-1995) was to consist of the formulation of strategic groupings of armed forces on Soviet territory with a new system for training and mobilization. The third stage was to last from 1996-2000. In this stage, further reductions, reorganizations, and reequipping of forces would take place.
The November 1990 Ministry of Defense draft military doctrine addressed some specific concepts for the deployment of troops. For example, it specified that "the first strategic echelon consists of troops of the border military districts and fleet forces. Troops of internal military districts form the strategic reserve."

By the year 2000, according to the 1990 draft plan, strategic nuclear forces were to be cut 50 percent with additional cuts possible. Ground, air, and air defense forces were to be cut by 6 percent to 20 percent. The number of generals to be cut was 1,300. The overall armed forces were to number 3-3.2 million personnel -- down from 3.9 million.

With the Ministry of Defense proposal came a public and extremely transparent debate over both the doctrine and the organizational development of the armed forces. Among the many articles that appeared was a February 1991 Military Thought article authored by General Vladimir N. Lobov, then-Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact. In this article, Lobov was very critical of the overly defensive nature of the draft reforms. Lobov's article was typical of a large number that appeared from military authors.

From the opposite perspective came a series of articles that criticized the Ministry of Defense plan for not going far enough. One extremely thorough article by a civilian academic criticized Defense Ministry reform plan for being too offensive in its orientation and for failing to take into account doctrinal, strategy, and force structure changes going on in the United States and other foreign nations. This article was perhaps one of the most well thought-out of the many that appeared in this major debate. The debate was temporarily interrupted by Operation DESERT STORM and analysis of its results.

Organizational development of the armed forces next appeared as a major topic of discussion after the August 1991 coup and a change in the leadership of the armed forces. In a Moskovskiy Novosti interview, General Konstantin I. Kobets, then-Russian Federation State Counselor for Defense, stated that the armed forces would "propose combining the strategic forces -- Missile Forces, Air Defense, and the Air Force -- in a single command."

In early September 1991, General Lobov, Chief of the USSR General Staff, gave an interview that suggested a civilian ministry of defense with the armed forces "should be under the command of the supreme commander in chief, who will have under him the General Staff, to which all the armed forces will be subordinat ed."

In an October 1, 1991 newspaper article, General Lobov reversed his previous criticisms of the defensive nature of the draft reforms and embraced a series of actions that went beyond the Yazov-era Ministry of Defense proposals. Lobov suggested that the president serve as the supreme commander in chief and
that the military districts be redrawn to coincide with the territory of each republic.

At a Vienna seminar on military doctrine with representatives from 38 members of the CSCE, General-Colonel Bronislav Omelichev, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, informed his audience that the Soviet armed forces would be reorganized into four services: the Strategic Deterrent Forces (SDF) [strategicheskiye sily_sderzhivaniya], an air force, a navy, and ground defense forces. This order is interesting because it places the air force and the navy ahead of the ground forces.

General-Colonel Frants Markovskiy, first deputy head of a main directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces told the same audience that there were specific organizational changes to the Soviet armed forces that demonstrated a shift to a defensive doctrine based upon reasonable sufficiency. He included: unilateral reductions in forces, the withdrawal of forces from foreign territory, the scrapping of short and medium-range nuclear missiles, the internal reorganization of divisions making them less offensive, the elimination of "spearhead tank forces," and the creation of a new coastal defense service in the navy. Markovskiy provided additional details as to the composition of varying ground forces units.

On October 23, 1991, the Ministry of Defense published a major interview with the Chief of the General Staff. In this interview, Lobov stated that "'noncombat' militarized components -- civil defense, military commissariats, military sports and defense societies, internal troops [MVD], border troops [KGB], construction troops, and railroad troops -- should, in my view, be removed from the Armed Forces structure and be redistributed between the new center and the sovereign republics." Lobov stated that the armed forces would be restructured into four services, the SDF, ground defense forces, air forces, and the navy. In using this hierarchy, the Chief of the General Staff appeared to indicate that ground forces should retain their usual place ahead of the air force and navy but after strategic nuclear forces.

In his parallel October 1991 Military Thought article, signed to press on November 11, 1991, Lobov gave a very different listing of the armed forces. The first service listed in this article was the ground defense forces. The second service was the navy, usually listed fifth in precedence. The SDF came third with air and air defense forces fourth and fifth. This ranking of services altered the leading role accorded to nuclear forces since the creation of the Strategic Rocket Forces under General Secretary Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev in 1959 and perhaps indicated more support for the ground forces than was otherwise being received from then-USSR Minister of Defense Air Marshal Shaposhnikov. Lobov defined the SDF as the existing Strategic Rocket Forces, the strategic nuclear forces of the air force.
A Ministry of Defense plan to restructure the Soviet armed forces was published in early November 1991. Bowing to the new power of the republics, a Council of Ministers of Defense of Sovereign States was formed. The Council was to work out common military policy, financing, manning, and strategy for the Union. Each republic was to be allowed to form national guard units, modeled after Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD) troops and manned by veterans of the Soviet armed forces. All normal Soviet armed forces would remain subordinated to the center.

The established Soviet military naturally fought hard against the setting up of capable republic armies. In late November 1991, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal Shaposhnikov even went so far as to explain that this new Council of Ministers of Defense of Sovereign States would not itself control the Union armed forces. Control of the normal armed forces would be exercised by the Soviet defense minister, Shaposhnikov, through the General Staff. The Council of Ministers of Defense of Sovereign States was officially formulated at the end of November 1991.

Codification of the new defense arrangements was also contained in a series of draft treaties prepared in November 1991. A new draft Union of Sovereign States Treaty was prepared in mid-November 1991. The Union of Sovereign States was to act on the international scene formally as the sovereign state succeeding the USSR. Joint Armed Forces of the Union of Sovereign States were to be set up with "central control over strategic defense including the nuclear missiles." A separate draft treaty on collective security specified that republic armed forces would not have nuclear weapons.

In an article published in observance of the mid-November 1991 Missile Forces and Artillery Day, General Yuriy Pavlovich Maksimov, Cincl of the USSR Strategic Rocket Forces, discussed the forthcoming creation of a new branch of the armed forces—the SDF that had previously appeared in General Lobov's October 1991 Military Thought article. The SDF were formally created by decree of Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. They eventually consisted of the existing Strategic Rocket Forces (RSVN), air force and navy strategic nuclear forces, missile attack warning systems, Space Attack Warning Forces (PKN), Space Defense Troops (PKO), Antiballistic Missile Defense Troops (PRO), and the Main Directorate of Space Systems. The SDF did not include any other general purpose or conventional forces. Maksimov was named the first Cincl of the USSR SDF.

Union ground forces were being formally re-named ground defense troops by the end of November 1991. Ground defense troops proposals included having only "one or two armies and one or two corps in border districts in areas where conflicts are
most likely." Such a concept is in total conformance with the August 1990 Ivanov proposal to restructure the armed forces.

In a Military Historical Journal article signed to press in late November 1991, Chief of the USSR General Staff, General Lobov, again proposed organizational changes in the armed forces. In another renumbering of the forces, ground defense forces remained listed first, but then came the air force, third the navy, and last was the new SDF. The air defense troops (PVO) were absorbed into the ground defense troops.

In the past, there was generally conformity in the public positions of the most senior leaders of the armed forces. During the final days of the USSR, we witnessed a public disagreement over organizational development between the two most senior officers in the defense ministry. Army General Lobov himself and later Air Marshal Shaposhnikov stated that the Chief of the General Staff's views on military reform diverged from those of the Defense Ministry.

Lobov openly stated that Shaposhnikov wanted public opinion shaped to accept a civilian Minister of Defense, hence he published a series of articles advocating splitting the higher echelon of the military administration into two parallel structures with only the General Staff remaining purely military. Shaposhnikov then changed his mind and Lobov was fired. General-Colonel Viktor N. Samsonov was appointed the last Chief of the USSR General Staff on December 7, 1991 by President Gorbachev, one day prior to the creation of the new CIS. Samsonov retained this position with the subsequent creation of the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command General Staff on March 20, 1992.

A series of actions that involved conventional or general-purpose forces that were capable of acting at the strategic-level of warfare resulted in an ugly confrontation between a number of republics. When Ukrainian President Leonid Makarovitch Kravchuk took command of the armed forces located on their territory, it opened up a major debate that has yet (May 1992) to fully be resolved. When the Ukraine formed its own national armed forces, Kravchuk's position was that any former Soviet armed forces physically located on the territory of the Ukraine were now part of the armed forces of the Ukraine. This included strategic nuclear forces and most of the Black Sea Fleet. The Ukraine added, however, that it would turn over all nuclear weapons to Russia for destruction. Kravchuk was adamant that "strategic forces" included only nuclear forces in the recently-created SDF.

Russia, and the military leadership of the former Soviet Union clearly did not want to split the armed forces and lose control of the capability that they had so long created under the Brezhnev years. Russian Federation President Boris N. Yeltsin attempted to set his republic's position on the matter when he told a December 12, 1991 Russian Supreme Soviet session that:
"The Commonwealth of Independent States will provide for a unified military-strategic space and unity of the nuclear forces under single command. The shared view is to create a defense alliance with a single command for strategic armed forces. This marks an end to the protracted debates about the future of the country's nuclear potential and the fate of the army."

The military directly and openly confronted civilian republic leaders. Marshal Shaposhnikov attempted to clarify exactly what forces Kravchuk took command of following the formation of Ukrainian armed forces. Shaposhnikov told a Moscow television audience on December 13, 1992 that:

"We spent a long time discussing this topic with him [Kravchuk], and we reached full agreement that not only strategic nuclear forces, but also tactical nuclear weapons, and also all the facilities providing back-up for both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons will be under central command."

Shaposhnikov was arguing that all of the support for the nuclear forces also should be included in the definition of strategic armed forces. All strategic forces, naturally, would be subordinate to the CIS and not individual republics. Essentially this would have meant the bulk of the combat arms of the former Soviet armed forces, again the basic position of the November 1991 Soviet Ministry of Defense reform plan. Shaposhnikov would have allowed modest republic armies, modeled after the MVD.

On December 17, 1991, Russian President Yeltsin proposed that the Soviet republics that were involved with forming the new CIS sign a Treaty on Defense Alliance. This treaty essentially codified the November 1991 Soviet Ministry of Defense plan for a unified and centralized command of the bulk armed forces of the USSR. This proposal was not adopted, however. At the December 21, 1991 CIS Alma-Ata summit, participants only signed an Agreement on Joint Measures Regarding Nuclear Weapons that subordinated, instead, only nuclear weapons to a joint strategic armed force. Marshal Shaposhnikov was named the interim Commander of the CIS joint (obyedinennyy) military-strategic space and unified (yedinyy) nuclear armed forces.

A more comprehensive defense treaty, along the lines of Yeltsin's December 17th proposal, was prepared in the closing days of December 1991 and actively debated in the open literature. Proposals were seen for a NATO-type military alliance to a unified armed force under single command. According to the
Marshal Shaposhnikov and the Ministry of Defense, forces not falling under the category of those that he commanded as the interim commander of the joint armed forces, nuclear forces, should be organized as separate, but centrally controlled, general purpose forces.51

On December 30, 1991, the CIS heads of state met in Minsk and signed a number of agreements that attempted to codify the future organization and command structure of the armed forces of the commonwealth. The attendees at Minsk signed an agreement that governed the strategic forces remaining under joint CIS command.52 The agreement's definition of what constituted these forces was vague enough, if one wanted to interpret it this way, to include most of the armed forces of the former USSR. But the Minsk agreement also stated that a precise schedule of "strategic" forces would be drawn up with each republic in a separate protocol. That protocol was never approved although reports of discussions and partial agreements at the working-level surfaced from time to time.53

Another strategic forces agreement was signed by all four nuclear republics in Minsk on February 14, 1992, but it again failed to clarify exactly what forces were strategic.54 It did, however, specify that a new Strategic Forces Command was to be created, subordinate to a CinC of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS. The Minsk agreement again opened up the definition of strategic forces of the CIS beyond nuclear forces. The parties appointed Marshal Shaposhnikov as the CinC of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS.55 A Joint Armed Forces High Command was created that included a Joint Armed Forces General Staff. The Minsk agreements did not include a CIS Ministry of Defense. Instead, the CinC of the Joint Armed Forces was directly responsible to the Council of Heads of State of the CIS.

Agreements with the Ukraine over divisions of the general purpose forces were never approved. At Minsk in February, Russia, Belarus, and six central Eurasian republics did sign a general forces agreement that stated all military forces not already a part of the strategic forces would be, with their consent, operationally subordinated to the High Command of Joint Armed Forces.56 In addition to Russia and Belarus, this Minsk agreement was signed by Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The High Command quickly set up a new General Forces Command to take charge of these units.

Further delineation of high-level military duties and responsibilities were included an agreement on defense issues signed at the March 20, 1992 CIS summit in Kiev.57 The Kiev agreement specifies that the CIS Council of Heads of State would reserve authority over CIS military policy, doctrine, and nuclear strategy. It also specified the defense duties of the Council of the Heads of Government and, to a limited degree, the Council of Ministers of Defense.
Another agreement signed in Kiev did little more than codify the structure of the Joint Armed Forces as being the previously arranged Strategic Forces Command and General Purpose Forces Command, without defining either. According to press reports, a separate protocol listing exactly what constituted strategic forces could not be agreed upon and was dropped from the Kiev agenda. Russia signed both of these agreements without reservations, Belarus specified that it only governed their actions for a two year transition period, and the Ukraine did not sign.

A General Purpose Forces Agreement was also signed in Kiev on March 20, 1992, but only by four republics—Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Russian Federation. A separate agreement appointed General Yuiry P. Maksimov as Commander of the CIS Strategic Forces and General-Colonel Viktor N. Samsonov as the Chief of the General Staff of the Joint Armed Forces. General-Colonel Vladimir M. Semenov was named as Commander of the CIS General Purpose Forces, part of the Joint Armed Forces.

Marshal Shaposhnikov announced a few days later that the CIS would set up a contingent of volunteer internal peacekeeping force to be brought into areas of interethnic conflict. These forces were to be subordinated directly to the CIS Council of Heads of State, and they would remain outside of the structure of the Joint Armed Forces.

The Ukraine, and a few other republics, moved to set up their own armed forces in early 1992 and did not participate in the creation of these CIS general purpose forces or command structure. The Ukraine, and later Belarus, also failed to participate in CIS border troops agreements. One major problem with the creation of republic armed forces, however, is that some of the best forces and equipment from the former Soviet armed forces ended up physically in the Ukraine and in Belarus, and therefore became bargaining chips.

Russia followed with the creation of her own armed forces, taking command of former Soviet forces stationed outside of the borders of the former Soviet republics. Russia subordinated her general purpose forces to the CIS command as permitted under the February 1992 Minsk agreements. Russian President Yeltsin proposed a republic armed force of around 1½ (later modified to 1¾) million personnel. This amount is only slightly more than total discussed in the August 1990 Ivanov proposal (for the entire USSR) and about half the size of the 1990 USSR armed forces.

Strategic nuclear forces were also included in the Russian armed forces but would continue to be subordinated to the CIS, the CinC of the Joint Armed Forces, and the Commander of the Strategic Forces. This would end the question of what flag the navy's nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) would fly since the CIS is not a country and does not have a flag.
Russia also formed its own Ministry of Defense, and split the functions into a largely civilian ministry and a military general staff. Yeltsin took on the post of interim Russian Defense Minister and then on May 7, 1992, Supreme CinC of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. General-Colonel Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev, First Deputy CinC of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, Chairman of the Russian State Committee for Defense Questions, and former CinC of the Airborne Troops, was initially appointed on April 3, 1992 as Russian First Deputy Defense Minister and then on May 7, simultaneously with Yeltsin's appointment as Supreme CinC of the Russian armed forces, as Acting Russian Defense Minister. General-Colonel Leonid Vasilyevich Kuznetsov was appointed as the Acting Chief of the Russian General Staff. The Russian Defense Ministry will operate independently and only discuss questions of strategic importance with Marshal Shaposhnikov.

Parliamentary hearings in mid-May 1992 indicated that Russian armed forces would be organized along the lines of the traditional USSR—without the modifications that created the new nuclear SDF—and without primary dominance of the armed forces by large ground forces groupings. Russian ground forces would be formed into two-three military groupings or districts: Western or Eastern, or Western, Siberian, and Eastern.

A Treaty on CIS Collective Security was signed by Russia and five Eurasian republics during the May 15, 1992 Tashkent summit. This treaty provided for collective defense and a Collective Security Council consisting of the heads of participating states and the Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. Central Eurasian signatories included Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. This group is the same that signed the general purpose forces agreement at Minsk in February, 1992, except for Belarus, indicating the lack of support for any expanded cooperative defense agreement by the European former-Soviet republics.

In a series of post-Tashkent interviews, Russian Defense Minister Grachev provided additional details about the organizational development of the Russian armed forces. Armed forces located outside of the CIS would be returned to Russian territory and form the basis of a smaller but very capable Russian armed force. The Western Group of Forces, currently located in Germany, would be the nucleus of the Russian armed forces.

Russian troops currently located in CIS republics would also be withdrawn to Russia as mutually agreed upon. Troops would be withdrawn in the very near future from Armenia and Azerbaijan. Troops would only remain in Georgia for an [unspecified] short period. Russians would not serve in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Status of forces agreements were being negotiated with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Agreements providing for joint armed forces with Turkmenistan were drafted and were expected to be signed in June 1992. A bilateral treaty on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance was signed later
with Kazakhstan with similar arrangements. Belarus took control of all military formations which were not specifically a part of the CIS Strategic Forces and Kyrgyzstan transferred all forces on their soil to their own command.

Russian Defense Minister Grachev also stated that the Russian armed forces would include a "new type of armed forces—rapid deployment troops." These apparently would be based upon the paratroops and marines -- "forces capable of operating independently in any area that poses an external threat to the country's security." Other forces mentioned include "airborne assault combined units, military transport and Army aviation, and mobile support services," and "motorized rifle formations, equipped with light armaments, who can be transported by military transport aircraft or MI-26 helicopters." Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin added at the end of May that the new Russian armed forces "should be like the surgeon's scalpel, compared to the mallet or sledgehammer of the past."

Grachev proposed a three stage restructuring of the armed forces. During the first stage (1992), the headquarters and administrative structures would be reformed. Legal and juridical foundations for the armed forces would be created. During the second stage (1992-1994) combined and other units would be reformed and created. The armed forces would be cut to 2.1 million service personnel by 1995. Mixed systems of conscript and professional manning and alternative service would be introduced. The third stage (1995-1999) would consist of the reorganization of the branches of service and their reduction in size to 1.5 million.

The Russian Ministry of Defense is not the only bureaucratic entity that will have a major say in the organizational development of the Russian armed forces. Chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov stated in a post-Tashkent interview that the parliamentary committee for Questions of Defense would be thoroughly involved in the reform effort.

It appears that Russian Defense Minister Grachev and Air Marshal Shaposhnikov may not see eye-to-eye on military reform efforts. In one post-Tashkent interview, Grachev made public a disagreement with the CIS CinC's order issued on draft deferments. Grachev, however, also stated that the functions of the CIS Joint Armed Forces will be amended with strategic forces remaining under joint command. The Russian defense ministry also ousted the CinC from his headquarters and moved him to the former headquarters of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces. Since the function of the command of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces was more like a military district rather than a war-fighting CinC, it is likely that Grachev took the facilities that had the most command and control support and relegated Marshal Shaposhnikov to more austere surroundings.

Shaposhnikov told a May 26, 1992 news conference that the Council of CIS Defense Ministers had met in his new headquarters
and finally initialed draft agreements on the definitive composition of the CIS strategic forces.\textsuperscript{94} To be included were the nuclear triad of the strategic rocket forces and the nuclear component of the air force and the navy, the systems of warning against missile attack, anti-missile defenses and space forces. Not included would be the bulk of the armed forces, specifically including the Black Sea Fleet. Apparently some disagreements remain with the Ukraine regarding strategic nuclear forces remaining on Ukrainian soil.\textsuperscript{95}

Russian Defense Minister Grachev gave an interview published after this meeting of the Council of CIS Defense Ministers that indicated that the Black Sea Fleet issue had not been solved and that the fleet belonged to the commonwealth as a whole.\textsuperscript{96} If this is the ministry's position, it indicates a lack of appreciation for international law since warships must be owned by a nation and under the command of a commissioned officer from that nation. Grachev stated that the Black Sea Fleet should be under the command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces CinC and that it "is not Ukrainian, not Russian, and does not belong to any other state."

Another draft agreement on the structure and functions of the CIS High Command of Forces was not initialed. Despite the lack of agreement in May, Shaposhnikov told his audience that the CIS High Command of Forces will include rapid operational response to local conflicts along the borders of the former union, but not inside them. All draft agreements are to be finalized at the next Council of CIS Defense Ministers meeting on July 3, 1992 one day before the CIS summit in Moscow. Not present at the May meeting were the ministers of defense from Azerbaijan and Moldova. Georgia sent an observer.\textsuperscript{97}

At the end of May, 1992, a four-day conference was held at the Academy of the General Staff on the "Military Security of Russia.‖\textsuperscript{98} Reports of the discussions at that conference seemed to indicate that the evolving Russian military would be "made up of troops and forces on permanent readiness capable of acting effectively in local conflicts, rapid reaction forces, and strategic reserves.\textsuperscript{99} Grachev told the conference that a concept for the organizational development of the Russian armed forces would be submitted to Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin by September 1, 1992.

Grachev has also provided additional details about the internal organization of the Russian military headquarters. He stated that the semicivilian semimilitary Ministry of Defense would assume political-administrative functions while the military general staff would tackle operational-strategic planning and lead the troops.\textsuperscript{100} The Ministry of Defense would be reorganized with one deputy heading the headquarters and being "responsible for the planning and management of the forces, as well as for the mobilization and intelligence operations."\textsuperscript{101} The other deputy would "direct the ministries activities in conversion, international cooperation, armament, and technical develop-
ment." A third deputy might be created with responsibility for personnel and social security matters of the servicemen, the military budget, finances and strategic research." A fourth "deputy" might be the chief of the General Staff.

Various numbers for the Ukrainian armed forces have been bandied about, the latest (March 1992) being a reduction from the 1½ million personnel currently stationed there to around 200,000-300,000 in all.102 Belarus has also had numerous figures mentioned with the latest (May 1992) being a reduction from 200,000 to roughly 90-95,000.103 Other republics have indicated they will build as follows: Georgia, roughly 20,000 men;104 Kazakhstan, around 50,000 men;105 Turkmenistan, some 40,000 men;106 Uzbekistan, roughly 25-30,000.107

There are some obvious questions regarding compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty due to the transfer of Committee on State Security (KGB) Forces to the USSR armed forces and the creation of republic armies. The former Soviet Union is moving toward re-positioning all ground forces within its borders, a military doctrine and strategy that includes absorbing the first blow from an adversary, then having the capability to repel the invasion to the border but not cross and continue the counteroffensive in enemy territory. This was an idea proposed first in 1988 by now-Deputy Defense Minister Andrey A. Kokoshin and General-Major Valentin Veniaminovich Larionov, a military professor at the General Staff Academy. Their proposal was considered so outlandish at the time, that it was not translated by either the U.S. government's FBIS or JPRS.108

Notes


(3) Colonel V. Strebbkov, "From the Standpoint of the New Think-


(9) Aleksey G. Arbatov, "Finale is Important, Not START [Strate-


(29) Vladimir Smelov report of statements by General-Colonel Bronislav Omelichev, first deputy chief of the General Staff of
the USSR Armed Forces, before the Vienna seminar on military doctrine with representatives from 38 members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, 1134 GMT, October 10, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-198, October 11, 1991, p. 1).


(37) Synopsis of draft treaty provided by Moscow INTERFAX in English, 1140 GMT, November 15, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-221, November 15, 1991, p. 31).


(61) "Decision on Appointment of Chief of General Staff and


(67) Speech by Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin to the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation at the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow, live broadcast by Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian, 0633 GMT, April 7, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-068-S, April 8, 1992, p. 27).


(77) Previous press reports indicate that Turkmenistan also signed the Tashkent agreement and not Kyrgyzstan. See reports of a post-summit press conference with various republic leaders: Moscow INTERFAX in English, 1629 GMT, May 15, 1992 and Moscow ITAR-TASS in English, 1701 GMT, May 15, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-099, May 21, 1992, pp. 19, 22).


(86) "Officers to be Appointed on Competitive Basis," report of


(97) "Novosti" newscast broadcast by Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian, 1100 and 1700 GMT, May 26, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-102, May 27, 1992, pp. 7, 8).


NEW ROLES FOR THE FORMER SOVIET NAVY

We must first look to land-oriented military strategy in order to properly understand the new Russian Navy roles and missions. Soviet Navy roles and missions were recast in terms of the defensive doctrine and strategy. What this meant for the Soviet Navy was that first-strike damage limitation by nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) was disavowed and that the fleet was to conduct defensive fleet operations (operat-sii) in bastions that may even have been closer to the shore than we once assumed.¹

The Russian Navy has ended its forward deployments of naval forces, even those that could have been construed by the West as being first-strike nuclear forces targeted against the United States, its overseas bases, or its allies. If the defensive strategy truly involves the Russian Navy, we should see evidence in the form of new building programs emphasizing antisubmarine warfare helicopters, short- or mid-range land-based naval aviation, and small coastal patrol ships instead of long-range Bear F aircraft, aircraft carriers, and supporting open-ocean battle groups.

Before a new naval building program could be promulgated, however, the Soviet military had to first work out its strategic nuclear force structure and overall military doctrine and strategy. As we have seen, that was just finished by the end of November 1991. In the Gorbachev-era USSR, the future of the Navy was decided upon after deciding the roles and missions the other services.

In November 1991, Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernavin, CinC of the Soviet Navy published what appears to be the long-awaited definitive article providing the Navy's position on its future.² Chernavin's article was not an announcement of the fleet's future but merely the Navy's position—after all the Union itself was up for grabs at the time that this article was signed to press. With the demise of the Soviet Union, this article should be seen as the most optimistic case for a future Russian Navy and also the worst case threat to the West; i.e. it is not likely that a Russian fleet would be as strong as that proposed by Chernavin for the whole USSR. Chernavin's November 1991 view of the future is also the least likely threat to the West since it implied resources that are not likely to be provided to the fleet.

Chernavin's Soviet Navy of the future was cast in terms of a defensive military doctrine that did not accept the lack of an external threat from the U.S. It used mission terms like averting war, repelling aggression, safeguarding the maritime flanks, depriving the enemy of the opportunity of conducting offensive operations, and creating the conditions for the restoration of peace.³ Training goals were similarly defensive-sounding.
The Navy CinC stated that naval strategic nuclear forces should continue to operate in the future, but in reduced numbers. Chernavin appeared to announce that no new SSBNs would be built or put into service in the next ten years. The retention of existing SSBNs is a critical decision since we should have assumed that future Soviet general purpose forces would continue to be optimized to protect SSBNs in bastions. This position remains at the center for the Russian Navy because if it is validated it provides some justification for Western antisubmarine warfare submarines, such as the SEAWOLF or CENTURION, designed to hunt these SSBNs in Russian coastal waters.

Chernavin's future general purpose forces were given the principal mission of "...ensuring the physical preservation and sound functioning of the naval strategic nuclear system under any condition." Secondary missions were to defend the maritime frontiers and to inflict "defeat on enemy naval strike groups and impeding the execution of broad-scale operations [and assist in] defensive operations in the continental theaters." Chernavin appeared to announce that the future building programs ruled out large surface or amphibious ships. Instead, primary attention was to be given to submarines and aircraft-carrying cruisers.

The civilian rejoinder to Chernavin, by Konstantin Eduardo-vich Sorokin, was also published in November 1991. It stressed coastal defense of SSBN bastions with diesel submarines, short-range land-based aircraft, existing air-capable ships, and mines. Other forces in reserve would have the mission of operations in remote ocean areas, protection of own maritime forces, evacuating citizens, and participation in United Nations actions. Sorokin specifically ruled out the mission of strategic antisubmarine warfare against foreign SSBNs. Sorokin's recommendations may be viewed as a worst case for the future Russian Navy and a best case for the West, unless one believes that economic conditions make even these suggestions optimistic.

With the demise of the USSR, naval building programs once again came under active discussion. A January 1991 Moscow News roundtable with senior Navy officers revealed a great deal of disagreement over a defensive doctrine that would lead to a fleet of only small coastal combatants. One participant revealed that recommendations coming from the General Staff's Center for Strategic Studies was "nothing short of a death sentence to the Navy."

Questions of new naval building programs, however, were eclipsed by political discussions over who owned the existing fleet. The world witnessed a public battle over possession of the former Soviet Navy that had not yet been resolved by the writing of this book. What seemed likely, by mid-April 1992, was that the former Soviet Navy would be divided and that the bulk of the ocean-going fleet would belong to Russia.

In a move to perhaps gain influence with the uniformed armed forces, Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin's Red Star interview pub-
lished in mid-March 1992 just prior to his being named a Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia indicated his support for more than a coastal defense fleet. 6

"We need not only coastal defense naval forces, collaborating with aviation and land forces, but some proportion of the strategic missile carriers deployed on combat patrol in the Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk regions. Submarine forces are also needed to ensure security of navigation in waters of the world's oceans which are important for Russia's national interests."

Kokoshin followed this up with an interview stating that "A navy is essential for Russia...we have legitimate interests on the high seas." Following this statement, however, was a carefully worded paragraph that discussed the need for maximizing the military benefit of any new shipbuilding. Preceding the strong navy statement was one pointing out that when the former USSR challenged the naval might of the West, it was very burdensome and dangerous to the Soviet navy.

Despite the lack of significant change in fleet hardware to date, we must consider that without a capability to consolidate victory ashore, the Russian Navy that we see today can be construed as a defensive force. Just how offensive is it anyway, without significant sea-based air power and at sea sustainability? The largest naval force ever amassed, the U.S. Navy, is understood without question to be part of an overall defensive military strategy. Despite our might at sea, NATO armies were simply capable of the type of defense that the Russians are moving towards—repulsing the aggressor and restoring prewar borders. The military-technical characteristics of war include its pace; hence there will be a requirement for conducting both short and long wars, although there may be funding shortfalls for the more expensive long war. Navies are a hedge against the long war.

Notes


(3) Similar words were used earlier by another senior Soviet flag officer. See Vice Admiral V. Zakharin, Deputy Chief of the Navy Main Staff, "Time and the Fleet: The Navy and National Defense," Moscow Morskoy Sbornik in Russian, no. 2 (February 1991): 3-7 (JPRS-UMA-91-017, July 1, 1991, pp. 31-34).


(7) Aleksandr Putko interview with Andrey A. Kokoshin, "The Army Can Become a Platform for Accord," Moscow Kuranty in Russian, April 15, 1992, p. 5 (FBIS-SOV-92-074, April 16, 1992, p. 28). This statement is attributed to Putko in the translation, but from the context of the remarks and the placement of subsequent identification of who spoke when, it is very likely that this is a translation error and Kokoshin make the comment.
The message for the West is that if reorganization plans like this are implemented and if reductions in military capability include strategic nuclear and naval forces in the future, then former Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev's promise to eliminate the threat has come true. The changes in strategy envisaged by President George Bush and by NATO are appropriate under such an international security environment.

Even if the Russians are found to be cheating on the margin with regard to the CFE Treaty and other future arms control and confidence building measures in Europe, we should ask ourselves if they are in the position to once again mount the old theater strategic offensive operation. When confronted with that question, CFE "cheating" may more correctly be seen as an inability to provide exact numbers and locations which will be corrected when requested. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 25, 1991, General John R. Galvin, U.S. Army, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), stated that two-thirds of all the Soviet military equipment moved east of the Urals, which has been described as noncomplying, has been left to rust—if not already partially or totally destroyed.

Learning how the Russians think and calculate the correlation of forces and means and coefficient of control must be of the highest priority to our intelligence community. It will then face the arduous task of explaining the Soviet perceptions to political and military decision makers who will not be as aware of the differences and will be tempted to automatically "mirror image." If the Russians appear to be oriented toward output measures, dynamic assessments, and other complicated non-Western measures, we must deal with these measures as the Russians see them.

CONCLUSIONS

During the Reagan administration, it became commonplace for the bureaucracy to take its cues from the openly available speeches of the senior leadership. Policy was announced and made in a series of public utterances that reflected the trial balloons and approved policy positions of the administration. Such a system exists in Russia as well.

Commenting on how the General Staff was attempting to conduct the organizational development of the Russian armed forces, the Chief of its Main Operations Directorate openly acknowledged that they used President Boris N. Yeltsin's speeches as guidance.

The Soviet Navy has, for some time, been attempting to argue their case to marshals, generals, and civilian leaders who do not
have a good appreciation for the value of maritime forces. The writings of the late Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov were examples of such attempts. More recently, we have seen the Soviet Navy correlate the size of World War II carrier task forces with Soviet frontal aviation air armies in order to make the comparison and the loss of one or two German transports, carrying troops and equipment, equivalent to "carrying out an army-level or even a front-level operation."5

When the armed forces of the USSR shift reliance to nuclear weapons, combat elements of the Navy and Air Force suffered. The shift to a new defensive doctrine, the reduction in the reliance in nuclear weapons, and the lessons of the Persian Gulf war are all reasons for the navy to once again make its case anew. The Persian Gulf war is not simply an episode but rather the model upon which future doctrine and organizational development must be built.

Operation DESERT SHIELD demonstrated to the West that the Soviet Union did not view its own security from the sole perspective of military preparedness. Despite the significant presence of the U.S. Navy, including its nuclear-weapons capable aircraft carriers, close to the southern borders the Soviet Navy was not only not beefed up, but it was withdrawn from the area when hostilities began.

The Soviet Union, and now Russia, seem to accept that the U.S. has shifted its strategic focus from a Cold War-oriented confrontation with the possibility of direct military interaction to a new regional focus in which the superpowers might not be engaged. The threat to Russia, in such an international security environment, is that the U.S. may become involved in states which directly border Russia or the CIS. Such an involvement cannot be ignored by Russia since the consequences of armed conflict on her borders cannot be fully foreseen.

The primary external military planning scenario for Russia, therefore, is at the operational-strategic-level of warfare in a contingency response by the West. The political goal of such a crisis would be to contain this crisis horizontally, vertically, and over time. If diplomatic and other efforts fail, the Russian military would be expected to keep the conflict from spreading across its borders.

Planning need not be conducted for simultaneous nor strategic-level attacks on Russia from all sectors—planning can be different in different TVDs. Planning for defensive military operations in Europe need not resemble those along Russia's southern borders. Strategic warning of an operational-level crisis can be counted on and sequential operations are all that need be planned.

The forces of choice for such a mission will be the type of forces that the coalition successfully used in Operation DESERT STORM. The initial period of war will offer Russia the opportuni-
ty to contain the crisis without having to mobilize its full military potential. The role of the navy and air forces in certain theaters of strategic military operations, therefore, will increase relative to that of the Russian ground forces. If the mobile standing forces are unable to contain the conflict, then reserve components of the armed forces will be mobilized in order to complete the defense of the homeland.

Since the U.S. would have to transport equipment and supplies by sea to any overseas contingency response, Russia will not program its response to allow a "free ride" to the theater of the crisis as Saddam Hussein permitted coalition forces in the Persian Gulf war. The size of this force need not be exceptionally large, and naval forces will allow the Russians the option of interdiction of the sea-lines of communications during a local and short war.

The concept of having mobile air and naval forces respond first to a military threat and larger ground forces only later is evidence of a considerable shift in thinking in the Russian military. Such military operational art is the norm in naval warfare where surface fleets will probably not engage until after the initial actions by air and subsurface forces.

The shift to a real defensive doctrine should lead the Russian military to study naval warfare in order to consider the similarities between war at sea and maneuver warfare ashore. Indeed, the final USSR issue of Military Thought analysis on the Persian Gulf war included a discussion of the need to "establish defensive force groupings within limits of one's own territory in short time periods." There is a considerable similarity in the formation of naval task groups which establish a working "sea control" over certain areas of the oceans for limited periods of time.

Perhaps the most significant lesson of the Soviet and Russian views on the Persian Gulf war is to once again remind us that their open-source discussions must be seen in the context of the larger debates that are ongoing. The navy has not been the most important Soviet armed service and should have not provided the primary evidence of Soviet military intentions. If the navy becomes more important under Russia, however, we will need to revisit that assumption and perhaps pay less attention to the ground forces marshals and generals who have dominated Soviet military thinking during the past decades.

Notes


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