U.S. Navy

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER, 1942

PG Numbers 30925 - 30929

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U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence

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War Diary

Captain U-boats Italy

The War Diary of Captain U-boats Italy, contains in daily entries the events from 0800 on the current day to 0800 on the following day.

Contents

I. a) Daily positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares. If positions are exact, i.e. based on signals etc., they are underlined.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800.

II. Air reconnaissance:

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Limit is the line from Cape Bon to Sicily.

III. Reports on the enemy:

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b) By air reconnaissance.

c) By radio intercept service.

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WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

1 - 15 JULY, 1942

PG/30925

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1 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 5290,
U 77 CP 5860,
U 97 CP 8250,
U 453 CP 7330,
U 372 CP 7310,
U 375 CJ 9820.

b) U 375 put in to Messina at 0855, put out at 2010.
U 561 put out from Messina at 0030, put in to Augusta at 0600.
U 371 put in to Patras at 1840, put out from Salamis at 0900.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia.

b) Sicilian Channel.

III. a) U 562: 1803 CP 6412 3 patrol vessels, 2 steamers, course 200°, speed 9 knots.

b) 1558 CP 5929 1 destroyer, 1 patrol vessel, 1 steamer, course 340°.
1615 CP 5639 1 escort vessel, 2 patrol vessels, course 180°.
1617 CP 6414 1 steamer, 1 patrol vessel, course 180°.
0635 CP 5777 3 destroyers, 3 medium-sized and several small steamers, course 270°.

c) 1345 unidentified unit transmitted the following: "Steamer "Ramses" torpedoed in CP 8294."

d) According to an agent's report a fairly powerful convoy is due to put out from Haifa on 2 July for Alexandria.

According to an agent, the British fleet left Alexandria on 30 June. Moved to Port Said. Preparations in Famagusta to receive the British fleet.

e) ./.

to a) U 372: 0854 CP 7341 convoy, easterly course.
U 372: CP 7345 1 steamer, 3 destroyers.

IV. U 372 (Neumann) contacted a convoy on an easterly course at about 0830 in CP 7341. At 1000 the convoy, consisting of one steamer and 3 destroyers, was in CP 7345 according to a shadower's report from U 372. "Neumann" reported at 1113: "Enemy in CP 7343 is anti-U-boat group."

U 453 (Schlippenbach) reported at 1150: "Steamer in CP 7354, westerly course."

U 568 (Hamm) reported at 1803: "Two steamers, three patrol vessels in CP 6412, speed 9 knots, course 200°, unsuccessful fan, am pressing on."

U 97 (Bürgel) has fired all his torpedoes and started the return passage. Boat received orders to proceed to Salamis.

U 372 (Neumann) reported at 0725: "0230 CP 7345 observed by destroyers, forced to submerge, apparently an eastbound convoy, dysentery increasing."

V. a) U 97 (Bürgel) sank an ammunition ship in CP 8258. ("Bürgel" estimated it at 1,800 GRT. According to the radio intercept service, a steamer was torpedoed in CP 8294. Radio intercept service stated "Formation Ramses" and gave the steamer at 3,773 GRT.)

b) ./.

VI. Captain U-boats in Messina to inspect U 375 and U 561 as well as to confer with the Naval Liaison Officer. At 0030 he proceeded to Augusta in U 561.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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2 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 5290,
U 77 CP 5860,
U 97 CP 4950,
U 453 CP 7330,
U 372 CP 7230,
U 371 CK 8720,
U 375 CO 1120,
U 561 CN 3210.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Cyprus - Crete, Haifa, Alexandria area.

III. a) ./.

b) 1350 CH 9554 1 tanker, course 270°.
1530 CP 8276 4 escort vessels, 4 guardboats, 4 steamers, 1 tanker, course 270°.
1740 CP 7319 1 large steamer, course 255°.
1750 CP 7328 1 small steamer, course 270°.
1755 CP 7363 2 guardboats.
1800 CP 8115 3 large units, probable battleship, course 90°.
1800 CP 8145 1 destroyer, 2 freighters,
1803 CP 8117 1 steamer, course 270°.
0645 CP 7265 2 M.T.B.s, course 210°.
0755 CP 8127 2 destroyers, 4 steamers, course 270°.
0755 CP 8144 2 guardboats, 5 steamers, course 100°.

c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1730 CO 5571 1 submarine.
0702 CK 7667 1 submarine.

IV. U 453 (Schlippenbach) contacted a steamer at 0943 in CP 7361, course 240°. At 1134 the boat reported contact lost. Seaplane. During the night the U-boat reported one unsuccessful run-in on 1 July and two on 2 July made on steamers, the cause being a waterlogged periscope. Hydrophone and shallow-sounder unserviceable. Boat requested permission to return. He received orders to remain in the attack area as:

1) Successes can be obtained by continuing to operate, in spite of an unserviceable periscope. (Boat has not fired all his torpedoes, night periscope is serviceable, he can make surface runs-in.)

2) With the withdrawal of U 453 only 3 boats would be left in the operational area.

U 372 (Neumann) fired an unsuccessful fan at 2230 in CP 7256 on a convoy consisting of 3 steamers and 4 escorts.

U 77 (Schonder) received orders to occupy the operational area which has been "Bürgel"'s.

British naval forces have left Alexandria according to photographic reconnaissance. French naval forces interned there were in the harbor as usual; as there was a possibility that French units might leave Alexandria and try to reach a French port, the following message was sent to the boats:

1) There is a possibility that French naval forces may leave Alexandria. Do not stop them if they are on a westerly or northerly course. On the other hand, they are to be attacked if they set course for Port Said or the Syrian coast.

2) No Gaullist ships of similar construction are in the sea area.

3) 1 battleship the "Lorraine", 4 cruisers the "Suffren" - "Duquesne" - "Tourville" - "Trouin", 3 destroyers and 1 submarine in Alexandria. From Captain U-boats.

The following radio message was received from Flag Officer German Naval Command:
"From 3 July onwards E-boat sorties off Alexandria are planned continuously at night. On some occasions there will be no previous notification. E-boats have orders not to attack submarines."

Boats were informed accordingly.

V. a), b) ./.

VI. Captain U-boats in Augusta for U 561 to take on mines.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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3 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 7290,
U 77 CP 5920,
U 453 CP 7330,
U 372 CP 7230,
U 97 CO 6270,
U 375 CO 2760.

b) U 371 put out from Patras at 1600.
U 561 put out from Augusta at 1900.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Port Said, Haifa and Suez.

III. a) ./.

b) 0800 CP 8185 1 minesweeper, 1 tanker, course 0°.
0800 CP 7361 1 escort, 1 freighter, course 90°.
1245 CO 5282 1 submarine, course 90°.
1725 CO 5328 1 submarine, course 270°.
0720 CP 5787 3 destroyers, 1 steamer, course 180°.
0722 CP 8127 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 1 tanker, 4 steamers, course 240°.

c), d), e) ./.

IV. The boats were informed that from 3 July E-boat attacks in the Alexandria area were planned every night. E-boats were forbidden to attack submarines.

From 4 July Italian U-boats will occupy the area east of 30° E, north of 33° 40' E. Our boats may cross this area only if they have contacted the enemy and have been forbidden to attack submarines here. New attack areas for our U-boats from 1200 4 July:

U 562 (Hamm) between the parallels in CP 5618 and CP 5892.

U 77 (Schonder) will occupy the area south of "Hamm" as far as the coast. Eastern limit for both boats will be the meridian in CP 5844.

U 77 (Schonder) and U 562 (Hamm) were ordered to send situation reports. "Hamm" reported moderate traffic, "Schonder" reported: "Strong traffic of escorts or patrol vessels in CP 5956, sometimes with small steamers. Still one stern torpedo left after four unsuccessful attacks. Intend to replenish in Salamis."

U 375 (Koenenkamp) was making for CP 4835. Boat was asked to report his position, was in CO 5635 at 2006.

V. a), b) ./.

0840 Captain U-boats back from his duty trip.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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4 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 5590,
U 77 CP 8230,
U 453 CP 7330,
U 372 CP 7220,
U 97 CO 2310,
U 375 CO 6580,
U 561 CO 1180,
U 371 CK 7180.

b) U 97 put in to Salamis at 1000.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, triangle of Cyprus, Alexandria, Crete, Suez.

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III. a) ./.

b) 1420 CP 7263 2 guardboats, course 270°.
1510 CP 8375 1 guardboat, 1 steamer, course 210°.
1525 CP 8324 2 guardboats, 2 steamers, course 0°.
0720 CP 8188 2 steamers, 1 naval vessel.

c) 1550 CP 7361 British aircraft reported a surfaced U-boat, course 0°, speed 10 knots.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1050 CO 4667 1 submarine.
1415 CO 4951 1 submarine.
1540 CO 7412 1 submarine.

IV. U 375 (Koenenkamp) at 2055 reported his position by short signal from CP 48.

The boat received as his attack area the area between the parallels in CP 5823 and CP 5883. Western limit is the meridian in CP 5844.

V. a), b) ./.

We have been notified by the Red Cross that 47 members of the crew of U 568 (Preuss), including the Commander, have been taken prisoner. That is the whole crew.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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5 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 5590,
U 375 CP 5855,
U 77 CP 8230,
U 453 CP 7330,
U 372 CP 7220,
U 561 CO 5210,
U 371 CK 4540.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete area, Port Said, Cyprus.

III. a) ./.

b) 0805 CP 7325 1 torpedoboat, course 280°, high speed.
0815 CP 8151 1 minesweeper, course 360°.
0820 CP 8223 1 destroyer, 1 guardboat, 2 steamers, course 90°.
0820 CP 8273 1 destroyer, 1 escort vessel, 2 steamers, westerly course.
0915 CP 5929 2 guardboats, 2 steamers, course 360°.
1210 CP 7326 2 cruisers, 3 steamers, course 255°.
1555 CO 6552 1 destroyer, southeasterly course.

c) British aircraft reported a surfaced U-boat in CP 5978 at 1008.
British aircraft reported at 1510: "Am over enemy U-boat in CP 7264."
British aircraft reported a surfaced U-boat in CP 7312 at 0110.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

2225 CK 7556 1 submarine.

IV. U 77 (Schonder) received orders to proceed to Salamis for replenishment.

New attack areas for the boats:

U 562 (Hamm) between the parallels of CP 5528 and CP 5822.

U 375 (Koenenkamp) south of "Hamm" as far as the parallel in CP 5888.

U 453 (Schlippenbach) south of "Koenenkamp" as far as the coast.

Western limit for these boats will be the meridian in CP 5844.

U 372 will occupy the former attack area of U 562 (Hamm).

U 375 (Koenenkamp) reported that he has no information on board of our minefields in the Eastern Mediterranean. According to sailing orders the Commander ought to have made inquiries from the Flotilla with regard to minefields. The information was transmitted by radio.

U 77 (Schonder) reported having commenced the return passage.

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The following instruction was received from Flag Officer German Naval Command:

1) Our U-boats are still to operate east of 32° E only.

2) Attack areas are to include: the area north of minefields of Port Said to Syria - Palestine, Haifa, Cyprus.

3) About a quarter of the U-boats are to be assigned to minelaying operations with occasionally one complete tube loaded with mines. Remainder of load to be torpedoes.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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6 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 5590,
U 375 CP 5940,
U 453 CP 8260,
U 77 CP 5750,
U 372 CP 7230,
U 561 CO 6670,
U 371 CJ 3970.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete - Alexandria - Cyprus area.

III. a) ./.

b) 0822 1 naval vessel (?) put out from Valetta.
1000 1 steamer, 1 M.T.B. put out from Famagusta.
1515 CP 8233 2 M.T.B.s, course 210°.
1535 CP 5954 1 cruiser (?), 2 destroyers, 4 guardboats, 5 steamers, course 190°.
1555 CP 7294 1 steamer stopped.
1655 CP 8321 2 steamers, course 90°.
0715 CP 5988 2 steamers, course 15°.
0745 CP 8343 2 steamers, 1 tanker, 2 guardboats, course 15°.

c), d), e) ./.

IV. U 372 (Neumann) is being withdrawn from the Alexandria - Port Said area in accordance with instructions from Flag Officer German Naval Command, and will occupy the area between the meridians in CP 8244 and CP 8237. Northern limit is the parallel of CP 5878, eastern limit for "Neumann" is the western limit for U 453 (Schlippenbach).

At 1030 U 375 (Koenenkamp) reported that he successfully attacked a convoy in CP 5957. At 2230 the boat reported: "Depth charge pursuit for 4 hours by destroyers. No damage."

V. a) U 375 (Koenenkamp) attacked a convoy in CP 5957 at 0526. Two hits heard on 1500 GRT. Sinking not observed because of depth charge pursuit.

b) ./.

Considerations for a U-boat minelaying operation based on the instruction issued by Flag Officer German Naval Command:

1) U 561 is at sea engaged in a minelaying operation. The minefield laid in April on the route to Port Said is being extended.

2) Apart from the enemy situation, the fact that the mines cannot be used in depths of over 30 meters as well as the limits of present minefields detract from the possibility of further minelaying operations.

While bearing these factors in mind, the following must be considered for a further minelaying operation:

a) The approaches to Haifa.

b) Additions to the minefields off Port Said (the experiences of U 561 in the operation now in progress have still to be received).

c) Off Cape Ras Beirut.

d) Off Jaffa.

e) Off Tripoli (oiling point).

f) Larnaca.

3) The operation is not considered likely to be successful this month because:

a) the U-boat putting out from Spezia on 9 July (U 565) cannot be supplied with mines without a considerable loss of time (mine-handling gear),

b) the next boat is not ready to sail before 4 August,

c) the boats sent to Salamis for replenishing cannot be made ready for minelaying operations there,

d) it is extremely disadvantageous to withdraw a boat from the operational area or to move one from Salamis to Spezia to take on mines at the present time when very few boats are ready to operate, as special importance is attached to U-boat operations in the present phase of fighting in Africa,

e) another minelaying operation by U 561 (Bartels) would take place in the full moon period.

4) Minelaying operations require the boats to approach the coast within a very few miles. Enemy patrols by naval and air forces must be expected. It is therefore not possible to lay mines surfaced in the full moon period. If the operation is carried out submerged at full moon, the boat must have an opportunity of being able to withdraw, if there is hydrophone and depth charge pursuit, by quickly seeking a greater depth, i.e. the 100 meter line must pass very close to the area intended to be mined. This is only the case off Larnaca. Here, however, it is not profitable at present. in view of the time outlay and the small number of operationally ready boats.

5) Therefore we decide: apart from the operation in which U 561 is now engaged, any more minelaying operations are being postponed until the August new moon period.

The considerations detailed above are being transmitted to Flag Officer, German Naval Command by radio.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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7 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 5590,
U 375 CP 5940,
U 453 CP 8340,
U 372 CP 7330,
U 77 CO 6680,
U 371 CJ 2360.

b) U 371 put in to Pola at 1000.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, otherwise the same as on previous day.

III. a) U 375: 0422 CP 5959 convoy, northerly course.

b) 1543 CP 8286 4 destroyers, 2 unidentified naval vessels, 4 steamers, course 270°.

c), d), e) ./.

IV. According to air reconnaissance reports received to date, traffic is running near the coast in the northern part of the present U-boat operational area.

The area for "Hamm" (U 562) and "Koenenkamp" (U 375) has therefore been moved west, bounded by the meridian in CP 5866.

U 562 (Hamm) was ordered to send a situation report. The boat reported moderate traffic on the 200 meter line. Twice at night depth charges were dropped shortly before firing at periscope depth. 9 electric torpedoes.

U 375 (Koenenkamp) at 0432 contacted a convoy on a northerly course in CP 5959.

Captain U-boats sent the following radio message to Flag Officer, German Naval Command:

1) "Bartels" off Port Said after 9 July.

2) In July only 1 U-boat is operationally ready. Moreover, U-boat "Franken" on 9 July, the next boat not ready until 4 August.

3) More minelaying operations, apart from 1), in July require:

a) taking into account serious delays in the operation of the few boats available,

b) execution of missions during the full moon period, minelaying only when submerged. The only suitable place for this is Larnaca, which in our opinion is not likely to prove rewarding.

4) Therefore no more minelaying operations before the new moon period in August.

5) Daily situation: "Mehl" put in to Pola.

V. a) ./.

b) U 568 (Preuss) is reported missing for the first time with effect from 6 July. The boat put out from Messina on 24 May and did not report again. First request for a position report was on 2 June. The whole crew has been taken prisoner. Confirmation of the date of loss will follow in the second announcement.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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8 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 7330,
U 372 CP 8250,
U 453 CP 8340,
U 375 CP 5950,
U 562 CP 5680,
U 77 CP 3360.

b) U 77 put in to Salamis at 0730.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Same as on previous day.

III. a) U 372: 2215 CP 8245 convoy, course 90°.
U 372: 2312 enemy steering northeast, speed 10 knots.
U 372: 0003 CP 8225 2 steamers, 2 patrol vessels.
U 372: 0102 CP 8229 1 M.T.B. with escort.
U 372: 0155 CP 8234 convoy.
U 372: 0329 CP 5899 convoy, course 60°, speed 8 knots.
U 372: 0527 CP 5975 convoy, 2 Swordfish flying over it.
U 372: 0701 CP 5957 convoy.

b) ./.

c) 1005 unidentified unit in CP 8324 reported a surfaced U-boat.
1728 unidentified unit in CP 5976 reported a surfaced U-boat.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0822 CP 8152 1 steamer, course 180°.
1340 CJ 9663 1 submarine.

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IV. At 2215 U 372 (Neumann) contacted a convoy in CP 8245. Convoy steering an easterly course.

U 375 (Koenenkamp) and U 453 (Schlippenbach) received orders to operate on the convoy.

U 371 (Neumann) shadowed the convoy, consisting of 2 steamers, 3 escorts and 1 M.T.B. until 0700. The convoy, according to U 371, was in the following positions at the following times:

2215 CP 8245
0033 CP 8252
0102 CP 8229
0125 CP 8234
0245 CP 8232
0329 CP 8299
0527 CP 5975
0701 CP 5957

At 0250 U 372 reported misses, all torpedoes fired. In the shadower's report at 0527 "Neumann" reported 2 Swordfish flying over the convoy.

U 372 received orders to proceed to Salamis to replenish.

"Koenenkamp" and "Schlippenbach" have occupied their former attack areas.

At 0845 "Koenenkamp" reported: "Contacted "Neumann"'s convoy, submerged several times, aircraft, escorts. Cannot attack again as making for Haifa."

"Schlippenbach" and "Koenenkamp" were requested to send a situation report.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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9 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 5680,
U 375 CP 5950,
U 453 CP 8340,
U 372 CP 8250,
U 561 CP 7330,
U 97 CK 8940.

b) U 565 put out from Spezia at 1800.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Malta area, Alexandria - Cyprus - Crete area.

III. a) U 453: 1152 CP 8265 convoy, easterly course.
U 453: 1806 CP 5975 convoy, course 30°, speed 5 - 7 knots.
U 453: 1823 1 small steamer, 2 torpedoboats, wheeled aircraft.
U 453: 1906 CP 5972 convoy.

U 453: 2328 CP 5918 torpedoboat.

b) 1332 CP 7282 2 patrol vessels, 2 steamers, course 190°.
1540 CP 5865 1 auxiliary cruiser, 1 torpedoboat, 1 patrol vessel, 1 steamer, course 150°.

c), d), e) ./.

IV. At 1152 U 453 (Schlippenbach) contacted an eastbound convoy in CP 8265, at 1806 another shadower's report was received from U 453. It gave the convoy's position as CP 5975, course 30°, speed 5 - 7 knots.

At 1906, according to shadower's report, convoy was in CP 5972 (at 2126 in CP 5946).

At 2215 U 453 reported he was forced away and lost contact. At 2328 he reported: "Torpedoboat in 5918."

U 453 (Schlippenbach) and U 375 (Koenenkamp) were requested to send a situation report. "Koenenkamp" reported: "Air patrols in daytime and at night. Moderate traffic, small escort M.T.B.s also outside 200 meter line. Operations in the daytime while surfaced are only possible with restrictions."

"Schlippenbach" reported: "First sighting yesterday. No traffic on 200 meter line. Moderate to strong air forces."

Flag Officer German Naval Command concurred with the plans of Captain U-boats concerning minelaying operations.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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10 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 5680,
U 375 CP 5950,
U 453 CP 5970,
U 561 CP 7330,
U 372 CD 4580,
U 565 CJ 5420.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta, Crete, Tobruk - Alexandria, Alexandria, Port Said - Haifa.

III. a) ./.

b) Italian air reconnaissance reported:

0700 CP 7327 2 torpedoboats, 2 M.T.B.s, 1 small steamer, 2 medium-sized steamers, course 90°, speed 10 knots.
0750 CP 8183 1 torpedoboat, 4 minesweepers, course 180°, speed 6 knots.
0726 CP 7327 6 escort vessels, 3 steamers, course 60°.
0750 CP 8161 1 minesweeper, course 360°.

c) British aircraft reported at 0920: "Am over enemy U-boat in CP 5927."

d), e) ./.

IV. Nothing to report.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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11 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 5680,
U 375 CP 5950,
U 453 CP 8340,
U 561 CP 8110,
U 372 CO 5390,
U 565 CJ 9820.

b) U 565 put in to Messina at 1040, U 372 put in to Salamis at 0700.

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II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Same as on previous day.

III. a) ./.

b) 0818 CP 8218 1 destroyer, course 225°, speed 12 knots.

c) 0831 CP 8312 British unit reported: "Surfaced U-boat."
0920 CP 5927 British aircraft reported: "Surfaced U-boat."
0921 CP 5927 British aircraft reported: "U-boat has submerged."
1400 CP 5353 British unit reported: "One U-boat."

d), e) ./.

IV. U 561 (Hamm) was requested to transmit a short weather report. Weather report received.

U 562 (Bartels) reported by short signal "yes". This showed that he had completed his special mission.

U 453 (Schlippenbach) received orders to start the return passage to Pola. The boat has been at sea for 45 days with one short break (replenishing in Salamis lasting 4 days) and has been damaged (attack periscope unserviceable).

U 562 (Bartels) has occupied the area east of the meridian in CP 8244 and south of the parallel in CP 5888.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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12 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 5650,
U 375 CP 5950,
U 561 CP 8250,
U 453 CP 5870,
U 372 CK 8940,
U 565 CJ 9850.

b) U 565 put out from Messina at 2015.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta Area, Alexandria - Haifa - Crete area.

III. a), b), c), d) ./.

e) 1830 CK 7139 1 submarine (Italian Navy).
1530 CJ 4931 1 submarine (Italian Navy).

IV. U 453 (Schlippenbach) reported having started to return.

Otherwise nothing to report.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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13 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 5680,
U 375 CP 5950,
U 561 CP 8250,
U 453 CP 4960,
U 565 CO 1170.

b) ./.

II. a), b) ./.

III. a) U 562: 0251 CP 5666 5 escorts, 4 steamers, 1 tanker, course 205°.

b), c) ./.

d) 0600: the "Eagle", the "Charybdis", the "Cairo" and 3 destroyers put out from Gibraltar on an easterly course.

e) ./.

IV. U 453 (Schlippenbach) reported his position from CO 6637 by short signal at 0400.

U 562 (Hamm) in CP 5666 has successfully attacked a convoy.

V. a) U 562 reported a convoy in CP 5666, course 205°, speed 6 knots. 4 steamers, 5 escorts. Two hits on tanker over 5000 GRT. 2 electric torpedoes.

b) ./.

Additional note:

Captain U-boats on duty trip to Salamis from 2130.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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14 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 5650,
U 375 CP 5950,
U 561 CP 8250,
U 453 CO 6610,
U 565 CO 2790.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers, otherwise westward as far as radius of action allowed.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Alexandria, Haifa, Crete area.

III. a) ./.

b) 1600 CH 7349 1 carrier, 1 cruiser, 6 destroyers, course 90°, speed 20 knots.
0728 CP 7342 2 patrol vessels, course 255°.
0750 CP 7514 2 patrol vessels, course 255°.
0753 CP 7436 2 steamers, course 255°.

c) ./.

d) 2000 CP 7112 unidentified units, course 270°, speed 25 knots.

e) Italian Navy:

0430 CN 2648 1 submarine.

IV. Nothing to report.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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15 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 5650,
U 375 CP 5950,
U 561 CP 8250,
U 565 CP 4470,
U 453 CO 1680.

b) ./.

II. a) Sardinia area, Majorca, Algiers, Tunis.

b) Sicilian Channel.

III. a) ./.

b) 0830 CH 9145 carrier formation, course 270°, speed 18 knots.
0930 7 naval vessels, 5 steamers standing off and on Alexandria.
1235 CJ 7724 1 cruiser, easterly course, high speed.
1530 CJ 7816 1 cruiser, easterly course, high speed.
1720 CP 8212 2 destroyers, 1 escort vessel, 1 steamer, course 10°.
1720 CP 8132 1 escort vessel, course 10°.
1750 CP 7511 1 M.T.B., course 320°.
1752 CP 7433 1 steamer, course 135°.
1810 CP 7513 2 M.T.B.s, making for Alexandria.
1810 CP 7513 2 guardboats, course 360°.
2225 CN 2152 1 cruiser, course 90°.

c) 2330 British aircraft reported: "Have lost contact with U-boat."
1125 unidentified unit to Beirut: "Surfaced U-boat in CP 8248."

d) 0715 the cruiser "Charybdis" put in to Gibraltar.

e) Italian Navy:

2130 CJ 4697 1 submarine.
2130 CJ 1636 1 submarine.

IV. U 565 (Franken) received orders to make for CP 8235.

U 561 (Bartels) was requested to transmit a situation report, U 453 (Schlippenbach) a position report, U 375 (Koenenkamp) a short weather report.

U 561 (Bartels) reported: "Little traffic, few aircraft, yesterday missed destroyer, to-day depth charges in CP 8257. Basic overhaul necessary. U 375 (Koenenkamp) transmitted short weather report at 0324.

U 453 (Schlippenbach) reported his position at 0355 from CO 2759.

V. a), b) ./.

Captain U-boats in Salamis, inspecting the crews of U 77, U 97, U 372. Conference in base and with Admiral Aegean.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

16 - 31 JULY, 1942

PG/30925

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16 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 5650,
U 375 CP 5950,
U 561 CP 5850,
U 565 CP 8230,
U 453 CO 2710.

b) U 77 put out from Salamis at 1700.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Sicilian Channel, otherwise same as on previous day.

III. a) ./.

b) 1520 CP 5623 1 destroyer, 2 steamers, course 210°.
1655 CP 8195 2 steamers, westerly course.
1700 CP 8183 2 destroyers, course 180°.
1700 1 escort vessel, stopped, off Port Said.

c) 0020 aircraft reported off Alexandria: "Surfaced U-boat in CP 5293."

d) 0800 the "Eagle" put in to Gibraltar with destroyers.

e) ./.

IV. U 651 (Bartels) has occupied CP 58 as his attack area, U 565 (Franken) - the previous area of "Bartels" east of the meridian of CP 8213 and south of the parallel of CP 5888.

V. a), b) ./.

1900 Captain U-boats returned from Salamis.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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17 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 5650,
U 375 CP 5950,
U 565 CP 8220,
U 561 CP 5850,
U 77 CO 2910,
U 453 CK 7880.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Alexandria - Haifa - Crete area.

III. a) ./.

b) 0915 CP 7287 1 destroyer, 1 escort vessel, course 280°.
1725 CP 8196 4 escort vessels, 4 steamers, course 80°.
1739 CP 8119 3 escort vessels, 1 steamer, course 285°.
1800 CP 7291 2 barges, course 70°.
0637 CP 7255 3 escort vessels, 1 steamer, westerly course.
0647 CD 4769 2 escort vessels, course 105°.

c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1550 CK 7218 1 submarine.

IV. U 77 (Schonder) reported crossing 35° N at 0955.

U 561 (Bartels) has commenced return passage.

The boat reported: "Yesterday aircraft and destroyer group. Accident to the conning tower hatch preventing diving. Flying boat shot down. Considerable depth charges. Damaged - muffler valves, cooling water and lubricating oil pumps. Pumping plant, periscope, multi-unit hydrophones etc." Then from CP 4545 the boat reported through Mines Officer the areas mined on this operation.

V. a) U 561 (Bartels) shot down a flying boat. (See under IV.)

b) ./.

The following radio message was sent from Captain U-boats to Flag Officer German Naval Command: "Request details of Lt.Cmdr.Oehrn's whereabouts, for report to C-in-C U-boats, as uncertainty and worry exist as a result of radio message heard here." The following radio message was received from Flag Officer German Naval Command: "Lt.Cmdr. Oehrn, advisor on U-boat questions at Naval Command Operations Headquarters North Africa, Mersa Matruh, has been missing since 14 July. Apart from the above-mentioned primary duty, Lt.Cmdr.Oehrn was also employed on duties representing Flag Officer with C-in-C South, and in other important conferences. At 1730 on 13 July, as ordered, he went in a personnel motor transport, driven by "Magnusdamm", official number 5274/41 KT, from the battle headquarters of C-in-C South to the battle headquarters of Field Marshal Rommel for a conference on the co-ordination of supplies by sea and the present military situation. Flag Officer meanwhile left

battle headquarters of C-in-C South for Tobruk for similar discussions with the Italian Navy. Rommel's battle headquarters is still 38 kilometers ahead of C-in-C South, 35 kilometers of that is the main road "Via Balbia", then 3 kilometers inland. Oehrn did not arrive at Rommel's headquarters. A 2-day search by car and aircraft was in vain. We must presume the officer lost. There is no explanation of the occurrence. He could not have missed the road. Hundreds of cars run on it daily. The only possibility is that Oehrn did not reach his destination during daylight because he had a breakdown, continued in the dark for unknown reasons and then reached the battle area or enemy territory. Detailed report follows. Flag Officer German Naval Command Operations Staff, North Africa."

Serial No. 159/42 Secret.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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18 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 5650,
U 375 CP 5950,
U 565 CP 8220,
U 77 CO 6620,
U 561 CO 6630,
U 453 CK 4810,

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete - Alexandria area.

III. a) ./.

b) 0850 CP 7282 1 tanker, 3 steamers, westerly course.
1800 CP 7292 1 minesweeper, 1 escort vessel, course 70°.
1845 CP 7511 2 destroyers, course 270°.
0705 CP 7276 1 guardboat, 2 steamers, course 100°.

c) 2130 reconnaissance aircraft reported a bearing in CP 7266 on A.S.V. set: probably a U-boat.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1145 CJ 1399 1 submarine.

IV. From reconnaissance reports it is evident that enemy supply traffic is again running to Alexandria.

The following radio message was received from Flag Officer German Naval Command: "Owing to the change in the situation, supply traffic is again proceeding to Alexandria from the east. It is very important that this should be attacked at the present time. The last meridian limitation is nullified for U-boat operations. We must expect E-boat operations, without warning, as far as 30° 30' E."

U 565 (Franken), which has been in the operational area east of Port Said for the last few days, is set on this traffic. An overlapping of the E-boat operational area must be avoided, so "Franken" is limited to the west by 30° 30' E.

The boats were assigned to the following attack areas:

U 565 (Franken) will operate south of the parallel of CP 4985 and between the meridians of CP 8144 and CP 7266.

U 375 (Koenenkamp) will operate east of the meridian of CP 5865, south of the parallel of CP 5912.

U 562 (Hamm) will operate east of the meridian of CP 8213, south of the parallel of CP 5888. "Koenenkamp"'s northern limit is "Hamm"'s southern limit.

U 565 (Franken) was requested to send in a short weather report between 0200 and 0500. Short weather report was received.

U 561 (Bartels) was ordered to go to Spezia for repairs.

V. a), b) ./.

We were informed as follows in Serial Number Naval War Staff 1st Division (Operations) 24912/42G:- Reuter reported at 1335/18 July from Capetown that a German U-boat was destroyed by 2 South African patrol boats in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The last loss was U 568 (Preuss) towards the end of May or the beginning of June.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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19 July 1942

I. a) U 562 CP 5950,
U 375 CP 8340,
U 565 CP 7320,
U 77 CP 5740,
U 561 CO 5290,
U 453 CK 4170.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Crete - Alexandria area, Malta area.

III. a) U 562: 1750 CP 5694 escorted troopship, course 140°.

b) 0906 CJ 7487 1 cruiser, course 270°.
1625 CH 9435 1 cruiser.
1730 CP 7239 4 naval vessels, 2 steamers, course 240°.
1735 CP 8125 1 escort vessel, course 175°.
0715 CP 7282 4 escort vessels, 10 M.T.B.s, 1 steamer, course 210°.
0721 CP 7225 2 light cruisers, 4 destroyers, course 90°, high speed.

c) 1234 CP 8125 a British aircraft sighted a U-boat.

d) 0400 the "Eagle" and 2 cruisers put out from Gibraltar to the east.

e) Italian Navy:

1700 CO 5812 1 submarine.

IV. From 2400/19 July the area north of 33° 40' N and east of 30° E will no longer be occupied by Italian U-boats.

It is intended to set U 77 (Schonder) off Beirut, Tripoli and Famagusta and on their communicating routes; as it is unlikely that part of the British supply traffic will follow a direct route from the ports of Cyprus, from Tripoli, Beirut and Haifa to Alexandria or Port Said, U 77 was ordered to make a reconnaissance of CP 57 eastern half, CP 58 and CP 55 while proceeding to the operational area.

U 565 (Franken) was instructed that our own E-boats operate, without notification, as far as the meridian of CP 7344.

U 562 (Hamm) reported an unsuccessful attack on an escorted troopship. The boat has used all its torpedoes and has been damaged by depth charges. It has commenced the return passage to Spezia.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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20 July 1942

I. a) U 565 CP 7320,
U 562 CP 4690,
U 77 CP 5730,
U 375 CP 8340,
U 561 CO 1920,
U 453 CJ 3760.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete - Alexandria - Port Said area.

III. a) ./.

b) 0915 east of Cape de Hata minelaying cruiser, course 300°.
1040 CP 7279 4 escort vessels, 10 M.T.B.s, 1 steamer, course 160°.
1645 1 submarine.
1755 CP 7513 2 M.T.B.s, course 300°.
1820 CP 7324 1 auxiliary sailing vessel.
1950 CO 6571 1 submerged submarine.

c) ./.

d) 1400 minelaying cruiser put in to Gibraltar.

e) Italian Navy:

0325 CH 5958 Force H, course 360°, speed 18 knots.

IV. U 375 (Koenenkamp), after the departure of U 562 (Hamm), again occupied the area off Haifa between the parallels of CP 5913 and CP 5978 east of the meridian of CP 5866.

U 77 (Schonder) was ordered to give a short situation report on crossing the parallel of CP 5555. The report was received. The boat reported moderate air patrol.

V. a), b) ./.

The following circumstances govern the disposition of the U-boats:

1) The allocation of only 3 U-boats to the operational area has confined the boats to the most important areas where traffic is expected. The areas chosen must not be too large.

2) It is necessary that one boat should occupy the area occupied by the Italians between Cyprus and the ports of Tripoli - Beirut, as rather important traffic is expected from and to Cyprus.

3) One boat must remain off Haifa, the most efficient and most heavily occupied port.

4) As to the choice of the third available boat being disposed off Port Said or between Port Said and Alexandria, the decision was made in favor of the disposition in the sea areas between the ports, since

   a) it can then intercept the supplies to Alexandria, which, destined for the army in Egypt, are the most important;

   b) the chosen disposition to intercept Port Said - Alexandria traffic certainly offers less chance of interception than off Port Said. On the other hand, however, any direct traffic from the ports on the Syrian coast to Alexandria can be attacked with greater prospects of success. For the determination of the western limit of the area see War Diary of 18 July.

5) When another boat arrives in the operational area, it is intended to operate it off Port Said.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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21 July 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 5290,
U 375 CP 5960,
U 565 CP 7320,
U 562 CO 6640,
U 561 CO 1590,
U 453 CJ 2360.

b) U 453 put in to Pola at 0815.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete area, Alexandria, Port Said and CP 50.

III. a) ./.

b) 0900 CH 9111 Force H, mean westerly course, high speed.
1525 CP 7288 1 escort vessel, 1 minesweeper, course 30°.
1750 CP 7285 2 escort vessels, course 200°.
1810 CP 7255 2 escort vessels, 1 steamer, course 50°.

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1815 CP 7188 4 M.T.B.s, westerly course.
1845 CP 8273 3 escort vessels, 1 tanker, 1 steamer, course 60°.
0650 CP 7282 4 fast motor minesweepers (?), course 90°.

c), d), e) ./.

IV. Nothing to report.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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22 July 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 5290,
U 375 CP 5950,
U 565 CP 7320,
U 97 CK 8950,
U 562 CO 2780,
U 561 CJ 9850.

b) U 561 put in to Messina at 0810, put out to sea at 1830.
U 97 put out from Salamis at 1630.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete - Alexandria - Port Said area.

III. a) ./.

b) 0925 CP 8128 8 guardboats, 1 tanker, 1 steamer, course 270°, 1 steamer sinking.
1000 CP 7288 3 escort vessels, 1 steamer, course set for Alexandria.
1425 CP 7326 2 cruisers, 3 destroyers or escort vessels, westerly course. Another aircraft reported this formation as 6 escort vessels, 2 steamers.
1420 CP 8183 3 escort vessels, 1 steamer, probably sinking.
1422 CP 8179 2 steamers stopped.

c) By radio bearing, 0900 1 U-boat in CJ 1347.

d) Between 1000 and 1100 Force H put in to Gibraltar.

e) ./.

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IV. Nothing to report.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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23 July 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 5950,
U 77 CP 5390,
U 565 CP 7320,
U 97 CO 2640,
U 562 CN 3360,
U 561 CJ 8340.

b) U 561 put in to Spezia at 0730.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete - Alexandria - Haifa area.

III. a) U 375: CP 5984 1 small freighter.

b) 0630 CP 7244 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, easterly course.
1445 CP 8224 3 destroyers, high speed, course 60°.
1515 CP 8146 1 destroyer, moderate speed, course 120°.
1515 CP 7286 1 M.T.B., course 240°.

c) At 1800 1 aircraft sighted a submerged U-boat in CP 8312.

d) ./.

e) At 1645 on echo-ranging set 1 submarine CJ 1344.

IV. U 375 (Koenenkamp) reported from CP 7984 misses on small freighter, otherwise no traffic. 5 electric torpedoes: request permission to commence return passage on Sunday. Refuelling and engine overhaul, if possible at Spezia.

The boat was requested to report the defects which made the return passage to Spezia necessary.

V. a), b) ./.

VI. a) It was intended that U 205 (Reschke) should carry out more minelaying operations off Haifa, (previously undertaken by U 81 (Guggenberger)), in the August new moon period (date of sailing 1 August). As the Italian Navy is planning a special operation off Haifa at this time,

U 205's operation is not possible in that area. It is being investigated whether instead of this it would be advantageous to mine the area off the pipeline and in front of Tripoli harbor, and whether in view of the small number of U-boats in operational readiness it would be rewarding to reduce the torpedoes on one boat by half.

In accordance with Naval War Staff 1st Division 1 M 18013/42 Most Secret, the German Naval Command Italy is to investigate whether it would be possible to have the boats operate on the aircraft-ferrying operations which are being carried out by carriers from Gibraltar to Malta. The operation is regarded by Naval War Staff as promising success.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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24 July 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 5390,
U 375 CP 5970,
U 565 CP 5920,
U 97 CO 6610,
U 562 CJ 8320.

b) U 562 put in to Spezia at 0730.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete area, Alexandria, Haifa.

III. a) ./.

b) 0617 CP 7327 2 medium-sized merchant ships, 1 destroyer, 2 (presumed) escort vessels, moderate speed.
0700 CP 7254 probably the same formation, 2 medium-sized and 1 small merchant ship, 3 guardboats, course 180°, moderate speed.
1515 CP 8165 4 medium-sized merchant ships, 5 escort vessels, course 50°, speed slight.

c) 0543 CP 5947 British aircraft reported a surfaced U-boat, course 40°, speed 4 knots.

d), e) ./.

IV. U 375 (Koenenkamp) reported: "Repairs to Diesel couplings. Both Diesel cooling water pumps out of order, new installation of Junkers compressor."

The boat was directed to remain in the operational area at present.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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25 July 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 5390,
U 375 CP 5970,
U 565 CP 8130,
U 97 CP 7350.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete area, Alexandria, Haifa.

III. a) ./.

b) 0655 CP 7248 4 naval vessels, 2 of which seemed to be destroyers, easterly course, speed not reported.
0730 CP 5921 4 medium-sized merchant ships, 1 tanker, 4 guardboats and 3 escort vessels, course 180°, speed slight. With the same time of origin, 1 probable freighter of approximately 5000 GRT, stopped, same position.
0845 CO 6133 1 submarine, easterly course, speed 8 knots.
1835 CP 7125 2 M.T.B.s, westerly course, high speed.

Italian air reconnaissance:

1330 CP 5981 2 destroyers, course 0°, speed 18 knots.

c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1505 CO 7271 1 submarine. Report doubtful.
1630 CJ 8863 1 submarine, course and speed not reported.

IV. U 97 (Bürgel) has occupied the previous operational area of U 565 (Franken) between Port Said and Alexandria. "Franken" is occupying the area off

Port Said and east of it. The boats in the operational area have received the following attack areas:

U 77 (Schonder) will operate from Tripoli, Beirut and Famagusta and on the communicating routes of these ports.

U 375 (Koenenkamp) in the area between the parallels of CP 5921 and CP 5987, east of the meridian of CP 5866.

U 565 (Franken) between the meridians of CP 5777 and CP 5888, south of the parallel of CP 5782, southern limit CP 8152.

U 97 (Bürgel) between the meridians of CP 7266 and CP 8114, south of the parallel of CP 4986.

U 565 was requested to give a short situation report. The report was received: "Moderate traffic of destroyers on 40 meter line, moderate air activity, bright nights CP 7352."

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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26 July 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 5390,
U 375 CP 5970,
U 565 CP 8130,
U 97 CP 7350.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete area, Alexandria, Haifa.

III. a) ./.

b) Italian air reconnaissance:

0845 CP 5988 1 destroyer, 2 medium-sized merchant ships, northerly course, speed 8 knots.

c) 2043 CP 8129 British aircraft reported a surfaced U-boat.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0340 CN 3213 1 submarine, course 270°, speed indefinite.
1030 CJ 2331 1 submarine, course and speed indefinite.

IV. U 565 (Franken) was ordered to concentrate on the western part of his operational area.

Nothing special to report.

V. a), b) ./.

Captain U-boats on duty trip to Pola.

VI. For the investigation of the employment of 2 U-boats in the Western Mediterranean ordered in Naval War Staff 1st Division I M 18013/42 Most Secret of 24 August (sic), the number of U-boats probably at operational readiness is of decisive importance. At present the situation is as follows:-

a) In the operational area:

1) U 375 (Koenenkamp) with a half supply of torpedoes. The boat has been operating for approximately 4 weeks and must be withdrawn to Salamis for refuelling and short repairs within the next few days.

2) U 97 (Bürgel) after intermediate replenishing in Salamis probably in operational readiness in 3 weeks.

3) U 77 (Schonder) same as U 97.

4) U 565 still has all his torpedoes; will probably have to put in to Salamis for intermediate replenishing in 14 days.

b) During August the following will be ready for operations:

1) U 372 (Neumann) ready to put out on 27 August after intermediate replenishing in Salamis; operation will probably last 3 weeks.

2) U 73 (Rosenbaum), U 83 (Kraus), U 205 (Reschke), U 331 (v.Thiessenhausen) will be ready for operations between 1 and 4 August in Spezia, and can be in the operational area in the Eastern Mediterranean any time after 7 days later.

3) U 559 (Heidtmann) clear in Pola on 15 August; will arrive in the operational area about 25 August.

4) U 81 (Guggenberger) and U 431 (Dommes) probably ready (in Spezia) to put out on 23 August, in the operational area by the end of August.

c) Accordingly, as far as can be seen, the following will be in the operational area in August:

1) By 8 August 4 boats.

2) Accordingly by the middle of August, with luck, 7 boats.

3) In the second half of August, definitely 4 boats, with luck 6-7 boats, not counting the boats mentioned in b) 4.

The War Diary of Flag Officer of Naval Command contains further observations on U-boat operations and the decision.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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27 July 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 5396,
U 375 CP 5976,
U 565 CP 8119,
U 97 CP 7351.

b) U 372 put out from Salamis at 1815.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Malta area, Alexandria area and Nile Delta.

III. a) ./.

b) 1315 CP 5928 1 destroyer, 1 tanker and 2 medium-sized steamers, course 0°, speed 8 knots.

c) 1430 CP 5868 submerged U-boat, course 285°, speed 8 knots.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0940 CJ 1672 by radio direction finding bearing 1 submarine.
0824 CO 9244 1 submarine, course and speed not reported.

According to an Italian agent's report, on 22 July a British submarine was sunk off Haifa. The boat is said to be lying in 110 meters water.

IV. U 375 (Koenenkamp) contacted a convoy at 0718 in CP 5984. (3 steamers, 2 corvettes). Convoy was steering a course of 30°, speed 9 knots. The boat attacked, but had no success because of a misfire. The query as to whether it could commence the return passage was answered in the negative, as the boat still has 2 stern torpedoes and the intention is that the boat will commence return passage whenever U 372 (Neumann) arrives in the operational area.

V. a), b) ./.

Captain U-boats inspecting at Pola.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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28 July 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 5390,
U 375 CP 5970,
U 565 CP 8110,
U 97 CP 7350,
U 372 CO 2890.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Alexandria area, Port Said.

III. a) ./.

b) 1655 CP ... 2 destroyers, course 80°, speed slight.

c) Aircraft to Alexandria: "Am over enemy U-boat CP 5975, 22 miles westnorthwest of Jaffa."

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0030 CO 4316 1 submarine.
0953 CK 4795 1 submarine.
2155 CJ 2334 Navy at Trieste located 1 submarine by listening set.

IV. U 372 (Neumann) has passed 35° N to the south.

Nothing special to report.

V. a), b) ./.

Captain U-boats returned from Pola.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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29 July 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 5390,
U 375 CP 5980,
U 565 CP 8110,
U 97 CP 7350,
U 372 CO 6610.

b) U 375 commenced return passage at 0400.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Malta area, Alexandria and Suez area.

III. a), b) ./.

c) 1614 CP 5948 1 submerged U-boat, course 45°, speed 10 knots.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0340 CO 5919 1 submarine.
1000 CK 7653 1 submarine.

IV. According to a report from Group South an Italian and a German U-boat were said to have been damaged by bombs and were thus unable to submerge. U 77 (Schonder) is operating in this area. The boat was requested to report his position. Report was received.

U 375 (Koenenkamp) has commenced the return passage on account of his fuel position. The boat was ordered to go to Salamis. U 372 (Neumann) has occupied "Koenenkamp"'s previous operational area.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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30 July 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 5390,
U 375 CP 5830,
U 565 CP 8110,
U 97 CP 7350,
U 372 CP 4690.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Malta area, Alexandria and Port Said area.

III. a) ./.

b) Italian air reconnaissance:

0950 CP 8135 2 schooners putting in to Port Said.

c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0800 CO 5712 1 submarine.

IV. U 77 (Schonder) and U 565 (Franken) were requested to send situation reports.

U 77 reported: "At times moderate traffic of escorted steamers through CP 2970." The boat also reported a success. In an attack on a destroyer he had three pistol failures. The boat hit and damaged the destroyer with 3 torpedoes. The boat still has 8 torpedoes.

U 565 (Franken) reported: "No traffic for 8 days. Slight air activity. Boat still has all its torpedoes."

On 17 July the boat found an abandoned Italian aircraft (number M.M.23729).

V. a) U 77 (Schonder) reported sinking 2 transport sailing vessels and damaging a destroyer. The destroyer was hit by 3 torpedoes; in each case the pistol failed.

U 565 (Franken) reported sinking a transport sailing ship.

U 375 (Koenenkamp) reported sinking 2 transport sailing ships.

VI. The following direction was sent by Flag Officer Naval Command as a result of the order Naval War Staff 1st Division I A 1445/42 Most Secret of 29 July:

"Of the next U-boats ready for operations, three will be assigned to the Western Mediterranean. Their assignment is the destruction of the Gibraltar forces penetrating into the sea area south of the Balearic Islands to ferry aircraft, and also of single supply vessels from Malta. Main attack target: Aircraft carriers and heavy naval units. The boats are to try to remain unobserved until they contact the enemy. The disposition and the adjustment of the operational areas with the Italians is left to Captain U-boats."

The following are intended for operations in the Western Mediterranean:

U 83 (Kraus), U 73 (Rosenbaum) and U 205 (Reschke). The boats will put out from Spezia between 1 and 3

August. The evaluation of reconnaissance results from previous operations of Gibraltar forces shows that the enemy, with varying courses, proceeds via 59 southern half, 83 northern half and 91, to ferry aircraft. A formation in 91 seems particularly promising.

The discussion with the Italian U-boat Command has the following result:

1) In both 83 northern half and 59 southern half there is an Italian U-boat at present.

2) The dispatch of 4 more U-boats to the Western Mediterranean is intended within the next few days. We are still investigating whether these boats will be set west or east of those named in 1).

3) There are no objections to 91 being occupied by 3 German U-boats.

4) Attacks on submarines are forbidden on both sides.

5) For combined operation, in which Italian U-boats supply reconnaissance information, the main difficulty is the long delay in such messages. Because of the increase in British air patrols to the west there are objections to a disposition too far west. All reports from German and Italian U-boats are passed on by the quickest route. The details for the operating of 3 boats in the Western Mediterranean are contained in Appendix 4 of operational order No. 6.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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31 July 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 2980,
U 372 CP 5950,
U 565 CP 8120,
U 97 CP 7350,
U 375 CP 4570.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Haifa, Alexandria, Crete area.

III. a) ./.

b), c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0835 CJ 3183 1 submarine - inexact position.
1404 CO 2145 1 submarine, course 330°.
2145 CO 5921 1 submarine, course and speed not reported.

IV. U 565 (Franken) lost his main periscope in an attack. The boat was ordered to proceed to Salamis. The periscope can be changed there.

V. a), b) ./.

Captain U-boats on duty trip to Spezia.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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Comments of Flag Officer of German Naval Command Italy on War Diary of Captain U-boats Italy for the period 1 - 31 July 1942.

1) No observations on the employment of the boats off the Syrian coast.

2) I concur with the statements on a minelaying operation and with the decision to refrain from any other minelaying operations apart from the current operation off Port Said in July. The minelaying operation planned by Captain U-boats off Haifa in the August new moon period cannot be executed because of an Italian operation scheduled for the same period. I agree with Captain U-boats that further minelaying operations off Alexandria and off ports on the Syrian coast would bring no reward. We are still awaiting the effect of the minelaying undertaken off Port Said.

3) The reduction in the number of available U-boats in the Mediterranean necessitates the greatest possible stepping-up of efficiency as well as a great restriction in the choice of assignments. The practice of Captain U-boats, i.e. the sending of the boats to Salamis - if they have no major requirements - between 2 operations for recuperation of the crew, replenishing and attention to minor repairs - does not fulfill its purpose satisfactorily in that the repair periods are disproportionately long because of an insufficient number of German dockyard workers in Salamis.

4) The remarks submitted by Captain U-boats on the choice of the waiting position for U-boats operating in the Western Mediterranean and individual orders given in Appendix 4 to Operational Order No. 6 are correct and adequate.

(Signed) Weichold.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

1 - 15 AUGUST, 1942

PG/30925

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1 August, 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 2988,
U 372 CP 5955,
U 97 CP 7352,
U 565 CP 4945,
U 375 CO 6198.

b) U 565 commenced return passage at 2230.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Haifa, Alexandria, Crete area.

III. a), b) ./.

c) 2050 CK 7251 1 submarine.

d) 2123 CO 7853 1 enemy unit.

e) ./.

IV. Nothing special to report. U 83 (Kraus) cannot put to sea because the Commander is sick. The boat is at operational readiness.

V. a), b) ./.

Captain U-boats returned from Spezia at 2345.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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2 August, 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 2988,
U 372 CP 5955,
U 97 CP 7352,
U 565 CO 6538,
U 375 CO 2643.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Malta, Port Said, Alexandria area.

III. a) 1800 CP 5123 2 destroyers, 1 merchant vessel, southerly course.

b) 1546 CP 8165 1 destroyer, course 230°, high speed.

c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0900 CO 5675 1 enemy submarine. Course and speed not known.

IV. At 1800 U 372 (Neumann) contacted a convoy consisting of 2 destroyers and 1 steamer. No further reports were received apart from this first shadower's report.
U 205 (Reschke) cannot put to sea because of trouble with the boat. Sailing has been postponed 24 hours.

V. a) U 565 reported sinking another transport sailing ship.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

3 August, 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 2988,
U 372 CP 5955,
U 97 CP 7352,
U 565 CO 5365.

b) U 375 put in to Salamis at 0845.
U 205 put out from Spezia at 2100.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Port Said, Crete, Alexandria area.

III. a), b), c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0350 CJ 2269 1 submarine, doubtful sighting from torpedoboat "Pilo".
0800 CJ 3865 1 submarine.
1018 CK 7212 " "
1520 CO 4978 " "
1755 CO 4958 " "

IV. The boats were forbidden to attack submarines east of 30° E, as the Italian Navy intends to carry out a special operation off Haifa with one U-boat in the new moon period.
Nothing special to report.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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4 August, 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 2980,
U 372 CP 5950,
U 97 CP 7350,
U 565 CK 8970,
U 205 CJ 1820.

b) U 73 put out from Spezia at 1100.

II. a) Straits of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Malta, Crete, Alexandria area, coast of Syria.

III. a) ./.

b) 1520 CO 2843 1 submarine.
1700 CO 2876 the same submarine.

c) 0617 CP 5949 1 surfaced U-boat.
0618 CP 5981 1 surfaced U-boat.
0012 CP 5954 1 U-boat.

d), e) ./.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

It is apparent from radio intercept reports that U 372 (Neumann) has frequently been seen and that the boat is being chased by aircraft and destroyers.
Since the Italian Navy has requested that our boats should not enter the area off Haifa after 6 August, Neumann was at once ordered to vacate his operational area (off Haifa). The boat has been granted permission to execute the special assignment (landing an agent near Beirut).
The boats have been informed that the area between the parallels of CP 5652 and CP 5952 and east of the meridian of CP 5595 is not to be entered until further notice.
U 372 (Neumann) was requested to transmit a short weather report between 1400 and 1900. The weather report is not received.
U 97 (Bürgel) was requested to send a situation report.
At 1445 a radio message was received from Bürgel. The boat reported: Bombs, unable to submerge, no compass, my position at 1400 on 5 August was CO 2592. Air escort for the boat was requested and granted. The boat has been asked for a position report for the air escort. The report has been received. At 1650 the boat was in CO 6341.
Admiral Aegean has placed destroyer ZG3 at our disposal to escort Bürgel. The boat has been informed that the destroyer will be in CO 2592 at 1400 on 5 August. At 1950

Bürgel reported that he would be at point 140A at 1900 on 5 August.
Bürgel was requested to report his position at 0400 by short signal for the use of the air escort when it becomes light. Report was received. Boat will be in CO 5319 at 0400.

b) Western boats:

The Western boats were informed that they might expect the Gibraltar forces to put to sea.

V. a), b) ./.

Captain U-boats on duty trip to Paris.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

5 August, 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 2988,
U 372 CP 5868,
U 97 CO 2869,
U 205 CH 6563,
U 73 CH 4142.

b) U 331 put out from Spezia at 1800.
U 97 made fast at Salamis at 2245.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Malta, Crete, Alexandria area.

III. a) Italian U-boat:

1015 CJ 6227 1 enemy submarine.

b) 0945 CO 6519 1 submarine submerging, course 250°.
1005 CP 8139 3 destroyers and 2 steamers, course 180°.
The same formation was reported by an Italian aircraft in the same position as 3 warships, type unknown, course 45°.

c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0755 CK 7691 1 enemy submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 97 (Bürgel) was ordered to report by short signal "Yes" when the boat had been picked up by destroyer "ZG 3". Report was received at 1452.

U 97 put in to Salamis at 2300.
U 372 (Neumann) was requested to send a situation report. No report is received.

b) Western boats:

Carrier formation put to sea at 0300.
Course not known.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

6 August, 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 2980,
U 372 CP 5860,
U 205 CH 9180,
U 73 CH 9160,
U 331 CJ 1730.

b) U 83 put out from Spezia at 1700.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Malta area, Port Said, Alexandria.

III. a), b), c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1600 CO 5324 1 enemy submarine.
2040 CJ 6785 1 enemy submarine.
1945 CK 8966 1 enemy submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 372 (Neumann) was again requested to send a situation report. No report was received.

b) Western boats:

According to an agent, the Gibraltar forces put out to the west.
Western boats' operational areas.
U 205 (Reschke) has occupied southern third,
U 73 (Rosenbaum) central third of CH 91.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 August, 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 2980,
U 372 CP 5860,
U 205 CH 9180,
U 73 CH 9160,
U 331 CH 6820,
U 83 CJ 5460.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Malta area, Haifa, Jaffa, Beirut.

III. a) ./.

b) 0910 CN 2887 submerged submarine, attacked by one SC 250. Result not ascertained.
1235 CP 5636 1 freighter of approximately 3,000 G.R.T. course 30°, speed 10 knots.
1305 CP 2878 2 freighters, 1 patrol vessel, course 150°, speed 10 knots.

Italian air reconnaissance:

0535 CP 5617 2 destroyers, course 150°, high speed.
0830 CP 5835 1 M.T.B., course 150°, high speed.
0935 CP 5816 2 destroyers, course 150°, high speed.

German air reconnaissance:

1200 CP 5958 2 destroyers, 2 escort vessels, 2 guardboats, 2 merchant ships, northerly course, speed slight.

c) ./.

d) 2215 CP 4568 1 British unit.

e) Italian Navy:

1305 CO 5221 1 submarine.
0740 CO 2359 1 submarine. Submarine was sighted twice more. Last sighting at 1455 in CO 2385.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 77 (Schonder) was requested to transmit a short weather report. Weather report was received.

b) Western boats:

U 331 (Tiesenhausen) has occupied the northern third of CH 91 as a waiting position.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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8 August, 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 2980,
U 372 CP 5860,
U 331 CH 9120,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 205 CH 9180.

b) U 83 put out from Messina at 1800.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) ./.

III. a) ./.

b) 1500 CP 8145 1 merchant ship of 5000 G.R.T., course 300°, speed slight.
1505 CP 8196 1 small merchant ship, course 90°, moderate speed.

c), d) ./.

e) 1300 CJ 9532 1 enemy submarine.
2025 CO 3884 1 enemy submarine.
2300 CJ 9536 1 enemy submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

It can be gathered from radio intercept reports that a boat was attacked by an aircraft between 1845 and 1900 in the Western Mediterranean in the vicinity of German and Italian U-boat waiting positions. So far no report has been received about this from own boats.

V. a),b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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9 August, 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 2980,
U 372 CP 5860,
U 331 CH 9120,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 205 CH 9180.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Malta area, Crete, Haifa.

III. a), b), c), d) ./.

e) 0110 CO 3244 1 submarine.
0200 CO 2665 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

The boats were informed that it seemed from radio intercept reports that a U-boat was attacked by our aircraft in the vicinity of the waiting positions and that forces were being deployed on an anti-U-boat hunt in this area.

U 331 (Tiesenhausen) reported: Yesterday at 1845 in in CH 9115 alarm given for Lockheed Hudson, then bombs. Rudder jammed, repaired, succeeded in driving off aircraft. First watchkeeping officer and one Chief Bosun's mate wounded. Will be at point C 1 at 0600 on 10 August to disembark at Spezia. Boat clear, CH 6346.

According to U 331's report, the attack on a U-boat - deduced from yesterday's radio intercept reports - was made on this boat.

U 331 was ordered to proceed to Spezia.
U 73 (Rosenbaum) has occupied the northern half,
U 205 (Reschke) the southern half of CH 91.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

10 August, 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 2980,
U 372 CP 5860,
U 83 CO 5120,
U 205 CH 9180,
U 73 CH 9120.

b) U 83 put in to Spezia at 0800.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Malta area, Haifa, Port Said, Alexandria.

III. a) ./.

b) Italian air reconnaissance:

0945 CJ 9587 1 submarine.
1930 CJ 8852 1 submarine.

German air reconnaissance:

1900 CH 8178 2 aircraft carriers,
2 battleships, 2 cruisers,
14 destroyers, 12 steamers,
course 90°.

c), d), e) ./.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 83 (Kraus) was requested to transmit a short weather report. Report was received.

b) Western boats:

According to an agent, a strong formation passed eastward through the Straits of Gibraltar during the night of 9/10. According to an air report this formation was in CH 8178 at 1900, and consisted of two battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 2 cruisers, 14 destroyers and 15 steamers. The boats were given permission to attack any targets of the formation.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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11 August, 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 2980,
U 372 CP 5320,
U 83 CP 4420,
U 205 CH 9180,
U 73 CH 9120.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Crete, Beirut, Haifa, Malta area.

III. a) 1710 CP 5424 4 cruisers, 10 destroyers.

b) Italian air reconnaissance:

0930 CJ 9579 1 enemy submarine.
1050 CJ 9868 1 enemy submarine.
1000 CJ 5725 1 enemy submarine.

German air reconnaissance:

0820 CP 7252 2 merchant ships, 2 escorts.
1215 CP 5358 1 merchant ship, 1 tanker,
2 destroyers.

A large enemy convoy escorted by several

aircraft carriers and battleships, as well as a large number of light units, was spotted by our air reconnaissance after 0800 and shadowed constantly. Enemy is probably proceeding in 3 groups on an easterly course, speed 13 - 15 knots.

1st Group. CH 9144 1 aircraft carrier, 4 cruisers, 7 destroyers, and a large unit which could not be distinguished.

2nd Group. 3 aircraft carriers (probably including the "Wasp"), 3 battleships (probably including the "Rodney" and the "Nelson"), about 20 - 25 cruisers and destroyers and 20 merchant ships (CH 5918).

3rd Group. CH 5973 6 destroyers in line abreast. The main enemy group in CH 9137 at 1746. 1807 CH 9168, apparently combined formation with 3 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 6 cruisers, 20 destroyers and 21 merchant ships.

c), d), e) ./.

IV. Eastern boats:

At 2025 U 83 (Kraus) - proceeding to the coast of Syria - reported, with time of origin 1710, CP 5424, 4 cruisers, 10 destroyers lost to sight on westerly courses. Unsuccessful.

U 83 (Kraus) was ordered to occupy the area between the meridians in CP 7265 and CP 8141 south of the parallel in CP 4985 as his attack area.

Western boats:

Our air forces contacted a convoy eastbound from Gibraltar. Shadowers' reports, composition and formation of the convoy were passed on to the boats. Convoy consists of about 65 vessels as follows: "First group: 1 carrier, 4 cruisers, 7 destroyers, 1 merchant ship; second group: 3 battleships (the "Rodney" and the "Nelson" among them), 20 escort vessels including cruisers and destroyers, about 20 merchant ships; third group: 6 destroyers.

At 1827 the following radio signal with time of origin 1145 was received from U 73 (Rosenbaum): "Enemy convoy sighted in 9118. Enemy is proceeding at 12 knots, course 90°."

Immediately after the transmission of this radio signal a radio message was transmitted by a boat, containing 1) Composition of one of the convoy groups 2) Success report and 3) Report on depth charge hunt. This radio message was probably also transmitted by U 73.

At 2215 both boats were requested for a position report. Both reports were received. U 73 was in CH 9122, U 205 in CH 9258.

The following radio message was sent to the boats:

"Rosenbaum, Reschke: Boat that sank the "Eagle" to report LQAF by short signal."

U 73 reported this group.

After 0300 an aircraft sent direction finding signals to guide both boats.

U 73 at 0617 reported his position from CH 9341.

No direction finding signals heard.

V. a) U 73 reported: Convoy of 15 destroyers and escort vessels, 2 cruisers, 8 freighters, the "Eagle", probably one battleship. 4 hits on the "Eagle" at 500 meters. Loud sinking noises, depth charges, everything clear.

b) ./.

Captain U-boats returned from duty trip.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

12 August, 1942

I. a) U 372 CP 5620,
U 77 CP 5460,
U 83 CP 7320,
U 73 CJ 7570,
U 205 CJ 7430.

b) U 331 put out from Spezia at 2100.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) ./.

III. a) 1710 CP 5424 4 cruisers, 10 destroyers on a westerly course. At 0200 on 12 August British reconnaissance aircraft reported apparently the same formation - probably by mistake - as 6 cruisers, 4 steamers and an indefinite number of destroyers in CP 4427.

b) At 1807 the now apparently combined formation of 3 carriers, 6 cruisers, 20 destroyers, and 21 merchant ships was in CH 9168.

The last position of the convoy, with 40 - 50 units, was CH 9254 at 2220.

0740 CN 2530 15 light units, 9 merchant ships, course 130°.

c) ./.

d) The "Furious" put in to Gibraltar at 1900 with a list.

e) Italian Navy:

1835 CJ 2382 1 submarine.
1923 CJ 8816 1 submarine.
2340 CJ 8835 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

In spite of exhaustive reconnaissance by the German and Italian air forces in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean, the cruiser formation reported by Kraus was not sighted again. Since it was still at sea according to radio intercept reports, U 77 (Schonder) - so that he could operate on the formation if occasion arose - was assigned the area CP 54 eastern half and CP 55 western half as a waiting position.
U 83 (Kraus) reported that one Diesel was out of order and that the listening set had broken down. The Commander considered it necessary to break off operations, but requested freedom of action while the dark nights last.
The boat was ordered to occupy the attack area assigned yesterday. The boat was intended to operate as long as possible in spite of defects, since we must still expect the formation in the Western Mediterranean to break through to Port Said.

b) Western boats:

German and Italian aircraft continued to shadow the convoy and attack it ceaselessly. Our boats lost contact and are, by dead reckoning, so far behind the convoy that, with their slightly superior speed, they can no longer catch up with the convoy before it reaches the minefields in the Sicilian Channel. 9° 30' E was defined as the eastern limit, in order to keep the boats out of the attack area of German and Italian E-boats.
As we are expecting returning escort forces to proceed through French territorial waters, the boats have been permitted to operate in French territorial waters. U 73 (Rosenbaum) reported his position from CH 7445 at 1157. The boat is so far behind that it does not seem worthwhile pursuing. The boat has therefore been ordered to occupy CJ 7570 as a waiting position.
Reports were received from air reconnaissance of ships damaged and out of control. The boats were set on these vessels. U 205 (Reschke) reported his position at 1528 from CJ 7435.
We expect some of the covering forces will not pass through the Sicilian Channel, but will start the return passage to Gibraltar when darkness falls.

It is intended to have the boats operate on these returning units.
If the boats have not succeeded by 2200 in finding the damaged ship, they will occupy the following areas as waiting positions:

U 73 (Rosenbaum) CJ 7580.
U 205 (Reschke) CJ 7540.

A formation, course 270°, was sighted by the German Air Force at 1940 in CJ 7691.
The boats have been ordered to operate on this formation.
At 2250 an Italian aircraft sighted 3 warships, course 270°, in CJ 8789.
The report was passed on to the boats.
At 0436 U 73 reported by short signal heavy and light enemy forces in CJ 7483.
At 0509 the boat reported the enemy's course as 270°, speed 16 knots.
At 0607 the boat lost contact.
It is a pity that only 2 boats were available for this great opportunity.

V. a) b) ./.

The Fuehrer has awarded the Knights Cross to the Commander of U 73, Lieut.(s.g.) Rosenbaum.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

13 August, 1942

I. a) U 372 CP 5620,
U 77 CP 5460,
U 83 CP 7320,
U 73 CJ 7580,
U 205 CJ 7540,
U 331 CJ 1810.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia westward as far as radius of action allowed.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, triangle of Crete, Port Said, Cyprus.

III. a) U 73: CJ 7830.
U 205: CJ 7932 0505 3 destroyers, westerly course.
U 73: CJ 7835 0030 oil patch 2 miles in diameter.

b) 0800 CP 1988 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 7 small units, course 135°.
1355 CN 3475 4 - 6 light units, 4 - 5 merchant ships, 2 damaged freighters with 2 destroyers and one aircraft carrier (?), course 100°.
1040 CP 7272 8 escort vessels, westerly course.
1440 CJ 7699 aircraft carrier, apparently stopped, as well as 3 freighters on fire.
1330 CH 9399 1 battleship, 1 cruiser, 4 destroyers, westerly course, speed 16 knots.
2015 CN 2599 3 - 4 cruisers, 3 - 4 destroyers, course 310°, high speed.
Several reports of units damaged and in tow.
0640 CN 2695 3 destroyers, 2 steamers, course 90°.
0715 CJ 7832 1 battleship, 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers.

c) 1200 1 damaged destroyer put in to Gibraltar.

d) Italian Navy:

0807 CJ 9547 1 submarine.
1005 CJ 9597 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 77 (Schonder) reported: Another pistol failure on the convoy, 5 more cargo-carrying sailing ships sunk, 2 bow, 2 stern torpedoes, 41 cubic meters.
The boat was instructed to bring back a warhead pistol.

b) Western boats:

The German Air Force attacked the convoy uninterruptedly.
In the morning the boats were ordered - if they did not contact returning or damaged vessels - to re-occupy the waiting disposition in order to be in a suitable position to attack more returning vessels. The sinking of a damaged 15,000 G.R.T. steamer by a U-boat was observed by the German Air Force. The boats were asked whether one of our boats sank this ship. No report was received about this. It appears from German Air Force reconnaissance reports, that the returning enemy groups are mostly proceeding westward about 20 - 40 miles from the coast. The rendezvous position of both boats has been improved. U 73 (Rosenbaum) will occupy CJ 7810 and U 205 (Reschke) CJ 7580. This new disposition will not yet have had its full effect. At 2017 the boats were ordered to operate on a stationary aircraft carrier (apparently damaged) reported by an aircraft to be in CJ 7932.

While en route there the boats pass through the area in which the returning escort forces were detected by air reconnaissance in the daytime. We can count on the boats on their passage east intercepting any enemy groups there may be. According to a shadower's report from an Italian E-boat, a returning formation passed Cape Bon to the west at 0143. Report was passed on to the boats.
At 0445 Rosenbaum reported: 5 destroyers, westerly course, at entrance to Galite Channel.
At 0505 U 205 contacted 3 destroyers steering west at high speed in CJ 7932.

Rosenbaum reported at 0515:

1. Fan of four fired at 2 destroyers in 7739 at 1845, one hit, no evidence of sinking.

2. Oil patch 2 miles in diameter in 7835 at 0030.

3. No carrier in Galite Channel or east of it. 7936.

At 0725 the position of the main group of the returning forces at 0500 was passed on to the boats.

V. a) U 73 (Rosenbaum) fired a fan of 4 at 2 destroyers at 1845, and obtained one hit. No evidence as to whether the destroyer sank.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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14 August, 1942

I. a) U 372 CP 5620,
U 77 CP 5460,
U 83 CP 7320,
U 205 CJ 7930,
U 73 CJ 7930,
U 331 CJ 7150.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia.

b) Sicilian Channel.

III. a) ./.

b) 0810 CP 8168 6 patrol vessels, 4 steamers, course 250°.
0815 CJ 7733 8 warships, course 270°, high speed.
0835 CP 8161 1 cruiser, 7 patrol vessels, 2 tankers, 3 steamers, course 195°.
0935 CJ 7547 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers.
0939 CJ 7734 considerable naval forces, course 255°, high speed.
1007 CJ 7723 enemy formation with aircraft carrier, course 270°.
1023 CJ 7723 enemy naval forces, high speed, course 270°.
1133 CH 9633 2 cruisers, 3 destroyers, course 270°.
1143 CH 9636 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, course 285°, high speed.
1500 CN 3712 large ship, without superstructure, in tow, 3 ships, making for Malta.
1700 CH 2699 large ship, without superstructure stopped.
0715 CP 2776 2 destroyers.

c) According to radio intercept service, a fairly large British unit was in difficulties north of Oran. 1343 British aircraft off Alexandria transmitted: submerged U-boat in CP 7163, course 85°.

d) 1730, the "Nelson", a carrier of the "Illustrious" class, one cruiser, 5 destroyers and 1 gunboat put in to Gibraltar. The carrier and 2 destroyers were damaged.

e) Italian Navy:

0910 CJ 7814 2 cruisers, course 270°.
0915 CJ 7736 5 destroyers, course 270°, high speed.
2050 CJ 7629 indefinite unit, course 270°, speed 9 knots.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 77 (Schonder) and U 83 (Kraus) were ordered freedom of action: Schonder in the area east of the meridian in CP 5146, north of the parallel in CP 5298; Kraus in the area east of the meridian in CP 4875, south of the parallel in 5855.

b) Western boats:

U 331 (Tiesenhausen) was ordered to operate on the main group of the returning forces, and to report his position by short signal.
Report was received.
U 73 (Rosenbaum) and U 205 (Reschke) are to the east of the returning vessels so far spotted by air reconnaissance. They are occupying as a

waiting position: Rosenbaum CJ 7650 and 7680, Reschke CJ 7820 and 7580. The waiting positions were moved for the night. Rosenbaum will occupy CJ 7590, Tiesenhausen CJ 7730. Reschke will remain in CJ 7820. More returning escort forces are expected. U 205 (Reschke) reported - with time of origin 1901 - that he has picked up 5 Italian airmen who were shot down, one of them slightly wounded, and requested orders. U 205 was ordered to occupy the waiting position ordered.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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15 August, 1942

I. a) U 372 CP 5620,
U 77 CP 5510,
U 83 CP 7320,
U 205 CJ 7580,
U 73 CJ 7560,
U 331 CJ 7710.

b) U 559 put out from Pola at 1830.
U 205 put in to Cagliari at 0750.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers - Majorca.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Sicily - southern tip of Greece - Benghazi area.

III. a) ./.

b) 0800 CP 1686 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers.
1210 CP 8224 5 cruisers, 4 destroyers, course 60°, speed 20 knots.
1730 CN 2274 1 submarine.

c) ./.

d) 1700 1 battleship, 1 aircraft carrier, 4 cruisers, 10 destroyers put in to Gibraltar.

e) Italian Navy:

1830 CO 2788 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 77 (Schonder) was requested to report the numbers of the pistols, depth set and track angle in order to examine the pistol failures.

b) Western boats:

The boats were ordered to proceed westward to 4° E in lanes of equal width parallel to the coast. The northern limit is the line 60 miles off the coast. The area is to be searched for damaged vessels.
U 205 (Reschke) reported sighting a periscope at 1430 in CJ 7812. (Probably an Italian U-boat). The boat reported that it has picked up 5 more Italian airmen and that all are severely wounded. The boat is making for Cagliari to disembark these men and thence to Messina for replenishing.
U 73 (Rosenbaum) and U 331 (Tiesenhausen) will occupy the following areas as waiting positions:
Rosenbaum: CH 9270 and CH 9510 northern half.
Tiesenhausen: CH 9510 southern half and CH 9540.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

12 September, 1942

Comments of Flag Officer German Naval Command Italy on War Diary of Captain U-boats for August, 1942

1. The destruction of the aircraft carrier "Eagle" is a particularly fine U-boat success. The disposition of U-boats in the Western Mediterranean was ordered by Naval War Staff. The restrictions of U-boat operations in the Eastern Mediterranean which had to be incurred have been repaid. The considerations noted by Captain U-boats regarding the U-boat operation on the Gibraltar forces - War Diary for 30 July - have proved apposite.

2. There is nothing to remark on further measures taken to attack the convoy. It was a pity that only 2 U-boats were available instead of the three intended.

3. I agree with the considerations stated on 16 August for the withdrawal of the U-boats from the Western Mediterranean, taking into consideration the information available at the time. Operating the boats after the receipt of the news of the re-appearance of the aircraft carrier was in accordance with the exigency of the situation.

4. U 372 was lost off the coast of Syria during August. Three boats have had to break off their operation prematurely because of bomb damage, and some have suffered very severe damage. The number of boats available for operations during the next few months has therefore been reduced to 13. Strong air patrols, as well as unfavorable conditions (of depth) and climatic difficulties force us to assign operations on the most important route off the Nile delta to experienced boats only, and not to leave any single boat too long in this exhausting operational area. In addition, it is not advisable to place too strict limitations on the boats. Captain U-boats' disposition of the boats took these requirements into account within the scope of the instructions he received.

(Signed) Weichold.

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WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

16 - 31 AUGUST, 1942

PG/30925

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16 August, 1942

I. a) U 77 CP 5510,
U 372 CP 5620,
U 83 CP 7320,
U 559 CJ 6220,
U 205 CJ 7310,
U 331 CH 9540,
U 73 CH 9270.

b) U 205 put out from Cagliari at 1100,
U 565 put out from Salamis at 1700.

II. a) Same as previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Cythion, Crete, Haifa, Alexandria, Benghazi.

III. a) ./.

b) 1050 CP 5955 1 steamer, course 180°.
1105 CP 5589 2 destroyers, course 195°, high speed.
1428 CO 5413 1 submarine submerging.

c) 2216 CO 5345 1 submarine from bearing.

d) The following put out from Gibraltar on a westerly course: 2 carriers, 1 battleship, 2 cruisers.

e) Italian Navy:

1200 CJ 4932 1 submarine.
1440 CK 7921 1 submarine.
1440 CK 7683 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

In order to examine the pistol failures, U 77 (Schonder) was asked to answer a few more questions in addition to those already put to him.
U 77 reported the number of the pistols which did not go off, the depths set and the track angle at which he fired the torpedoes.
The boat intends to commence the return passage on Tuesday.
U 565 reported crossing 35° N to the south.

b) Western boats:

After the enemy forces given below had put in to port:

3 aircraft carriers
2 battleships
5 cruisers
26 destroyers
1 gunboat
4 corvettes,

of which,

1 carrier,
4 destroyers put in to Gibraltar at 1900 on 12 August,
1 carrier,
1 battleship,
1 gunboat at 1730 on 14 August,
1 carrier,
1 battleship,
4 cruisers,
10 destroyers at 1740 on 15 August,
1 cruiser,
7 destroyers,
4 corvettes on the night 14/15 August, the great convoy action can be considered ended for the time being.
The following considerations have been put forward for further U-boat operations:

1. Even with a careful evaluation of the success reports, the damaging of all 3 aircraft carriers which put in to Gibraltar must be confirmed. The "Argus" has been undergoing repairs for some time.
   The fact that she was not used in the last operation shows clearly that she was not ready. We need not assume that supply runs to Malta or ferrying aircraft will be carried out without aircraft carriers. It is improbable that new aircraft carriers can be brought up quickly.
   To postpone the operation for about a week would involve an unfavorable phase of the moon. The greatest probability therefore is that it will be repeated in the new moon period in September and until then there will be no satisfactory targets in the Western Mediterranean.

2. At present there are only 2 boats in the Eastern Mediterranean and we must allow for their withdrawal shortly because of damage or cessation of fighting power. Two boats are outward bound, one from Salamis and one from Pola. An increase in the strength of the boats is therefore necessary as U-boat operations are being concentrated on the Eastern Mediterranean.

Decision:

Boats will be withdrawn from the Western Mediterranean to operate in the eastern part. As Naval War Staff ordered a maximum of 3 boats to be disposed in the Western Mediterranean, Captain U-boats requested Naval War Staff 1st Division by telephone for concurrence.

Naval War Staff concurred.

At 1300 U 73 (Rosenbaum) received orders to proceed to Spezia to take on more torpedoes and U 331 (von Tiesenhausen) to proceed to Messina for replenishing and to rest the crew. The same orders were sent to U 205 (Reschke) who put in to Cagliari at 0750 to disembark seriously wounded Italian air crews.

U 331 (Tiesenhausen) intends to reach Entrance Point West at 0700 on 17 August and to put in to Messina on the afternoon of 18 August.

U 205 (Reschke) and U 331 (Tiesenhausen) were requested to report when they intend to reach Point M.

The reports were received. Reschke at 1200 on 17 August, Tiesenhausen at 1315 on 18 August.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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17 August, 1942

I. a) U 372 CP 5620,
U 77 CP 5510,
U 83 CP 7320,
U 565 CO 2850,
U 559 CK 4460,
U 205 CJ 8680,
U 331 CJ 7530,
U 73 CH 6620.

b) U 205 put in to Messina at 1440.

II. a) Southern half of Strait's south of Sardinia, Malta area, Crete - Cyrenaica area.

b) Sicilian Channel.

III. a) ./.

b) ./.

c) According to radio intercept service: At 2350 a British aircraft attacked a U-boat, which ran off surfaced on a northerly course, position not indicated.

The aircraft returned because of shortage of fuel.

d) Aircraft of the French Air Force at 0915 reported, 1 battleship, 1 carrier, 5 - 8 ships abreast of Algiers. At 0900 Armistice Commission reported; CH 9413, 1 carrier stopped, 7 destroyers on an easterly course, 1 battleship apart from them.

e) Italian Navy:

1300 CJ 4697 1 submarine.
1537 CO 2187 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 83 (Kraus) had reported on 12 August that he had engine trouble and the listening set had broken down. Kraus was requested today to report the damage in detail, if the situation permitted.
At 2111 a success report was received from U 83.
The boat requested permission to put in to Salamis. He has two torpedoes left.
U 77 (Schonder) reported having commenced the return passage.

b) Western boats:

U 73 (Rosenbaum) reported he would reach Entrance Point North at 0030 on 19 August and Point C at 0800.
Teleprinter message No. 28041/42 G was received from Naval War Staff at 1900.
In it Captain U-boats received the first notification that the "Furious" has put to sea on an easterly course. Captain U-boats requested Naval War Staff 1st Division by telephone for further details which even it, however could not supply. At 1920 the Staff Officer on duty in Naval War Staff 1st Division phoned concerning a sighting report by French aircraft which spotted 1 battleship, 1 aircraft carrier and 6 units at 0900 40 miles north of Algiers. Even if it is accepted as highly probable that this formation will only send off aircraft for Malta and this plan has presumably already been carried out, an effort must however be made to have at least U 73 (Rosenbaum) and U 331 (Tiesenhausen), who are still in the Western Mediterranean operate on this formation.
Therefore this radio message was sent to both boats: "Turn about at maximum speed".
U 73 was probably in CJ 4119 at 2000, U 331 in CJ 8578. We are forced to operate these boats from their positions. The boats received the following orders: "To Rosenbaum, Tiesenhausen. Another sortie by enemy forces into the Western Mediterranean. 1 battleship, 1 aircraft carrier, 5 - 8 units today

at 0900 40 miles north of Algiers. Tiesenhausen make for CJ 7688. From there proceed to CH 9178 at maximum speed. Rosenbaum make for CH 9155 at maximum speed."
So U 331 is proceeding towards the formation, i.e. he will be in a favorable position if the enemy wants to break through the Sicilian Channel; U 73 is making for the point where the ferrying of aircraft to Malta will probably take place.
If the formation should proceed further, U 73 will be in a good position for its return. The prospects for a success from the operation of the boats are slight. We already have been lucky in intercepting them. It is a pity as there would have been a good chance with yesterday's disposition.

V. a) U 83 (Kraus) reported in a signal with time of origin 1409 (received at 2111), CP 8134, auxiliary cruiser sunk out of fleet formation. Three-funnelled ship of approximately 12,000 G.R.T.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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18 August, 1942

I. a) U 372 CP 5620,
U 77 CP 5510,
U 83 CP 4930,
U 565 CP 6610,
U 559 CK 7510,
U 73 CH 6620,
U 331 CJ 7530.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel.

III. a) ./.

b) 0915 CP 5825 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, course 180°, high speed.

c) ./.

d) 0945 the "Furious" with 1 cruiser and 10 destroyers put in to Gibraltar.

e) Italian Navy:

0830 CK 7283 1 submarine.
0900 CJ 7354 1 submarine.
1403 CK 8778 1 submarine.
2135 CJ 7374 1 submarine.
2220 CJ 7365 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Radio intercept reports were received in the night 17/18 August revealing that anti-submarine measures are in progress in the area in which U 83 (Kraus) sank the auxiliary cruiser. According to these reports Kraus has also been picked up by anti-submarine forces. One British aircraft reported at 2350, "have attacked a U-boat". At 0700 a radio message was received from U 83 (Kraus). The boat was unable to dive, was in the Eastern Mediterranean and required immediate help. The 2 boats in the Eastern Mediterranean, U 77 (Schonder) and U 565 (Franken) received orders to go to Kraus' assistance. In addition air cover was requested for the boat from C-in-C South. Air cover is being supplied by 10th Fliegerkorps but cannot reach the boat before 1400. As it turned out later, the aircraft did not find the boat. Admiral Aegean was asked if destroyer ZG3 could be detailed for rescue work. The destroyer was lying in the Piraeus ready to escort a convoy bound for Tobruk. Permission could only be granted by Supermarina - Supermarina granted permission via German Naval Command for the use of ZG3. The destroyer put out from the Piraeus at 1900 to assist the boat. At 1235 Schonder asked for Kraus' position. Kraus was in CP 4676 at 1340. This position was passed on to Admiral Aegean to inform ZG3. The boats were informed by radio that ZG3 was putting out to assist Kraus.
Schonder had not found Kraus by nightfall. The boat was standing off and on in CP 4410 from 0400. Admiral Aegean remained the control for the destroyer, which had sailed to join in the search.
So that ZG3 could operate on U 83, Kraus was requested to report his position by short signal at 0200 and 0400. Position, course and speed were sent by the boat at 0230. He was in CP 4415, course 285°, speed 7 knots. These details were transmitted to ZG3.
At the same time Kraus reported a bomb hit forward. Boat was difficult to hold against the sea.
The boat's position report was transmitted to 10th Fliegerkorps so that the air cover detailed for the next day could have a chance of finding the boat. In order to bring about a meeting between

U 83 and ZG3 and between U 83 and the covering aircraft as quickly as possible, "Kraus" was requested to send his position by short signal every hour from 0630 and to send direction finding signals lasting 4 minutes every 30 minutes after 0700.
At 0622 Schonder reported, "Am in CO 6389 with Ju 88 near Kraus".
At 0743 Schonder reported his position from CO 6388.
According to a signal from Schonder at 0804, ZG3 has taken over the escort of U 83.
The 2 boats detailed to assist Kraus, U 77 (Schonder) and U 565 (Franken) received orders to continue their passage as soon as ZG3 had taken over U 83.
U 565 was requested to report his position. Signal was received. He was in CO 6635 at 1032.

b) Western boats:

The enemy forces which put out from Gibraltar on 17 August have put in to port again except for one battleship.
U 73 (Rosenbaum) and U 331 (Tiesenhausen) received orders to occupy the following waiting positions at cruising speed.
U 73 (Rosenbaum) will occupy:
the central and northern third of CH 91.
U 331 (Tiesenhausen):
the southern third of CH 91 and the northern third of CH 94.

V. a) U 77 (Schonder) has sunk another cargo-carrying sailing ship. The boat has thus sunk 8 cargo-carrying sailing ships on this operation.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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19 August, 1942

I. a) U 372 CP 5620,
U 83 CO 6380,
U 77 CO 6380,
U 565 CO 6610,
U 559 CO 1930,
U 205 CJ 9820,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 331 CH 9170.

b) U 205 put out from Messina at 1950.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete - Haifa - Alexandria area.

III. a) ./.

b) 0845 CJ 7718 3 destroyers, course 270°, moderate speed.

c) 0400 CO 7627 1 submarine according to radio location.
0200 17 steamers passed Gibraltar ostensibly on an easterly course.
0230 the "Argus", the "Furious", the "Nelson", 2 cruisers and several destroyers put out from Gibraltar. Course not known.

d) 0100 2 large and 2 small units passed Gibraltar on a westerly course.

e) Italian Navy:

1240 CN 5166 1 submarine.
1900 CJ 4582 1 submarine.
1955 CK 7629 1 submarine.
0445 CO 5911 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

After ZG3 had taken over the duty of escorting U 83, Schonder received orders to proceed to Pola to lie up in dock.
It was announced by Admiral Aegean that ZG3 with U 83 was in CO 6384 at 1100.
U 77 (Schonder) had to be diverted to Salamis. The boat had only 15 cm. fuel left and would last on short rations until Friday, 21 August, with the food on board.
U 565 (Franken) received the area south of the parallel in CP 5855 and east of the meridian in CP 8144 as his operational area. The coast forms the eastern and southern limits.
At 1805 U 559 (Heidtmann) reported trouble with the after hydroplane. The boat must go to Salamis for repairs.

b) Western boats:

According to Italian air reconnaissance three destroyers, course 270°, high speed, were in CJ 7915 at 0800. The boats were informed.
From other reconnaissance reports it can be recognized that the formation is sailing westwards far in the south. U 73 (Rosenbaum) is occupying as a waiting position the northern third of CH 94, U 331 (Tiesenhausen) the central third of 94.
As there are no longer any Italian U-boats in the Western Mediterranean, the western boats are given freedom to attack all enemy warships.

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V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

20 August, 1942

I. a) U 565 CP 8210,
U 83 CO 5310,
U 77 CO 5230,
U 599 CO 2540,
U 205 CO 1140,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 331 CH 9170.

b) U 83 put in to Salamis at 2345.
U 97 put out from Piraeus at 0830, put in to Patras at 1530.

II. a) Same as previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete - Port Said - Alexandria area.

III. a) ./.

b) 1035 CO 2329 1 submarine.
0742 CK 7237 1 submarine.

c) Unit in CP 5973.

d) 0400 the "Argus", the "Furious", 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers put out from Gibraltar on a westerly course.

e) Italian Navy:

0930 CN 5573 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 205 (Reschke) was requested to report his position by short signal.
Signal was received at 1758. As it was planned to carry out an anti-submarine sweep in Zone F1 on the nights 20/21 and 21/22 because of supply traffic now at sea, the boat received orders not to cross 22° E before 0600 and to pass 24° 30' E at 2000 on 21 August at the latest.
The ban at present in force on attacking submarines east of 29° 30' E was raised and permission was again granted to use the area east of 33° 50' N between 32° 40' N and 33° 30' N longitude.

b) Western boats:

According to an agent's report the following put out from Gibraltar at 0230 on an easterly course: the "Argus", the "Furious", the "Nelson", 2 medium-sized units, several destroyers and a convoy of 20 steamers. The Western boats (U 73 and U 331) received orders to occupy their former waiting positions again. U 73 (Rosenbaum) occupied the northern and central thirds of CH 91, U 331 (Tiesenhausen) the southern third of CH 11 and northern third of CH 94.

c) As it is not clear whether Schonder's pistol failures were due to the fact that the safety range did not run in a set depth of 1 meter, orders have been issued that no depths are to be set below 2 meters.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

The Fuehrer has granted the award of the Knight's Cross to the Commander of U 77, Lt. (s.g.) Schonder.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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21 August, 1942

I. a) U 565 CP 8210,
U 77 CO 2320,
U 559 CO 2320,
U 205 CO 5220,
U 97 CK 8730,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 331 CH 9170.

b) U 559 made fast in Salamis at 0820, as did U 77.
U 97 put out from Patras at 2115.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia.

b) Sicilian Channel.

III. a) ./.

b) 1105 CH 5556 1 destroyer, 3 torpedoboats, course 60°, speed 18 knots.
1117 CO 2677 1 submarine, course 60°.
2340 CK 8478 1 submarine.

c) 1500 CP 8317 British reconnaissance aircraft reported a surfaced U-boat, course 270°, speed 8 knots. At 1740 submerged in the same position. 0510 British aircraft in the Eastern Mediterranean reported, "Have attacked enemy submarine with depth charges and believe 3 hits were obtained".

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1800 CK 7379 1 submarine.
0030 CJ 6715 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 205 (Reschke) was requested to report his position. The boat was in CO 5367 at 1829.
From radio intercept reports it is evident that U 565 has been attacked by aircraft. Otherwise nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

The "Argus", the "Furious", 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers have passed Gibraltar to the east according to German Espionage Agency, Spain. In spite of air reconnaissance in the Western Mediterranean the convoy has not been sighted. The convoy which sailed yesterday is not believed to be in the Western Mediterranean.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

Captain U-boats on duty trip to Salamis from 0800.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

22 August, 1942

I. a) U 565 CP 8210,
U 205 CO 6530,
U 97 CK 7190,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 331 CH 9170.

b) U 97 put in to Taranto at 1628.
U 375 put out from Salamis at 1700.

II. a) Sicilian Channel.

b) Straits south of Sardinia.

III. a) ./.

b) 1359 CN 2826 damaged submarine with fighter cover.

c) ./.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1445 CJ 8712 1 submarine.
0050 CO 3182 1 submarine.
0200 CK 7228 and CK 7694 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Yesterday's radio intercept messages have been confirmed. At 1825 U 565 (Franken) reported: "Heavy bombing, successful defense, able to submerge again with restrictions, have commenced return passage to Salamis, 5485."
Air cover for U 565 was requested from 10th Fliegerkorps through Admiral Aegean. The request was granted. In order to ensure that U 565 and the aircraft meet, "Franken" was ordered to report his position at 0230. Position report was received. The boat was in CO 4678 at 0300, course 280°, speed 14 knots.
U 205 (Reschke) occupied the area between the meridians of CP 7165, 8144, south of the parallel of 4865 as his attack area.

b) Western boats:

The "Argus", the "Furious", one cruiser and two destroyers have passed to the west of Gibraltar. The convoy was not intercepted in spite of air reconnaissance in Western Mediterranean.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

Captain U-boats in Corfu. Emergency landing in Corfu.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

23 August, 1942

I. a) U 565 CP 4560,
U 205 CP 4880,
U 205 CJ 6960,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 331 CH 9170.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area.

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III. a), b), c) ./.

d) 0300 the "Illustrious" put out from Gibraltar for the west.

e) Italian Navy:

0700 CJ 6771 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

It was announced by Admiral Aegean that an aircraft has taken over the escort for U 565 (Franken) after 1000.
1016 Franken reported that he would cross 35° N at 1600 on 24 August and be at Point 140A at 0500 on 25 August.
U 375 (Koenenkamp) at 1328 reported crossing 24° 30' E.
U 565 (Franken) was asked to report his position at 0400. The signal was received and sent to 10th Fliegerkorps via Admiral Aegean.
The boat was in CO 6191 at 0347.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

Captain U-boats in Salamis.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

24 August, 1942

I. a) U 205 CP 4880,
U 375 CP 4410,
U 565 CO 5360,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 331 CH 9170.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, coast of Cyrenaica.

III. a) ./.

b) 0815 CO 5616 1 submarine, course 0°.
Italian aircraft reported 25 mines 4 miles off shore on a bearing of 350° from Ras el Tin in a northerly direction.
2130 CP 7199 2 destroyers (?), course 270°, high speed.

c) At 1332 British aircraft reported to Alexandria, "Am over enemy U-boat in CO 6933, have attacked enemy with torpedo. Result not observed".

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1000 CK 7156 1 submarine.
2000 CK 7215 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 375 (Koenenkamp) will occupy as his attack area the area east of the meridian in CP 8144 and south of the parallel in CP 5855.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

25 August, 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 8210,
U 205 CP 4880,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 331 CH 9170.

b) 0800 U 77 put out from Salamis for Pola.
0800 U 565 put in to Salamis.
1800 U 77 put in to Patras.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Malta area, Alexandria, Port Said area.

III. a) ./.

b) 1458 CP 7263 3 sailing ships.
1500 CP 8215 2 destroyers, 1 submarine, course 0°.
1506 CP 7284 1 hospital ship, 1 small merchant ship, course 350°.

c) 1620 CP 4926 British unit located.
1805 CP 1766 British unit located.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0821 CN 6615 1 submarine.
1430 CJ 5991 1 submarine.
1645 CO 3614 submarine, course 270°.

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IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

Captain U-boats back from his duty trip.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

26 August, 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 8210,
U 205 CP 4880,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 331 CH 9170,
U 77 CK 8720.

b) U 77 put out from Patras at 1600.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Malta area, convoy route, Crete, Alexandria, Port Said, Haifa area.

III. a) ./.

b) 1035 CK 7218 1 submarine, course 122°.
1110 CP 5879 1 steamer, course 60°, speed 18 knots.
1450 CP 8238 1 steamer, course 40°.

c) Alexandria transmitted the following at 1805 to a destroyer at sea, "CP 7333 one U-boat, course 315°".
2151 an unidentified unit sent an aircraft instructions to search for a U-boat in a 15 mile-radius circle round CP 8317 and to attack it.
0055 CP 5354 British aircraft reported surfaced U-boat.

d) Shipping in Gibraltar has increased to 56 merchant ships.

e) Italian Navy:

0100 CK 7318 1 submarine.
0705 CO 2598 1 submarine.

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IV. a) Eastern boats:

From radio intercept messages it is evident that U 375 (Koenenkamp) was sighted by aircraft and a submarine subchaser received orders to hunt him. The Radio Intercept Service believes that it can deduce from radio traffic that the U-boat attacked and was successful.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

27 August, 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 8210,
U 205 CP 4810,
U 77 CK 7220,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 331 CH 9170.

b) U 97 put out from Taranto at 1740, put in to Messina at 0740.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia.

b) Malta area. Eastern Mediterranean from Crete as far as radius of action allowed.

III. a) ./.

b) 1120 CN 2165 1 submarine.
1427 CK 7699 1 submarine.
1705 CP 5532 2 destroyers (?), 2 steamers, course 180°.

c) 2000 CO 2598 1 submarine according to radio location.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0430 CO 2673 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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28 August, 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 8210,
U 205 CP 4880,
U 97 CJ 9820,
U 77 CK 4170,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 331 CH 9170.

b) U 97 put out from Messina at 1000.

II. a) Sardinia - Majorca, southern half of straits south of Sardinia.

b) Malta area, otherwise same as on previous day.

III. a) ./.

b) 0815 CP 7282 3 escorts, 1 steamer, 1 tanker, course 105°.

c) ./.

d) 2 troopships put out from Gibraltar on an indefinite course.

e) Italian Navy:

1015 CK 7526 1 submarine.
1050 CO 4952 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 205 (Reschke) was asked to transmit a short weather report, U 375 (Koenenkamp) a position report.
Short weather report was received from Reschke.
No position report received from Koenenkamp.
Otherwise nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

29 August, 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 8210,
U 205 CP 4880,
U 77 CJ 3730,
U 97 CJ 5180,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 331 CH 9170.

b) U 97 put in to Spezia at 1855.
U 559 put out from Salamis at 1700.
U 77 put in to Pola at 0735.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Malta area, Crete area, Alexandria - Port Said.

III. a) ./.

b) 0800 CP 7188 4 destroyers, 1 in tow, course 90°, speed 5 - 6 knots.
1200 CP 7279 4 destroyers, 1 in tow, course 90°, moderate speed.

c) British aircraft reported a surfaced U-boat at 1450 in CP 8233.

d) In the afternoon 2 battleships and 5 destroyers put in to Gibraltar. At 2400 14 vessels put out on an easterly course.

e) Italian Navy:

2130 CJ 9666 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 375 (Koenenkamp) was again asked to send a short weather report.
Weather report was received at 0450.
Otherwise nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

30 August, 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 8210,
U 205 CP 4880,
U 559 CO 2830,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 331 CH 9170.

b) U 77 put in to Pola at 0800.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Malta area, Alexandria area.

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III. a) ./.

b) 1639 CP 8183 2 escorts, 2 steamers, stopped.

c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0828 CK 4778 1 submarine ?
1540 CK 7626 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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31 August, 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 8210,
U 205 CP 4880,
U 559 CP 6520,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 331 CH 9170.

b) U 83 and U 565 put out from Salamis at 0800.
U 453 put out from Pola at 1945.

II. a) Same as on previous day, Gibraltar in addition.

b) Malta area, Crete - Alexandria - Port Said area.

III. a) ./.

b) 1350 CO 6158 3 M.T.B.s, course 290°, very high speed.
1410 3 M.T.B.s, course 150°, very high speed.
1830 CO 6582 3 M.T.B.s, course 115°, very high speed.
0600 CO 6264 1 unidentified warship, course 310°.

c) ./.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Italian E-boats will be operating shortly in a line 5 miles broad parallel to the coast west of the Rosetta mouth. This area is not used by our U-boats. With the arrival of Heidtmann in the operational area it is possible to have one boat for a time in a less exacting area for a change.
The boats therefore occupy the following attack areas: U 559 (Heidtmann) the area between the meridians of CP 7135 and CP 8114 south of the parallel in CP 4865; U 205 (Reschke) the area east of the meridian in CP 8114 south of the parallel in CP 5845; U 375 (Koenenkamp) the area CP 29, CP 37 and the northern half of CP 53, CP 61.
"Koenenkamp" was asked to report the situation briefly after leaving the operational area south of the parallel in CP 5655.
The boats were informed of the traffic routes observed to date in the Eastern Mediterranean.

b) Western boats:

With the renewed offensive of the Panzer Army near El Alamein thoughts are directed to a probable Allied landing in Algiers which would create an invaluable advantage for the enemy. The North African coast, steep nearly all along, hardly offers any opportunity for landing troops apart from the ports. Taking into consideration the Axis air forces, a landing would be more difficult further east than Algiers. U-boats detailed for the Western Mediterranean would have to deal with any landing operation in addition to attacking forces supplying Malta from Gibraltar and escort forces and transports. The War Diary entry of 30 July contains the considerations for the U-boat disposition. These considerations are also applicable here. In the event of a landing in or west of Algiers, however, it seems worthwhile to move the boats 60 miles further west. They have received orders to this effect.
U 73 (Rosenbaum) has occupied the southern half of CH 59.
U 331 (Tiesenhausen) has occupied the northern half of CH 83.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

1 - 15 SEPTEMBER, 1942

PG/30926

CONFIDENTIAL

1 September 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 2990,
U 205 CP 8220,
U 559 CP 7230,
U 453 CJ 3480,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 331 CH 9170.

b) U 83 and U 565 put in to Messina at 2130.

II. a) Western Mediterranean as far as radius of action allowed.

b) Malta area, Crete area, Alexandria - Port Said.

III. a) ./.

b) 1800 CK 7664 1 submarine.

c) ./.

d) According to unconfirmed reports 50 destroyers ? and gunboats passed to the east to-day.

e) ./.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 375 (Koenenkamp) transmitted a situation report as ordered. The boat reported little traffic, moderate air activity.

U 453 (Schlippenbach) reported at 0500 that he was returning to Pola, shaft gland broken down, necessary to dock.

Otherwise nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) U 375 (Koenenkamp) obtained a hit on a 4000 GRT steamer in a convoy on 26 August. Steamer probably sunk.

b) ./.

VI. Flag Officer German Naval Command Italy issued the following regulation concerning the issuing of orders during his absence from Rome:

Regulation concerning the issuing of orders to U-boats during my next absence from Rome. Contrary to the instructions I issued for the command of U-boats during my first stay in Africa, in which I had retained operational control of U-boats myself, the whole conduct of U-boat operations by German Naval Command during my next absence from

Rome will be carried out by my deputy.
Rome, 28 August 1942.

Flag Officer German Naval Command
Italy.

The Flag Officer issued the following directive on U-boat operations:

Directive of Flag Officer German Naval Command Italy on U-boat operations during the period of increased fighting in North Africa.

1) Western Mediterranean.
Naval War Staff's orders concerning the employment of up to 2 U-boats still stand.
Duties:
a) As before, the destruction of Gibraltar forces which advance into the sea area southeast of the Balearic Islands to ferry aircraft to Malta, as well as of convoy and single ships supplying Malta. Main targets are aircraft carriers and heavy units.

b) Attacks on transports and covering forces engaged in any British landing attempts on the north coast of Africa in the Western Mediterranean.

2) Eastern Mediterranean.
U-boat operations will concentrate on the line of communications between Alexandria and Port Said. Alternative targets are traffic routes off ports on the coast of Syria and Cyprus to Port Said and Alexandria. These alternatives are given freely if, as in Captain U-boats' estimation, special conditions off the Nile Delta - concentrated defenses, shallow water, climatic difficulties - necessitate the withdrawal of individual boats.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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2 September 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 2990,
U 205 CP 8220,
U 559 CP 7230,
U 83 CK 7760,
U 565 CK 7760,
U 453 CJ 3490,
U 73 CH 5950,
U 331 CH 8320.

b) U 431 put out from Spezia at 1845.
U 83 and U 565 put out from Messina at 1620.
U 453 put in to Pola at 1735.

II. a) Sardinia area, Balearic Islands, Algiers, Galite Channel.

b) Malta area, Eastern Mediterranean.

III. a) ./.

b) 1435 CJ 9515 1 submarine.

c) ./.

d) Destroyer "Hermes":

1915 CO 5379 1 submarine.

Italian Navy:

1300 CK 7664 1 submarine.
1130 CK 4589 1 submarine.
1700 CJ 3985 1 submarine.
2330 CJ 9667 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Italian Navy is operating two U-boats in the area between 2° E and 2° 20' E and between 37° and 38° N. This area lies in the waiting positions of both our boats. Their duties, which arise from the considerations laid down in the War Diary of 31 August, will have to be taken over by the two Italian U-boats. Our boats received orders to re-occupy their former waiting positions.

U 73 (Rosenbaum) will occupy the northern and central third of CH 91.

U 331 (Tiesenhausen) will occupy the southern third of CH 91 and the northern third of CH 94.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 September 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 2990,
U 205 CP 8220,
U 559 CP 7230,
U 83 CJ 9830,
U 565 CJ 1630,
U 73 CJ 9150,
U 331 CH 9180,
U 431 CJ 4140.

b) U 453 put out from Pola at 1945.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Malta area, Crete - Alexandria - Haifa area.

III. a) ./.

b) 0815 CP 5764 3 cruisers, 6 destroyers, course 240°, speed 24 knots.
0845 CP 5864 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, course 45°, speed 24 knots.
0645 CJ 9942 1 submarine.

c) 1605 an aircraft sighted a surfaced U-boat, position not indicated.

d) The "Resolution" put out from Gibraltar for the west.

e) Italian Navy:

1315 CJ 6377 1 submarine.
2320 CK 4792 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

The area between the meridians of CO 9347, CP 7347 south of the parallel of CP 7167 is prohibited to our U-boats because of our E-boat operations. It seems evident from radio intercept reports that U 375 (Koenenkamp) was sighted by enemy aircraft. Apart from that, radio intercept service deduced, from enemy damage reports from the Eastern Mediterranean, that a U-boat made a successful attack. No success report has been received yet.

b) Western boats:

U 73 (Rosenbaum) has commenced the return passage. The boat was in CH 6582 at 1711. He had only 9·5 cubic meters of fuel left and short rations until Friday.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

4 September 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 2990,
U 205 CP 8220,
U 559 CP 7230,
U 453 CJ 3760,
U 83 CJ 1630,
U 565 CJ 1630,
U 73 CJ 4110,
U 331 CH 9180,
U 431 CH 6840.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Malta area, Crete - Alexandria - Haifa area.

III. a) U 205: at 0156 enemy was in CP 5811, course 180°, high speed.

b) ./.

c) 1230 British aircraft reported a surfaced U-boat in CP 5895.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0135 CO 5833 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

According to information from Naval High Command/ Radio Intercept Service Control Station, it cannot definitely be assumed that the radio intercept reports mentioned in yesterday's War Diary were damage reports.

U 205 (Reschke) requested permission to return as the stern tubes and exhaust cut-outs were leaking badly.

The boat received orders to return.

At 0156 "Reschke" reported by short signal: "Enemy is in CP 5811, course 180°, high speed. Have lost contact."

U 453 (Schlippenbach) was ordered to report his position by short signal at 0800. The signal was received, boat was in CK 4817 at 0800.

b) Western boats:

U 431 (Dommes) has occupied the attack area formerly occupied by U 73 (Rosenbaum) - the northern and central thirds of CH 91.

V. a) U 205 (Reschke) reported: "1500 hit on destroyer in CP 5971."

b) ./.

Captain U-boats on duty trip to Spezia after 1135.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

5 September 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 2990,
U 205 CP 8220,
U 559 CP 7230,
U 453 CK 4810,
U 331 CH 9180,
U 431 CH 9150.

b) U 73 put in to Spezia at 1015.
U 562 put out from Spezia at 1940.
U 371 put out from Pola at 1800.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Malta area, Crete - Haifa - Port Said area.

III. a), b), c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

2130 CK 7154 1 submarine.
2120 CN 3615 unidentified unit.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 453 (Schlippenbach) was ordered to report his position by short signal at 2100.

Signal was received at 2156. Boat was in CK 7219.

Otherwise nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a), b) ./.

Captain U-boats returned from Spezia at 2335.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 September 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 2990,
U 559 CP 7230,
U 205 CO 6560,
U 453 CK 7820,
U 371 CJ 6230,
U 562 CJ 1790,
U 331 CH 9180,
U 431 CH 9120.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Malta area, Crete - Alexandria - Haifa area.

III. a) ./.

b) 1459 CP 7353 1 tanker, course 110°.

c) 2238 CP 8151 British aircraft reported U-boat, boat submerged.

d), e) ./.

IV. a) U 559 (Heidtmann) occupied as his operational area the area between the meridians of CP 4975 and CP 8245 south of the parallel of CP 5755.

Because of one of our Africa-bound convoys, U 453 (Schlippenbach) and U 371 (Mehl) received orders not to cross 20° E to the east except on the receipt of special orders.

U 205 (Reschke) received orders not to cross 24° E to the west except on the receipt of special orders. The attention of the boats was drawn to the fact that the convoy's escort is free to attack all submarines and that they must remain submerged from dawn till dusk.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 September 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 2990,
U 559 CP 8110,
U 453 CO 1370,
U 371 CK 7220,
U 562 CH 6840,
U 431 CH 9150,
U 331 CH 9180.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete - Alexandria - Haifa area.

III. a), b) ./.

c) 2242 the Admiralty transmitted a warning of a U-boat in CP 8151.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0927 CO 2446 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 453 (Schlippenbach) and U 371 (Mehl) were given permission to cross 20° E to the east after 2100. Both boats were ordered to report their position at 0800 on 8 September. Because another convoy was sailing from north to south, "Reschke" was not yet permitted to cross 24° E to the west.

Position reports were received from "Schlippenbach" and "Mehl".

"Schlippenbach" was in CO 5241 at 0800, "Mehl" in CK 5241 at 0800.

b) Western boats:

There are indications that the enemy is planning another operation (convoy or ferrying aircraft) in the Western Mediterranean in the coming new moon period.

U 331 (Tiesenhausen) for this reason did not receive orders, as was intended, to return after U 562 (Hamm)'s arrival, but has occupied CH 9210, CH 9240, CH 9270 and CH 9510 as a waiting position.

U 562 (Hamm) occupied U 331 (Tiesenhausen)'s former position - the southern third of CH 91 and the northern third of CH 94.

CONFIDENTIAL

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

8 September 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 2990,
U 559 CP 8110,
U 453 CO 5240,
U 205 CO 5650,
U 371 CO 1220,
U 331 CH 9160,
U 431 CH 9150,
U 562 CH 9180.

b) ./.

II. a) Majorca area, Sardinia, Galite Channel, Algiers.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area.

III. a) ./.

b) 1402 CO 5216 1 submarine, southeasterly course.

c) ./.

d) British tanker put out from Mersin for Haifa on the night of 8/9 September.

e) Italian Navy:

1830 CJ 9548 1 submarine.
1940 CJ 9657 2 submarines.
0030 CJ 9687 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 205 (Reschke) was permitted to cross 24° E after 0830. The boat was ordered to report his position and to proceed to Pola for repairs.

Position report was received from U 205 (Reschke) at 1150. Boat was in CO 5365.

U 453 (Schlippenbach) had to proceed to Salamis because the stern gland of the starboard shaft was leaking again.

U 371 (Mehl) was not allowed to cross 21° 30' E to the east because there was a convoy of ours sailing from south to north.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a), b) ./.

The Flag Officer German Naval Command Italy issued the following instruction in view of the change in the situation in Africa:

In view of the altered situation with the Panzer Army in Africa the instructions hitherto applicable to U-boat operations have been altered as follows:

a) free attack in the Eastern Mediterranean as Captain U-boats thinks fit.

b) in the Western Mediterranean it is left to discretion as to whether one U-boat will reconnoiter as far as Gibraltar.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

9 September 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 2990,
U 559 CP 8110,
U 453 CO 2640,
U 371 CO 5210,
U 205 CO 1690,
U 331 CH 9240,
U 562 CH 9180,
U 431 CH 9150.

b) U 561 put out from Spezia at 1820.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Malta area, Crete - Alexandria - Haifa triangle.

III. a) ./.

b) 0840 CP 8214 4 escort vessels, 3 merchant ships, course 90°.
1245 CP 5672 2 destroyers.

c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1945 CJ 9639 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

10 September 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 2990,
U 559 CP 8110,
U 371 CO 6630,
U 453 CO 2310,
U 205 CK 7270,
U 561 CJ 5540,
U 562 CH 9180,
U 331 CH 9240,
U 431 CH 9120.

b) U 453 put in to Salamis at 0815.

II. a) Majorca area, Algiers, Tunis, Sardinia and on as far as radius of action allowed.

b) Sicilian Channel, Crete - Alexandria and Malta area.

III. a), b), c) ./.

d) The cruiser "Charybdis" put out from Gibraltar in an unknown direction.

e) ./.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 371 (Mehl) requested attack area. The boats received orders to attack freely; U 559 (Heidtmann) in the area south of the parallel of CP 5585.

U 371 (Mehl) in the area between the parallels of CP 5255 and CP 5675.

U 375 (Koenenkamp) in the area north of the parallel of CP 5355.

U 559 (Heidtmann) and U 375 (Koenenkamp) were ordered to report the weather.

Both reports were received.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) U 372 (Neumann) is reported missing for the first time with effect from 4 August 1942 in Ref. No. Secret 9915 A5.

The boat put out from Salamis on 27 July. Last signal on 2 August from CP 59 reporting 2 destroyers and 1 steamer. Fate of the crew is not known.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

11 September 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 2990,
U 371 CP 5510,
U 559 CP 8110,
U 561 CJ 9820,
U 205 CK 4420,
U 331 CH 9240,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 562 CH 9180.

b) U 453 put in to Salamis at 0815.
U 561 put in to Messina at 1045.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, otherwise same as on previous day.

III. a), b) ./.

c) 0738 CP 3447 British aircraft sighted a surfaced U-boat, course 270°, speed 8 knots.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1720 CJ 2939 1 submarine.
0245 CO 3142 1 submarine.
0250 CO 3775 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

From radio intercept reports it may be deduced that U 375 was sighted by an enemy aircraft.

Otherwise nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

12 September 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 2990,
U 371 CP 5510,
U 559 CP 8110,
U 331 CH 9240,
U 205 CJ 2390,
U 562 CH 9180,
U 431 CH 9120.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area.

III. a), b), c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1705 CJ 4589 1 submarine.
0330 CJ 1374 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

U 331 (Tiesenhausen) sighted 2 Swedish Red Cross ships at 0730 in CH 9274 and presumed they were carrying supplies to Malta.

The steamers were intended to supply Greece and were sailing with the consent of the Italian Government. In spite of the promise given that German Naval Command and Captain U-boats Italy would be informed of the passing of Gibraltar and the ships' daily positions, the Royal Italian Navy has failed to supply this information. Questions put to the Supermarina have revealed that the Swedish ships have transmitted their daily position reports (as ordered). The boats have been advised that these are Swedish ships making for Greece.

According to a report from the Communications Command, Algiers, two very large submarines were sighted submerging 50 miles north of Algiers at 1730 on 11 September. The position given lay in the region of our boats' waiting positions.

CONFIDENTIAL

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

13 September 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 2990,
U 371 CP 5510,
U 559 CP 8110,
U 561 CO 1270,
U 331 CH 6810,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 562 CH 9180.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Crete - Tobruk - Alexandria area.

III. a) ./.

b) 0830 CP 7282 4 escorts, 2 steamers, easterly course.
0835 CP 7262 6 light naval vessels, westerly course, high speed.
1305 CO 5321 1 submarine, course 0°.

c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0800 CJ 1358 1 submarine.
1130 CK 4116 1 submarine.
1400 CO 8323 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

The traffic between Port Said and Alexandria has increased.

The boats received new attack areas.

"Heidtmann" will occupy the area between the meridians in CP 4875 and CP 7326, "Koenenkamp" the area between the meridians in CP 4986 and CP 8214. "Mehl" received orders to attack freely in the area east of the meridian in CP 8245.

At 0045 the enemy landed commandoes near Tobruk.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

14 September 1942

I. a) U 375 CP 5640,
U 371 CP 8120,
U 559 CP 7230,
U 561 CO 5250,
U 331 CH 6810,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 562 CH 9180.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day, Western Mediterranean area as far as Gibraltar.

b) Sicilian Channel, otherwise same as on previous day.

III. a) U 371: 0415 CP 5688 3 steamers, 2 patrol vessels, course 200°, moderate speed.
U 371: 0500 CP 5928 3 steamers, 2 escorts, course 200°, speed 8 knots.

b) 0800 CP 4981 1 destroyer, 2 escort vessels, 1 steamer, course 40°.
0830 CP 7114 several escort vessels, course 280°, 2 escort vessels, course 160°.
1130 CO 6968 1 destroyer, 1 light cruiser on fire, 6 destroyers, course 120°, speed slight.
1350 CP 4778 1 light cruiser, 2 destroyers, 1 unit on fire, 1 stopped.

c) 1630 CH 9280 British aircraft sighted a U-boat submerging.

d) 25 ships were supposed to have passed Gibraltar on an easterly course on the night of 14 September.

0800 the cruiser "Charybdis" put in to Gibraltar from the west.

e) Italian Navy:

1400 CO 4671 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

As yet no clear picture can be obtained of the progress of the enemy's attempted landing near Tobruk, by the few reports received here greatly delayed.

It is now known that the enemy tried to land near Tobruk after 0045, that Tobruk was bombarded from the sea and that naval forces are withdrawing to the east. It is presumed that the forces will make for Alexandria, Port Said or Haifa. The positions of our boats are as follows:

a) One boat in the area off Alexandria and to the east of it.

b) One boat en route from the north to the area off Port Said.

c) One boat east of the meridian of CP 5845 probably abreast of Haifa.

A grouping around or direct operation on the returning naval forces is not being undertaken at first because:

1) the present situation is not yet exactly clear,

2) a combined operation by the boats mentioned in b) and c) has no prospects because of the long approach route.

The boats have been notified of the landing of Commando troops and of the appearance of British naval forces off Tobruk; they have also been warned that they will probably put in to Alexandria, Port Said or Haifa. At the same time the boats were requested to report their positions in order to obtain information for any likely operation by having the situation clarified. Position reports were received at 1259 from U 375 (Koenenkamp) in CP 8129, at 1507 from U 561 (Schomburg) in CO 5275 (the boat is outward bound), at 2226 from U 559 (Heidtmann) in CP 4984, at 2307 from U 371 (Mehl) in CP 5669.

In the course of the morning shadowers' reports were received from our aircraft who are attacking the formation. Only a very sketchy picture could be obtained from these reports. It was not clear until the afternoon that the main part of the naval forces was making for Alexandria. U 559 (Heidtmann) received orders at about 1700 to make for CP 7165 so as to attack the vessels making for Alexandria. The measure will no longer have had any effect, for the boat was submerged during the daytime, therefore received this order very late and, apart from that, he was at the eastern edge of his operational area. U 375 (Koenenkamp) received orders to make for CP 8115 to intercept any forces making for Port Said.

U 371 (Mehl) received orders to occupy CP 5830 to intercept any vessels making for Haifa. The boat was placed at this comparatively great distance from Haifa so as not to endanger it too much. The Commander is on his first operation.

The reconnaissance reports received by the evening gave the following picture: in the early hours of 14 September several small enemy groups were in the wide sea area off Tobruk. Another formation of enemy forces was lying northeast of Mersa Matruh to pick up those returning from Tobruk. During the day German Air Force attacks scattered forces withdrawing to the east.

In a signal, time of origin 0415, U 371 (Mehl) reported: "Convoy CP 5688, course 200°, moderate speed, 3 steamers, 2 escorts." At 0420 the boat reported he still had one stern torpedo left, all misses, probably several depth-keeping failures, all 2 meters. According to a later report from U 371 the convoy was in CP 5928, course 200°, speed 8 knots, at 0500.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

15 September 1942

I. a) U 331 CH 9240,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 562 CH 9180,
U 371 CP 5660,
U 375 CP 8120,
U 561 CO 6520,
U 559 CP 4980.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers and 3° W.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta, Alexandria, Port Said area.

III. a) ./.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

16 - 30 SEPTEMBER, 1942

PG/30926

CONFIDENTIAL

16 September 1942

I. a) U 371 CP 4640,
U 561 CP 4650,
U 375 CP 8120,
U 559 CP 7230,
U 331 CH 9240,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 562 CH 9180.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, area from Crete to the Nile Delta.

III. a) ./.

b) 1008 CN 3194 1 submarine.

c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1120 CJ 4543 1 submarine.
1230 CN 3466 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 371 (Mehl) was instructed not to cross 24° 30' E to the west before dawn on 17 September. Anti-submarine sweeps will not cease before dawn in zone F I. U 559 (Heidtmann) reported at 0250 that he has commenced the return passage, all torpedoes, requires to go into dock for a short period. Asked if Messina were possible. The boat had been ordered to cease operations in the Eastern Mediterranean on 17 September. He is to proceed to the Western Mediterranean after taking on supplies in Salamis (if he requires more torpedoes) or in Messina. Boat received orders to make for Messina.

b) Western boats:

C-in-C South considered it hopeless for U 431 to continue searching for the crew of one of our aircraft reported in distress at sea yesterday. U 431 (Dommes) has re-occupied his former waiting position.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 September 1942

I. a) U 561 CP 5640,
U 375 CP 8120,
U 559 CP 4880,
U 371 CO 6510,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 562 CH 9180,
U 331 CH 9240.

b) U 453 put out from Salamis at 1115.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, otherwise same as on previous day.

III. a), b) ./.

c) 2040 CP 5973 aircraft reported submerged U-boat.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1100 CN 6769 1 submarine.
1630 CK 7628 1 submarine.
2030 CN 6764 1 submarine.
2245 CP 1445 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 371 (Mehl) reported that he could not cross 35° N until 2 hours later. According to radio intercept service U 561 (Schomburg) has been seen by an enemy aircraft in CP 5973 at 2040. U 559 (Heidtmann) was ordered to report his position by short signal at 0500. The boat transmitted a radio message at 0355. Replacements were required for Messina. Position of the boat was CO 6556.

b) Western boats:

U 331 (Tiesenhausen) has commenced the return passage to Spezia.

V. a), b) ./.

Captain Kreisch on leave. Deputy: Lieutenant (s.g.) Frauenheim.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 September 1942

I. a) U 561 CP 5910,
U 375 CP 8130,
U 559 CO 6430,
U 371 CO 2610,
U 453 CK 8730,
U 331 CH 6330,
U 562 CH 9180,
U 431 CH 9120.

b) U 371 put in to Salamis at 1700.
U 331 put in to Spezia at 0745.

II. a) Sardinia area, Balearic Islands, Algiers, Galite Channel.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete - Nile Delta area.

III. a) ./.

b) 1215 CO 5326 1 submarine.
1617 CO 5267 1 submarine.
0645 CO 5282 1 submarine.

c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

2012 CN 6881 1 submarine.
0025 CN 3624 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

According to an agent's report stronger patrols are being carried out in the area east of the Straits of Gibraltar.

Otherwise nothing to report.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

19 September 1942

I. a) U 561 CP 5910,
U 375 CP 8130,
U 559 CO 2740,
U 453 CK 8730,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 562 CH 9180.

b) U 453 put out from Patras at 1815.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete - Alexandria - Port Said area.

III. a) ./.

b) 1000 CP 8223 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, course 60°, moderate speed.
1015 CP 5598 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, course 165°, speed 12 knots.

c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1840 CK 4714 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 375 (Koenenkamp) has commenced the return passage. The boat is making for Salamis to refuel and revictual.

Otherwise nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) U 375 (Koenenkamp) reported sinking a 1200 GRT steamer and 4 sailing ships.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

20 September 1942

I. a) U 561 CP 5910,
U 375 CP 4050,
U 559 CO 1680,
U 453 CK 7850,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 562 CH 6280.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete - Alexandria - Port Said area.

III. a) ./.

b) 1015 CO 5919 1 submarine.
1100 CO 3726 2 submarines.

c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0830 CO 5449 1 submarine.
1130 CO 4689 1 submarine.
1305 CK 4737 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

According to unsigned reports 6 of the ships which put out from Gibraltar on 18 September are believed to be on a reciprocal course and have passed through the Straits of Gibraltar on an easterly course.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

21 September 1942

I. a) U 561 CP 5910,
U 375 CP 6420,
U 559 CJ 9860,
U 453 CJ 9850,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 562 CH 9180.

b) U 453 put in to Messina at 0825, put out at 1830.
U 559 put in to Messina at 0850.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete - Sidi Barrani - Port Said - Cyprus area.

III. a), b) ./.

c) According to a radio direction finding location a British unit was in CP 8198 at 1516.

According to a radio direction finding location a British unit was in CP 1879 at 1602.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1102 CK 4729 1 submarine.
1220 CK 4116 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 561 (Schomburg) transmitted a success report at 1225.

Otherwise nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) U 561 (Schomburg) reported sinking a 500 GRT topsail schooner in CP 3479.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

22 September 1942

I. a) U 561 CP 2690,
U 375 CO 2370,
U 453 CJ 8640,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 562 CH 9180.

b) U 375 put in to Salamis at 0800.

II. a) Sardinia area, Ibiza, Tunis, Bizerta.

b) Sicilian Channel.

III. a), b), c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1220 CK 7667 1 submarine.

Sighted from land:

1820 CO 3761 1 submarine.

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IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

23 September 1942

I. a) U 561 CP 2690,
U 453 CJ 7610,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 562 CH 9180.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Ibiza and Algiers and westward as far as radius of action allowed.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Nile Delta area.

III. a) ./.

b) 1002 CO 3752 submerged U-boat.

c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1135 CK 4719 1 submarine.
1630 a submerged submarine east of Mersa Matruh.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 561 (Schomburg) reported: "No traffic, moderate air activity." The boat requested permission to return because of damage. He received orders to proceed to Salamis for repairs.

b) Western boats:

U 453 (Schlippenbach) has occupied the northern half of CH 92 as a waiting position.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

24 September 1942

I. a) U 561 CP 5270,
U 375 CK 8860,
U 453 CH 9260,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 562 CH 9180.

b) U 375 put out from Salamis at 0815, put in to Patras at 1650.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Rhodes - Alexandria - Crete area.

III. a) ./.

b) 1710 CP 7124 1 M.T.B., course 300°, high speed.

c) 2330 CJ 6773 1 submarine according to radio direction finding location.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1930 CJ 5455 1 submarine, course 100°.
2240 CJ 9657 1 submarine.
0100 CK 7211 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 561 (Schomburg) transmitted a success report at 2350.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) U 561 reported sinking a transport sailing ship in CP 5284.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

25 September 1942

I. a) U 431 CH 9120,
U 562 CH 9180,
U 453 CH 9250.

b) U 375 put out from Patras at 2230.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Ibiza and Algiers.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete - Nile Delta area.

III. a) ./.

b) 0800 2 destroyers, 4 transports off Alexandria.

c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1330 CJ 9261 1 submarine.
2015 CN 2684 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 375 put out from Patras for Pola at 2230.

Otherwise nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

U 431 (Dommes) reported Junkers compressor broken down, requested permission to return to Spezia. Position at 2045 was CH 8569. Orders were sent to return:

1) if the situation permitted,

2) if U 431's operational duration was extended by intermediate replenishment.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

26 September 1942

I. a) U 561 CO 6280,
U 375 CK 7860,
U 431 CH 6610,
U 562 CH 9180,
U 453 CH 9250.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Crete area, Rhodes, Jaffa, Derna.

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III. a) ./.

b) 1555 CP 8279 2 steamers, westerly course, speed 15 knots.
1605 CP 8155 2 steamers, 3 destroyers, course 160°, speed 10 knots.

c) According to radio intelligence there has been a possibility for two days of an operation eastward from Gibraltar.

d) 2 destroyers (?) put out from Gibraltar in the morning for the east.

e) Italian Navy:

1035 CO 5981 1 submarine.
1845 CJ 3111 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 561 (Schomburg) received orders not to cross 35° N except when ordered by Admiral Aegean and to report his position by short signal. Position at 2044 was CO 6188. No boats in the operational area.

b) Western boats:

U 453 (Schlippenbach) received orders to include "Dommes"'s area, the northern and central thirds of CH 91, as a waiting position.

V. a), b) ./.

VI. a) ./.

b) Captain U-boats back from leave in Rome for a conference on saving manpower.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

27 September 1942

I. a) U 561 CO 5230,
U 375 CK 7510,
U 453 CH 9120,
U 562 CH 9180.

b) U 431 put in to Spezia at 0900.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Crete, Alexandria, Port Said, Haifa area.

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III. a), b), c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1010 CK 4883 1 submarine.
1640 CO 1359 1 submarine.
1810 CK 7624 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Permission from Admiral Aegean for "Schomburg" to put in at 1054. No boats in the operational area.

b) Western boats:

U 431 (Dommes) put in to Spezia at 0945. According to an Italian agent's report a convoy of 12 merchant ships and 2 cruisers are supposed to have passed east of the Straits. Report appears unlikely.

V. a), b) ./.

VI. a) ./.

b) Captain U-boats' interrupted leave continued in the morning.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

28 September 1942

I. a) U 453 CH 9120,
U 562 CH 9180,
U 375 CK 4410,
U 561 CK 8970.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) ./.

III. a) ./.

b) 1115 CP 8123 1 hospital ship, easterly course.
1145 CP 8314 1 sailing ship, easterly course.
1205 CP 5927 2 destroyers, 4 steamers, course 0°.
1640 CP 7254 2 M.T.B.s, course 330°.
1655 CP 7167 1 submarine, northerly course.

c) According to a radio direction finding location 1 submarine was in CO 2444 at 1930.

d) 0400 the "Malaya" put out from Gibraltar for firing practice.

e) ./.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

No boats in the operational area.

b) Western boats:

Orders from C-in-C U-boats, concerning the treatment of neutrals, were transmitted to U-boats.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

29 September 1942

I. a) U 375 CJ 3140,
U 453 CH 9120,
U 562 CH 9180.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers and westward as far as radius of action allowed.

b) Malta area, Nile Delta area.

III. a) ./.

b) 0840 CP 7515 2 minesweepers, courses varying.

c) ./.

d) 1700 the "Malaya" put in to Gibraltar again.

e) Italian Navy:

1830 CO 5824 1 submarine.
2115 CO 5947 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

No boats in the operational area.

b) Western boats:

Swedish ships passed the operational area in the evening. It has been assumed on the basis of urgent radio messages that Malta will receive supplies from both east and west shortly.

U 559 (Heidtmann) was to operate in the Western Mediterranean according to Flag Officer's instruction of 15 September. As the operation planned for U 81 (Guggenberger) fell through because of transport traffic during the new moon phase and it therefore joined the western boats as the fourth one, "Heidtmann" was free for operations in the east, at present unoccupied. He received orders to make for CP 5468. Freedom of action is intended off the Syrian and Palestine coasts.

V. a) ./.

b) According to a signal from C-in-C U-boats the whole crew of "Neumann" (U 372) is in British hands.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

30 September 1942

I. a) U 453 CH 9150,
U 562 CH 9420,
U 431 CJ 4120,
U 559 CO 1430,
U 561 CK 8860.

b) U 561 put out from Salamis at 0800, put out from Patras at 2200.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Malta area, Nile Delta.

III. a) ./.

b) 1606 CP 7136 1 submarine.
1630 CO 2616 1 submarine.
1550 CP 8162 3 patrol vessels, 1 merchant ship, course 220°.

c) According to radio intelligence an unknown unit was in CP 4913 at 1835.

d) 2230 the "Malaya" put out from Gibraltar.

e) Italian Navy:

0930 CJ 9868 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

"Hamm" (U 562) and "Schlippenbach" (U 453) received orders to move their operational area to the south. "Hamm" received the northern and central third of CH 94 as far as French territorial waters as the limit, "Schlippenbach" the central and southern third of CH 91, "Dommes" (U 431) the northern third of CH 91 and southern third of CH 67.

Otherwise nothing to report.

The move south was carried out as enemy landings (Italian sources) may be expected in the new moon period on the French coast and especially in Tunisia.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

Comments of Flag Officer German Naval Command Italy on the War Diary of Captain U-boats Italy for the period from 1 to 30 September 1942.

1) The War Diary contains considerations for moving the focal point of U-boat operations from the Eastern to Western Mediterranean. Naval War Staff has concurred.

2) The measures devised by Captain U-boats to strengthen the U-boat disposition in the Western Mediterranean were to the point and complied with instructions. That this caused the eastern area to be exposed to a very large extent was a result of the unexpectedly early withdrawal of boats operating there.

3) The unusually few successes in September are due to the transfer, for operational reasons, of U-boats to the Western Mediterranean where the enemy has not been in evidence.

4) Otherwise nothing to remark.

(Signed) Weichold.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

1 - 15 OCTOBER, 1942

PG/30927

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1 October, 1942

I. a) U 559 CO 2780,
U 561 CK 7940,
U 431 CH 6840,
U 453 CH 9180,
U 562 CH 9420.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Balearic Islands, Algiers.

b) Malta area, Nile Delta.

III. a) ./.

b) 1530 CP 879 2 destroyers, 3 escort vessels, 2 steamers, course 60°.

c) ./.

d) The "Malaya" is believed to have put out to the west.

e) Italian Navy:

0900 CJ 9918 1 submarine.
1100 CO 2699 1 submarine.
2028 CO 9613 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

2 October, 1942

I. a) U 431 CH 9120,
U 453 CH 9180,
U 562 CH 9420,
U 559 CO 6510.

b) U 561 put in to Messina at 0815, put out from Messina at 0100.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Nile Delta.

III. a) ./.

b) ./.

c) ./.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1030 CJ 3999 1 submarine.
1820 CJ 9639 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Heidtmann was granted freedom of action off the coasts of Palestine and Egypt, concentrating on the Alexandria - Port Said convoy routes to Beirut, Haifa and Jaffa.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

3 October, 1942

I. a) U 559 CP 4640,
U 561 CJ 9150,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 453 CH 9180,
U 562 CH 9420.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Malta area, Nile Delta.

III. a) ./.

b) 1500 CP 4558 1 submarine.
1500 CP 7238 1 submarine.

c), d), e) ./.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

According to an agent's report the "Malaya" has put out for Britain with 25 survivors from the aircraft carrier "Eagle" and 50 airmen. Another report stated that the "Malaya" in the Atlantic was in radio communication with the cruiser "Charybdis", suggesting that an operation is about to commence.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

4 October, 1942

I. a) U 559 CP 5540,
U 561 CJ 1660,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 453 CH 9180,
U 562 CH 9420.

b) U 561 put in to Spezia at 1300.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Malta area, Crete, Alexandria, Cyprus area.

III. a), b), c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1000 CJ 8922 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

At 0210 Admiral Aegean reported that at 1500 on 3 October, in CP 4558 one of our aircraft spotted a U-boat unable to submerge. He requested to be informed whether an escort should be provided on 4 October.
Heidtmann was requested to provide details of his position and at 0357 he reported his position from CP 5457.
Admiral Aegean has been informed.

b) Western boats:

Further increased patrol vessel activity in the Gibraltar area. The battleship "Malaya" was reported with a southbound convoy from Britain. The battleship "Ramillies" was in the Freetown area. Nothing to report.

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V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

5 October, 1942

I. a) U 559 CP 5910,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 453 CH 9180,
U 562 CH 9420.

b) U 81 put out from Spezia at 1250.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sidi Barrani - Port Said - Crete area.

III. a), b), c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1025 CJ 3838 1 submarine.
0005 CJ 9575 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

6 October, 1942

I. a) U 431 CH 9120,
U 453 CH 9180,
U 562 CH 9420,
U 81 CH 3990,
U 559 CP 5910.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Sicilian Channel, otherwise same as on previous day.

III. a) ./.

b) 1223 4 M.T.B.s off Alexandria.
1505 CP 8195 1 patrol vessel.
0710 CP 5665 2 destroyers, course 200°.

c) ./.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1030 CJ 4826 1 submarine.
1100 CJ 8922 1 submarine.
1137 CO 4928 1 submarine.
2320 CJ 4963 1 submarine.
0605 CK 7166 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Guggenberger received CH 02 as his waiting position.
Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

7 October, 1942.

I. a) U 559 CP 5910,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 453 CH 9180,
U 562 CH 9420,
U 81 CH 9250.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel.

III. a), b), c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0630 CO 5499 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

8 October, 1942

I. a) U 431 CH 9120,
U 453 CH 9180,
U 562 CH 9420,
U 81 CH 9250,
U 559 CP 5670.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Malta area, Tobruk area, Port Said, Beirut, Crete.

III. a) ./.

b) 1145 CK 7694 and CK 7683 1 submarine in each.
1450 CP 5718 2 sailing ships. CP 4691 1 sailing ship, course 180°.
1545 CP 8125 1 patrol vessel, course 60°.

c) ./.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1630 CJ 3822 1 submarine.
0210 CJ 9539 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

9 October, 1942

I. a) U 559 CP 5670,
U 81 CH 9250,
U 562 CH 9420,
U 453 CH 9180,
U 431 CH 9120.

b) ./.

II. a) As on the previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Tobruk area, Jaffa, Crete.

III. a) ./.

b) 1432 CP 7272 2 torpedoboats, course 140°.
1500 CP 8257 4 merchant ships, 1 destroyer, 6 escort vessels, easterly course.

c) ./.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1506 CO 2677 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

As no Italian boats were operating off the Syrian coast, the eastern boats were granted freedom of action against submarines east of 30° E.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

10 October, 1942

I. a) U 559 CP 5670,
U 81 CH 9250,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 453 CH 9180,
U 562 CH 9420.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel.

III. a) ./.

b) 1522 CP 7258 2 patrol vessels, easterly course.
1525 CP 7276 2 patrol vessels, easterly course.
Italian aircraft:
1245 CP 5738 1 steamer, course 240°.

c) ./.

d) 0930 CO 2677 1 submarine located by echo ranging set.

e) Italian Navy:

0300 CN 5168 1 submarine.
1000 CO 4429 1 submarine.
1040 CK 4162 1 submarine.
1010 CO 2156 1 submarine.
1110 CN 5195 1 submarine.
To b)
0515 CO 2533 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

U 605 (Schütze) reported from CH 7542 at 1057 that a fan was evaded. After a three hour underwater duel an unsuccessful fan of four was fired at a "Snapper" class submarine. Eight plus two (torpedoes), 80 cubic meters.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

See appendix I of War Diary dated 10 October. Captain U-boats, Most Secret. S.O.s only No. 61.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

11 October, 1942

I. a) U 559 CP 5670,
U 81 CH 9250,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 453 CH 9180,
U 562 CH 9420.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Haifa area, Eastern Mediterranean.

III. a) ./.

b) 0920 CJ 6782 1 submarine.
1100 CH 5870 2 destroyers, course 340°, high speed.

c) ./.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0045 CJ 8836 1 submarine.

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IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

According to radio intercept reports a British aircraft was over a submerged U-boat. A message was transmitted to Gibraltar from the aircraft.
U 605 (Schütze) reported at 0209 by the short signal, "Yes".
Thus in accordance with Operational Order No. 8, the boat has reported passing through the Straits of Gibraltar.
U 605 was ordered to proceed to Spezia.
The newly arrived boats will first put in to Spezia for the following reasons:

1. for their experiences to be evaluated,

2. to give them detailed information of conditions in the Mediterranean,

3. for the control of U-boat operations during November.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

12 October, 1942

I. a) U 559 CP 5670,
U 605 CH 6550,
U 81 CH 9250,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 453 CH 9180,
U 562 CH 9420.

b) U 77 put out from Pola at 1915.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Eastern Mediterranean area.

III. a) ./.

b) 1632 CP 7271 1 submarine.

c) ./.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1100 CO 5976 1 submarine.

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IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 559 (Heidtmann) was requested to make a coded weather report between 0200 and 0500. Weather report was received at 0441. Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

According to an Italian radio intercept report a British unit transmitted a radio message from the area south of the Balearic Islands at 1348. It is thought that this unit is probably one of the destroyers spotted yesterday by our air reconnaissance.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

VI. From 15 October French warships and merchant ships in the Mediterranean will have the same markings as French ships in the Atlantic. (Yellow burgee beneath the ensign and the French colors bordered with yellow, painted on the ship's side.)

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

13 October, 1942

I. a) U 559 CP 5330,
U 605 CH 6550,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 453 CH 9180,
U 562 CH 9420,
U 81 CH 9250,
U 77 CJ 6220,
U 371 CK 8730.

b) U 371 put out from Patras at 1845.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia, Balearic Islands, Tunis.

b) Sicilian Channel.

III. a) ./.

b) 1350 CP 5785 12 steamers, 10 destroyers, course 90°.

c) ./.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1305 CJ 9417 1 submarine.
1455 CJ 4631 1 submarine.
1732 CJ 8928 1 submarine.
2200 CJ 2688 1 submarine.
0319 CJ 7443 1 submarine.
0644 CO 4913 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 371 (Mehl) sent a short weather report as requested.
Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

U-boats:

U 458 (Diggins)
U 660 (Baur)
U 593 (Kelbling)

reported their arrival.

They were ordered to make for Spezia.
U 453 (Schlippenbach) reported by short signal: "Have commenced return passage".
U 81 (Guggenberger) will occupy Schlippenbach's operational area (CH 91 central and southern third). A radio message subsequently received explained why U 453 (Schlippenbach) has commenced the return passage. The boat reported that in the process of overhauling the C/30 machine gun in the forward compartment a round fired itself and killed Ordinary Seaman Saupe, wounding three other members of the crew.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

14 October, 1942

I. a) U 559 CP 5330,
U 77 CK 7550,
U 371 CK 7520,
U 605 CJ 1380,
U 453 CH 6330,
U 458 CH 6290,
U 660 CH 6290,
U 593 CH 6520,
U 81 CH 9150,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 562 CH 9420.

b) U 605 put in to Spezia at 1025.

II. a) ./.

b) Sicilian Channel, Malta area, Eastern Mediterranean.

III. a) ./.

b) ./.

c) According to radio direction finding location a British submarine was in CN 6445 at 1900.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

0930 CK 7236 1 submarine.
1350 CJ 9417 1 submarine.
1625 CN 2214 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

U 458 (Diggins)
U 660 (Baur)
U 593 (Kelbling)

were instructed to be at point C at 1630 on 15 October to be picked up by an escort.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

15 October, 1942

I. a) U 431 CH 9120,
U 81 CH 9180,
U 562 CH 9420,
U 458 CJ 1580,
U 660 CJ 1580,
U 593 CJ 1580,
U 453 CJ 1390,
U 371 CJ 6370,
U 77 CO 2720,
U 559 CP 5330.

b) U 458, U 660 and U 593 put in to Spezia at 1800.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Sicilian Channel, Eastern Mediterranean, Malta.

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III. a) ./.

b) 1430 CP 5672 1 steamer, course 120°.
1440 CP 8183 3 steamers, 1 destroyer, 3 escort vessels, course 220°.

c) ./.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1145 CN 6484 1 submarine.
1540 CO 2562 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

VI. The ban on the area between the meridians of CO 9371 and CP 7293, south of the parallel of CP 7159 which had been cleared for E-boat operations, has been cancelled.

Captain U-boats left on a duty trip to Spezia at 1135.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

16 - 31 OCTOBER, 1942

PG/30927

CONFIDENTIAL

16 October, 1942

I. a) U 431 CH 9120,
U 81 CH 9180,
U 562 CH 9420,
U 77 CO 6410,
U 559 CP 5330,
U 371 CJ 2390.

b) U 371 put in to Pola at 1100.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Eastern Mediterranean, Malta.

III. a) ./.

b) 1425 CP 5891 2 destroyers, course 30°, speed 30 knots.
1526 CP 8194 4 escort vessels, 3 merchant ships, course 110°.
1528 CP 8191 2 destroyers, 1 submarine, stopped.

c), d), e) ./.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

17 October, 1942

I. a) U 559 CP 5330,
U 77 CP 4540,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 81 CH 9180,
U 562 CH 9420.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, Eastern Mediterranean, Malta.

III. a), b), c), d), e) ./.

CONFIDENTIAL

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 559 (Heidtmann) has occupied the area south of the parallel of CP 5685 and U 77 (Hartmann) the area to the north of it.

b) Western boats:

U 562 (Hamm) has commenced return passage to Spezia.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

Captain U-boats returned from his duty trip to Spezia at 1935.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

18 October, 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 9180,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 562 CJ 1389,
U 77 CP 5615,
U 559 CP 5767.

b) U 562 put in to Spezia at 1000.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia.

b) ./.

III. a), b), c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1040 CK 7961 1 submarine.
1045 CK 4537 1 submarine.
1120 CJ 4665 1 submarine.
1135 CO 5988 1 submarine.
1545 CJ 9685 1 submarine.
1629 CO 3948 1 probable submarine.
0300 CJ 5174 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

The ban on attacking warships smaller than cruisers, in force until now, has been raised.
The boats were granted freedom of action against enemy destroyers and escort vessels. The order

restricting attacks was made at a time when it was considered desirable that the operation of German U-boats in the Western Mediterranean should be concealed from the enemy until a worthwhile target was encountered. But we can no longer expect to surprise him. For instance, U 453 observed star shells being fired in the area of the waiting positions.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

VI. In order to increase the operational period of the boats in the Western Mediterranean, it seems to be an advantage to hold some of the boats at readiness in a port.
As all our Western Mediterranean bases are remote from the operational area of the boats, making it doubtful whether they could be put into action quickly enough, Cagliari is considered to be the most favorably situated port. If the boats are held ready in Cagliari we must take into account the fact that in the event of an enemy aircraft ferrying operation, when according to recent experiences, the aircraft took off in the area to the south or to the west of Majorca, they would not be able to operate.

The Italian Navy was requested to investigate whether they could guarantee a berth for two boats, occasionally provide shore billets for a U-boat crew, and supply the boats with fresh meat and vegetables.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

19 October, 1942

I. a) U 431 CH 9120,
U 81 CH 9180,
U 559 CP 5760,
U 77 CP 5610.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Malta area, Eastern Mediterranean.

III. a) ./.

b) 1345 CP 8276 1 torpedoboat, 2 steamers, course 240°.
0740 CN 2686 1 steamer, southeasterly course.

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c) 1220 CN 2553 1 submarine by radio direction finding location.
2105 CN 2496 1 submarine by radio direction finding location.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1010 CK 7661 1 submarine.
1130 CN 2811 1 submarine.
1150 CO 3277 1 submarine.
1252 CN 2598 1 submarine.
1315 CO 5954 1 submarine.
0237 CN 5296 1 submarine.
0439 CN 5615 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

According to radio intercept reports 1 boat was sighted in CP 8316 at 1545. The position lies in the operational area of U 559 (Heidtmann) who will be notified.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

20 October, 1942

I. a) U 431 CH 9120,
U 81 CH 9150,
U 559 CP 5760,
U 77 CP 5610.

b) U 205 put out from Pola at 1630.
U 73 put out from Spezia at 1700.

II. a) ./.

b) ./.

III. a) 0715 CJ 6325 1 submarine.

b) 1437 CP 8214 2 destroyers, 1 submarine, course 210°.
1447 CP 7339 1 tanker with a barrage balloon, 1 escort vessel, course 270°.
Italian aircraft:
1645 CN 2852 1 submarine.

c) ./.

d) 1100 CN 2977 1 submarine by radio direction finding location.

e) Italian Navy:

1428 CO 3634 1 submarine.
1645 CN 2852 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 205 (Bürgel) reported 1 submarine at 0715 in CJ 6225, southeasterly course.

b) Western boats:

U 73 (Deckert) has occupied the northern half of CH 94.
U 605 (Schütze) has occupied CH 92 as a waiting position.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

21 October, 1942

I. a) U 431 CH 9120,
U 81 CH 9150,
U 559 CP 5760,
U 77 CP 5610,
U 205 CJ 6260,
U 73 CJ 1790.

b) U 605 put out from Spezia at 1710.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia.

b) Malta, Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus.

III. a) ./.

b) 1640 CN 2463 1 submarine.

c) ./.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1025 CJ 9583 1 submarine.
1540 CJ 2364 1 submarine.

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IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 559 (Heidtmann) was requested to send a short weather report between 0200 and 0500. No report was received.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

22 October, 1942

I. a) U 605 CJ 4150,
U 73 CH 6850,
U 431 CH 9120,
U 81 CH 9180,
U 205 CK 7580,
U 559 CP 5760,
U 77 CP 5610.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers, Gibraltar.

b) Malta, Eastern Mediterranean.

III. a) ./.

b) 1130 CP 8262 3 destroyers, course 45°.
1328 CP 8248 1 destroyer, 2 escort vessels, 1 tanker, 1 steamer, course 90°.
1336 CP 8183 3 destroyers, 2 escort vessels, 1 tanker, 3 steamers, course 270°.

c) ./.

d) One "Arethusa" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar at 1250.

e) Italian Navy:

1140 CK 7649 1 submarine.
0725 CP 1732 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

U 559 (Heidtmann) was requested to report his position. The report was received. At 0500 the boat was in CP 8122.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

23 October, 1942

I. a) U 431 CH 9120,
U 81 CH 9150,
U 73 CH 9420,
U 605 CH 9250,
U 559 CP 8122,
U 77 CP 5610,
U 205 CO 5210.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean, Malta.

III. a) ./.

b) ./.

c) 0500 CN 6726 1 submarine by radio direction finding location.

d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1250 CO 3664 1 submarine.
1700 CK 5996 1 submarine.
0220 CN 2732 1 submarine.
0340 CN 2762 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

The boats were allotted new attack areas.
U 205 (Bürgel) was granted freedom of action south of the parallel of CP 5855, concentrating in the southern half of the area.
U 77 (Hartmann) was granted freedom of action between the parallels of CP 5855 and CP 5525.
U 559 (Heidtmann) was granted freedom of action north of the parallel of CP 5525.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

24 October, 1942

I. a) U 431 CH 9120,
U 81 CH 9150,
U 73 CH 9420,
U 605 CH 9250,
U 205 CP 4460,
U 559 CP 5530,
U 77 CP 5590.

b) U 660 put out from Spezia at 1830.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) ./.

III. a) ./.

b) 0930 CP 7271 3 escort vessels, 1 steamer, course 180°.
1310 CP 7513 1 steamer, course 45°.
1330 CP 9192 4 escort vessels, 3 steamers, course 270°.
1335 CP 8137 2 destroyers, course 180°.
1323 CP 8273 1 patrol vessel.

c), d) ./.

e) Italian Navy:

1600 CN 6714 1 submarine.

IV. a) Eastern boats:

Enemy traffic off Port Said and Alexandria detected by air reconnaissance.
Nothing to report.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

VI. In connection with the putting into operation of the boats which will be operationally ready during October and during first week in November, the following considerations are noted within the framework of the operational orders issued:

1. Assignment:

In connection with U-boat operations it was ordered in Naval War Staff, 1st Division 1U. (U-boat operations) 1839/42 Most Secret, S.O.s only dated 17 September, that they were to concentrate in the Western Mediterranean, but

because of the possibility of British operations from the east thus threatening the coast we occupy, the Eastern Mediterranean must not be left undefended.

2. Own Situation:

1. The following were put into operation on 24 October:

a) in the west 4 boats, expected to remain at sea through the November new moon period.

b) in the east 3 boats, of which U 559 will be breaking off in 6 or 7 days, as by then all his resources will be exhausted.

2. Within the next fortnight the following boats will be operationally ready:

On 24 October U 660; on 25 October U 565; on 26 October U 458; on 2 November U 593; on 3 November U 561; on 7 November U 331.
All boats are in Spezia.

3. Enemy Situation:

1. In the Western Mediterranean no convincing signs have yet been observed of the start of an operation, against the resumed air raids on Malta for instance. The enemy has not appeared in the Western Mediterranean since the middle of August.

2. In the Eastern Mediterranean air reconnaissance radio intercept service reported an increase in traffic in the last few weeks. Naval War Staff, 1st Division has drawn attention to the growth of shipping traffic in the ports of Southern Turkey. The damage sustained by this shipping is of great interest. Today the enemy opened a large scale attack near El Alamein. The possibility of landingsbeing attempted in the rear of our front must not be excluded.

4. Intentions:

As the Eastern Mediterranean has now increased in importance compared with the last two months (see also the indications of Naval War Staff, 1st Division) and as the occupation of the area by U-boats had had to be abandoned for a time, and because even now their number is inadequate for the execution of the assignments of the second part of the instructions of Naval War Staff, it is intended to send the next two available boats to the

east. In view of the length of the approach route they will be arriving there at a favorable lunar period. The boat available on 26 October will first be kept back in Spezia until 29 October, so that it may be available for operations in the west as soon as there are indications of an operation. On the other hand any change in the Eastern Mediterranean situation may require the operation of U-boats there. Of the three boats available at the beginning of November, at least two will be put into operation in the Western Mediterranean, so that there will be at least 6 boats in the west during the new moon period which, according to our previous calculations, can be joined by 2 more. The most experienced Commanders are available in the west where the concentration remains.

5. In pursuance of this plan U 660 has been ordered to make for the Eastern Mediterranean, U 458's date of sailing is scheduled for 28 October.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

25 October, 1942

I. a) U 431 CH 9120,
U 81 CH 9180,
U 73 CH 9420,
U 605 CH 9250,
U 660 CJ 5460,
U 205 CP 5770,
U 77 CP 5560,
U 559 CP 5350.

b) U 565 put out from Spezia at 1800.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Malta, Cyprus area, Port Said, Alexandria, Crete.

III. a) ./.

b) 1000 CN 3498 minesweeper ?
1046 CN 3497 " course 180°.
1045 CP 5781 1 steamer, course 30°.

c) ./.

d) The "Furious" is in Gibraltar.

e) Italian Navy:

1120 CJ 6343 1 submarine.

IV. a) U 660 (Baur) was diverted to the Western Mediterranean for operations there in accordance with orders from Naval War Staff. The boat was ordered at 2000 to report his position by short signal. The position report was received at 2006. The boat was in CJ 8232.
U 205 (Bürgel) and U 77 (Hartmann) were ordered to make for Messina. Naval War Staff has ordered them to operate in the Western Mediterranean.
U 559 (Heidtmann) was granted freedom of action in the entire Eastern Mediterranean operational area.

b) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) U 568 (Preuss) was reported missing for the second time with effect from 28 October in C-in-C U-boats G 12164 A5 dated 26 October.

VI. A report was received at 1130 from Naval War Staff, 1st Division, U-boat operations (in IU 2136/42 Most Secret, S.O.s only) according to which the U-boat that put out from Spezia on 24 October was to be directed immediately to the Western Mediterranean. What is intended is not quite clear. If a boat has to be sent west as quickly as possible, it would be far better to take U 565 which is ready to put out today. The difference in the time taken to reach the operational area is not worth mentioning but it would avoid the bother and danger involved in the diversion. An anti-submarine sweep is being carried out in the Tyrrhenian Sea outside the U-boat route agreed on with the Italian Command. In view of the delicate nature of the organization of the Italian anti-submarine and escort services it is not easy on a Sunday to divert U 660 destined for Messina. It is urged that, in view of bitter past experiences, the greatest care should be taken. But Naval War Staff's order may possibly also mean that not only the boat that put out on 24 October but also subsequent boats are intended for the west. Information was sought by telephone. At 1315 the order was received: All 3 boats to make for the west. U 660 was diverted.
At 1900 a Most Immediate teleprint message from Naval High Command Naval War Staff, 1st Division (operations) (26611/Most Secret) was received containing the Fuehrer's decree that in view of the possibility of British

operations, either to supply Malta or to land in Sardinia, all available German U-boats are to be put into operation in the Western Mediterranean. At the moment only 3 U-boats are operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. Of these, U 559 has been in the operational area since the end of August, having undergone an intermediate replenishing in Messina. In a few days the boat will have exhausted all resources and will need an overhaul. It will, therefore, not be available for operations in the Western Mediterranean. It has been ordered to attack freely in the whole Eastern Mediterranean area until its resources are exhausted. The other 2 boats were ordered to Messina for replenishing. They should probably be able to arrive there on 31 October.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

26 October, 1942

I. a) U 431 CH 9120,
U 81 CH 9150,
U 73 CH 9420,
U 605 CH 9250,
U 565 CJ 4150,
U 660 CJ 7350,
U 205 CP 4760,
U 77 CP 4640,
U 559 CP 5670.

b) ./.

II. a) Same as on previous day and as far as Gibraltar.

b) Malta area, Eastern Mediterranean.

III. a) ./.

b) 1005 1 destroyer CP 8137, course 240°.

c) ./.

d) The "Furious" put in to dock.
1000 2 destroyers, 2 gunboats and 1 tanker put out from Gibraltar for the east, 1815 put in again.

e) 1002 CK 7271 1 submarine (Italian Navy).
0700 CN 2736 1 submarine (Italian Navy).
0725 CJ 9283 1 submarine (Italian Navy).

IV. 1. The instructions of Flag Officer German Naval Command to arrange the U-boat disposition in such a way that it would be able to intercept the enemy even if he should attempt to follow the route west of the Balearic Islands and

adjusting it with Italian U-boat operations had the following results after a conference with the Director of the Italian Operations Department:

a) The Italians have 3 boats in the sea areas west of Ibiza 3 in the eastern halves of CH 56 and 59.

b) On the German side there are at the moment 7 boats available for operations, 5 more may reach the operational area either in the middle or at the end of the first week in November.

c) 3 German boats occupy CH 81 and 84, 2 boats are placed behind them in the southern third of 58 and in 84. 2 more boats occupy 91.

2. The advantages of this solution are believed to be the following:

a) A distinct separation from the Italian U-boat formation.

b) The boats are disposed in quarterline sufficiently far west to intercept enemy forces following the route west of the Balearic Islands.

c) The formation is fully effective for action in the more probable case, namely if the enemy keeps to his route south of the Balearic Islands.

d) The boats favorably placed for any British landing planned on Algeria.

e) A further advance to the west is not recommended. It would increase the danger from air attack, and greatly reduce the possibility of informing the boats in time of the start of an operation and the enemy's position by messages received from air reconnaissance and other sources.

3. The Western boats received the following orders:

Waiting positions are to be occupied as follows:

U 431 (Dommes) CH 81 northern and central third.
U 81 (Guggenberger) CH 81 southern third.
U 605 (Schütze) CH 84 northern and central third, watch for three - mile limit.

U 565 (Franken) CH 58 southern third and
CH 82 northern third.
U 73 (Deckert) CH 91.

Italian U-boats are between the meridians of CH 5925 and CH 5935, between the parallels of CH 5985 and CH 5661 and west and northwest Ibiza. Waiting positions of Italian U-boats in the south are to be avoided. Italian U-boats, bound for their waiting positions, may be encountered.

IV. a) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Eastern boats:

U 205 (Bürgel) and U 77 (Hartmann) were requested to report their positions by short signal at 0800 on 27 October.
U 205 (Bürgel) was in CO 5258.
U 77 (Hartmann) in CO 6627.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

27 October, 1942

I. a) U 559 CP 5670,
U 77 CO 6620,
U 205 CO 5250,
U 458 CJ 4150,
U 431 CH 8310,
U 81 CH 8340,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 605 CH 9170,
U 660 CH 9160,
U 565 CH 9140.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers.

b) Sicilian Channel, Eastern Mediterranean.

III. a) ./.

b) 0834 CP 8213 1 destroyer, 2 torpedoboats, course 210°, speed 20 knots.
0926 CP 8185 1 large tanker, 4 merchant ships, 3 destroyers, 2 escort vessels, course 0°.
0929 CP 8158 1 tanker, 2 merchant ships, 4 escort vessels, course 300°, balloon barrage.
1340 CO 5379 1 submarine, course 165°.

c) ./.

d) The "Furious" has taken aircraft on board, the "Charybdis" is out of dock.

e) Italian Navy:

0900 CN 2555 1 submarine.
0930 CN 2766 1 submarine.
0130 CO 1624 1 submarine.

IV. a) Western boats:

U 73 (Deckert) is occupying the southern half of CH 91.
U 458 (Diggins) is occupying the northern half of CH 91.

Nothing to report.

b) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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28 October, 1942

I. a) U 559 CP 5596,
U 77 CO 2747,
U 205 CO 1556,
U 458 CH 9128,
U 73 CH 9181,
U 565 CH 8212,
U 660 CH 8281,
U 431 CH 8152,
U 81 CH 8185,
U 605 CH 8427.

b) U 205 put in to Messina at 0740.

II. a) Western Mediterranean as far as Gibraltar.

b) Malta, Eastern Mediterranean.

III. a) U 605: 2146 aircraft carrier formation in CH 7399, course 60°.
U 81: 2150 aircraft carrier formation in CH 8179, course 50°, speed 21 knots.

b) 1815 CH 7563 aircraft carrier formation, 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers, 8 destroyers course 90°, speed 21 knots.

c) ./.

d) 0930 the "Furious", the "Charybdis", the "Penelope", 6 destroyers and 2 gunboats put out from Gibraltar for the east.

e) Italian Navy:

0840 CO 5238 1 submarine.
1025 CK 7373 1 submarine.
1145 CK 4736 1 submarine.

28/29 October.

IV. a) Western boats:

According to an agent's report the "Furious" took aircraft on board on 27 October. We must therefore expect an operation ferrying aircraft to Malta. Towards midday an Italian agent's report was received stating that the following ships have put out for the east: The "Furious", the cruisers "Charybdis" and "Penelope", the destroyers "Westcott", "Verity", "Wishart", "Achates", one "H" class destroyer and the "Bliskawika". It is presumed that this formation did not put out to sea for exercises but to ferry aircraft.
The Western boats, therefore, received the following orders:
The "Furious", 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers put out from Gibraltar at 0930 for the east. Presumably it is an aircraft ferrying operation. The possibility that the aircraft will take off in the sea area west of the Balearic Islands, should not be ignored. As the western edge of the waiting position of our boats will not be reached by the formation until after dark, and as we cannot entirely rely on receiving air reconnaissance or air shadower's reports beforehand, the barrier formed by the U-boats' disposition between the Spanish and North African coasts, has been reinforced by one more boat.

The boats received the following radio message:

"The new waiting position for Franken is the northern third of CH 81, for Deckert it is the southern third of CH 58 and the northern third of CH 82, for Diggins CH 91."

The disposition of the boats is now as follows:

The boats have occupied:

U 565 (Franken) CH 81 northern third,
U 431 (Dommes) CH 81 central third,
U 81 (Guggenberger) CH 81 southern third,
U 605 (Schütze) CH 84 northern and southern thirds,
U 73 (Deckert) CH 58 southern third and CH 82 northern third,
U 660 (Baur) CH 82 central and southern thirds,
U 458 (Diggins) CH 91.

Disposition of the Italian U-boats:

4 boats between Cape St. Antonia and Ibiza. Tnree boats in the eastern third of CH 56 and CH 59.

Even without an aircraft shadower's report it seems unlikely that the aircraft carrier formation will break through the waiting disposition of the boats unobserved.

An aircraft report was received at 2120. According to this at 1815 the formation was in CH 7563 course 91°, moderate speed.

This report was transmitted to the boats at 2133.
As more shadowers' reports from aircraft were not anticipated, freedom of action on the strength of this one report was not granted to the boats because we did not wish to remove the cutting-off position. A U-boat gained contact with the convoy for the first time at 2146. As the boat had to submerge, the report was not received until 2345.

The boat reported:

"A fan of four was observed in the group of aircraft carriers in 7399, course 60°. Whilst submerging there were several detonations, possibly depth charges. Schütze (U 605)."
After this report was received the boats, except for U 458, were granted freedom of action.
U 458 (Diggins) is to remain in his waiting position (CH 91), so that he should not be moved too far west. CH 91 can be reached by the carrier formation by daybreak. It is presumed that its aircraft will start operating from there.
At 2150 another boat (U 81) gained contact. The shadower's report was received at 0124 after a very great delay.

The boat reported:

"Enemy sighted in CH 8179, speed 21 knots. Have lost contact, course 50°. U 81."
U 81, therefore, gained contact at about the same time as U 605. After receiving the shadower's report from U 81, the position of the formation reported by U 605 seems unlikely. As it is hopeless for the U-boats to pursue the formation because of its high speed, suggestions for operations against the carrier formation on its return need to be examined.

The attack disposition selected for the U-boats must be such that:

1. it can definitely be reached by the boats by dawn, as air patrols which must then be expected will make a longer passage impossible for the boats,

2. it will intercept the enemy whether his return passage starts off the Spanish Wash in the center of the sea area or off the North African coast,

3. it is spread in depth in order to improve the operational prospects,

4. it allows the U-boats to attack as far as possible by daylight or during the first dark nocturnal hours (the moon rises at 2130). Bright moonlight nights are most unsuitable for attacking heavily defended aircraft carriers. It is presumed that the formation will choose the sea area south of the Balearic Islands for the take-off of the aircraft and that it will then return by the shortest route. The take-off itself will be on a southwesterly course, because of the prevailing direction of the wind. In view of the habits of the enemy in the past, the possibility of a return passage being undertaken close to the African coast must not be overlooked.

At 0214 the boats, therefore, received the following orders:

"The moment the prospects of operating against the carrier formation become hopeless,

1. Franken, Dommes, Guggenberger, Schütze in that order will take up attack positions in CH 8110 and CH 8270 against the returning formation.

2. Deckert and Baur will take up attack dispositions in the former waiting positions. Concentration in the northeast."

As it has not been definitely ascertained that the aircraft were not already taking off from the "Furious" at daybreak in CH 59, U 458 was granted freedom of action at 0500.

1026/29 the first aircraft shadower report was received. According to it, the formation was in CH 9153 at 0840, course 190°. The aircraft presumably took off at that time.

The following radio message was transmitted to the boats:

"One of our aircraft sighted the carrier formation at 0840 in CH 9153, course 190°, speed 17 knots, presumably when the aircraft were taking off. All boats except Diggins are to

remain in the attack disposition."

According to an aircraft shadower's report received at 1140 the formation was in CH 9179 at 0945, course 180°.

U 458 (Diggins) gained contact at 1000. The boat reported by short signal:

"Enemy sighted in CH 9154, course 180°. U 458."

This signal was received at 1150. At 1125 a German aircraft spotted the formation in CH 5983, course 270°.

The report was received at 1310.

The boats received the following radio messages:

"Carrier formation at 1125 in CH 5983, westerly course. Deckert and Baur operate on it."

U 73 and U 660 are furthest east in the attack disposition and were granted freedom of action by radio. In the hope of receiving further aircraft messages which would act as a basis for an operation by the boats, the remainder will continue to remain in their favorable disposition.

At 1140 an Italian aircraft reported the formation in CH 5987, course 270°.

This report was received at 1346, that is, 2 hours after the sighting. In the interim the formation has reached a point so close to the disposition of the Western boats that it is now time to grant them freedom of action.

The boats received the following orders:

"According to an Italian report the formation was in CH 5987, course 270°, speed 18 knots at 1140. All boats are granted freedom of action."

At 1504 an Italian aircraft reported the formation in CH 8266, course 270°, 16 knots.

The report was received at 1546 and was passed on to the boats for it is possible that the enemy has tacked to the south.

At 1627 U 73 (Deckert) gained contact.

He reported: "Enemy sighted in CH 5874, speed 20 knots, course 270°. U 73."

The same boat reported at 1655:

"1504 submerged because of an aircraft. Noticed bombs. No contact with the enemy."

At 1835 U 605 (Schütze) gained contact. The boat reported:

"Enemy sighted in CH 8158, 3 enemy aircraft are over the formation. From U 605."

U 431 (Dommes) gained contact at 1737 and attacked. The boat reported from CH 8153, an unsuccessful fan fired at an aircraft carrier, 260° 20 miles from Dommes. (Report received at 1947.)

No more shadower's reports were received. Once it appeared that there were no longer any prospects of operating against the formation, the boats received the following orders at 2235:

"The following are to be occupied as waiting positions:

Diggins the northern, Deckert the central, and Baur the southern third of CH 91. Franken the southern third of CH 58, Dommes the northern, Guggenberger the central, Schütze the southern third of CH 82."

The intention is:

To maintain the cutting off position with 4 boats while, however, reducing the danger from air attack by moving 60 miles further east than before and to keep 3 more boats ready in CH 91.

The operation is thus concluded. It has been quite unsuccessful. The enemy has achieved his intention of sending out fighter aircraft for Malta. Of the 7 U-boats available, 5 different boats have had altogether 6 encounters with the enemy. 2 boats each fired a fan of four, no hits were obtained. To attack a heavily defended aircraft carrier, proceeding at high speed, is not simply a question of opportunity but also of luck, for in the daytime a U-boat has only a few opportunities of improving his position once the swiftly moving formation is sighted. The bright moonlight night afforded a night attack only very few chances of success. The lengthy delay in the reception of aircraft and U-boat position reports increased the difficulties of the Command. They will be reported on separately.

b) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

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V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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29 October, 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 8110,
U 431 CH 8150,
U 77 CO 2760,
U 559 CP 5590,
U 81 CH 8160,
U 660 CH 8260,
U 605 CH 8270,
U 73 CH 5890,
U 458 CH 9150.

b) U 77 put in to Messina at 1045.

II. a) Western Mediterranean as far as longitude of Oran.

b) Sidi Barrani - Alexandria, Tobruk - Alexandria.

III. a) U 458: carrier formation in CH 9154, course 180°.
U 73: 1627 carrier formation in CH 5879, course 270°, speed 20 knots.
U 431: 1737 carrier formation in CH 8153.
U 605: 1835 carrier formation in CH 8158.

b) 0715 CP 7199 2 M.T.B.s.
0855 CP 7329 2 merchant ships, 1 aircraft, course 270°.
0905 CP 8273 4 steamersup to 10,000 G.R.T. 6 escort vessels, course 90°, fighter cover balloon barrage.
0912 CP 8192 3 merchant ships, 1 destroyer, 2 escort vessels, course 90°, escort cover.
0935 CP 8143 1 merchant ship of 5,000 tons, 1 escort vessel, course 130°, barrage balloon.
0840 CH 9153 carrier formation, course 190°, speed 17 knots, (1 carrier, 2 cruisers, 8 probable destroyers)
1125 CH 5986 carrier formation westerly course.
0831 ships in harbor at Port Said according to photographic reconnaissance:
1 dummy battleship, 3 "Dido" class cruisers, 1 "Aurora" class, 4 destroyers, 4 escort vessels, 4 submarines (1 in the floating dock), 5 small naval vessels, 8 motor transport barges, 3 tankers and 25 freighters totaling 133,500 G.R.T.

0830 ships in harbor in Suez according to photographic reconnaissance:

42 freighters, 6 tankers totaling 218,000 G.R.T.

c) ./.

d) The following put in to Gibraltar:

1020 1 "Fiji" class cruiser.
1015 1 American tanker, 1 destroyer.
1200 the battleship "Rodney", 2 destroyers, 13 steamers with an escort of 4 destroyers, 4 gunboats, 2 fast motor minesweepers from the west.

e) Italian U-boats:

1200 CJ 3131 1 enemy submarine.

Italian Navy reported: 2035 in CO 2549 1 submarine.

IV. b) Eastern boats:

U 559 was requested to send a short weather report.
The report was received.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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30 October, 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 5880,
U 431 CH 8220,
U 81 CH 8250,
U 605 CH 8280,
U 458 CH 9120,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 660 CH 9180,
U 559 CP 7230.

b) U 77 put out from Messina at 1740.

II. a) Western Mediterranean as far as the longitude of Algiers.

b) Cape Krios - Derna - as far as Rhodes - Port Said.

III. a) ./.

b) Italian aircraft:

1000 CN 2217 1 submarine.
1317 CP 8157 1 tanker (6,000 G.R.T.).
1 escort vessel with barrage balloons.
1355 CP 8216 2 destroyers, course 20°,
2 torpedoboats, course 180°.

c) ./.

d) 0810 the "Furious" formation from the east within sight of Gibraltar.
At 0900 the tankers "Dingledale" and "Brown Ranger" put out from Gibraltar, escorted by 4 destroyers. After joining the "Furious" formation on an easterly course, they were lost to sight, probably on maneuvers.
According to a German agent's report of 30 October, the "Furious" formation carried out exercises east of Gibraltar until 1330.
At 1430 a cruiser of the "Arethusa" class and at 1544 the "Charybdis" put in from the east, the "Furious" was sighted coming from the east.
The 2 tankers and 4 destroyers that had put out for exercises at 0900, put in to port at 2030.

IV. a) Western boats:

The following radio message was transmitted to the boats:

"According to an agent's report the "Furious" formation did not put in to Gibraltar, but picked up two tankers that had put out from Gibraltar and was proceeding on an easterly course. Probably for exercises or for oiling.

b) Eastern boats:

U 559 (Heidtmann) was requested to report during the night should the boat score any successes.
No report was received.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

31 October, 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 5880,
U 431 CH 8220,
U 81 CH 8250,
U 605 CH 8280,
U 458 CH 9120,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 660 CH 9180,
U 559 CP 7230,
U 77 CJ 8326,
U 205 CJ 9468.

b) U 205 put out from Messina at 0210.

II. a) Sicilian Channel.

b) Cape Krios - Derna to Rhodes - Port Said.

III. a), b), c) ./.

d) Ships in Gibraltar at 1800/31 October:

1 battleship, 1 aircraft carrier, 3 cruisers, 17 destroyers, 6 submarines, 1 auxiliary cruiser (undergoing repairs), about 67 small units, 23 freighters, 1 liner, 15 tankers.

e) Italian Navy reported: at 0426 CJ 7763 1 suspicious laden ship. It was a French ship which had not been reported and which called at the port of Bone at about 0700.

IV. a) Western boats:

Nothing to report.

b) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) U 77 (Hartmann) has sunk a transport sailing ship in the Eastern Mediterranean.

b) ./.

VI. In reply to the request made to the Italian Navy on 18 October to allow boats operating in the Western Mediterranean to call at and lie in Cagliari in order to prolong their endurance, the Italian Navy reported that Cagliari is so overcrowded with Italian U-boats that German U-boats can no longer be received there. Maddalena is offered by the Italian Navy. Maddalena, however, is unsuitable for the boats owing to its most unfavorably placed approach route with regard to the direction of advance of an enemy appearing in the Western Mediterranean. The Italian Navy was therefore requested to ascertain whether German boats may be kept in readiness in Trapani.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

Captain U-boats on the Staff of Flag Officer, German Naval Command, Italy.

10 October, 1942

Most Secret. S.O. only 61.

Appendix to the War Diary of Captain U-boats Italy, dated 10 October, 1942

Subject: The sending of more U-boats to the Mediterranean.

Reference: None.

I. On 19 September 1942 Naval War Staff 1st Division (U-boat operations) (on 1815/42 Most Secret, S.O. only), ordered 6 more boats to be sent to the Mediterranean so as to be at the disposal of Captain U-boats Italy.
C-in-C U-boats in C-in-C U-boats, Most Secret, S.O. only 372 A1 reported that it was intended to send the following boats during the October new moon period:

U 89 (Lieutenant (s.g.) Lohmann),
U 458 (Lieutenant (s.g.) Diggins),
U 605 (Lieutenant (s.g.) Schütze H.V.),
U 660 (Lieutenant (j.g.) Baur),
U 593 (Lieutenant (s.g.) Kelbling),
U 438 (Lieutenant (s.g.) Franzius).

The boats will put out from bases in Western France between October 1 and 3.

II. The boats will be under the command of C-in-C U-boats until they have passed through the Straits of Gibraltar as far as 5° W, and from there onwards of Captain U-boats Italy.

III. Execution of the operation.

A. a) Until the Straits of Gibraltar have been passed in compliance with the additional order to Operational Order No. 53 for U 605, U 438, U 458, U 660, U 593, U 89, Group Tümmler.

b) After the Straits of Gibraltar have been passed in compliance with Operational Order Mediterranean No. 8 for German U-boats in the Mediterranean. (With reference number Most Secret, S.O. only 32/42 sent to Naval War Staff.)

B. In signal serial number 0215/7/163 U 89 (Lohmann) requested that the operation be executed despite the failure of radio location set. In compliance with the additional order to Operational Order No. 53 paragraph I b), the breakthrough is not to be carried out if the radio location set has failed.
In signal serial number 1148/7/170 C-in-C U-boats issued orders that the operation be cancelled for U 89.
The boat will be put into operation in future in the Atlantic.

On 8 October 1942 the boats were ordered to carry out the breakthrough in the night of 10 to 11.
It was reported by radio message that the radio location set of U 438 (Franzius) had broken down. (Serial number 0952/8/199).
A subsequent radio message from the boat reported that the set could not be repaired with the materials available on board.
C-in-C U-boats ordered in serial number 1112/9/115, that the operation was cancelled for U 438 (Franzius).

IV. The remaining boats (U 458, U 605, U 660, U 593) have succeeded in breaking through the Straits of Gibraltar.

(Signed) Kreisch.

Comments of Flag Officer German Naval Command Italy on the War Diary of Captain U-boats Italy for the period from 1 to 15 October, 1942

No comments.

(Signed) Weichold.

CONFIDENTIAL

Comments of Flag Officer German Naval Command Italy on the War Diary of Captain U-boats Italy for the period from 15 to 31 October, 1942

I. With a view to increasing the operational period of the U-boats in the Western Mediterranean, discussions had been held as to whether individual boats should be allowed to seek out bases suitable to their respective operations, where they could take in more stores. As has been reported elsewhere in detail, the policy chosen was indicated by the fact that the E-boat supply ship "Bengasi" was dispatched to Cagliari with supplies of torpedoes, provisions and heavy Diesel oil, while a small steamer carrying provisions and heavy Diesel oil was to be sent to operate in the sea area around the Balearic Islands once the present difficulties had been cleared up.

II. The deliberations set out on 24 October concerning sending U-boats to both the Western and Eastern Mediterranean operational areas were based on the idea of being equipped for the operations in the Eastern Mediterranean envisaged in the directive from Naval War Staff, because this area had for a long time been only very inadequately occupied. In assigning the boats, the length of the outward passage to the remote area off the Syrian coast must be taken into account. The occupation of the Western Mediterranean which is quite strong numerically should be maintained to each dateline. Also the boats exhaust themselves far more quickly in the Eastern Mediterranean than in the Western Mediterranean. The solution is found by the order received in the interim that all boats are to be put into operation in the Western Mediterranean.

III. Leaving U 559 behind in the Eastern Mediterranean after the other boats operating there had been recalled, was done deliberately. The boat had been operating against the enemy since August with only one break of a few days and as it is in need of repairs it was out of the question to put it into operation in the Western Mediterranean. But the boat can be of use in the Eastern Mediterranean a few days longer until it has exhausted all its resources.

IV. I concur with the disposition chosen on 26 October for the U-boat operation.

V. The operation of the boats against the aircraft carrier "Furious" on 28 October was unsuccessful. The first disposition of the boats complied with the instructions issued by Naval Command. The measures carried out during the course of the operation were appropriate for the situation as the results, considered favorable by the Command proved. Of 7 boats put into operation, 5 different boats had altogether 6 encounters with the enemy. I agree with Captain U-boats' opinion that the attack on the heavily defended aircraft carrier presented the boats with a particularly difficult task and one which luck alone would have brought to a successful conclusion. A night attack especially during bright moonlight, on a very swift and compact formation with numerous escort forces has only slight chances of success.

VI. During October no ships were sunk by the U-boats except for one transport sailing vessel. The reason behind this was the concentration of operations ordered in the Western Mediterranean for operational reasons and which was not passed through by the enemy until the "Furious" operation.

(Signed) Weichold.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

1 - 15 NOVEMBER, 1942

PG/30928

CONFIDENTIAL

Comments of Flag Officer German Naval Command Italy on the War Diary of Captain U-boats Italy for the period from 1 to 30 November 1942.

1) The first U-boat disposition of 6 November corresponded to the situation and instructions issued.

2) The enemy was not intercepted by the U-boat disposition. The operation of the 4 U-boats furthest west which resulted at 1730 from aircraft reconnaissance failed because the convoy turned away most probably to the north after darkness fell. The question therefore arises as to whether it would not have been better to remain in the formation first selected until the enemy put in to port.

3) On the evening of 7 November the enemy announced his intention of landing near Algiers - successful dissimulation. The last reconnaissance reports showed that, as darkness fell, the leading groups were already east of Algiers longitude. Besides the old belief that the destination was Malta, the possibility of a landing in Bougie Bay, particularly suitable for the purpose, was considered. The enemy move to Algiers, carried out at night, was not intercepted. The bringing up again of U-boats, which tried to gain room to the east, took up a lot of time in view of the strong air patrols.

4) Later U-boat operations then had, of necessity, to be off the main landing beaches at Oran and Algiers. With the increase in the number of operationally ready U-boats later brought about by calling on others from the Atlantic, the focal point was made in the sea area at the eastern end of the Gibraltar "bottleneck", where the enemy had to pass, whether with new forces or returning units. I have nothing to comment on the formation selected there by Captain U-boats. I concur with the explanations and observations appearing in Captain U-boats' War Diary, in particular with the experiences reported on 19 November.

5) To sum up:

   a) The U-boats operating on the large-scale enemy landings on the North African coast were not able to come to grips with enemy forces effectively before they reached their destination. Only the destruction of one transport and the damaging of one cruiser, so putting it out of action, can be counted as successes in this phase of the operations.

   b) Attacks on landing beaches near Oran and Algiers as well as on covering forces, returning convoys and subsequent transport formations resulted in:

the sinking of 11 more ships totaling 107,000 GRT, to which must be added one tanker, tonnage not known, which must have been destroyed by one of the U-boats lost. (Report from a U-boat that a large patch of oil was sighted off Oran and about 30 men swimming.) In addition 1 "Leander" class cruiser, 3 destroyers and 1 escort vessel were sunk. 1 tanker of 10,000 tons, 2 freighters totaling 8,000 tons and the transport "Nieuw Zeeland" were torpedoed as were 1 probable American cruiser, 1 destroyer and 1 escort vessel, the battleship "Rodney" and the aircraft carrier "Argus".

c) Our own losses amounted to 5 U-boats, 3 of them definitely sunk by aircraft on anti-submarine sweeps and the remaining 2 in all probability also.

d) The inflexibility, persistence and tenacity shown by U-boat crews as well as the Commanders' daring deserve unstinted praise.

(Signed) Weichold.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 November 1942

I. a) U 559 CP 7320,
U 565 CH 5880,
U 431 CH 8220,
U 81 CH 8250,
U 605 CH 8280,
U 458 CH 9120,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 660 CH 9180,
U 205 CJ 7631,
U 77 CJ 1629.

b) U 77 put in to Spezia at 1030.

II. a) Sicilian Channel.

b) Cape Krios - Derna as far as Rhodes - Port Said.

III. a) ./.

b) 1450 CP 7261 1 medium-sized merchant ship, 2 torpedoboats, course 80°, moderate speed.

c) ./.

d) Italian agents' intelligence:

0800 a "Dido" class cruiser and 2 destroyers put in to Gibraltar.

Changes in Gibraltar shipping compared with yesterday:

Arrivals: 1 light cruiser, 3 destroyers.

Departures: 4 submarines.

e) Italian Navy reported:

1700 CN 2614 1 submarine (report doubtful).
1730 CK 7624 1 submarine.
0850 CO 5985 1 submarine.

IV. a) Western boats:

U 205 (Bürgel) occupied the northern third of CH 94 as a waiting position.

According to an Italian radio intercept report a British aircraft sighted 1 U-boat in CH 5872 at 1245. The position given by the aircraft lay in U 565 (Franken)'s waiting position.

b) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

2 November 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 5880,
U 431 CH 8220,
U 81 CH 8250,
U 605 CH 8280,
U 458 CH 9120,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 660 CH 9180,
U 205 CH 9526,
U 559 CP 7313.

b) U 593 put out from Spezia at 1030.

II. a) Sicilian Channel.

b) Cape Krios - Derna as far as Rhodes - Port Said.

III. a) ./.

b) 1156 CO 5126 1 submerging U-boat.

c) ./.

d) 0915 1 "Erebus" class monitor put in to Gibraltar from the west.
1230 1 "Fiji" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the west.

e) Italian Navy reported:

0745 CK 7277 1 submarine.

IV. a) Western boats:

U 565 (Franken) reported that he was attacked on 1 November by 2 aircraft (Lockheed). U 593 (Kelbling) reported that his Junkers compressor was unserviceable. As we may expect an operation eastwards from Gibraltar in the approaching new moon period, the boat received orders to continue operating. It is intended to fetch the boat back to Spezia to repair the compressor after the new moon period.

b) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

V. a) U 565 (Franken) shot down 1 enemy aircraft of the "Lockheed" type in CH 5977 on 1 November and seriously damaged another.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 November 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 5880,
U 431 CH 8220,
U 81 CH 8250,
U 605 CH 8280,
U 458 CH 9120,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 660 CH 9180,
U 205 CH 9420,
U 593 CJ 4131,
U 559 CP 7316.

b) U 77 put out from Spezia at 1600.

II. a) Sicilian Channel.

b) Inshore waters reconnaissance, Cape Krios - Derna as far as Rhodes - Port Said.

III. a) ./.

b) German aircraft:

1100 east of Malta 2 small coasting vessels, southerly course and south of Mersa Scirocco 3 small ships and small single coasting vessels.
1350 3 submarines, 1 patrol vessel put out from Valetta harbor.

c) ./.

d) 0410 2 units, probably a cruiser and a destroyer, put out for the Atlantic.
0530 6 destroyers put out on an unknown course.
0730 the aircraft carrier "Argus" with one "Cairo" class cruiser and 2 destroyers put in from the Atlantic.
The escort of cruiser and destroyers immediately put out again on a westerly course.
0830 1 British aircraft carrier, class not known, 1 "Delhi" class cruiser and 3 destroyers put in from the Atlantic.
1300 1 "Fiji" class cruiser put out for the west according to an Italian agent's report.
1800 on 3 November in Gibraltar harbor:
1 battleship, 3 aircraft carriers, 5 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 1 monitor, 2 submarines, 1 auxiliary cruiser (undergoing repair), 25 freighters, 1 liner, 16 tankers.
2000 on 3 November 1 "Fiji" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar on an unidentified course.
2130 1 unidentified cruiser put in.

e) Italian torpedoboat reported:

1515 CK 3718 1 submarine.

CONFIDENTIAL

IV. a) Western boats:

According to radio intercept service 3 U-boats were sighted by enemy air reconnaissance. The aircraft sighting reports lay in the waiting position of U 660 (Baur), U 565 (Franken) and U 431 (Dommes). U 593 (Kelbling) received orders to occupy the central third of CH 58 as his waiting position. At 2000 U 431 (Dommes) reported that the boat had been damaged in a bombing attack and that he was withdrawing west for repairs. As his waiting position was now unoccupied, U 565 (Franken) was ordered to occupy U 431's former waiting position and U 593 (Kelbling) to occupy his. At 0035 U 431 (Dommes) reported that the attack was carried out from a very high altitude in a smooth sea and blue skies, contrary to former practice.

b) Eastern boats:

U 559 (Heidtmann) was requested to transmit a short weather report between 0200 and 0500. No signal was received.

V. a), b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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4 November 1942

I. a) U 593 CH 6740,
U 565 CH 8220,
U 81 CH 8250,
U 605 CH 8280,
U 431 CH 8330,
U 458 CH 9120,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 660 CH 9180,
U 205 CH 9420,
U 559 CP 7320,
U 77 CJ 4146.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers longitude.

b) Same as on previous day.

III. a) ./.

b) German air reconnaissance reported:

0633 CO 5951 1 submarine.
1030 CH 8184 1 destroyer.
1210 CP 8165 2 merchant ships up to 10,000 GRT, 2 merchant ships up to 5,000 GRT, 5 escort vessels, westerly course, moderate speed.
1220 CP 8164 4 merchant ships of 3,000 GRT each, course 240°, speed slight.

1902 in Haifa harbor from preliminary appreciation:

12 destroyers, 3 small vessels, 2 tankers and 2 freighters totaling 23,000 GRT.

In Beirut harbor:

2 probable escort vessels, 1 small warship.

c) ./.

d) German agents' intelligence:

0900 14 laden freighters, 3 destroyers, 1 corvette put in to Gibraltar.
The cruiser reported putting in yesterday was probably a destroyer.
0900 4 cruisers in Gibraltar.

In Gibraltar harbor:

1800 1 battleship, 3 aircraft carriers, 5 cruisers, 1 monitor, 9 destroyers, 2 submarines, 1 auxiliary cruiser (undergoing repair), 41 freighters, 1 liner, 16 tankers.

e) Italian Navy:

1530 CN 2562 1 submarine.
1600 CK 4885 1 submarine.
1758 CO 4749 1 submarine according to radio direction finding location.

IV. a) Western boats:

U 431 (Dommes) reported that the periscope damaged in the bombing attack could not be repaired with the tools available on board. The boat was making for Spezia.

U 77 (Hartmann) is occupying the central third of CH 58 as his waiting position.

At 2230 according to an agent's report 1 "Manx-man" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar. This cruiser put in again on 5 November.

b) Eastern boats:

It has been learned here that U 559 was not

supplied with the November codes. The boat was ordered by the reserve hand process to use the October tables in November. At the same time he was ordered to report his position by short signal. This signal was not received.

V. a), b) ./.

VI. a), b) ./.

1) The boats' operational duration is at present determined by the consumption of food and fuel supplies, in view of the rarity of enemy encounters in the Western Mediterranean. The Naval Command is placing the former U-boat supply ship "Bengasi" at our disposal to supply U-boats with food, fuel and torpedoes in the vicinity of the operational area. It will be commissioned in Cagliari. Also a 1,300 GRT steamer equipped with food and fuel has been allocated which will be on duty in a base in the Balearic Islands not yet announced.

2) The 29th U-boat Flotilla is being instructed to commence all the preparations for a speedy fitting out of the two steamers. "Bengasi" is expected in Spezia on 8 November, the other steamer on 9 November. "Bengasi" will carry 40 electric torpedoes, (the possibility of loading and heating them is still to be tested), food for 10 crews for one month and 500 cbm. fuel as well as the lubricating oil required. The other steamer will carry the same amount of supplies and, if there is sufficient storage space, 500 cbm. fuel in barrels. Further details concerning the Balearic base, which will be used with Spanish consent, are expected from Naval War Staff.

3) In a teleprint message from Naval War Staff the expected statement that every effort was being made to shorten repair time, was made. The fairly long times for repairs are explained by:

a) the special features repairs cause in an Italian dockyard,

b) the fact that the Mediterranean U-boats have particularly heavy demands made of them by climatic conditions and those inherent in this restricted theater of operations,

c) the circumstance that the majority of U-boats have now been in commission for 2 years and so require a basic overhaul,

d) damage caused by bombs and depth charges. The two bases, Spezia and Pola, are strained to their utmost to reduce the time taken to repair boats.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 November 1942

I. a) U 593 CH 5880,
U 565 CH 8220,
U 81 CH 8250,
U 605 CH 8280,
U 458 CH 9120,
U 73 CH 9150,
U 660 CH 9180,
U 205 CH 9420,
U 77 CH 6740,
U 431 CJ 1810,
U 559 CP 7310.

b) U 431 put in to Spezia at 1745.

II. a) Western Mediterranean as far as Algiers longitude.

b) Same as on previous day.

III. a) ./.

b) 1320 Italian aircraft sighted 1 destroyer in CP 5867.
1341 German aircraft sighted 1 merchant ship up to 5,000 GRT, 4 patrol vessels, course 60°, speed not determined, in CP 7282.

c) ./.

d) According to Italian agent's report:

0800 1 "Southampton" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar.
2230 on 4 November 1 "Abdil" class minelayer put out from Gibraltar, course not determined.
0930 the cruiser "Penelope" was confirmed to be no longer in the harbor.
1100 1 "Dido" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar.

In Gibraltar at 1800 on 5 November:

1 battleship, 3 aircraft carriers, 7 light cruisers, 1 monitor, 20 destroyers (3 destroyers or gunboats in dock), 11 gunboats, 1 auxiliary cruiser (undergoing repair), 40 freighters, 1 liner, 15 tankers.

2000 naval forces began to put out for Mediterranean - including the aircraft carrier "Argus", 1 unidentified large ship, probably 5 cruisers and a few destroyers.
2310 to 2345 according to an Italian agent's report 35 darkened ships (10 large) were observed passing abreast of Tarifa, easterly course, speed about 14 knots.
0225 5 more ships on the same course.
0045 to 0110 20 more darkened ships (6 large) passed Tarifa on an easterly course.
2 battleships and 2 aircraft carriers were identified among the large units.

e) Italian Navy reported:

1055 CJ 8463 1 submarine.
1400 CO 2828 1 submarine.

IV. a) Western boats:

At 1205 the boats were informed that the "Manxman" class cruiser had put in to Gibraltar again.

According to an agent's report the following had put out from Gibraltar by 2125: 1 aircraft carrier, 3 cruisers, 6 destroyers.

With regard to this report a cutting-off position was taken up by 4 boats as in the case of the aircraft ferrying operation by the "Furious".

The boats received the following orders:

"New waiting positions: "Kelbling (U 593) the northern third of CH 81, "Franken" (U 565) the central, "Guggenberger" (U 81) the southern. "Schütze" (U 605) the northern and central third of CH 84. "Hartmann" (U 77) the northern, "Baur" (U 660) the central, "Bürgel" (U 205) the southern third of CH 82. "Diggins" (U 458) the northern half, "Deckert" (U 73) the southern half of CH 91."

This formation has been selected:

1) to intercept the enemy with the greatest possible certainty by the new operationally ready boats, quite independently of air reconnaissance,

2) to obtain a quarter-line disposition in depth to increase prospects of operating. The plan is to remain in the waiting positions until we have some information of the enemy's course and position from air reconnaissance or sighting reports from the U-boats.

See Sketch 1.

b) Eastern boats:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 November 1942

I. a) U 593 CH 8120, U 565 CH 8150,
U 81 CH 8180, U 77 CH 8220,
U 660 CH 8250, U 205 CH 8280,
U 605 CH 8420, U 458 CH 9120,
U 73 CH 9180, U 559 CP 7320.

b) U 431 put out from Spezia at 2400.

II. a) Extensive reconnaissance as far as Melilla longitude.

b) Same as on previous day.

At 0930 the following reports of enemy movements were received:

1) By 2125 on 5 November 1 carrier, 3 cruisers, 6 destroyers had left Gibraltar.

2) At 2345 a formation of 35 units passed Tarifa to the east.

3) At 0110 20 darkened units, including 2 battleships and 2 aircraft carriers, had passed Tarifa.

The boats were informed, the disposition was being retained.

Apparently strong air reconnaissance during the morning in the area of our U-boat disposition. According to radio intercept reports 3 boats were sighted:

a) At 0925 a boat in U 81 (Guggenberger)'s waiting position was reported attacked with depth charges by an aircraft at 0935.

b) A boat in U 605 (Schütze)'s waiting position. Aircraft reported at 0944: "Have attacked with depth charges."

c) At 1037 a boat in U 77's waiting position. Aircraft reported at 1045: "Have attacked enemy with bombs."

At 1720 we received a reconnaissance report from one of our aircraft which sighted the formation consisting of

3 carriers
4 battleships
30 merchant ships, 5 of them up to 20,000 GRT
30 light naval craft
40 escorts

in CH 7561, high speed, course 50°.

The formation approached within 60 miles of the most westerly U-boats at a speed of 14 knots at 1730. These boats therefore received freedom to

attack, those in CH 82 and CH 91 to remain in their waiting positions. If they are to operate with any effect we must await further details and not let them go in too soon.

According to a report from the Italian Navy, an enemy convoy consisting of 25 steamers is believed to have passed the Straits to the east at 1400.

Teleprint message from the Führer:

To Captain U-boats and all U-boats.
The existence of the Africa Corps depends on the destruction of the Gibraltar force. I expect a ruthless, victorious operation.

The Führer, Adolf Hitler.

At 2000 the 29th Flotilla received orders to have U 431, putting out from Spezia at 0100, proceed east of Corsica and Sardinia to CH 7655 at high cruising speed. This measure is based on the following consideration:

The enemy formation reported at 1515 in CH 7561 has to cover 580 miles before a possible encounter with U 431, if he is passing through the Sicilian Channel. Assuming a cruising speed of 14 knots the formation will be in CJ 7655 at 0800 on 8 November. U 431 has 410 miles to cover and can reach the grid square ordered at 0600 on 8 November at a speed of 14 knots. I believe moreover that the formation will make less than 14 knots, but the attempt must be made in any case as it is much more important to inflict damage on the convoy before it reaches its destination than to attack returning escort forces.

Two more boats, U 331 and U 561, are ready for operations in Spezia on 7 November. The sailing time has not yet been decided as every effort is being made to be ready before 1200 and 1400 as scheduled. The Flotilla has been ordered to prepare the channels both east and west of Sardinia with the Italian Command for the U-boats' operations. By operating west of Sardinia the boats will only be able to attack returning escort forces. Attacks on the outward bound convoy are much more important and every effort must be made to reach it as long as there is any prospect at all of success. The decision, however, can only be taken when we are certain of the boats' time of sailing as well as the enemy's speed. This information is expected during the night.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 November 1942

I. a) U 593 CH 8110, U 565 CH 8140,
U 81 CH 8170, U 605 CH 8410,
U 77 CH 8230, U 660 CH 8250,
U 205 CH 8280, U 458 CH 9120,
U 73 CH 9180, U 431 CJ 1960,
U 559 CP 7320.

b) U 561 put out from Spezia at 0900.
U 331 put out from Spezia at 1100.

II. a) Extensive reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

b) Same as on previous day.

At 0005 the boats were given freedom to attack within French territorial waters.

At 0015 U 605 (Schütze) reported port diesel engine broken down. The boat's speed was reduced to 10 knots and therefore could not operate on the first convoy. U 605 occupies CH 7390 to operate on the second one.

At 0040 the boats were reminded of the necessity to transmit shadowers' reports as quickly as possible - a decisive factor in the operation of the other boats. I desisted from the measure considered earlier not to have the shadower attack, as a boat should not be prevented from seizing an opportunity to attack a very strongly guarded formation. Opportunities for attack will not be offered very often.

At 0200 the boats in the first wave, U 593, U 565, U 81 and U 605 received orders to make for CH 8483 at maximum speed if they had not made contact. The boats in the second wave, U 77, U 660 and U 205 each move their formation an 18 mile broad line further south. The following considerations lead to this:

1) After an aircraft signal of 1445 (received at 2000) had arrived which reported the formation in CH 7618, course 100° and which had not been believed until then as several reports gave a northeasterly direction, another delayed aircraft report was received at 0200 giving the enemy's position at 1728 as CH 7658, course 100°. This, together with the report of 2 more strong transport formations passing through the Straits of Gibraltar at 1600 and 2300 to the east, pointed to the possibility of an enemy landing. Mostaghanem was assumed from the position and course.

2) The assumption of a landing gained in probability by the fact that up to now no shadowers' reports have been received from the boats. It is almost impossible for a convoy of over 100 ships not to be intercepted by 4 searching U-boats in what

experience has proved to be very good hydrophone conditions.

3) We must not exclude the fact that the convoy may have passed close under the North African coast.

At 0530 we received the aircraft report that the head of the convoy was in 5886 at 0440, course unidentified, speed 14 knots according to dead reckoning. The boats in the second wave, U 77, U 660 and U 205 were given freedom to attack this formation. The boats in the first wave receive orders to occupy 8110, 8140, 8170, 8410 as waiting positions at maximum speed. As there is no longer any question of their operating on the convoy reported, they will be set on to the convoys reported off Tarifa at 1600 and 2300, which can reach the U-boat disposition at 1100 or 1800 at a speed of 14 knots.

The U-boats operating on the strength of the first aircraft shadower's report have not found the convoy. U 593 made contact briefly with light forces at 0145; the report about this was not received until 0615. The enemy apparently passed north of the second U-boat group.

One of our boats contacted the convoy at 0935 and is trying to haul ahead.

At 0830 the boats in the first wave, U 592, U 565, U 81 and U 605 were informed that the formation ordered ought to intercept the second and third formations which may be expected at 1100 and 1800.

The 29th U-boat Flotilla reported that U 561 put out from Spezia at 0900 and U 331 was due to put out to sea at 1100. Both boats have orders to make for CJ 7655 at 14 knots cruising speed via east of Sardinia. They can arrive there at 1600 and 1800 on 8 November and will perhaps still be able to attack the first convoy, if not then the second and third. In any case the attempt promises success.

At 1300 the boats U 73 and U 458 in CH 91 were given permission to attack freely the formation reported at 1040 in CH 5977 by a German aircraft. U 331 put out from Spezia at 1100.

On the strength of the situation portrayed, the decision was taken at 1500:

1) to leave the 4 boats of the western group in their waiting position until the third enemy group had passed - which would not be before 1800. I am awaiting reports on that from the boats,

2) to have the 5 remaining boats operate on the

first group of the enemy force, in so doing they will be maneuvering to the east,

3) to set the boats approaching east of Sardinia in a waiting position as the situation develops.

See Sketch 2.

U 77 contacted the formation, consisting of at least 5 large twin-funnelled vessels, at 1401 in CH 8311. The boat was attacked with bombs and gunfire and has sustained casualties.

At 1614 U 660 and U 205, later U 73 and U 458, received orders to try and maneuver to the east, if they did not make contact, and to report their position by short signal as soon as possible.

Position report was received from U 660 at 1730 in CH 9197. By 2340 all the boats had reported except U 458. U 77 reported at 1446 that he was several times forced to submerge, last enemy position at 1512 was 8316, boat was pressing ahead. U 73 reported at 1830 enemy formation in CH 5998 consisting of one ship with 3 funnels, several with two funnels and large single-funnel ones, as well as light escort forces and air cover. Mean course 90°, tacking up to 9°, speed 10 knots, prevented by depth charge attack from firing.

U 205 reported at 2009 in CH 8333 fan fired at an 18,000 tonner, two explosions heard. He was hauling ahead. U 81 contacted an enemy group, course 70°, at 1102 in CH 8192. The boat was observed while attacking the "Furious" and the "Argus".

U 458 reported at 2236: "Bombed twice at periscope depth in daytime. Twin fan on "Leander" on a westerly course in 9145. One hit, gunfire."

2330 Captain U-boats conferred by telephone with Chief of Staff of 2nd Fliegerkorps concerning reconnaissance for 8 November 1942:

1) Shadowing main group.

2) Ascertaining the extension of the group.

3) Position of main targets (for U-boats).

4) Impression of cover.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

8 November 1942

I. a) U 205 2009 CH 8333, U 660 1736 CH 9197,
U 73 2204 CH 9178, U 458 2236 CH 9145,
U 565 2325 CH 8152, U 81 2000 CH 8385,
U 605 2143 CH 8422, U 593 2311 CH 8267,
U 77 1646 CH 8316, U 331 CJ 4990,
U 561 CJ 7360, U 431 CJ 7590,
U 559 CP 7320.

b) ./.

II. a) Extensive reconnaissance as far as Gibraltar.

b) Same as on previous day.

At 0010 radio message sent to western boats on the situation:

1) First very strong enemy group proceeded slowly during the day.

2) Second group opened out until 1800 so that now one whole group is in the southern half of CH 59 and northern half of CH 83. Since 1800 speed of advance eastward is 12 knots.

3) At 1708 3 heavy and 15 light units in 5956, course 100°, speed not reported.

4) Third group not intercepted to date by reconnaissance, doubtful if it exists.

At 0010 U 431 (Dommes) in waiting position CJ 7680 was ordered not to cross 10° to the east because of danger from mines.

As the third group must have passed our U-boat disposition in the western third of 81 by 2300, even at a speed of 11 knots, U 593, U 565, U 81 and U 605 received orders at 0012 to proceed east at maximum speed.

At 0330 the first report of the landing in North Africa was given by the British Broadcasting Corporation.

At 0232 U 593 contacted part of the formation in CH 8192, course 80°, speed 10 knots. U 565 and U 605 who are in the vicinity were ordered to operate on this formation.

As we must now expect a landing on the North African coast, U 458 received orders at 0432 to make for Algiers. U 81, U 205, U 73 and U 660 were ordered at 0544 to make for Bougie Bay at maximum speed. This seems the most likely landing point according to the last reported enemy position and course.

At 0630 the Flag Officer's instruction of 0500 was received.

1) The situation, based on the latest intelligence of the enemy:

   a) Main objective of the enemy is a landing on the French African coast in the Mediterranean.

   b) Subsidiary objective possibly Malta supply.

   c) Attempt to land in Tripolitania unlikely.

2) Landing operation is to be regarded as the probable enemy aim:

   a) Western group either a special landing at Tenes or joining the main group and second wave of landing troops.

   b) Main eastern group landing on the coast between Algiers and Philippeville concentrating on Bougie.

3) Further U-boat operations exclusively directed against enemy landings on the coast of French Africa. The move east will accordingly be reversed.

4) The boats are to operate according to the enemy's grouping:

   The western boats on the convoy reported at 0230 by U 593; the eastern boats, including those coming from Spezia, on the main enemy group in the east.

C-in-C South informed us by telephone that several carriers were ascertained by our reconnaissance aircraft to be in CH 9451. Presumably covering forces for the landing operation. Boats were informed of them. The following was transmitted at 0834 to the boats coming from Spezia which are proceeding southward east of Corsica and Sardinia:

"To U 431, U 651, U 331:
Main task of the U-boats is to attack British landing operations which we believe to be concentrating near Bougie. Proceed via CJ 7595 and 7710. En route use favorable opportunities of attacking any Malta supply traffic."

See Sketch 3.

Position of U-boats at approximately 0500:

U 605 CH 8265, U 458 CH 9170,
U 77 CH 9530, U 665 CH 8255,
U 81 CH 9510, U 660 CH 9530,
U 593 CH 8280, U 205 CH 9520,
U 73 CH 9610.

At 0745 a message was received from U 205 reporting that he had lost contact with the convoy attacked at 2009 in CH 8333. According to hydrophone bearings it was steering a northeasterly course in CH 9281.

At 0924 the following was transmitted to the boats: "Aircraft report: convoy, probably one battleship and merchant ships, in CH 9416 at 0715, course 90°."

U 605 reported at 1108: "Enemy sighted in CH 8368, course 0°." This signal was also sent to the boats. The following was passed on to the boats at 1115: "Aircraft report: 0820 in 9419 2 aircraft carriers, 1 battleship, 3 cruisers, courses varying, speed over 17 knots."

U 605 reported in message, time of origin 1125: "Wing protection of cruisers, destroyers and flying boats north of Cape Casino, courses varying."

Situation at 1200:

1) At 1145 C-in-C South has the impression, as a result of air reconnaissance, that no enemy forces are east of Algiers. A landing is in progress at Algiers. Several aircraft carriers in CH 8362 and battleships, cruisers and aircraft carriers in CH 9419 form the escort for it; it is possible that the two groups are identical.

2) The majority of the boats are operating on Bougie Bay; it is not advisable to send them to Algiers now as air reconnaissance has still not proved that the enemy is not in Bougie, which is very suitable for a landing. The boats have to cover 100 miles from Bougie to Algiers which they could not do in daylight. It is therefore better to wait for more definite reconnaissance information before leaving Bougie.

According to a verbal report received later from Flag Officer German Naval Command through C-in-C South (Field Marshal) at 1215, there is no reason to assume that there are any enemy formations in Tunisian waters, i.e. between Tunis and Algiers. Therefore a new situation has arisen insofar as it is now necessary for all boats to operate off Algiers. The boats are ordered to make for Algiers with the greatest possible speed. They are informed: "According to air reconnaissance results so far there are no landings east of Algiers, no Malta convoy. Large-scale landing at Algiers, French counter-attacks. As far as is known, no ships have put in to port so there are innumerable valuable targets in the roads."

U 205 reported at:

1316 last position of convoy at 0722 was CH 9521, course 180°, have lost contact. (Refers to convoy of 2009/7 November).

1415 the following was sent to boats: "0850 according to aircraft report 1 light cruiser, 6 transports, 1 tanker, 7 destroyers, 2 heavy cruisers, 27 freighters and 18 destroyers in CH 9482."

1730 Captain U-boats summed up the situation, as it was transmitted to the boats in the following radio message:

"Landings of strong enemy forces at many points principally at Oran and Algiers and in CH 8379. Algiers apparently in enemy hands, stronger French resistance at Oran. Innumerable transports in CH 9471 and 9468, covered by aircraft carriers and battleships. Go to it, all out, dare everything."

1843 U 77 reported: "No enemy forces in Bougie Bay, 3 large ships with 3 funnels, 5 with 1 funnel, French markings. Making for Algiers." (Received corrupt).

In order to prevent the boats from being misled under some circumstances into operating on the aircraft carriers reported and thus wasting time (by reason of the ruling concerning the importance of targets laid down at the beginning of the operation which defined carriers as a main target), the boats received orders at:

1950 "Search for targets in Algiers roads and close under the coast due west and east of Algiers, do not let yourselves withdraw by operating on covering forces standing off to sea."

U 81 reported at:

2010 that he was in CH 9415 at 1900. The following considerations apply to the operation of the 6 U-boats expected from the Atlantic which are grouped together under the cover name "Group Delphin":

1) The boats will commence their passage through the Straits of Gibraltar on the night 8/9 November in accordance with their first order. This order was altered on 6 November by C-in-C U-boats so that the attempted breakthrough would take place as quickly as possible. It is likely that some boats have already passed the Straits.

2) The boats have orders not to report that they have entered the Mediterranean until

they have passed 5° E. The reason behind this order was to transmit a radio message only in the area where the enemy suspected the presence of German U-boats. A premature message might direct the enemy's attention to the Straits of Gibraltar and cause difficulties for subsequent boats. At present no importance is attached to this consideration any longer in view of the alteration in the situation compared with earlier on. The radio picture has been fundamentally altered by the prevailing situation. The enemy is strained to his utmost by his operations. But greater importance is attached to the fact that Captain U-boats must know as soon as possible how many boats he can count on for operations in the west. Therefore the boats in "Group Delphin" received instructions to transmit the signal ordered when they have passed 1° N.

3) The boats coming through the Straits of Gibraltar are in a very favorable position for operating on the second large enemy landing operation near Oran. All operationally ready boats in the group were therefore ordered to proceed to Oran to attack the landing forces. Two boats in this group do not have any Mediterranean equipment on board and have only the grid square chart of the Mediterranean. If these boats are otherwise ready to operate I will have them operate also in view of the tensity of the situation.

4) 2nd Fliegerkorps transmitted the plan "Night operation with flare droppers on enemy naval units". The operation planned with flares would render simultaneous U-boat operations almost ineffective. An arrangement has therefore been made with 2nd Fliegerkorps that the use of flares will be restricted in time. They will be used between 0300 and 0400. The boats have been informed. Later Fliegerkorps notified us that the whole night attack by aircraft has been cancelled.

U 593 (Kelbling) reported at

1940 "Single destroyers off Algiers, otherwise no traffic. My position CH 9449, am proceeding east."

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

9 November 1942

I. a) U 458 0152 CH 8388, U 565 0210 CH 8362,
U 660 0203 CH 9455, U 205 0337 CH 9481,
U 73 0400 CH 9446, U 561 0805 CH 9559,
U 595 CH 7634, U 81 CH 9415,
U 605 CH 9473, U 77 CH 9596,
U 431 CH 9626, U 331 CH 7474,
U 593 CH 9449, U 559 CP 7320.

b) ./.

II. a) Extensive reconnaissance as far as Oran.

b) Same as on previous day.

0026 the following radio message was sent to all boats: "Street fighting in Algiers, authorities have remained faithful, resistance against landings offered in all places. Do not attack if you encounter French units."

0037 U 605 reported at 2345: "Am in CH 9476, Bay (of Algiers) empty, fires in harbor, a few destroyers outside, am withdrawing."

0058 U 595 signal 1 "yes", i.e. the boat has passed the Straits of Gibraltar and crossed 1° W to the east.

1) The signal from U 605, reporting he has found Algiers Bay clear, was the second one of this nature, after U 593 had already discovered no targets off Algiers at 1940.

2) Thus a new situation has arisen insofar as no targets are offered for the intended U-boat operation. Either the enemy put in to the harbor in part convoys and with others in to nearby bays or he withdrew seawards as darkness fell. In this case it is presumed that he cleared the bay according to plan because of expected air and U-boat attacks and he will come again at dawn, or a landing is being attempted at some other place because of too strong resistance. A final break away and withdrawal west is unlikely.

3) Up to now all boats have been ordered to make for Algiers and seek targets in the roads or along the coast. In the absence of air reconnaissance we must try and gain information by the use of U-boats. For this it is necessary to have them search west and east. We have only partial information of the U-boats' positions. U 83, U 593 and U 605 are off Algiers; they are ordered to search to the west. U 77, off Bougie at 1446 and making for Algiers, is presumed to be still east of Algiers. U 431, U 331

and U 561 are still far to the east. The last named were ordered to search along the coast en route to Algiers. U 565, U 205, U 73, U 458 and U 660 were ordered to report their positions immediately by short signal. After their signals have been received, the boats most suitably placed for searching will operate to the east. The remainder will be left in Algiers Bay in case the enemy returns or leaves the harbor.

4) Captain U-boats informed the Chief of Staff of 2nd Fliegerkorps that 2 U-boats have found the Algiers roads empty, in case this report may affect Luftwaffe plans.

5) U 595 coming from the Atlantic was ordered to attack landing forces off Oran.

The following position reports have been received:

0215: U 458 in CH 8388 at 0152,
0226: U 565 in CH 8362 at 0210,
0226: U 660 in CH 9455 at 0203.

0216 radio message sent to U 458: "Search along the coast in the direction of Algiers."

0308 radio message sent to U 660: ""Baur" make for Cape Matifon; search along the coast from there to the east."

Situation at

0600 1) Chief of Staff of 2nd Fliegerkorps informed us by telephone that reconnaissance has so far revealed nothing. 2 reconnaissance aircraft with special apparatus were operating in the sea area south of 38° as far as west of Algiers, further reconnaissance in progress. They will sweep as far as Gibraltar. The first wave of bombers took off with a total of about 15 bombers and torpedo-carrying aircraft. The second wave is being kept back at present and is at readiness.

2) All boats ordered to report their position at 0112 have replied. The boats outward bound from Spezia were ordered to report
0620 their positions. A signal was received from U 73. The boat reported that he

a) was depth-charged in 9481 from 2345 to 0300,

b) was in CH 9446 at 0400,

c) did not meet any enemy vessels along the coast from Bougie to Matifon.

At the same time

0620 a signal was received from U 205 reporting that he was observed by a patrol vessel in CH 9481 and depth-charged and that only patrol vessels are lying along the coast.

3) So there is no new information for the U-boat operation. After U 73's report there is no longer any need for U 660 to search eastwards as ordered. U 431, U 331 and U 561 approaching from the east will be sufficient. U 660 received orders to return to the sea area off Algiers.

0607 U 431, U 561 and U 331 were ordered to report their positions immediately by short signal.

0700 It was necessary, in order to avoid confusion, to form the boats off Algiers and Oran into 2 groups. As the boats operating off Oran have just come from the Atlantic and already belonged to group "Delphin", they remained grouped under "Delphin". The other boats formed Group "Hai". Group "Hai" concentrated on Algiers, Group "Delphin" on Oran. The boats in Group "Hai" were ordered to make for the sea area off Algiers if they were not searching to the west and east. I wished to keep the boats together in order to have them at hand as soon as the reconnaissance had any results. The boats received appropriate orders.

0806 U 561 reported: "My position at 0900 is CH 9559."

1) So far the situation has not changed. The enemy has neither been intercepted by the boats searching along the coast nor by air reconnaissance.

2) With the arrival of the 3 boats from the east, U 431, U 561 and U 331 expected during the forenoon, 9 boats are lying off Algiers. Group "Delphin" off Oran at present consists of only 1 boat. It is uncertain when the 5 other boats expected from the Atlantic will arrive. According to reports received, landings have also been carried out in Mostaghanem and Arzeu. Valuable targets may be expected on the route from Algiers to Oran. It therefore seems worthwhile to have U 81, U 605 and U 593 search as far as Oran. At the same time the boats were required to report their positions by short signal.

1007 U 331 reported his position from CH 9469.

1100 after a conference with Flag Officer, German Naval Command U 458, U 565 and U 73 received orders to make for Oran and join Group "Delphin". The reasons for this decision:

1) According to information received, Algiers is in enemy hands; fighting is taking place around Oran. Therefore valuable targets for U-boats may rather be expected there. The sea area off Algiers is at present free from the enemy. Enemy forces are presumed to be still in the harbor.

2) While the movement from west to east was taking place during the first part of the operation, a reverse movement from east to west may now be expected. The boats in the west are generally favorably placed for operations.

1130 aircraft report received: "2 carriers and 50 freighters in 8391, course 200°, speed 11 knots." Boats have been informed and Group "Hai" (boats of 29th U-boat Flotilla) and those boats of Group "Delphin" within range (boats from the west) set on to the formation.

1130 U 617 (Brandi) reported by short signal: "My position CH 7677. Am completely ready to operate." As there are still landing forces in the vicinity of Oran, it is vital for this boat to operate there, but at the same time it is not known exactly whether U 595 is already in the Oran area. U 617 is not equipped with Mediterranean charts; as the area does not seem to be difficult navigationally, however, the boat was ordered: "Make for Oran. In the absence of charts avoid the area west of Cape Falcon. Go in to 1,000 meters' distance from the coast east of Cape Falcon. U 77, 205, 331, 431, 561 and 660 belong to Group "Hai". Group "Delphin" consists of U 73, 81, 458, 565, 593, 595, 605, 617."

1521 position report from U 81 in 8385.

Naval War Staff informed us that 2 French flotilla leaders were trying to break through from Oran to Toulon. The boats were notified at 1552.

Naval War Staff announced that fairly large-scale landings were being carried out near Arzeu and Mostaghanem. As at least some of the boats of Group "Delphin" were operating on the formation reported at 1130 (2 carriers, 50 ships), the Group was required to report its position at 1802 in order that we might have an idea as to how many boats could

operate off Arzeu and Mostaghanem.

1816 Group "Delphin" was informed by radio of these landings.

U 73, 81, 458, 565, 593 and 605 received orders at
1957 to proceed to Oran at maximum speed, exceptions only if in direct contact with the enemy; in that case, report intention. Situation off Oran and Arzeu requires your speedy arrival.

1652 U 431 reported that the coast from Dellys to Sigli is free of the enemy; he can only do 10 knots as a maximum speed because of faulty port coupling.

1902 radio message transmitted at 1127 was received from U 605: "Escort vessel sunk, depth charges, clear, no compass." An aerial photographic evaluation showed 15 ships in Algiers. As movements in to and out of the port are probable at night, a radio message to this
2000 effect has been transmitted to Group "Hai".

1916 U 73 reported his position from CH 8365.

2103 U 565 reported his position from CH 8372.

The afternoon reconnaissance showed many more ships in Algiers, namely 20 ships of 5,000 to 18,000 GRT and 15 cruisers and destroyers.
2215 Group "Hai" was informed by radio message. It is necessary to form a disposition for the boats to avoid gaps or unwanted concentration. U-boat disposition off Algiers in sectors: "Point of the sector is the foot of the mole in the North Jetty. Sector I (270° to 10°) U 561, 660. Sector II (10° to 45°) U 205, 770 and Sector III (45° to 180°) U 431, 331. Inner disposition up to 10 miles from the head of the sectors, outer disposition 20 miles. At night go in close."

See Sketch 4.

2208 U 593 reported his position from CH 8391.

2232 U 605 reported his position from CH 8380, can still do 12 knots only.

2249 U 81 reported his position from CH 8289.

2357 U 596 reported his position from CH 7483, just arrived from the Atlantic.

1846 U 458 reported his position from CH 8392.

2010 radio message from U 331 in CH 9473 - at 1404 he sank a 2 funnelled troopship at anchor.

Directive from the Flag Officer to Captain U-boats:

1) Operations by the U-boats against the first phase of the British landing must be regarded as ended as the enemy has succeeded in withdrawing his transport formations of the first wave of landing troops or in putting in to the ports and thus these targets are removed from the U-boats' attacks.

2) Further U-boat operations must now be directed against enemy reinforcements and supplies to bases he has won.

3) This will be first achieved by blockading the concentration points of Algiers and Oran, which are of approximately equal importance.

4) We must bear in mind the fact that besides a stationary bottling up of the ports named, an active group must be formed again for operating freely at sea - probably concentrating far in the west. On the strength of this directive it is intended:

   a) to gather Group "Delphin" off Oran and form the active Group from it, when more boats arrive from the Atlantic at the latest,

   b) to carry out the blockade of Algiers by means of Group "Hai". Whether it is better to have all 6 boats off the bay or to remove 2 of them for a stationary blockade and set the remainder on the probable routes to and from Algiers, will be shown as the situation develops.

Reasoning:

1) The number of boats available necessitates an apportioning in the allocation of duties otherwise a danger arises of the boats being chased to and fro, using up their combat strength and losing their power of supervision.

2) The following factors must be considered for the operation of the boats:

   a) Only inaccurate information is available of their present positions.

   b) Movements take time - which cannot be calculated in advance - in an area patrolled by aircraft.

c) The peculiarities of the U-boats, resulting from a) and b), require it to be directed largely by target settings which allow a certain amount of play for commanders' shrewdness and initiative.

3) It follows from point 1) that, apart from the plans mentioned, additional tasks, as e.g. appearing off Philippeville and Bone or other points, which are not in the immediate vicinity of Algiers and Oran, would mean a splitting of our forces when the disadvantages would be preponderant in the present situation.

4) It follows from point 2) that a rigid and narrow control of the boats, which at any time must be based on a knowledge of the positions of the boats as well as of their movements, cannot lead to success.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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10 November 1942

I. a) U 73 1916 CH 8365, U 565 2103 CH 8376,
U 593 2208 CH 8391, U 605 2235 CH 8380,
U 431 0131 CH 9199, U 407 0207 CH 7451,
U 458 0405 CH 8349, U 81 0620 CH 8523,
U 596 2337 CH 7483, U 595 CH 7696,
U 617 CH 8471, U 205 CH 9481,
U 660 CH 9457, U 331 CH 9448,
U 77 CH 9548, U 561 CH 9469,
U 559 CP 7320.

b) ./.

II. a) Extensive reconnaissance as far as Gibraltar.

b) Reconnaissance of inshore waters from Cape Krio - Derna as far as Rhodes - Port Said.

0120 U 596 (coming from the Atlantic) received orders to proceed to Oran.

0142 U 81 reported a convoy of 3 vessels in 8512, course 50°, speed 7 knots.

U 407 was in CH 7451 at 0207.

0255 U 205 reported: "Clear again apart from small leakages. Starboard shaft is knocking badly, crawling not possible."

0255 from U 431: "After failure of port diesel coupling the starboard coupling is showing similar signs; there is a danger that the boat will be incapable of maneuvering. Am withdrawing north, am in CH 9199."

0354 from U 431: "CH 9247 fan on formation of light naval vessels, course 300°, speed 15 knots; in 3 detonations one unit exploded, second developed smoke strongly."

0405 from U 458: "8349 three fan miss on large destroyer because of sea reflections, course set for Algiers."

0431 U 458 reported his position at 0411 from CH 7695.

The following radio messages were sent to the boats:

0605 "U 205 and U 431 occupy the outer positions, U 77 and U 331 the inner ones of the sectors allotted to them."

0632 "To all. Plans in general for U-boat operation:

1) Blockade of Algiers and Arzeu sea area.

2) Formation of active group in CH 75 and 76 sea area as soon as possible. Orders follow.

3) Open fire on destroyers and escort vessels only when certain of firing opportunities."

0642 the following situation summary was transmitted to the boats: "Oran still in French hands. Landings near Oran and Arzeu, local armistice for Algiers; General Weygand is taking over Supreme Command in Africa. In Morocco the French are offering stubborn resistance. Situation in Casablanca critical; Agadir and Mogador occupied by British. Heavy losses of French light surface craft. C-in-C South reports air successes so far: 1 bomb hit carrier, 4 hits on various cruisers and destroyers, several hits on merchant ships."

0620 U 81 reported enemy convoy in CH 8523.

0845 U 431 reported: "My position at 0747 CH 9227, maximum cruising speed still 6 knots. Boat submerging for attempt at repairs; formation consisted of 7 units, including 3 cruisers." (The one attacked at 0354 is meant.)

0921 following radio message sent to Group "Hai": "German aircraft sighted 2 aircraft carriers, 2 cruisers, 5 - 10 destroyers, southerly

course, speed slight, at 0745 in CH 9473."

During the morning of 10 November 1942 the situation did not alter basically from that of the previous day. The decision, referring to the blockade of Algiers and the sea area around Oran, to form an operational group as soon as possible is therefore upheld. It is necessary for this to withdraw boats from Groups "Hai" and "Delphin" to form the new Group "Wal". Four U-boats are considered sufficient to blockade Algiers - U 431 will join them after completing repairs. U 660 will be free. In Oran sea area: 2 boats off Oran, 2 off Arzeu and Mostaghanem. 5 boats from Group "Delphin" have been released for Group "Wal". The boats arriving from the Atlantic will join them. "Wal" will operate east of Gibraltar.

0953 "Hai" received a radio message on the occupation of sectors off Algiers:

U 561 the whole of Sector I
Sector II - U 77 inside,
U 205 outside.

U 331 the whole of Sector III.

U 431 will go to Sector III when he is ready.

U 660 commenced the passage to the west, will join the new Group "Wal".

1017 radio message to Group "Hai": "At 0910 German aircraft reports heavy naval forces, varying courses in CH 9455."

1025 radio message to Group "Delphin": "Delphin" consists of only U 458, U 593, U 595, U 596, U 605; U 595 and U 596 occupy the sea area off Oran, will search close under the coast west of Oran if it is clear of the enemy. U 605 and U 593 operate off Arzeu, U 458 off Mostaghanem. U 73, U 81, U 407, U 565, U 617, U 660 form new Group "Wal", operating in CH 75 and 76, proceed there as quickly as possible as it is important to arrive there soon; further orders follow.

1044 radio message sent to Group "Wal": "U 73, U 565, U 617, in that order, will occupy as attack areas CH 7530, 7560 and 7590 in east - west lines of equal breadth, U 407 make for CH 7620, U 660 for CH 7650; hurry! Keep a very sharp look-out for aircraft. Report position by short signal between 1600 and 1800."

See Sketch 5.

1222 U 561 reported by radio: "1108 CH 9445 the "Argus", 2 "Fiji" class cruisers, destroyers, course 330°, speed 15 knots. Fan on "Argus", nothing observed, bombed shortly after firing, clear apart from very leaky night periscope. Loud noises in hydrophone which works with difficulty." As was later learned, U 561 hit the aircraft carrier "Argus".

1151 radio message to "Hai", to the effect that several cruisers and destroyers and 24 merchant ships were in CH 9472 at 0940.

1242 radio message to all boats: "3 fan misses on destroyers must be avoided in the present situation, only fire at destroyers and escort vessels (apart from self defense) if a miss is impossible at closest range."

1244 to Group "Hai": "According to air reconnaissance in Gibraltar harbor at 1040: 2 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 8 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 3 transports up to 10,000 GRT, 1 up to 5,000 GRT, and 10 small vessels."

At 1400 the steamer "Bengasi" put out from Spezia for Cagliari. She is to be in commission in Cagliari as a floating supply base for the U-boats. She is carrying 40 electric torpedoes, 500 cbm. oil, 10 cbm. motor oil, food for 12 U-boats for 28 days. Expected to reach Cagliari after 11 November."

1400 the following aircraft report was received: "1135 convoy found in CH 7447, 30 transports, 3 heavy cruisers, about 20 escorts, mean course 80°, speed slight." An attempt must be made to establish contact with the enemy in the daytime. Assuming the enemy's speed to be 10 knots, it is very doubtful whether the boats in Group "Wal" can reach their positions by 1030 before the enemy passes this area. A new disposition must therefore be ordered altering the orders already issued.

1520 the following radio message was therefore sent:

"To all boats from Captain U-boats:

1) New situation - convoy of 55 units, including 30 transports, 3 cruisers, about 20 escorts in CH 7447 at 1135, course 80°, speed slight.

2) U 596 (Jahn), U 407 (Brüller) try to make contact; if it is not safe to shadow in the daytime, U 596 occupy CH 7640 and U 407 CH 7610 as attack areas.

3) Occupy the following attack areas as speedily as possible: U 617 (Brandi) CH 7670, U 73

(Deckert) CH 7370, U 565 (Franken) CH 7390, U 81 (Guggenberger) CH 7630, U 660 (Baur) CH 7660.

4) U 596 (Jahn) will now join Group "Wal".

5) Group "Wal" immediately report your positions."

The examination ordered by Naval War Staff 1st Division (Operations) as to whether it is possible for U-boats to operate east of Algiers, as enemy landings there too are not excluded, reveals

1) the number of operationally ready boats necessitates strict limitation in the allocation of assignments, otherwise there is a danger that our strength is frittered away and nothing is achieved;

2) the plan underlying the operation now ordered is to blockade the two known points of where the landings are concentrated - Algiers and Oran - and also to operate where more convoys may definitely be met, namely in the sea area east of Gibraltar;

3) U-boat operations take up a lot of time. Movements for the plan in 2) are under way. Redisposition creates uncertainty and in the last resort, a lack of success;

4) at present a large convoy is en route east of Gibraltar. The orders for attack have been issued. Only the boats now off Algiers are available to operate east of Algiers. The almost definite possibility of inflicting damage on the enemy, is not considered capable of being substituted for speculations as to enemy plans;

5) operations against possible enemy landings east of Algiers are therefore not advisable in the present situation and with the forces available;

6) we must endeavor to bring up Italian U-boats to landing points east of Algiers.

1540 U 81 reported his position at 1506 from CH 8385.

1815 radio message sent to U 596 and U 407 to amplify the order given at 1520: "Cease search for contact in time to occupy attack areas by 2330."

1831 radio message sent to U-boats expected from the Atlantic: "U 259 occupy CH 7530 as attack area; U 380 CH 7560, report position as soon

as possible."

Nothing is known of the boats' positions. If they were already in the Mediterranean, they could be used.

1925 U 660 reported his position at 1852 from CH 8364, is therefore further back than was believed.

U 73 reported the "Rodney" and one cruiser at 1817 in CH 8455, course 45°, speed 20 knots. Four-fan miss at 5,000 meters. He is making for 7530. Boat was ordered at 2010 by radio to make for 7370.

2110 position report from U 81 at 2056 in CH 8424. He is still 30 miles from the attack area.

2143 the attention of the boats is drawn to the fact that in the present very serious situation a premature loss of a boat as a result of careless use of torpedoes is inadmissible and therefore to fire a fan of four at an enemy vessel at 5,000 meters' range at high speed is incorrect.

2153 Group "Hai" was informed that an aircraft carrier 6 miles northwest of Cape Caxine was damaged by bombs; another carrier was lying undamaged in the northeastern section of the Bay of Algiers.

The boats ordered to report their positions at 1520. All have reported except U 617 (Brandi). The boat was off Oran. According to an Italian radio intercept report a U-boat was attacked off Cape Blanc and west of Oran.

U 431 (Dommes) and U 617 (Brandi) were ordered to report their positions.

2355 U 331 reported the enemy in CH 9443, 2 aircraft carriers on a northeasterly course.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 November 1942

I. a) U 561 1108 CH 9445, U 660 1852 CH 8364,
U 73 1817 CH 8455, U 81 2056 CH 8424,
U 407 2308 CH 7553, U 596 2316 CH 7638,
U 205 2357 CH 9419, U 331 0003 CH 9427,
U 259 0135 CH 7544, U 617 0836 CH 7675,
U 595 CH 8471, U 605 CH 8449,
U 593 CH 8481, U 458 CH 8459,
U 77 CH 9467, U 431 CH 9227,
U 565 CH 6798, U 559 CP 7320.

b) ./.

II. a) Extensive reconnaissance as far as Gibraltar.

b) Same as on previous day.

U 596 reported at

2315 on the 10 November that there is fog in the Gulf of Oran. 6 destroyers off Oran, moderate air activity. Position of the boat CH 7638, en route to the attack area.

U 205 reported from CH 9419 at 2357 misses fired at large transports and destroyers.

0135 U 259 was in 7544.

0150 radio message from U 565: "0045 flange of ship's side valve to cooling water pipe-line torn off by depth charges; periscope out of action, able to dive with restrictions, am putting in to Spezia."

0305 U 259 received orders by radio to occupy CH 7390 as his attack area; boat will join Group "Wal".

Situation at

0700 1) The large convoy, which was in 7447 at 1135 on 10 November, course 80°, has not yet been reported again.

2) According to an agent's report, 25 darkened vessels, including 6 large and 5 medium-sized ships, passed Tarifa between 2325 and 2340 on 10 November, speed 14 knots, course 0°.

Plans:

1) The assignment for "Hai" and "Delphin" remains the blockade of Algiers and Oran.

2) "Wal" remains at first in the formation ordered as this offers the most likely chance of operating at present. U 596 and U 407 have still not succeeded in making contact during the daytime. According to dead reckoning, taking the enemy's speed to be 10 knots, the convoy could come into

contact with the first wave at 0000, with the second wave at 0400. Assuming a speed of 7 knots, the times would move accordingly to 0400 and 1000. U 259, just arrived from the Atlantic, will take the place of U 565. The boat will shortly be informed of the situation.

3) I expect air reconnaissance reports during the forenoon.

0718 U 431 and U 617 were ordered to report their positions by short signal as soon as the situation permitted.

1120 C-in-C South reported by telephone: "Enemy convoy at 0930 in CH 8283, course 120°."

1215 radio message received from U 73: "1136 CH 7375 fan of three on large single transport, 2 pistol failures, course 250°, speed 11 knots, am in pursuit." Radio Intercept Service picked up a signal from the large 20,000 GRT steamer "Otranto" reporting that a U-boat attacked her. Misses below the stern. A comparison of positions showed that it was the transport attacked by U 73. The boat was informed that there were no pistol failures.

1348 U 596 (Jahn) reported: "Enemy sighted in CH 7641, course 80°."

1447 Group "Delphin" was ordered by radio to report the situation as soon as possible.

1525 radio message from U 596 (Jahn): "1510 enemy on course 110°."

1628 a signal was received from U 660 (Baur) reporting a convoy at 1230 in CH 8418, course 70°, moderate speed (at least 20 ships).

U 755 reported
1729 "Am in CH 7633. At 0900 in CH 7622 convoy of transports, cruisers and strong escort. Attack on 2-funnelled steamer frustrated by depth charge pursuit. Slight damage."

The situation at

1800 summarized as follows:

I. Information of the enemy:

Important signals received since 0700

1) The steamer "Viceroy of India" has been torpedoed in CH 8416 according to a radio intercept report. With regard to the more important interception of the Gibraltar convoy, a

U-boat operation on the "Viceroy" has not been carried out. The radio intercept report was transmitted to Group "Wal" in order to give a boat in a favorable position the chance of sinking the steamer.

2) At 1405 we were informed that another convoy of 16 steamers, escorted by 5 gunboats put out from Gibraltar for the east at 0900.

3) No new reports from Algiers and Oran.

4) Several reports on the enemy east of Algiers.

5) Gibraltar convoy was in CH 7641 at 1358.

6) The Dutch steamer "Nieuw Zeeland", 11,069 GRT, reported having been torpedoed by a U-boat in CG 9923. A British aircraft reported that he was over a sinking ship in CH 7482.

7) According to a U-boat report a convoy (of at least 20 ships) was in CH 7663 on a southerly course.

II. Own situation:

1) U-boat disposition as at 0700.

2) Group "Wal" operating on the convoy reported in I5).

3) U 617 has reported his position, he is in the attack area ordered.

4) No report has been received on U 431's ability to operate.

5) The torpedo attacks mentioned in I6) can only have been carried out by a U-boat entering the Mediterranean from the Atlantic.

6) U 596 has shadowed the convoy since 1358. (See I5)).

7) U 660 has made contact with the convoy in I7).

8) During the day the boats of Group "Wal" were sighted by enemy aircraft eight times altogether.

III. Plans:

1) Group "Wal" will continue to operate on the convoy reported by U 596.

2) Group "Hai" will remain off Algiers.

3) Since a) no reports have as yet been received from the boats off Oran,
b) Oran meanwhile is believed to have been captured by the enemy,
c) a convoy, shadowed by U 660, is within the range of Group "Delphin",
I have decided, with the consent of Flag Officer German Naval Command, to set Group "Delphin" to this convoy.

IV. Miscellaneous:

The supply steamer "Bengasi", intended to supply U-boats in Cagliari, was torpedoed by a British submarine at about 1600 off Cape Ferrato on the southeastern corner of Sardinia, and was sinking, according to information received from the Italian Navy. She had on board 40 electric torpedoes, 500 cbm. fuel oil, lubricating oil and 12 months' supply of food for U-boats. So we have lost an urgently required source of supply in the favorable site of Cagliari. The commissioning of the steamer "Favor" (1,300 GRT), with fuel oil in barrels and food, in Cagliari is intended as a speedily-effected temporary relief. We have still to determine whether she can carry electric torpedoes and, if so, how many.

U 259 reported
1830 0957 CH 7391 single ship, westerly course, bombs.
1710 CH 7368 steamer, course 250°, moderate speed, air cover.

1825 radio message from U 660: "Enemy sighted at 1740 in CH 7663, southerly course."

1842 Group "Delphin" received orders to operate on U 660's convoy.

1901 U 407 reported: "0524 CH 7619 fan of four and stern torpedo on "Viceroy of India", course 270°, speed 15 knots, 2 hits, a loud detonation aft, probably one pistol failure; sinking not observed, forced to submerge by escort while withdrawing to reload; very loud series of depth charges, clear, CH 7622, position very inexact."

1902 U 73 reported: "From 1250 continually forced to submerge by strong air patrols; 1530 2 bombs, clear again, am in CH 7370."

1933 radio message from U 593: boat reported sighting enemy convoy at 1820 in CH 8457, northerly course, consisting of about 6 large transports, 4 destroyers, no contact.

1953 U 458 reported: "Enemy convoy in CH 8452, northeasterly course, have lost contact."

2100 U 660 reported: "Several transports, course 70°, speed 15 knots, lost to sight in CH 8428."

2120 U 561 reported: "Enemy sighted in CH 8363, 1 aircraft carrier, 1 heavy cruiser, destroyers; enemy on westerly course."

2145 U 561 reported: "2143 CH 8365 forces reported out of sight."

2250 U 431 reported: "Am clear, my position 9143."

2302 U 595 reported: "0406 CH 7694 fan on transport ("Blue Funnel" line), course 210°, speed 14 - 16 knots, 2 detonations, bulkheads broken, boiler explosion heard, 16 hours of depth charges, am withdrawing to CH 73."

2312 U 617 reported: "7 hours of depth charges. My position CH 7656: am pressing on." (The radio message had no reference.)

2328 U 380 reported: 1) "Am in 7544; 7 torpedoes and 2 torpedoes on upper deck, 100 cbm. fuel left." 2) "In 7472 at 1242 twin-funnelled liner of "Viceroy of India" class, course 300°, speed 15 knots, sunk."

2358 U 81 reported: "35 cbm. fuel left, 2 + 2 torpedoes, 8 days food. Junkers compressor, direction finding set broken down; main periscope, multi-unit hydrophones clear with restrictions; require 5 days in dock at Spezia; 4,000 GRT freighter sunk out of convoy on 10 November, escort vessel torpedoes in CH 8531."

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

12 November 1942

I. a) U 596 0302 CH 7382, U 660 2100 CH 8428,
U 593 1820 CH 8457, U 755 1957 CH 7633,
U 259 1710 CH 7368, U 458 1953 CH 8452,
U 407 1901 CH 7622, U 73 0150 CH 7375,
U 431 2250 CH 1143, U 561 2145 CH 8365,
U 595 0900 CH 7800, U 81 2358 CH 8531,
U 617 2312 CH 7665, U 605 CH 8449,
U 331 CH 9446, U 205 CH 9419,
U 77 CH 9467, U 565 CH 6368,
U 559 CP 7310.

b) ./.

II. a) Reconnaissance as far as Oran.

b) Same as on previous day.

0010 radio message to Group "Delphin": "Boats which are not likely to achieve successes if they operate on the convoy, will occupy the following attack areas:
U 755 CH 7350, U 407 CH 8180,
U 593 CH 8150, U 605 CH 8450,
U 458 CH 8130."

0030 radio message to U 755: "Boat will join Group "Delphin"."

0046 U 595 reported: 1) "No fires observed in Oran; lights extinguished except on moles and Habibas Island; strong destroyer escort up to 15 miles to sea."

0150 U 73 reported: "My position is CH 7375."

0230 radio message to all boats: "Agent reported convoy of about 20 ships off Melilla at 1500 on 10 November 1942; 2325 convoy of 25 ships, including 5 large and 6 medium-sized tankers; both convoys on an easterly course."

0302 U 596 reported: "While with convoy at 1415 in CH 7646 heavy bombs, both periscopes, main ballast pump out of action, rod aerial leaking to control room; returning to Spezia my position CH 7383." The boat which was operating in the Mediterranean for the first time, received detailed port entering instructions.

0345 radio message to all boats: "Agent sighted convoy, 13 large transports, easterly course, at 1115 on 11 November between Cape de Gata and Melilla."

0403 U 593 reported: "The "Rodney" with one cruiser and one destroyer was standing off and on in CH 8481 and 8459 between 0700 and 1200 on 11 November; fan of four missed; otherwise only

destroyers and convoy reported already in Arzeu Bay."

0516 to U 380 from Captain U-boats: "1) Occupy CH 7640 as attack area. 2) U 380 will join Group "Wal". "

Throughout 11 November a total of 12 sighting reports from British aircraft on German U-boats were received from radio intercept service. Apart from those, a British aircraft reported that he was over a sinking ship in CH 7482 (probably the transport of "Viceroy of India" class sunk by U 380).

Situation at

0700 information of enemy and own situations as in individual reports above.

Plans:

1) Groups "Wal" and "Delphin" will be employed further in the sea area between 2° W and 1° E which has proved to be very fruitful. Group "Wal" will receive their old attack area, "Delphin" received orders at 0010 to occupy new ones. The possibility as to whether the attack carried out by the boats has an advantage over a disposition over a wide area, in which the boats can operate in turn and the Command limits its control to the transmission of reports to the boats and identification of targets for attack, will be examined.

See Sketch 6.

2) Group "Hai" off Algiers has not yet achieved any success. Their operation in the open sea, leaving behind only one boat off Algiers, is being considered.

Stocks of torpedoes held by boats as calculated here are:

U 73 5, U 331 8, U 565 8, U 605 5, U 380 8, U 77 12, U 407 7, U 593 8, U 617 12, U 81 4, U 431 8, U 595 8, U 660 12, U 205 3, U 458 5, U 596 12, U 259 12.

0836 radio message from U 77:
1) 2310 on 10 November CH 9442 fan on the "Furious", detonation heard, boat could not observe success because of "Alarm".

2) 0309 on 11 November CH 9472 hit on bridge of "Tribal" class destroyer, boat withdrew.

1100 the following considerations for further U-boat operations have been submitted to

Flag Officer German Naval Command and agreed to:

I. Enemy situation:

1) Few enemy movements off Algiers, only destroyers sighted off Oran, apart from the "Rodney" standing off and on yesterday.

2) Continual supply traffic and more transports to strengthen landings so far made or the creation of new bases have been detected. Large transports sail singly, unescorted or with weak escort, back to Gibraltar. Convoys discovered to date moved at relatively high speeds of 12 - 14 knots.

3) CH 75, 73, 76, 81 and 84 as well as CH 59 and CH 83 seem particularly valuable operational areas. Traffic is here continually.

II. Own situation:

1) Still 17 operationally ready U-boats in the operational area, divided into 3 groups:
Group "Wal" 7 U-boats,
Groups "Hai" and "Delphin" 5 U-boats each.

2) Groups "Wal" and "Delphin" are operating from attack areas in CH 75, 73, 76, 81 and 84.

3) Group "Hai" off Algiers.

III. Considerations:

1) The blockade off Algiers and Oran ought to intercept enemy forces putting in and out. According to information received to date such movements have only taken place on a small scale or were not spotted by the boats. The approach to the landing beaches necessary for the effectiveness of the blockade forces the boats to crowd together in a narrow space and to operate in shallow waters. Apart from the serious danger this entails the boats, the great disadvantage of a narrow disposition is that the appearance of an aircraft forces the boats to depth. As the blockade continues, the boats' chances of success decrease as the enemy realizes their presence and cuts them

out to a greater or lesser degree by increased patrols and sweeps. It therefore seems appropriate to alter the arrangement.

2) A disposition in the sea area of CH 59 and CH 83 is regarded as a worthwhile opportunity for Group "Hai" to operate. Supply traffic for Algiers and the landing beaches runs past here east of Algiers; also covering forces lie here. We plan to place 4 boats in the southern half of CH 59 and in CH 83 and to leave 1 U-boat in CH 9440 and 70.

3) The attempt made on 11 November to have one group operate on a convoy had no result. The reasons are believed to be as follows:

a) The operation required space and time. Neither were available in the strictly limited sea area of the Western Mediterranean.

b) It was necessary for Command to know the boats' positions all the time in the limited sea area. This requirement could not be fulfilled in an area of constant air patrol.

c) The receipt of orders, as well as the transmission of reports, was only possible for the boats with a great loss of time. In this way was lost the most essential basis for rigid control.

d) When convoys were following quickly up on each other and splitting up, it was difficult to indicate targets and confusion was caused.

e) With constant enemy air patrols in conjunction with relatively fast 12 - 14 knots convoys and warship formations it was neither possible to shadow nor haul ahead.

IV. <u>These considerations lead to the following decision:</u>

1) Disposition of Groups "Wal" and "Delphin" in the sea area between 2° 30' W and 0° 30' E in squares in attack areas which give the boats considerable freedom of movement and guarantee supervision of the routes to and from Gibraltar which is the only source of supply.

2) Disposition of Group "Hai" as in III2).

3) The advantages of this free formation are:

a) Greater play for the Commanders' initiative and shrewdness,

b) better supervision of the sea area chiefly used by the enemy,

c) stretching enemy defenses and so reducing the threat to the boats,

d) relieving the Command resulting in greater clarity,

e) reducing radio traffic.

V. The decision was put into force by means of the following orders: See Sketch 7

Radio message at

1232 1) New attack areas for Group "Hai":

U 77 (Hartmann)	CH 9440 and 70
U 331 (Tiesenhausen)	CH 8360
U 561 (Schomburg)	CH 8370
U 431 (Dommes)	CH 8320
U 205 (Bürgel)	CH 59 southern half.

1405 2) New attack areas for Group "Wal":

U 73 CH 7370, U 407 CH 7530,
U 380 CH 7560, U 617 CH 7670,
U 259 CH 7390, U 81 CH 7620,
U 660 CH 7660.

1402 a query was sent by telephone from Captain U-boats to Naval War Staff 1st Division (Operations) as to whether a change in the treatment of French warships and merchant vessels might be envisaged. The reply was that so far we have no information that French warships or merchant ships are sailing in the enemy's service. We do not need to inform the boats: the attack ban applies to them until it is revoked.

Radio intercept service picked up an instruction to a British command station to operate more aircraft on anti-U-boat patrols. The boats have been warned to expect increased British air patrols.

1900 no alteration in the situation. No reports from our boats. The plans reported in the considerations of 1100 remain unchanged.

2020 U 380 confirmed that the "Viceroy of India" class steamer reported at 2328 on 11 November

capsized and sank in CH 7472 after a hit and finishing shot.

2115 U 561 reported: "1945 discovered during an attack on convoy, depth charges, diving tank gashed, watertight stern leaking, loud noises from hydroplane, noticeable oil traces." The boat received orders by radio to make for Spezia.

2229 U 596 reported: "Light enemy forces on southerly course in CH 5782." This report
2303 was re-transmitted to all boats.

Reports on the enemy from Axis air reconnaissance during 12 November 1942:

0854 CH 9593 1 probable cruiser, 5 freighters and liners, 1 destroyer, 2 presumed special craft, 4 landing craft.
1045 CH 7388 2 destroyers, course 55°, moderate speed.
1104 CH 9435 2 carriers, 2 battleships, 2 light cruisers, 12 destroyers.
1145 CH 7612 2 destroyers, course 50°, moderate speed.
1200 CJ 7735 2 cruisers, course and speed not given.
1 carrier with several destroyers hove to 6 miles west of Jijelli between 0900 and 1000.
1405 CH 7691 13 merchant ships 5,000 tons, 1 merchantman 10,000 tons, 2 tankers, 8 destroyers, 5 escort vessels, course 140°, speed up to 10 knots.
1435 CH 8315 22 medium-sized naval vessels, easterly course, high speed.
1515 CH 9596 4 merchant ships up to 3,000 GRT, 2 others on fire, 45 escort vessels.
0854 Bougie harbor: 2 French merchant ships about 2,000 GRT.
Bougie roads: 4 British troopships approximately 18,000 - 20,000 tons each, 4 freighters approximately 10,000 GRT, 2 destroyers, 9 corvettes withdrawing landing troops.
0955 Algiers: 9 freighters (30,200 tons)
Algiers, off the harbor: 1 liner (17,000 GRT), 5 smaller freighters (4,000 - 5,000 tons each), 2 torpedo-boats.
1345 4 freighters up to 3,000 tons putting in to Oran, 7 freighters up to 5,000 tons putting out, several submarines putting in.

1800 Bougie Bay: 7 merchant ships of 10,000 - 20,000 GRT.

North of Bougie: 1 carrier, 1 cruiser, several destroyers and patrol vessels.

During 12 November, according to radio intercept service, our boats were intercepted by enemy air patrols on 12 occasions.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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13 November 1942

I. a) U 596 2229 CH 5782, U 205 0215 CH 5987,
U 407 CH 7530, U 380 CH 7560,
U 73 CH 7370, U 259 CH 7390,
U 81 CH 7620, U 660 CH 7660,
U 617 CH 7670, U 755 CH 7350,
U 593 CH 8480, U 605 CH 8450,
U 595 CH 8180, U 458 CH 8130,
U 431 CH 8320, U 331 CH 8360,
U 561 CH 8370, U 77 CH 9440,
U 559 CP 7310.

b) U 565 put in to Spezia at 0800.

II. a) Reconnaissance as far as Oran.

b) Same as on previous day.

0215 U 205 reported three destroyers, one fairly large silhouette, in CH 5987, easterly course, moderate speed.

0320 U 593 reported a convoy putting out from Arzeu Bay, partly consisting of large transports, at 1240 and one at 1400. 1515 2 hits on 2 steamers, 7,000 GRT each, of convoy putting in to port. Boat requested freedom of action.

U 593 was instructed to remain off Arzeu Bay, at the same time U 605 and U 660 were set on to Oran and Arzeu Bay.

0700 still 16 operationally ready boats in the operational area, 3 homeward bound.

1232 U 431 reported: "0615 CH 8324 convoy on an easterly course. One "Tribal" class destroyer sunk, one tanker set on fire, more detonations heard, 2 torpedoes, need to dock soon."

1410 radio message from U 755: "1329 convoy in CH 7383, course 240°, moderate speed." The message was passed on to the boats at 1423.

1435 U 755 reported that aircraft were over the convoy at 1158, so he was forced to submerge and lost contact; the boat was pressing on.

1735 radio message from U 73: "1445 5 destroyers, 2 aircraft carriers, 3 transports, in CH 7377, course 230°, speed 18 knots."

1743 the message was passed on to the boats.

Situation at

1900 I. Enemy situation:

1) On the whole no change.

2) Of importance for U-boats, apart from the individual reports given:

a) 0950 enemy convoy sighted in CH 8146, 1 aircraft carrier, southwesterly course, moderate speed (U-boat report).

b) According to an Italian agent's report the "Argus" was towed to Gibraltar by 2 destroyers. 2 tugs put out from there to assist. Position and course inexact.

II. Own situation:

1) Disposition of U-boats same as before. U 593 had received orders at 0700, on the receipt of his report of valuable traffic off Arzeu, to remain there. But the boat meanwhile went to his attack area CH 8150 as a report originating from there at 0950 shows. He received orders at 1230 to remain in CH 8150, U 605 was ordered to operate in Arzeu Bay.

2) No more reports have been received of the convoy reported by U 755. As the convoy's course led through the U-boat disposition, it can be assumed that still more U-boats will approach it. U 81, U 407 and U 380 are in favorable positions. The shadowers' reports received have been passed on to the boats.

III. Miscellaneous:

1) U 565 put in to Spezia at 0820.

2) U 561 reported his arrival at Spezia approach point as 0800 on 14 November.

1833 U 593 reported: "0814 fan of three missed the "Furious". Still 2 stern torpedoes left, vents 3 and 5 and Junkers compressor out of action, main periscope clear with restrictions, am making for Spezia."

1850 U 755 reported: 1443 convoy was in CH 7612, course 200°, speed 12 - 14 knots. Boat was forced to submerge by aircraft and destroyers and has lost contact.

1936 all boats were informed that the ban on attacking French warships and merchant vessels will stand so long as it is not known with certainty that they have sought or are seeking communication with the enemy.

1958 U 81 reported at 1600:

"1) CH 7634 2 steamers, 4 escort vessels, course 150°, speed 8 knots.

2) 2 steamers 11,000 GRT torpedoed, probably sunk.

3) Returning.

4) For Spezia base: probably new Jumo-trim dial, direction finding received, 3 NA units (TN-part of radar set) required, 1 day in dock."

2048 U 458 (Diggins) reported at 1530: "Heavy bombs, complete breakdown, will attempt to put in with full speed all out, code tables destroyed, only message code AKNOW left; my position CH 8228."

2130 radio message to all boats: "U 380 (Röther) reported on "Ireland" at 1754: "Convoy in CH 7553, moderate speed, course 270°, passed to the south, am in pursuit; strong air and sea patrols"."

2146 U 73 reported: "Carriers were the "Argus" and the "Furious"; exact position at 1600 CH 7539, course 230°, forced to submerge, 1645 possible torpedo detonation heard. Assume position of "Argus" at 0000 to be CH 7541 with towing speed of 8 knots; am in pursuit; my position CH 7533."

2243 U 407 reported: "Am operating on the "Argus"."

2312 U 431 reported:

"1) Forward hydroplane jammed, attack periscope clouds after each time we submerge. Port loud noises, shaft knocking, am making for Spezia.

2) Successes: 10 November one probable "Leander" class cruiser sunk, one destroyer torpedoed, probably sank at 0430.
13 November one "Tribal" class destroyer sunk, one large tanker torpedoed, set on fire, another hit heard."

2352 radio message to U 431: "Break off operations if Commander thinks fit, then make for Pola via Messina."

2359 radio message to U 458: "Make for Spezia, maximum speed, report position at 0500."

(Signed) Kreisch.

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14 November 1942

I. a) U 458 0458 CH 5661, U 73 0553 CH 7455,
U 407 CH 7530, U 380 CH 7560,
U 617 CH 7670, U 755 CH 7620,
U 81 CH 5880, U 259 CH 7390,
U 660 CH 8470, U 605 CH 8450,
U 595 CH 8180, U 593 CH 8154,
U 431 CH 8370, U 205 CH 5980,
U 331 CH 8360, U 77 CH 9470,
U 596 CH 3990, U 561 CJ 1389,
U 559 CP 7310.

b) U 375 put out from Pola on operations at 1500.

II. a) Reconnaissance as far as Oran.

b) Inshore waters reconnaissance, Cape Krio - Derna as far as Rhodes - Port Said.

0047 single boats to operate as follows:

U 660 in the Bay of Oran.
U 605 and U 660 to report their positions as soon as possible.
U 755 received CH 7620 as his new attack area.
U 77 and U 331 in the Bay of Algiers.

0135 U 331 reported at 2240: "Observed this morning in CH 8366 while attacking Algiers convoy: heavy depth charges. The forward hydroplane, damaged by touching the seabed during a shallow water attack, can now only be moved with difficulty by hand. Request short period in dock."

As, in the present situation the withdrawal of more boats is extremely awkward, U 331 was ordered to remain in the operational area unless it is absolutely necessary for him to dock.

In view of the damage to the boat the operation planned off Algiers will be abandoned. CH 8360 will remain as U 331's attack area.

0325 U 407 reported at 0230 that he has ceased pursuing the "Argus" and is making for his old attack area.

0700 the situation was summarized as follows:

I. Enemy situation:

1) On the whole no change.

2) Important messages for U-boats, apart from those already given:

a) Naval High Command - Radio Intelligence - announced: "The "Argus" towed by 2 destroyers en route to Gibraltar. 1630 convoy consisting of 5 empty merchant ships (3 British, 1 American, 1 Dutch), escorted by 5 gunboats."

b) According to an Italian radio intercept report: it was revealed from radio bearing that the Allied High Command directing the operations was en route for Gibraltar, located abreast of Oran in the afternoon.

3) A composite picture of valuable traffic in the area where U-boats operate results from the reports of the day, concentration is in the north as suspected.

4) Very strong enemy air forces which in many cases attacked U-boats even when submerged and made operations very difficult.

II. Own situation:

1) Still 12 U-boats operationally ready in the operational area; 6 boats damaged, 1 seriously returning to Spezia. U 561 is expected to reach Spezia at 0830.

2) During 13 November the following boats contacted the enemy: U 755, U 380, U 73, U 458, U 81, U 431, U 593, U 407, U 259, U 331. Altogether 4 convoys were intercepted, 2 of these in the Algiers area, also the "Furious"-"Argus" formation was intercepted.

3) U-boat operations were also made

difficult to a large extent by strong air patrols and anti-U-boat measures and good prospects of attacking were frustrated. The countless sighting reports of enemy aircraft show that the boats always tried to operate on the surface again, even in the daytime, in order to see better.

4) 10 out of 15 boats in the area of operations reported during the day.

5) The following successes on 13 November have been reported so far:

a) U 81 reported 2 steamers of 11,000 GRT torpedoed at 1600, heard to sink.

b) U 431 reported that the naval vessel torpedoed on 10 November (exploded) was a cruiser of the "Leander" class, also 1 destroyer torpedoed and probably sunk, on 13 November one "Tribal" class destroyer sunk, 1 large tanker torpedoed, set on fire, another hit heard.

6) Damage reported:

U 593: Junkers compressor out of action, main periscope clear with restrictions, valves 3 and 5 out of action.
U 458: Complete breakdown caused by heavy bombs.
U 431: Forward hydroplane jammed, attack periscope cloudy after submerging. Port main coupling making loud noises, shaft knocking.
U 81: Junkers trim dial, direction finding receiver, 3 NA units (parts of radar set), 1 day in dock.
U 331: Forward hydroplane can only be moved by hand with difficulty (short period in dock).

U 593, U 458 and U 81 of the boats mentioned are bound for Spezia; care must be taken that Spezia does not become congested. It is planned to take in here U-boats with slight damage and a repair period of less than a fortnight and, of course, seriously damaged boats which cannot undertake the longer voyage to Pola, for instance U 458 at present. In consequence of this plan, U 431 received orders to make for Pola, after his signal that he

was making for Spezia. The boat has been a very long time in the operational area (since 2 September) with only a few days' break and is due for a normal overhaul. 5 more U-boats, apart from those undergoing the normal overhaul there, all wanting to dock, are marked for Spezia.

III. Plans:

1) The plans so far drawn up for the U-boat disposition within the framework of instructions issued remain in force as they have held good.

2300 2) At approximately a teleprint message was received from Naval War Staff pointing out that:

1) The new disposition ordered for the boats must be suitable both with reference to the fundamental alterations in plans and to the sea area.

2) The enemy will probably divert his forces to the south after discovering the area of our U-boat operations.

3) The new disposition must not deviate in principle from the predominant plan of blockading the landing points but will include continuous U-boat assaults right up to the ports and close in to the coast. An examination of the U-boats' operational areas and our own plans, taking as a basis the number of operationally ready boats still available, namely 12, with Naval War Staff's instructions reveals:

to 1) The new disposition has fulfilled its purpose. The many sighting reports of to-day show that traffic is running where suspected and U-boats ought to encounter it. Whether, when and how the U-boat disposition will be altered shortly, in view of the decrease in the number of operationally ready boats, must be examined.

to 2) The considerations for the operation of boats and the reason for altering our first plan (blockading Oran and Algiers) are contained in the survey of the situation at 1100 on 12 November. The idea that the enemy might, after discovering the operational area, avoid it or find a

means of reducing the effectiveness of U-boat operations, determined the alteration in plans and must remain the controlling factor. The possibility that the enemy might try to slip past to the south, must be kept in mind. Up to now the enemy has preferred the center and north.

to 3) U 605 is to carry out a sortie in Arzeu Bay at 1230 on 13 November. In addition, U 660 has been ordered to carry out a sortie off Oran, and U 77 to operate off Algiers. A change of attack areas increases the prospects of success and splits up defenses. It must however not lead to the boats having to carry out long cruising movements continuously; at the same time we cannot allow complete inaction. With a sufficient number of U-boats the sea area selected, between 2° 30' W and 1° E, is most important for the enemy must pass here quite apart from knowing that U-boats are operating here. In addition there is the knowledge added to daily - the British are determined.

To sum up: The operational areas are dependent upon a knowledge of the enemy's movements, the need for concentration as the number of available boats sinks, and the need for changing positions to split the enemy's defenses.

3) The center of the disposition has been weakened by U 81's withdrawal so U 755, in the north until now, has been ordered to occupy U 81's position which is still regarded as the most profitable.

0950 U 561 reported having put in to Spezia; a periscope was sighted off the harbor.

1035 U 81 reported: "0800 CH 5894 2 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, cruisers and destroyers on a westerly course, speed 18 knots."

1040 war distress signal from U 595: "Attacked by aircraft in CH 8150." U 259 was ordered to make for the damaged U-boat.

1426 U-boats U 617, 605 and 660 were ordered to report their positions, U 605 and U 660 to report the situation in addition.

1535 U 77 in CH 9445 reported: "2 German airmen picked up, 1 officer severely wounded, 1 NCO not wounded. Officer of the watch shot through the knee, seaman has broken arm; request permission to call at Cagliari to transfer them to Luftwaffe hospital." It is extremely unsuitable at present for the boat to drop out of operations. He has therefore received orders to remain in the operational area. At the same time instructions for medical treatment have been transmitted to the boat with the order to report a rise in temperature of the knee casualty.

1800 the following considerations for further U-boat operations were submitted to Flag Officer German Command and agreed to by him:

I. Enemy situation.

To-day's reconnaissance revealed:

1) Off harbors:

a) No reconnaissance of Oran and Algiers.

b) Light naval forces off Bougie, 3 merchant ships up to 3,000 GRT and 2 merchant ships of up to 10,000 GRT.

c) Off Jijelli: 1 merchant ship of 20,000 GRT, 15 landing craft. It is presumed that the transport is a wreck.

d) Off Philippeville: single light naval forces in the sea area off the port. 1 Italian U-boat approached close to the harbor entrance, reported no shipping in the harbor.

e) Off Bone: 2 transports up to 20,000 GRT.

2) In the open sea the picture reveals a great reduction in convoy traffic.

3) Very strong anti-U-boat sweeps by aircraft in our U-boats' operational area.

II. Own situation:

1) Apart from U 81 no other boat has reported contact with the enemy.

2) It is therefore expected that the number of operationally ready boats, to-day at 0700 amounting to 12, has decreased again and will do so still further very shortly for

a) U 595 reported in a war distress signal an aircraft attack in CH 8150 at 1040. The nature of the signal implies that the boat is so severely damaged that he has already had to destroy his code tables. The boat has not reported since then. We must presume his loss, or at least his withdrawal from the operational area.

b) Of the innumerable British aircraft reports of U-boat sightings, 2 are particularly serious:

1) In CH 8417 a U-boat was repeatedly reported on the surface and reported damaged by a ground station in Gibraltar with the order to the aircraft to attack.

2) In CH 8541 a U-boat was reported, its crew had left the boat and landed on shore. From the reports it could be either U 605 or U 660 which were to make a reconnaissance of Oran and Arzeu Bay. The boats have not reported since 11 November. They have been ordered to report their positions at once and, in addition, the situation, as soon as possible.

It therefore seems right to count on no more than 9 operationally ready boats.

3) 2 of the 9 boats have only 2 stern torpedoes left, 1 boat (U 331) has requested permission to call at Spezia for a short time because of the difficulty of moving the hydroplane, and U 77 at Cagliari because of the wounded men on board. The boats have been ordered to remain in the operational area, but they must be withdrawn shortly for a little while. We must therefore expect the number of operationally ready boats to decrease shortly by another 2 or 3. It must be kept in mind that the boats have had great demands made of them for the past week and frequently came into contact with the enemy.

4) We cannot expect any more boats in the operational area before 20 November. U 375 put out from Pola on 14 November. It takes 5 or 6 days to reach the operational area. The boats which have put in or are putting in to Pola are all damaged. Even if the work is speeded up to the limit, 4 or 5 days will still be required according to past experience. In addition 2 days are required for the outward and return passage. The next boat to be ready as planned will leave Spezia on 18 November at the earliest.

5) After the loss of the supply ship "Bengasi", it will only be possible to take on more supplies of torpedoes in Spezia.

III. Plans for further U-boat operations:

1) The considerations for the present disposition in the open sea are contained in the survey of the situation for 11 November. One of the bases for the decision then has altered decisively, the fact that the number of operationally ready U-boats has decreased so much that they are no longer sufficient to patrol the 90 mile broad channel. With the reduction of our forces in general a sharper concentration is necessary. To this is added the fact that aircraft anti-U-boat sweeps have reached a degree of intensity and effectiveness which force us to adopt the strongest measure, that is the withdrawal of the boats from the present area.

2) In general two possibilities are offered for the operation of U-boats against landing transports:

a) The present solution (disposition off the "bottleneck," the narrow sea channel to Gibraltar).

b) A disposition off the landing areas or in the sea areas adjoining concentration points of enemy landings.

Advantages and disadvantages of the solutions in brief:

to a) Advantages: The enemy must sail here; only here can we, with any probability, intercept formations of naval craft.

Disadvantages: The sea area, 90 miles broad, requires many U-boats in view of a definite depth to achieve effective supervision. At present the enemy has transferred his concentrated anti-U-boat sweeps there. It may be assumed that the enemy possesses a clear picture of the attack areas of U-boats in this area.

to b) Advantages: Enemy supply traffic destined for the main landing areas can be intercepted off them by a few U-boats with good prospects. The disposition permits a concentration of weak forces.

Disadvantages: With a disposition off the ports a large part of enemy traffic, namely everything not bound for those ports, is not intercepted. Operations in shallow waters put great demands on the U-boats. The enemy will quickly bring up defenses.

A decisive factor is that our forces are not sufficient for solution a) and also that we must not deviate from the present disposition, temporarily at least, because of intense anti-U-boat measures.

IV. Decision:

Change in the area of operations, i.e. a disposition in support of the main landing at Algiers while uncovering Oran. The enemy landings east of Algiers (Bougie, Jijelli, Philippeville and Bone), of which we have partly contradictory information, must remain the operational area of Italian U-boats.

The disposition of the boats is chosen in such a way that, according to the available forces, the boats will be stationed off Oran and Algiers; further boats will operate in the sea area west of Algiers.

The boats therefore received the following order at

2355 1) Groups "Wal", "Delphin" and "Hai" are being disbanded.

2) New attack areas, east - west lines.

U 205 (Bürgel)	CH 5940 to CH 9140.
U 407 (Brüller)	CH 5970 to CH 9170.
U 77 (Hartmann)	CH 8310 to CH 9410.
U 331 (Tiesenhausen)	CH 8340 to CH 8360.
U 617 (Brandi)	CH 8370 to CH 8390.

See Sketch 8.

3) U 73 (Deckert) and U 755 (Göring) will operate off Algiers in CH 9440 and CH 9470; both boats to concentrate in the south.

4) U 660 (Baur) off Oran, U 605 (Schütze) and U 380 (Roether) will operate in Arzeu Bay.

5) U 259 (Koepke) will continue to search for U 595 (Quaet) until dawn. Then make for CH 6325.

Reports of U-boats from 0700 - 1900/
14 November:

1000 CH 8424	British aircraft: "Am over enemy U-boat."
1050 CH 8428	enemy U-boat attacked with depth charges, probably 2 hits.
1000 CH 7614	enemy U-boat, attacked with depth charges at 1007.
1125 CH 8416	enemy U-boat.
1155 CH 8188	enemy U-boat.
1235 CH 7675	1 submerged U-boat.
1055 CH 8189	surfaced U-boat.
1202 CH 7618	enemy U-boat.
1000 CH 8427	enemy U-boat attacked with depth charges.
1105 CO 1668	enemy U-boat.
1202 CH 8427	enemy U-boat.
1310 CH 8342	enemy U-boat, crew abandoned boat in same position.
1025 CH 8416	enemy U-boat.
1055 CH 8189	enemy U-boat.
1236 CH 6772	enemy U-boat.
1310 CH 8541	enemy U-boat, crew on shore.

2037 radio message sent to all boats stating that night sweeps may be expected by British location aircraft.

2237 U 595 has been ordered to report his position immediately.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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15 November 1942

I. a) U 380 CH 7480, U 755 CH 7610,
U 660 CH 8470, U 605 CH 8480,
U 617 CH 8420, U 259 CH 8150,
U 595 CH 8150, U 407 CH 8180,
U 205 CH 5950, U 77 CH 8320,
U 331 CH 8350, U 73 CH 3440,
U 431 CH 9320, U 81 CH 6350,
U 593 CH 6330, U 559 CP 7310,
U 375 CJ 6310.

b) U 596 put in to Spezia at 0945.
U 458 put in to Spezia at 1930.

II. a) Reconnaissance as far as Oran.

b) Same as on previous day.

0200 U 617 reported at 0017: "CH 7529 convoy passed out of range; boat returning to attack area; so far no traffic there, only bombs and depth charges."

0630 radio message from U 380. Boat reported at 1132 on 14 November: "Fan of 2 on large enemy unit in convoy. Tonnage at least 10,000 GRT. One detonation heard."

0700 the situation is as follows:

I. Enemy situation:

1) The formation of heavy ships sighted by U 81 at 0800 on 14 November in CH 5894 has not been intercepted again.

2) The "Argus" put in to Gibraltar at 0930 on 14 November.

3) One U-boat intercepted a convoy in CH 7476 at 1132, course not reported.

4) 10 - 15 merchant ships in Algiers according to evening reconnaissance.

5) No reconnaissance off Oran.

6) No more traffic intercepted in U-boats' operational area.

II. Own situation:

1) U-boats U 595, U 605 and U 660, about whom great concern is felt, have not reported so far in spite of repeated requests to transmit their positions. We must therefore presume that the boats were lost in bombing attacks.

2) According to reports from U 755 and U 617 very determined anti-U-boat sweeps are carried out by aircraft and destroyers in the area where the boats are operating. U 617, in the south, reported no traffic.

3) U 81, U 593, U 458 and U 431 have reported arriving at entrance points to Spezia and Messina approaches.

4) Only 9 operationally ready U-boats may be counted on in the operational area.

1242 radio message to the boats: "1031 German aircraft sighted 2 merchant ships, course 270°, in CH 7384."

1315 U 380 reported at 0916: "Yesterday until 2400 forced to submerge from strong naval and air forces; depth charges, absorbent valve leaking badly, depth charge depth not possible for long

periods, attack periscope out of action, further operations not possible, request permission to make for Spezia; 4 + 2 (torpedoes), 80 cbm." The boat received permission to put in to Spezia. As air reconnaissance reported heavy traffic off Bougie, not included in the Italian disposition, it seems worthwhile to send 2 U-boats in to Bougie Bay. The same applies to Arzeu Bay.

1456 the following operational orders are therefore transmitted: "U 77 and U 407: operate in Bougie Bay, heavy traffic there; U 205 occupy U 77's east - west line; U 259 operate in Arzeu Bay.

Situation at 1900 on 15 November.

I. Enemy situation:

1) No alteration in general situation.

2) Anti-U-boat sweeps by enemy aircraft continue. 9 sightings throughout the day.

3) A convoy was sighted by U 755 at 0800: 1 destroyer, 5 steamers in CH 7397, westerly course, speed 12 knots.

4) German air reconnaissance:

Bougie harbor: 5 transports 5,000 - 6,000 GRT, 3 destroyers, in outer roads 1 battleship, 6 cruisers and destroyers, 8 merchant ships approximately 10,000 GRT each hove to.

Bone harbor: no other shipping identified apart from 10 barges.

Nothing in Jijelli, Collo, Philippeville.

Tabarca harbor: 5 fishing barges; no shipping traffic identified along the coast between Tabarca and Bougie.

5) According to a radio intercept report the Dutch steamer "Nieuw Zeeland" was towed to Gibraltar on 11 November.

6) According to an agent's report a convoy for Malta is being assembled in Gibraltar. The escort consists of light and heavy cruisers, as well as aircraft carriers, date of sailing not yet determined.

The carrier "Furious" is due to put out for the east at 1430 on 15 November with

the destroyers "Beagle" and "Wishart".

II. Own situation:

1) U 596 put in to Spezia at 0945, U 458 at 1900.

2) U 380 must start the return passage to Spezia because of leakages and breakdown of attack periscope.

3) U 595, 605, 660 did not report to-day.

4) At present 16 U-boats at sea; 3 of them returning to Spezia, 1 returning to Pola, 1 outward bound from Pola, 3 presumed lost; giving 8 operationally active boats.

III. The U-boat disposition ordered on 14 November had to be altered in the following points:

1) As Bougie at present offers valuable targets however in contrast to the assumption that Bougie is not included in the Italian U-boat disposition, U 77 and U 407 received orders to operate in Bougie Bay. U 205 will occupy U 77's attack area. The U-boat disposition west of Algiers has therefore been weakened by 2 boats which must be taken into account.

2) With the loss of U 380, the Arzeu Bay - Oran area is not definitely occupied as there is considerable dubiety as to whether U 605 and U 660, who are supposed to be operating there, are still there. But it is important for U-boats to be there. U 259 received orders to operate in Arzeu Bay.

IV. 4 unreadable radio messages were received on 14 November. Naval Communications officers at Bernau and Athens, in addition to the one at Rome, were unsuccessful in decoding them. It may be assumed that they were transmitted by the damaged U-boats.

U 595 has been attacked by aircraft (1040 on 14 November), transmitted a distress signal and according to the radio intercept service was spotted several more times by aircraft. He has not reported again since then.

1915 U 755 reported at 1153 that a small convoy, 1 destroyer and 5 steamers, was in CH 7395 at 0800, westerly course, speed 12 knots.

1935 radio message to the boats informing them that the "Furious" and 4 destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the east at 1430. Probably ferrying aircraft.

2038 U 431 received instructions to put in to Messina. Own supply traffic to Tunis is protected by strong anti-submarine measures. Therefore for reasons of safety, it is necessary for our U-boats passing this area to keep to special courses.

2235 U 605, 595, 660 were again requested to report their positions.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

16 - 30 NOVEMBER, 1942

PG/30928

CONFIDENTIAL

16 November 1942

I. a) U 380 CH 7394, U 660 CH 8474,
U 259 CH 8481, U 605 CH 8485,
U 595 CH 8150, U 331 CH 8350,
U 617 CH 8380, U 755 CH 9440,
U 73 CH 9470, U 205 CH 6755,
U 407 CH 9550, U 77 CH 9590,
U 431 CJ 8474, U 593 CJ 1621,
U 81 CJ 1621, U 559 CP 7320,
U 375 CK 7493.

b) U 81 put in to Spezia at 1045.
U 593 put in to Spezia at 1130.

II. a) Reconnaissance as far as Oran.

b) Sicilian Channel.

0057 U 205 reported at 0006: "7 battery cells ripped, ship's side valve, Kingston valve rod, stern tube leaking badly; great depths only for a short time; starboard shaft knocking loudly, 2 and 1 torpedoes; request permission to put in to port."

0152 radio message to U 205: "Put in to Spezia."

0700 I. Enemy situation:

1) No alterations in general situation; more enemy naval forces and merchant ships returning.

2) The carrier "Furious" which put out for the east at 1430 with the destroyers "Beagle", "Bulldog" and "Wishart", put in again at 1850 with the battleships "Renown" and "Rodney", one carrier of the "Illustrious" class, 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers.

II. Own situation:

1) Boats were informed that the "Furious" formation had put in to port again.

2) With the withdrawal of U 205 we can still count on 7 available U-boats. There are no new considerations for the disposition.

1233 U 431 received further orders on the route to be taken for Messina and procedure.

1234 radio message to U 77 and U 407: "According to a report from our aircraft 8 ships are lying in Bougie roads, including some up to 20,000 GRT."

1303 radio message to the boats: "Own aircraft reported 2 merchant ships, 1 tanker, 2 destroyers on an easterly course in CH 8295 at 1054."

The radio intercept service intercepted the following sighting reports of our U-boats by enemy aircraft and patrol vessels:

0532 CJ 7848 aircraft attacked U-boat.
0540 CH 7286 British patrol vessel reported surfaced U-boat, course 0°.
1002 CH 8268 British aircraft over submerging U-boat.
1002 CH 8149 top left, American aircraft reported: "Am over enemy U-boat; enemy on surface, then observed to dive."

1625 U 77, U 407, 617 and 755 were ordered to report their positions by short signal.

1900 I. Enemy situation:

1) 5 convoys moving in CH 93, 95, 96 on an easterly course, are expected.

In detail:

a) 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, 5 steamers, last sighted at 1055 in CH 9652, course 90° and speed 12 knots.

b) 7 merchant ships, 2 cruisers, last sighted at 1100 in CH 9562, course 90°, speed not determined.

c) 13 ships first reported in Bougie roads and sighted at 1215 in CH 9673, course 20°, speed 8 knots.

d) Formation "School" reported at 1215 an attack by Axis aircraft in CH 9345.

e) 2 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 3 large ships at 1530 in CH 9612, course 120°, speed 14 knots.

2) 1200 the "Nelson", the "Rodney", the "Furious", 1 "Illustrious" class carrier, 2 "Dido" class cruisers, and 10 destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the east.

3) Still energetic anti-U-boat sweeps by aircraft; 6 sightings during the day.

II. Own situation:

1) U 81 put in to Spezia at 1045, U 593 at 1130.

2) U 73 received orders at 1917 to make for Spezia. The boat has a leaky periscope shaft and is not able to dive below depth A, in addition he has only 2 stern torpedoes left.

3) At 1545 the boats were informed that the heavy units had put out from Gibraltar.

4) After U 73 started to return, 6 U-boats are still available in the operational area, namely 1 off Arzeu and 1 off Algiers, 2 in the sea area west of Algiers and 2 in Bougie Bay. 3 U-boats returning to Spezia, 1 to Pola, 1 outward bound from Pola. 3 boats are missing.

See Sketch 9.

Message received at 2145:

German Armistice Commission wired via Naval High Command/Naval War Staff 1st Division (Operations): "In reply to C-in-C's query, mines were only present at Casablanca and Bizerta. French Admiralty confirmed this and stated that they have had no reports of minelaying on the North African coast between 2 and 11 November, nor later in Tunisian waters."

U 259 was ordered at 2240 to report the situation as soon as possible.

At 2250 U 617 reported his position from CH 8384.

At 0045 U 407 reported his position from CH 9278.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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17 November 1942

I. a) U 755 1936 CH 9417, U 617 2225 CH 8384,
U 407 0015 CH 9278, U 77 0456 CH 9596,
U 660 CH 8470, U 259 CH 8480,
U 605 CH 8480, U 595 CH 8150,
U 331 CH 8350, U 380 CH 5695,
U 73 CH 6643, U 205 CH 6384,
U 431 CJ 9464, U 559 CP 7310,
U 375 CJ 9855.

b) ./.

II. a) Reconnaissance as far as Oran.

b) Sicilian Channel.

0700 I. Enemy situation:

1) No change apart from an agent's report that between 1600 and 1700 5 destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the east.

II. Own situation:

1) It is necessary to have a look into the situation off Oran and Arzeu Bay. The situation report ordered from U 259 operating there has however not been received during the night.

2) The boats ordered at 1620 on 16 November to send position reports by short signal reported:

U 755 at 1936: position CH 9417.
U 617 at 2225: position CH 8384.
U 407 at 0015: position CH 9278.

U 77 and U 407 have, according to this, not yet taken up their positions in Bougie Bay as ordered. With the present air patrols, movements by the U-boats require considerable time.

0720 radio message from U 77: Boat reported his position at 0456 from CH 9596, Bougie Bay and roads empty except for patrol vessels. The following radio intercept message was received from radio intelligence of Naval High Command at 0915:

Broadcast report: "Allied Headquarters in North Africa. On 16 November we captured 1 officer and the crew of an enemy U-boat which was sunk off the North African coast." (Reuter 2338 on 16 November.)

1100 Captain U-boats to Spezia to settle repair questions and talk to crews of U-boats which have just returned.

1115 radio message to U 259: "Situation report important for further U-boat operations; if valuable traffic, report "yes" by short signal; in addition, withdraw to the north if necessary. If no traffic, occupy new attack area - central third of CH 59 and central third, western half of CH 91. Report by short signal when setting off."

1127 radio message to U 77 and U 407: "U 77 make for CH 9535, U 407 for CH 9295, after arrival, occupy the following attack areas, westerly

courses:
U 77 northern third of CH 83 and northern third, western half of CH 94.
U 407 southern third of CH 59 and southern third, western half of CH 91."

The survey of the situation at 1900 contains the reasons for this measure.

1210 radio message to the boats: "2 aircraft carriers, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 10 destroyers in CH 5768, course 60°."

1522 U 431 was warned by radio of an enemy submarine that was sighted at 1325 in CH 9822.

Survey of the situation at 1900.

I. Enemy situation:

According to a report from U 77 Bougie Bay is empty.

German reconnaissance aircraft sighted the formation of warships which put out from Gibraltar yesterday in the following positions:

1) 1000 in CH 5875, consisting of 5 cruisers, 11 destroyers, course 115°, speed slight.

2) CH 5872: presumably the same formation, course 60°, moderate speed.

3) CH 5841: heavy naval forces, no details of course or speed.

4) CH 5756: 2 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 3 cruisers up to 5,000 GRT, 1 cruiser up to 10,000 GRT, 10 destroyers, course 45°, no details of speed.

5) CH 5768: 2 aircraft carriers, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 10 destroyers, course 60°, moderate speed.

II. Own situation:

1) The aforementioned report from U 77 at 0456 was the decisive factor in deciding to withdraw from Bougie Bay the two boats operating there and dispose them in attack areas in CH 59. The report permitted the assumption that there was also no traffic to be encountered in Arzeu Bay.

It is intended to have U 259 operate in CH 59 too if the assumption is correct.

The sighting of the naval force by our aircraft was passed on to the boats.

2) U 431, returning from the operational area, and U 375 from Pola have put in to Messina. U 375 was having trouble with one Diesel engine, repaired it in Messina and was due to commence the passage to the Western Mediterranean at 0700 on 18 November.

3) Radio intercept service sent the following sighting reports of our U-boats by enemy aircraft:

0925 CH 8356 submerging U-boat.
1214 CH 8354 surfaced U-boat.
1330 CH 8357 enemy U-boat.
1545 CH 8383 submerging U-boat.

2243 U 407 reported: "Leakage in starboard diesel engine, now clear for 6 - 7 knots. My position CH 9539; sortie in Bougie Bay unsuccessful."

(Signed) Kreisch.

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18 November 1942

I. a) U 407 2243 CH 9539,

U 660 CH 8470,	U 259 CH 8480,
U 605 CH 8480,	U 595 CH 8150,
U 617 CH 8380,	U 331 CH 8360,
U 755 CH 9410,	U 77 CH 9530,
U 73 CH 6380,	U 380 CH 6350,
U 205 CH 6340,	U 559 CP 7310.

b) U 431 put in to Messina at 1610.
U 375 put in to Messina.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Oran longitude.

b) Inshore waters reconnaissance, Sicilian Channel.

0208 U 755 reported at 2325:

1) No traffic observed off Algiers. Strong destroyer patrols on the 200 meter line.

2) Heavy depth charge pursuit when breaking into the bay; both shafts knocking badly.

3) Ship's side valve leaking at flange; head valve control letting in water; manhole

in ballast tank 3 leaking; great depths only for a short time; request permission to put in to Spezia. At 0240 U 755 received orders to proceed to Spezia.

U 331 and U 617 together will occupy U 755's attack area.

0700 I. Enemy situation:

1) No further reports of the presence of enemy forces and convoys.

2) The report from U 77 at 0456 on 17 November that there was no traffic in Bougie roads and bay was confirmed by U 407 at 2243 on 17 November.

3) According to U 755's report there is also no traffic off Algiers.

II. Own situation:

U 755 out of action (compare report at 0208/18 November and radio message at 0240/18 November), therefore U 331 and U 617 received orders at 0305: "Increase attack areas eastward to meridian in CH 9455."

So now there are 4 U-boats in attack areas north of Algiers; of them U 407 is temporarily only good for 6 - 7 knots as the starboard diesel is not working.

U 259 in Arzeu Bay, ordered 2 days ago to send situation reports, has not replied. We must presume his loss. U 375 en route for the operational area, who put in to Messina temporarily, reported torpedo reloading gear out of order. The torpedo department at Spezia was informed. Experts set off from there to-day.

0944 an aircraft report was received, convoy's position at 0855 was CO 5647, course 285°.

1855 radio message to U 755: "According to a report from an Italian aircraft a probably damaged enemy cruiser was in CH 6577 at 0930, if the boat's position is favorable operate on the cruiser."

1900 I. Enemy situation:

1) Air reconnaissance has not spotted the enemy naval force in the Western Mediterranean again.

There is only the report from an Italian aircraft which sighted 1 cruiser at

0930 in CH 6734, course 90°, speed slight.

According to another report received at 1815 from the Italian aircraft, the cruiser was in CH 6577 at 0930, presumably damaged.

2) A convoy was spotted by the German Air Force in the Eastern Mediterranean on a westerly course. The following messages were received of this convoy:

0615 in CO 5657 1 convoy, 30 ships, westerly course.
0630 in CO 5598 formation.
0855 in CO 5647 enemy formation, course 285°.
1120 German aircraft sighted 21 ships on a westerly course in CO 5548.

II. Own situation:

1) U 755, homeward bound, was ordered to operate on the cruiser, if his position was favorable.

2) The German air reconnaissance reports permit the assumption that the convoy sighted in the Eastern Mediterranean is bound for Malta.

It is not possible for several boats to operate on this convoy as all operationally ready U-boats are in the Western Mediterranean. U 375 is bound from Pola via Messina for the Western Mediterranean. At present he is in Messina because his reloading gear has broken down. It was intended to leave the boat in Messina until the experts arrived from Spezia and mended the reloading device. U 375 has been set on to the convoy, abandoning the prescribed torpedo servicing (it is impossible to reload torpedoes with the failure of the reloading device). At 1205 U 375 put out from Messina. The boat was ordered to make for CO 1780. If it should turn out later that the convoy is not bound for Malta, but for Benghazi or another North African port, the boat will be recalled to Messina.

III. U-boat sightings:

According to the radio intercept service our U-boats were spotted by enemy aircraft in the following positions:

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1240 CH 5995 submerging U-boat.
1220 CH 9165 one U-boat sighted.

1935 Captain U-boats returned from Spezia.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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19 November 1942

I. a) U 259 CH 8480, U 617 CH 8380,
U 331 CH 8360, U 77 CH 8330,
U 407 CH 9213, U 755 CH 6579,
U 205 CJ 1391, U 73 CJ 1391,
U 380 CJ 1389, U 559 CP 7320.

b) U 73 and U 380 put in to Spezia at 0830.
U 205 put in to Spezia at 0940.
U 431 put out from Messina at 1700.
U 375 put out from Messina.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Oran longitude.

b) Cape Krio - Derna as far as Rhodes - Port Said.

0030 radio message to U 375 and U 431: "Meeting with Italian U-boats possible. Attention is drawn to basic ban on attacks on submarines."

Situation at

0700 I. Enemy situation:

An Italian U-boat contacted an eastbound convoy at 0019 in CH 9616. According to a radio intercept message an enemy aircraft sighted one of our boats at 1320 in CH 9165.

II. Own situation:

1) Operations by our boats on the convoy reported by the Italian aircraft are not possible because of the great distance.

U 407 reported serious damage caused by bombs. Boat is no longer fit for operations and received orders to return to Spezia.

2) The position report requested of U 331 has not been received. According to radio intercept reports of 17 November 1942, the boat was attacked on 17 November by aircraft in his attack area.

3) The convoy spotted by the German Air Force in the Eastern Mediterranean has continued on a westerly course according to shadowers' reports. U 375 had therefore received orders at 2120 to make for 3830 and operate from there in long legs obliquely to the enemy's northwesterly direction of advance.

4) U 73 and U 205 will be at Point C off Spezia at 0700, U 380 at 0900.

5) As Spezia is very busy at present and should be used for as short repairs as possible, U 407 received orders at 1207 to proceed to Pola for repairs; the boat requires a fairly long period to repair the damage.

6) The situation permitted U 77 a short time to transfer his wounded to Cagliari. The boat received orders to this effect at 1239.

At the request of C-in-C U-boats the following summary of the situation was compiled and transmitted:

1) Main landing points are Oran, Arzeu Bay, Algiers, Bougie, Bone. No extensive reconnaissance of the ports as our aircraft are greatly restricted by weather conditions and fighter defenses. At present there is no clear picture of enemy supply routes. Presumably a pause. Heavy forces suspected in Balearic area. According to an evaluation direction finding and radio intercept service's brisk traffic in the Eastern Mediterranean between Alexandria and Cyrenaica, large westbound convoy, presumably supplies for Malta or Benghazi, reported for the first time on 18 November.

2) In view of the numerical weakness of our aircraft and the multiplicity of their duties, the most effective weapon is the German U-boat. Operations in constantly changing dispositions make it more difficult for the enemy to concentrate his defenses. During bright nights U-boat disposition is widespread. Probably we will be forced shortly to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean also.

3) Experiences of boats returning do not give a coherent picture of operational possibilities. They agree in their

estimation of the great effectiveness of enemy anti-U-boat measures by aircraft, the impossibility of shadowing and hauling ahead when attacking convoys, particularly difficult last week in bright sea reflection.

4) Losses feared: U 559 in the east, U 259, U 605 and U 660 off Oran, U 595 in the sea area north of Oran, U 331 west of Algiers, three of these definitely by bombing, the remainder presumably also by bombing.

Damaged: U 596 changing of barrels, probably U 458 also, and U 458, U 205, U 407 changing of batteries. Other boats suffered slighter damage by bombing which impaired diving capacity.

5) Commanders estimated the chances of effect as positive, even if impaired by very strong defenses. Morale and behavior of crews unaffected, according to Captain U-boats' personal impression.

6) The development of the traffic situation is dependent upon the operational situation chiefly in Tunis which is still not clear. After the present breathing space an increase in supply traffic to bring up guns, heavy armament, ammunition and fuel is assumed, probably to Algiers and to the east, also brisk activity in the Eastern Mediterranean, Malta supplies from there too.

7) Possibilities of effectiveness are restricted by the number of operationally fit U-boats which is estimated at 8 or 9 as the maximum in the favorable December lunar period.

8) Intensified defensive measures must be expected as the enemy considers the U-boat menace and its effect suitable for anti-U-boat sweeps by aircraft, also the use of airfields on the North African coast is an advantage to him. Heavy losses to us cannot be avoided.

9) Repair position is at present strained to the utmost. Captain U-boats' conference in Spezia resulted in complete understanding and obligingness of Italian commands.

The main experiences of the fighting of the last fortnight are partly repetitions of earlier arguments:

a) Shadowing and hauling ahead again by U-boats in convoy attacks is not possible in practice with air cover and the comparatively high speed of strongly

escorted convoys.

b) The operation of the boats therefore required reliable and continuous reconnaissance. The first notification that convoys were setting out occurred early and satisfactorily by means of reports of their passing through the Straits of Gibraltar. This service has worked exceptionally well. (Pencil note in margin: Observation from land - German Espionage Agency Spain.) Further reconnaissance by the German Air Force was insufficient. The reasons for this detract from our estimation. As far as is known there were insufficient aircraft, on the other hand the activity of defenses was restricted. Reconnaissance reports suffered from incompleteness and delays.

c) U-boat movements require considerable time in consequence of enemy air patrols. The position of the boats therefore differed from our earlier calculations. Frequent requests for positions endanger the boats and give the enemy undesirable information, at least of their number in the operational area. Replies to queries as to positions are possible only after great delays.

d) A special difficulty was the strong sea lights which, according to Commanders' reports, repeatedly spoiled profitable attacks and shots.

e) The greatest threat to the boats is aircraft anti-U-boat sweeps. Location results, visual reconnaissance, the exactness of position reports, the precision of bombing, the tenacity of pursuit, the cooperation between destroyers and patrol vessels as well as enemy air tactics all reveal a height of efficiency necessitating the greatest watchfulness. The completion of radar interception sets, in which there are great weaknesses of performance at present, as well as an increase in U-boat anti-aircraft guns are vitally necessary. This need is recognized and the necessary measures are being taken in hand. For the Command there is the necessity of avoiding too long a concentration of U-boats in one place and chiefly preventing enemy defenses from concentrating by obtaining a certain mobility (in the U-boat disposition). However it must be borne in mind that on the one hand the U-boat as portrayed in c) requires a lot of time to move, on the other hand maneuvers to avoid enemy defenses in the Mediterranean are

restricted. We do not wish to abandon entirely assaults on the focal points of enemy traffic.

U 617 received CH 58 as his attack area; he is to report his position by short signal when he sets off.

1300 U 375 was informed that the convoy was in CN 6215, course 270°, at 1030; further at 1558 that 5 destroyers, 3 cruisers or merchant ships, easterly course, speed 11 - 17 knots, were in CN 6233 at 1430. Convoy presumably from Malta has been sighted.

1900 Situation:

I. Enemy situation:

1) According to an agent's report a convoy of 18 steamers passed Gibraltar to the east.

2) The convoy spotted yesterday by the German Air Force in the Eastern Mediterranean was sighted again to-day by aircraft in CN 6215, course 270°, at 1030.

1430 another aircraft contacted 5 destroyers and 3 cruisers or merchant ships, on an easterly course, speed 11 - 17 knots, in CN 6233.

II. Own situation:

1) The heavy attacks by enemy aircraft on our boats have forced us to loosen the disposition and withdraw the boats from the coastal region.

2) U 375 has probably not yet contacted the forces of which he was informed.

3) No radio intercept messages of sightings of our U-boats.

4) Homeward bound:

a) U 205 and U 380 put in to Spezia at 0830, U 73 at 0940.

b) U 431 en route from Messina to Pola.
U 755 en route to Spezia.
U 407 en route to Messina.
U 77 en route to Cagliari.

2333 the boats were informed that:

1) A convoy of 19 steamers put out from

Gibraltar for the east at 2300 on 18 November.

2) According to an agent's report the "Queen Mary", "Ile de France" and "Mauretania" are due to pass Gibraltar to the east in the early hours of 20 November. The ships are believed to be carrying troops and to be bound for Oran.

3) U 617 is to make a sortie in the southern half of CH 75 and the northern half of CH 78 and in addition to report his position immediately.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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20 November 1942

I. a) U 259 CH 8480, U 617 CH 8390,
U 331 CH 8360, U 77 CH 9270,
U 407 CH 6860, U 755 CH 6350,
U 375 CH 3750, U 431 CK 7210,
U 559 CP 7320.

b) U 205 put out from Spezia at 1800.
U 85 put out from Spezia at 0015.

II. a) Extensive reconnaissance to Oran longitude.

b) Same as on previous day.

0346 U 617 reported his position from CH 8391.

0700 Situation:

I. Enemy situation:

1) An aircraft made contact with an unknown ship on an easterly course in CN 3988 in the eastern Mediterranean at 1825.

2) At 1930 the convoy presumably from Malta was spotted again by an aircraft in CN 6362 on an easterly course.

II. Own situation:

1) We must allow for the fact that there is only 1 U-boat in the operational area in the Western Mediterranean.

2) U 617 and U 331 were ordered to report their positions. A signal was received from U 617; U 331 did not reply again after a second request. It is very

probable that the boat has been lost.

3) U 375 operating in the Central Mediterranean has not yet contacted the Malta-bound convoy or the one from Malta. The boat received orders at 1942 to occupy CN 3720, 3750 and 3760 as his attack area if he did not make contact. The plan is to intercept the escorting forces which have perhaps sailed from Malta. After about 2 days the boat must be ordered to return because his torpedo reloading gear has broken down.

4) U 83's proposed sailing, scheduled for 19 November, has had to be postponed for about 24 hours because of slight damage discovered on the trial run.

5) C-in-C South informed us that a Gibraltar reconnaissance aircraft had reported to Malta sighting a U-boat in CN 2993. Possibly U 375.

6) 4 boats homewardbound, U 77, U 755 and U 407 reported their time of arrival at the entrance point. U 431 has been held up by the seaway and will not reach Point H until 0700 on 22 November.

1240 U 77 received detailed instructions for putting in to Cagliari.

1642 the C-in-C's appreciation was passed on to the boats.

1900 Situation:

I. Enemy situation:

According to air reconnaissance 13 steamers were lying in Algiers, 3 large and 4 small steamers in Bougie; 4 large and 12 small vessels in Jijelli; 6 large steamers, 8 small vessels, 10 patrol or escort vessels in Philippeville; 3 small steamers, 3 minesweepers and 3 small auxiliary vessels in Bone.

No reports of the naval forces which put out from Gibraltar on 16 November.

No reports of the convoy which put out for the east at 2300 on 18 November.

No reports of the "Queen Mary", "Ile de France" or the "Mauretania".

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II. Own situation:

1) The steamer "Favör", bound for Cagliari as a U-boat supply ship, sailed from Civitavecchia at 0515.

2) U 205 put out from Messina at 1800. Boat is going to Pola for repairs.

3) Radio intercept service picked up the following sighting reports from British aircraft:

a) 1140 CH 8274 submerging U-boat, course 270°, speed 8 knots.

b) 1225 CH 8273 U-boat, course 280°, speed 6 knots.

c) 1228 CH 8425 submerging U-boat.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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21 November 1942

I. a) U 617 CH 7820, U 375 CN 3750,
U 83 CJ 1570, U 205 CJ 5420,
U 407 CJ 8410, U 77 CJ 7340,
U 431 CJ 6350, U 755 CJ 1389.

b) ./.

II. a) Extensive reconnaissance as far as Algiers longitude.

b) Cape Krio - Derna - Rhodes - Port Said.

0700 Situation:

I. Enemy situation:

1) According to reports from Tangiers and Ceuta, a convoy of 40 ships (that is according to Tangiers: Ceuta says 25 ships) passed the Straits to the east. It is presumably the convoy reported by an agent on 19 November to which the "Queen Mary", "Ile de France" and "Mauretania" belonged. The U-boats have been informed.

2) No reports of the 3 transatlantic ships. No reports of the convoy which put out from Gibraltar at 2200 on 18 November.

3) No reports of the naval forces which put to sea on 16 November.

4) No reports on Central and Eastern Mediterranean.

II. Own situation:

1) U 83 put out from Spezia at 0015 to operate in the Western Mediterranean.

2) U 77 is due to put in to Cagliari to-day to transfer his wounded. If the supply ship "Favör" has already arrived in Cagliari the boat will take on more fuel, food and torpedoes (acoustic torpedoes).

1500 U 375 reported: "1 "Dido" class cruiser and 8 destroyers at 1159 in CN 3753, out of range. Need to reload torpedoes, am making for Messina."

1900 Situation:

I. Enemy situation:

0430 3 merchant ships and 3 small warships were spotted by an aircraft in CH 9592.

1730 a German aircraft contacted a convoy in CH 7693. The convoy consisted of 19 cruisers and escorts and 14 merchant ships and was on a course of 60°. Presumably part of the convoy which passed Ceuta to the east last night.

II. Own situation:

1) At 1330 an enemy unit reported a U-boat in CH 7648. Presumably an escort vessel or aircraft of the convoy reported at 1730 has reported U 617. U 617 was informed of this sighting and was instructed to withdraw from the operational area if there were strong defenses and if he thought fit.

2) U-boats homewardbound:

U 77 put in to Cagliari.
U 755 did not find his escort at Point C. The boat probably had the wrong position. U 755 was instructed to withdraw at night towards entrance Point N and be at Point C to-morrow at 0830. The escort has been arranged for that time. In addition 2 Italian aircraft will search the area for the U-boat and guide him to the Point if necessary.

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2100 U 617 reported:

1) 19 November CH 8393 2 standard freighters, 1 destroyer torpedoed out of small convoy.

2) Algiers roads and harbor empty.

3) 1130 today CH 8474 fan of four on overlapping "Rodney" and "Nelson", 3 detonations, formation of battleships, cruisers, 1 aircraft carrier, northerly course.

4) 4 + 2 torpedoes.

(Radio message had to be decoded.)

(Signed) Kreisch.

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22 November 1942

I. a) U 617 CH 7680,
U 83 CH 6660,
U 407 CJ 8380,
U 205 CJ 9190,
U 375 CJ 9980,
U 755 CJ 1389.

b) U 431 put in to Pola at 0900.
U 755 put in to Spezia at 1155.
U 77 put in to Cagliari at 0830.
U 562 put out from Spezia at 1905.
U 375 put in to Messina at 1545.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia as far as Algiers longitude.

b) Cape Krio - Derna as far as Rhodes - Port Said.

0700 Situation:

I. Enemy situation:

According to an Italian agent's report 76 ships are due to pass through the Straits of Gibraltar from the west. The report is doubted but U 617 has been informed in any case.

II. Own situation:

1) The steamer "Favör" put in to Cagliari at 2100.

2) Aircraft reported to Gibraltar at 0200:

Submerging U-boat in CH 7636, course 315°, speed 15 knots - U 617 may possibly have been sighted.

0810 U 83 received orders to occupy CH 83 as his attack area.

1150 radio message to U 617: "A German aircraft sighted 1 cruiser, 8 escorts and 23 merchant ships on a westerly course in CH 8411 at 0945."

1520 radio message to U 617: "Convoy of 20 freighters, 2 tankers, 7 destroyers was in CH 8286, course 260° at 1215 according to a signal from a German aircraft."

1620 U 77 reported:

"1) Am putting out from Cagliari at 1800 on 22 November, exit point West at 2400.

2) "Favör" in port; torpedoes not clear in time, my stocks 5 + , 88 cbm.

3) Condition of the boat; director angle computor, multi-unit hydrophones and tube 3 unserviceable, Junkers compressor, gyro-compass, diesel engine coupling clear with restrictions, cylinder heads leaking.

1900 Situation:

I. Enemy situation:

1) The aircraft report passed on to U 617 at 1520 was probably false for two more aircraft reports agreed with a radio intercept message and stated: At 0945 a convoy of 1 cruiser, 8 escorts, 23 steamers, course 270° in 8288. The radio intercept report read: A formation in CH 8521 has reported a shadower; formation was on a course of 257° at the time, speed 8 knots. The second aircraft report read: A convoy in CH 8286 at 1215, 20 freighters up to 10,000 GRT, 2 tankers and 7 destroyers, course 260°, speed slight.

2) In the Eastern Mediterranean the German Air Force contacted a convoy (1 cruiser, 4 destroyers, 4 torpedoboats) at 0710 in CO 5458, course 60°. According to the radio intercept service this formation (Bonson) reported to Alexandria at 0936: Shadower with convoy, our position CO 5493, course 110°, speed 18 knots. At 1435 this formation was in CO 5945 according to the shadower's report.

3) An agent's report said that submarines based on Gibraltar operating in the Mediterranean pass 10 miles southeast of Cape Pelos on their passage from their operational areas. This must be gone into if there are sufficient forces available.

4) An agent reported that a formation of warships was putting in to Gibraltar from the east after 1530, presumably the one attacked by U 617 at 1130 on 21 November.

II. Own situation:

1) It is intended to scatter the next operationally ready U-boats during the period of bright moonlight nights over attack areas CH 58, 59, 91 and 92. There they will be in areas recently searched several times by enemy warship formations. A very widespread disposition makes the enemy's anti-U-boat sweeps more difficult.

2) U-boats homewardbound:

U 431 put in to Pola at 0900.
U 755 put in to Spezia at 1055.
U 205 (en route from Spezia to Pola) put in to Messina and out again.
U 375 is due to put in to Messina at 1630 (so far no arrival report).
U 407 has reported that he will reach Point M2 at 0630.

2008 U 77 was allotted CH 59 as his attack area.

2333 radio message to U 77: "One of our aircraft is in CH 9333 or CJ 7173 in distress, search the area."

2333 radio message to U 83: "If you are still in the vicinity of the crash, go to the aircraft's assistance also."

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

23 November 1942

I. a) U 617 CH 7580,
U 83 CH 6970,
U 77 CH 7170,
U 562 CJ 1780,
U 205 CO 7220,
U 407 CJ 9580.

b) U 565 put out from Spezia at 0800.
U 375 put out from Messina at 1530.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia, extensive reconnaissance as far as Oran longitude.

b) 5 Junkers 88: Cape Krio - Derna as far as Rhodes - Port Said. Probing reconnaissance of Nile Delta.

0128 radio message to U 617: "A convoy of 25 - 30 ships including large warships sighted on easterly course from Tres Forcas at 1730.

C-in-C South gave the following picture of the situation at
0200:

The following situation was revealed by aerial reconnaissance on 22 November and photographic reconnaissance confirmation:

1) On 21 November the large transports (altogether 10 ships totaling 100,000 GRT) returned to Gibraltar escorted by about 10 light naval craft.

2) On 22 November according to an aerial photograph there were 14 large liners between 17,000 and 20,000 GRT in Algiers roads, 50 freighters in the harbor at 0855; towards evening in addition the following must have come from the convoy sighted on 20 November between Tangiers and Ceuta: In the roads - 10 transports totaling approximately 60,000 GRT and 5 light naval craft; in the harbor - 25 steamers totaling, approximately 150,000 GRT.

3) It can be assumed that about 3 steamers totaling 15,000 GRT protected by 3 light naval craft had already called at Bougie around 1100 (aerial photograph at the time shows, among others, 1 freighter of 13,000 GRT and 8 freighters totaling 35,700 GRT, apart from 4 units on the seabed and on their sides). This would give an increase of 315,000 tons with 48 steamers. It may be assumed that, of the ships lying in Algiers roads, some will be ready to continue east on the night of 23 November.

4) The sailing of 1 cruiser and 8 destroyers, which left Malta on 21 November, for the east was confirmed. Last interception at 1620 due north of Tobruk.

0700 Situation:

I. Enemy situation:

At 1450 on 22 November the "Renown", "Charybdis", "Vindictive", "Maidstone", 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 1 "Dido" class cruiser, 1 "Aurora" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar.

At 1550 the "Nelson", "Furious" and 6 destroyers put in to Gibraltar; the "Rodney", 1 "Illustrious" class carrier sighted in the east at 1600.

According to an agent's report the enemy intends to mine harbors on the south coast of France, in Corsica, Sardinia and the Mediterranean coast of Spain.

II. Own situation:

U 562 put out from Spezia at 1905.
U 375 put in to Messina at 1545 on 22 November.

1025 U 77 and U 83 received orders to abandon the search and proceed to the attack areas ordered; U 77 via CH 9350, 9280.

1128 radio message to U 617: "Convoy was in CH 7666 at 0912, course 85°, moderate speed."

1900 Situation:

I. Enemy situation:

According to air reconnaissance one convoy composed of 50 ships and naval craft was in CH 7666 at 0912, course 85°.

1100 a convoy, 40 merchant ships, 10 medium-sized naval craft, was in CH 8457, course 90°, probably the one sighted at 0912 in CH 7666. A German aircraft contacted the convoy at 1500 in CH 8436. The convoy was reported again at 1630 in CH 8513, course 80°, speed 10 knots. The boats have been informed but there is some doubt as to whether one will get close.

Enemy naval forces were in CH 8198 at 1515, course 70°, speed 10 knots, probably wing protection for the convoy.

II. Own situation:

U 565 put out from Spezia at 0800, U 375 put out from Messina at 1530; U 407 put in to Messina and will continue his journey to Pola.

2208 U 617 reported:

"1) 1106 in CH 7796 fan of two on cruiser, escorted by 2 destroyers, similar to "Jeanne d'Arc". 2 minutes after hit 2 dull detonations, vibrations perceived in the boat.

2) 38 cbm. fuel, 2 stern + 2 torpedoes; damage still under control."

Even if the Commander describes all this damage as "under control", leaving the U-boat in the operational area will be less useful, in view of the fact that he has only 2 stern torpedoes left, than withdrawing for speedy repairs and a refit.

No radio intercept reports of U-boat sightings.

U 617 therefore received orders at
2310 to proceed to Spezia via CH 6645 entrance point North in CJ 1583, port entering instructions to follow.

2320 radio messages to the boats: "Naval forces were in CH 8328, course 270°, at 2225 according to a reconnaissance report."

(Signed) Kreisch.

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24 November 1942

I. a) U 617 CH 8420,
U 83 CH 5850,
U 77 CH 5950,
U 562 CH 6810,
U 565 CH 6360,
U 375 CJ 8310,
U 205 CJ 3440,
U 407 CK 7720.

b) U 81 put out from Spezia at 1915.
U 205 put in to Pola at 1245.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Straits south of Sardinia, extensive reconnaissance as far as Oran.

0155 radio message to the boats: "According to air reconnaissance 1 convoy was in CH 5795 at 2335; 1 convoy was in CH 8365 at 0032."

0330 radio message to the boats: "According to air reconnaissance 1 convoy, about 10 - 15 ships, including several merchant ships of 10,000 GRT, at 2250 was in CH 9458, northeasterly course."

It is planned:

To allot the U-boats attack areas from Cape Palos eastward about 60 miles apart along the North African coast during bright moonlight nights. Widely spaced disposition to reduce the possibilities of British air patrols' effectiveness. As soon as we are certain of the minefields in Algiers roads laid with our aerial mines, we intend to have a boat carry out a sortie there. Another boat will operate due east of Gibraltar. The remaining boats to operate from their attack areas on traffic reported according to the situation.

1855 U 562 received orders to attack in the Bay of Algiers where merchant ships are at present concentrated in great numbers.

1900 Situation:

I. Enemy situation:

Convoy traffic spotted by the German Air Force east of Bougie. Aircraft shadowed it throughout the whole of the day and attacked, according to radio intercept reports.

According to an Italian report 2 cruisers and 1 destroyer were sighted hove to in CH 5364 at 0910.

A German aircraft sighted a convoy of 2 steamers, 2 destroyers, course 135° at 1455 in CH 7726.

According to an Italian agent's report a large convoy from the east was sighted from Gibraltar at 1030.

II. Own situation:

In reply to a query to C-in-C South we have been informed that the minelaying operation planned for today in the Bay of Algiers has been cancelled. (Compare orders to U 562 at 1855.)

U 205 put in to Pola at 1245.

Captain U-boats to Spezia for conferences on repair questions and inspection of returned crews.

2300 Orders were received from Naval War Staff 1st Division (Operations) to the effect that we may expect French naval forces lying in Toulon to break through and it is necessary to have all available U-boats operate to prevent the French from breaking out. The U-boats' course to Toulon must be such that any units which have already escaped may be intercepted en route to Gibraltar. The following orders to the boats show the measures undertaken:

2345 to U 81 which put out from Spezia at 1945: "Operate off Toulon against warships breaking out from there. Freedom to attack all French naval forces. Proceed there on direct course at maximum speed."

2345 to U 83, U 77, U 562 and U 565: "U 83 via the area west of Ibiza, U 77 between Ibiza and Majorca, U 562 between Majorca and Minorca, U 565 direct to Toulon at maximum speed, freedom to attack all French naval forces."

(Signed) Kreisch.

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25 November 1942

I. a) U 617 0400 CH 5948,
U 83 CH 5510,
U 77 CH 5380,
U 562 CH 6730,
U 565 CH 6530,
U 81 CJ 1470,
U 375 CJ 4790,
U 407 CK 4450.

b) U 561 put out from Spezia at 1820.

II. a) Italian reconnaissance: Straits south of Sardinia as far as the Balearic Islands.

b) Cape Krio - Derna as far as Rhodes - Port Said.

0207 radio message to all boats:

1) U 375 make for Toulon at maximum speed from entrance point.

2) En route for the area ordered:
U 565 via 6535 U 77 via 6144
U 562 via 6185 U 83 via 2925.

3) Orders for disposition off the ports named will follow.

0215 to all boats:

There is a possibility that naval forces lying in Toulon will try to break out. The Führer has ordered all available U-boats to stand off the port; U-boats have permission to attack any French naval craft.

0715 radio message to U 617:

"Make for Toulon via 6554 and 6254."
At 1213 instructions were issued to all U-boats to remain unobserved en route and in the operational area.

According to radio intelligence a convoy, course 90°, speed 8 knots, was in CJ 7751 at 1250; an Italian aircraft sighted the convoy at 1415 in 7752.

At 1314 a westbound convoy was in CH 9652.

Captain U-boats back from Spezia.

2006 the boats received the following orders:

1) The line through Cape Cepet bearing 270° may not be crossed to the north.

2) From tonight until further notice we may expect French merchant ships from ports on the south coast of France, mainly Marseilles, to Italy. These ships may not be attacked.

3) We may possibly expect 4 French naval tankers to break out of Toulon in the direction of Gibraltar. Permission is given to attack these.

2236 The boats were allotted the following attack areas:

Point of sectors Cape Cepet, sector 120° - 160°: U 81 inside, U 375 outside.
Sector 160° - 200°: U 565 inside, U 77 outside.
Sector 200° - 250°: U 562 inside, U 83 outside.
Inner boats at a distance of 10 miles from the point of the sector; outer boats 10 - 15 miles; U 617 will occupy sector 200° - 250° at a distance of 15 - 20 miles.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

26 November 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 3380,
U 561 CH 3390,
U 375 CH 3620,
U 565 CH 3630,
U 562 CH 3650,
U 77 CH 3640,
U 83 CH 3810,
U 617 CH 3890,
U 407 CJ 3170.

b) U 407 put in to Pola at 0830.

II. a) Extensive reconnaissance as far as Oran.

b) Probing reconnaissance as far as Nile Delta.

0030 U 561 was ordered to sector 160° - 200°, 15 - 20 miles from the point of the sector. The boat put out from Spezia at 1820.

0700 Situation:

I. Enemy situation:

The "Charybdis", 1 "Dido" class cruiser and 2 destroyers put out from Gibraltar at 1630.

According to information from C-in-C South similar ships (possibly torpedoboats) were in CJ 7753, course 90°, moderate speed, at 0300.

A westbound convoy put in to Gibraltar. No reports have been received of the group of heavy naval units which put out from Gibraltar for the east at 1740 on 24 November.

II. Own situation:

8 boats en route to the attack areas ordered off Toulon.

According to information from the Italian Commander di Gropello there are no longer any French mines off Toulon or the whole of the French coast. At the end of the Armistice all mines were swept. There are only a few net barrages in Toulon harbor.

1900 Situation:

I. Enemy situation:

1) At 0830 a convoy of 9 laden ships escorted by 1 destroyer and 5 gunboats from the Atlantic put in to Gibraltar (troopships).

2) Our air reconnaissance spotted a convoy of apparently 4 merchant ships and 3 escorts westbound 30 miles north of Bougie at 0845.

Another westbound convoy, consisting of 4 merchant ships and 4 destroyers (torpedoboats?), intercepted at 1035 30 miles northeast of Cape Tenes; a shadower was with the convoy; no more reports received.

At 0845 a destroyer or torpedoboat flotilla westbound was intercepted in CH 9439.

At 1035 a convoy of 4 torpedoboats and 4 steamers, course 75°, was intercepted 66 miles north of Arzeu.

2 cruisers and 2 destroyers were sighted in CH 8429 making for the east at high speed.

II. Own situation:

The crossing of French shipping (transports and tankers) from French ports on the south coast, particularly Marseilles, to Italy can cause the U-boats doubt as to whether they are to attack or not. The only way of inducing certainty is to order that only warships are to be attacked. This would also of necessity mean that no attack was to be carried out on the 4 naval tankers which, it is feared, will break out of Toulon. Since, however, their destruction is important, a compromise solution must be found so that the U-boats have permission to attack only warships but in addition boats in the inner disposition can attack the tankers breaking out of Toulon. It may be assumed that the boats closest to Toulon will be able to decide accurately whether a tanker is from Toulon and sailing south or whether it is one from Marseilles bound for the east. The boats received orders accordingly at 1735.

U 407 put in to Pola at 0830.

1940 the boats were informed, on the strength of a communication from Naval War Staff, that there were signs of an imminent breakout.

2210 another reminder was sent to the boats that they must take into account the fact that until further notice steamers will run continually on the coastal route between Port Vendres and

Genoa via Sete and Marseilles as part of transfer operation.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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27 November 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 3380,
U 565 CH 3380,
U 562 CH 3380,
U 83 CH 3370,
U 77 CH 3620,
U 375 CH 3620,
U 617 CH 3610,
U 561 CH 3620.

b) ./.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia, Balearic Islands, separately as far as Oran.

b) Sicilian Channel, probing reconnaissance as far as the Nile Delta.

0900 a convoy, 1 British and 1 Belgian freighter, both laden, the auxiliary cruiser "Leomian" escorted by 1 corvette and 1 gunboat put out from Gibraltar for the east.

Our air reconnaissance during the forenoon spotted a heavy battle group consisting of 1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser, 2 aircraft carriers and probably 7 destroyers operating on varying courses in the sea area north of Algiers. 5 eastbound merchant ships were sighted north of Collo, speed slight.

1200 after the boats off Toulon became free they were disposed according to earlier plans and received the following orders:

New attack areas: U 83 CH 73, U 375 CH 81, U 561 CH 57, U 565 CH 58, U 77 CH 59, U 81 off Gibraltar; U 562 to operate in the Bay of Algiers, as the Commander thinks fit if there are strong defenses.

Besides the 2 sorties planned to be carried out by 1 U-boat on Algiers and 1 off Gibraltar, the remaining boats were disposed loosely in areas where the boats were favorably placed to operate against convoy traffic and covering forces and where, at the same time, they could maneuver to avoid enemy air patrols. With a more favorable aspect of the moon approaching,

if the situation permits we intend an operation off the main ports of Oran and Algiers and eastwards as well as in the Straits of Gibraltar. The boats are en route to their newly allotted areas, U 617 en route to Spezia.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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28 November 1942

I. a) U 617 CJ 1580,
U 562 CH 6550,
U 77 CH 6550,
U 565 CH 2960,
U 561 CH 2960,
U 375 CH 2990,
U 81 CH 2950,
U 83 CH 2940.

b) U 380 put out from Spezia at 1400.
U 617 put in to Spezia at 1515.

II. a) Same as on previous day.

b) Sicilian Channel, probing reconnaissance to Nile Delta.

Situation:

0700 the warship formation sighted yesterday between 0945 and 1000 has so far not been spotted again.

At 0045 an aircraft contacted a convoy of over 10 ships in CH 9387, course 270°. Aircraft reported: "Am shadowing"; no more reports received since then.

At 0302 an Italian U-boat sighted 2 merchant ships, 1 destroyer, course 270°, speed 13 knots in CH 9512. At 1700 the cable ship "Mirror" put out from Gibraltar for the east.

According to British figures the following losses have been sustained so far in the African landings:

Sunk: 16 freighters, 2 of them American,
3 British destroyers,
4 British corvettes.

Damaged: 1 British, 1 American cruiser,
1 battleship (class not known).

CONFIDENTIAL

Situation:

1900 I. Enemy situation:

Heavy convoy traffic between Algiers and Bougie.

At 0715 in CH 9554 7 merchant ships, 3 destroyers, 4 escorts, course 260°, speed slight.

At 0915 in CH 9278 9 merchant ships up to 10,000 GRT, 1 tanker, 4 destroyers, speed slight.

At 0725 in CH 9524 a convoy on an easterly course.

At 1300 an Italian seaplane sighted a formation of ships, probably 5, in CH 6862, course and speed not known.

II. Own situation:

U 380 put out from Spezia at 1400; U 617 put in to Spezia at 1515.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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29 November 1942

I. a) U 380 CJ 4120,
U 561 CH 5750,
U 565 CH 5850,
U 77 CH 5950,
U 83 CH 7350,
U 81 CH 7360,
U 375 CH 8150,
U 562 CH 9470.

b) U 593 put out from Spezia at 1000.
U 453 put out from Spezia at 1600.
U 73 put out from Spezia at 0100.

II. a) Straits south of Sardinia, Balearic Islands, separately as far as Oran.

b) Sicilian Channel, probing reconnaissance as far as the Nile Delta.

Italian agent reported: "At 1600 on 28 November convoy of 5 armed merchant ships, 1 cable ship, escorted by 1 British auxiliary cruiser (British tanker type), 1 gunboat not identified, gunboat U 3 put out from Gibraltar on an easterly course."

According to an Italian report the French submarine 151 put in to Barcelona at 1515 on 28 November.

At 0725 a convoy of 7 ships passed Cape Tres Forcas making for the Mediterranean.

At 1545 3 (probable) warships and several merchant ships were sighted in CH 9595.

Apparently one of our U-boats was spotted by enemy air reconnaissance at 1253 in CH 9127.

U 593 put out from Spezia at 1000, U 453 at 1600.

1940 radio message to the boats: "U 565 reported at 1732 2 aircraft carriers, 1 battleship, 2 light cruisers, 5 destroyers in CH 5865, course 90°, moderate speed." As we do not expect Italian U-boats at present in the Western Mediterranean, there is a chance of giving freedom of attack against enemy submarines in individual sea areas. As a result of this intention the following orders were issued:

1) U 81 free to attack submarines west of 3° W. From about 7 December expect our U-boats in the operational area.

2) U 561: according to an agent's report enemy submarines pass 10 miles east of Cape Palos on the outward and return passage. Attack free against enemy submarines in EB 0770: our U-boats may not pass through this square except on recall.

2007 U 380 received orders to occupy CH 78 as his attack area.

2031 U 565 reported: "Formation in CH 5894 according to hydrophone bearing, mean course 225°, high speed; operation to-day apparently ferrying aircraft."

2150 radio message to the boats: "At 1630 1 tanker, escorted by 1 destroyer, 1 corvette, put out to sea, course 90°."

2240 report from U 565 re-transmitted to the boats with this additional note from Captain U-boats: "Probably not ferrying aircraft; formation has been in the area south of Balearic Islands since about 25 November."

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 November 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 7440,
U 83 CH 7350,
U 375 CH 8150,
U 561 CH 5760,
U 565 CH 5860,
U 77 CH 5950,
U 562 CH 9470,
U 380 CH 6770,
U 593 CH 6370,
U 453 CJ 4410.

b) ./.

II. a) Western Mediterranean.

b) Same as on previous day.

In C-in-C U-boats G 13864/A 5 the names of 35 members of the crew of U 559, including the Commander, in British hands, were given; in C-in-C U-boats G 13920/A 5 the boat was reported missing with effect from 3 November 1942. U 559 put out from Messina on 29 September: last signal 30 October. Operational area was Eastern Mediterranean.

In C-in-C U-boats G 13921/A 5 U 331 was reported missing with effect from 18 November 1942. The boat put out from Spezia on 7 November. Last signal was on 13 November from CH 8366 reporting an attack on a convoy and damage; the fate of the crew is not known.

1131 U 83 reported sighting a probable "Dido" class cruiser at 0756 in CH 7385 and several destroyers, according to hydrophone bearing, course 260°, speed 12 - 15 knots.

The German Air Force intercepted a convoy at 1214, 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, 8 medium-sized and larger merchant ships, mean course 70°, very high speed; in addition at 0950 in CH 9593 a single destroyer on a westerly course, moderate speed and at 1047 in CJ 7822 one (probable) minelayer on a southwesterly course, speed slight.

0953 3 escorts and 4 merchant ships were spotted by our aircraft in Bone.

"Manxman" class cruiser in CJ 7913, course 60°, speed 32 knots at 2030 according to an Italian report.

The convoy sighted at 1214 in CH 8439 was reported to the boats at 1518. 3 U-boat sighting reports from enemy aircraft. Among them a report of a bomb hitting a U-boat in CH 7615.

U 73 put out from Spezia at 0100, the boat was informed at 0330 that an Italian patrol vessel was attacked in CJ 1597 by a British submarine.

According to an agent's report the "Nelson" (probably the "Rodney" however) was seriously damaged by a U-boat at dawn on 19 November off Gibraltar.

2010 1) U 453 was ordered to occupy CH 95 as his attack area.

2) U 593 to carry out an offensive sortie into the bays of Arzeu and Oran.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

1 - 15 DECEMBER, 1942

PG/30929

CONFIDENTIAL

1 December, 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 7440, U 380 CH 7660,
U 83 CH 7350, U 375 CH 8150,
U 561 CH 5750, U 565 CH 5850,
U 77 CH 5950, U 593 CH 5970,
U 562 CH 9470, U 453 CH 9520,
U 73 CJ 1580.

b) U 371 put out from Pola at 1415.

II. a) Western Mediterranean.

b) Same as on previous day.

According to radio intercept service, 3 of our U-boats were reported by enemy aircraft in the morning.

2000 U 593 was ordered to operate in the Bay of Arzeu and U 565 off Oran; the boats are not to remain constantly in the bays, but will make sorties into them and then withdraw depending on the defenses. Both boats were requested to send a situation report as soon as possible.

U 83 was allotted CH 58 as attack area. U 562 reported at:

2006 that at 1500 he sighted a convoy of 6 - 10 steamers off Algiers proceeding westwards at 11 - 13 knots. The report was repeated to the boats until 2400.

U 73 was informed at:

0104 that: at 1835 a German aircraft sighted light naval forces (8 ships) in CH 6235, at 1914 light naval forces (9 ships) in CJ 4184, both groups on a northerly course. Possibility of an operation against the mainland or Corsica. At 2240 a German aircraft reported 5 enemy ships (probably medium-sized naval forces) in CJ 7692, easterly course, high speed. It was established later that they were 1 cruiser and 5 destroyers; these attacked one of our convoys bound for Tunis at 0046 in CJ 8786.
Our boats were spotted by enemy air reconnaissance four times between 1900 and 0700.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

2 December, 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 7450, U 380 CH 7820,
U 83 CH 7350, U 565 CH 7690,
U 593 CH 8480, U 375 CH 8150,
U 561 CH 5750, U 77 CH 5950,
U 562 CH 9470, U 453 CH 9550,
U 73 CH 6850, U 371 CJ 6390.

b) ./.

II. a) Western Mediterranean.

b) Sicilian Channel, probing reconnaissance as far as the Nile Delta.

According to an agent's report an enemy convoy passed Ceuta at 0100 on an easterly course (12 medium-sized steamers, 2 destroyers and probably gunboats). The report was transmitted to the boats at 1227.

According to an aircraft report, at 0705 two badly damaged enemy destroyers were in CH 7832, and at 0708 two enemy destroyers, in CJ 7823, course 190°, speed 23 knots; also 1 ship, stopped. Several reconnaissance reports were received of enemy convoy traffic north of Bone between 0805 and 0900.

Two of our U-boats were reported by enemy aircraft; one was said to be attacked with depth charges in CH 5857, with two probable hits. U 77 is in this area.

1950 U 77, U 83, U 375, who were sighted and attacked by enemy aircraft according to radio intercept reports, were requested to report their positions by short signal. Position reports were received.

U 375 reported at:

2030 Two hits on a "London" class cruiser yesterday in CH 8198, wreckage and boats found, probably sunk.

2330 Radio message to U 380:

British anti-submarine fishing vessel was informed on 26 November that there were magnetic mines and moored mines in the vicinity of Melilla.

0050 U 77 reported various breakdowns, that he was no longer operationally fit, and requested permission to put in to Spezia.

0105 Radio message to U 77:

Commence return passage to Spezia.

According to Italian air reconnaissance, there were 1 heavy cruiser, 4 destroyers, 1 collier and several smaller ships in Bone at 1400.

At 1525 a convoy consisting of one 15,000 - 20,000 G.R.T. steamer, 3 ships of 10,000 G.R.T. each, one heavy cruiser, 2 destroyers, was sighted in CH 7760, course 270°, speed 16 knots.

C-in-C U-boats gave the following information under reference C-in-C U-boats G 14060/A5: U 605 was reported missing with effect from 11 November 1942. The boat put out from Spezia on 21 October, last report on 9 November was a position report from CH 8380. No clues as to fate of crew.

C-in-C U-boats gave the following information under reference C-in-C U-boats G 14061/A5: U 595 was reported missing with effect from 14 November. The boat put out from Brest on 31 October, last report was a war distress signal on 14 November concerning an aircraft attack in CH 8150; according to a report from an enemy submarine the crew reached the shore.

C-in-C U-boats gave the following information under reference C-in-C U-boats G 14062/A5: U 660 was reported missing with effect from 14 November 1942. The boat put out from Spezia on 24 October, last report was on 11 November from CH 8428 concerning a convoy. The fate of the crew is not known.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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3 December, 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 7450, U 380 CH 7850,
U 83 CH 7380, U 375 CH 8150,
U 565 CH 8470, U 593 CH 8480,
U 561 CH 5750, U 73 CH 5850,
U 562 CH 9470, U 453 CH 9550,
U 77 CH 5930, U 371 CK 7220.

b) ./.

II. a) Western Mediterranean.

b) Probing reconnaissance as far as the Nile Delta.

At 1315 a radio message was sent to all boats: merchant shipping traffic in the area west of the line Valencia - Balearic Islands - Toulon.

1. German ships crossing from France to Italy and Spanish vessels.

2. Swiss traffic from Gibraltar to Genoa and back under Swiss flag; supply traffic under the Spanish flag between Gibraltar, Lisbon and Genoa.

3. Red Cross steamer from Gibraltar to Marseilles and back.

Attacks on merchant shipping are definitely forbidden in this area.
The only exception is merchant ships under enemy escort.
According to an agent's report a convoy of 7 freighters, 4 tankers and 6 destroyers bound for the Mediterranean was sighted north of Melilla between 1230 and 1400 on 2 December.

During the day three of our U-boats were reported by enemy aircraft on the surface or submerging.

Italian Intelligence Service reported: convoy of 6 ships with 2 warships bound for the Mediterranean was off Cape Gata on the afternoon of 2 December.

1925 Radio message to U 77:

Yesterday an enemy submarine was sighted in CJ 1513, today one in CJ 4152 and one in CJ 4261.

2400 U 73 was ordered to occupy a new attack area.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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4 December, 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 7450, U 380 CH 7820,
U 83 CH 7380, U 375 CH 8150,
U 561 CH 5750, U 77 CJ 4170,
U 73 CH 8250, U 565 CH 8470,
U 593 CH 8480, U 562 CH 9470,
U 453 CH 9550, U 371 CJ 9850.

b) ./.

II. a) Western Mediterranean as far as Bone.

b) Central Mediterranean. Probing reconnaissance from Mersa Matruh to Sollum.

According to agent's report, a convoy of 26 ships put into port at 1130 from the East: the escorting monitor "Erebus" was visibly laden, 3 destroyers, 2 gunboats and 1 French gunboat. During the day enemy aircraft reported 3 of our U-boats; one was probably U 83.

Report from U 375 at 1715: 2 battleships, 2 carriers, 1 cruiser, 8 destroyers, course 70°, speed 16 - 18 knots in CH 8197; the report was transmitted to the boats at 1928.

U 371 put in to Messina about noon. Work has still to be carried out on one of the boat's Diesels and on the Junkers compressor.

According to an agent's report, troopships are supposed to have put out from Gibraltar for Algiers during the night 4/5, and this information was sent to the boats at 0118.

U 562 reported that according to a hydrophone bearing the carrier formation was in CH 5974 at 0200, course 260°.

At 0712 the boats were informed that a convoy of 20 ships passed Ceuta bound for the Mediterranean at 2330. (Based on an agent's report.)

According to a special radio intercept report, British submarine has been ordered to carry out anti-U-boat measures and to occupy the area inside a 20 mile radius from CJ 7195.

C-in-C U-boats gave the following information under reference C-in-C U-boats G 14037/A5:

U 259 is reported missing with effect from 16 November; boat put out from La Pallice on 5 November; last report on 11 November from CH 73 concerning enemy forces; no clue as to the fate of the crew.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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5 December, 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 7450, U 83 CH 7380,
U 73 CH 8250, U 380 CH 7820,
U 565 CH 8470, U 593 CH 8480,
U 375 CH 8150, U 561 CH 5750,
U 453 CH 9520, U 562 CH 8360.

b) U 77 put into Spezia at 0830.

II. a) Western Mediterranean as far as Bone.

b) Inshore waters, Malta and Nile Delta.

1300 Radio message to U 562:

1. Not impossible to lay a net barrage from Cape Matifon to Algiers.

2. After dark, move off westwards and occupy CH 83.

1300 Radio message to U 561:

Occupy CH 75.

According to agent's report a "Dido" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar for the east at 1400.

According to a radio intercept service report at 1807 of convoy formation "Mayfair", course 264°, speed 20 knots, in CH 9544, this is passed on to the boats at 1948.

0215 Radio message to boats:

Two transports carrying troops put out from Gibraltar eastwards at 1700; escort of 1 destroyer, 1 gunboat.
At 0401 U 443 reported that he had passed through the Straits of Gibraltar, and he was allotted CH 84 as his attack area.
During the day an enemy aircraft gave one U-boat sighting report in CH 8285.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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6 December, 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 7450, U 380 CH 7820,
U 83 CH 7380, U 565 CH 8470,
U 593 CH 8480, U 443 CH 8450,
U 375 CH 8150, U 561 CH 5760,
U 73 CH 8250, U 562 CH 8360,
U 453 CH 9520.

b) U 371 put out from Messina at 0100.

II. a) Western Mediterranean as far as radius of action allowed.

b) Probing reconnaissance of Mersa Matruh, Nile Delta.

0940 U 73 was ordered to put in to Spezia because his diving capacity was limited.

According to a "Sabine" report, at 1000 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers and 1 hospital ship put in to Gibraltar from the east.

1 "Illustrious" class carrier put out from Gibraltar.

The enemy supply traffic to North Africa has not been intercepted by the widespread disposition of the boats adopted during the full moon period. The beginning of the new moon period enables us to arrange the boats in a closer disposition at the narrowest place in the Western Mediterranean. The boats are disposed in two lines, one behind the other, running from northwest to southeast, in which they move up and down equally inside their attack areas in the direction of the line during the night. The disadvantage of concentrating the boats in a narrow space is that they are more easily spotted by enemy aircraft.
It remains to be seen how long this disposition can be kept.

1600 The boats were ordered to make for new attack areas.

1. U 83 CH 7360 and 7390,
   U 443 CH 7910, U 375 CH 7620,
   U 453 CH 7660, U 565 CH 7370,
   U 380 CH 7550, U 561 CH 7510,
   U 593 CH 7590,
   U 562 CH 7690 northern and central thirds.

2. At 2200 on 7 December all boats will endeavor to move away from the southeast corner of the attack area ordered, and to make for the northwest corner. Then turn about, and arrange it so that the southeast corner is reached again after 6 hours. Then again make for the northwest corner.

3. Boats which do not reach the southeast corner at the time ordered on 7 December are to sheer accordingly in their attack areas.

4. Carry out these movements as ordered only during hours of darkness; by day as the situation permits.

5. U 83 will carry out movements by day and night inside his attack area according to his own judgment.

6. Proceed on 8 December and after as under 2).

2114 U 562 reported:

Convoy put in to Algiers in the morning twilight; otherwise little traffic; Algiers heavily patrolled; CH 9471.

2222 U 565 reported:

4 medium-sized freighters in Oran; one patrol vessel always off Oran, little traffic; heavy air activity at night and 2 direction finding sets on shore; CH 8471.

0530 U 593 reported:

Only destroyers off Arzeu Bay; stern tube-runner fired at "Tribal" class destroyer, heavy defensive fire from locating aircraft, CH 8183. These reports confirm the impression that further operations directly off the ports will bring no results due to the patrolling which has meanwhile been set up.

0745 U 81 was ordered:

Permission to attack submarines granted temporarily has been withdrawn with immediate effect, as our boats will be proceeding through the operational area, U 83 in the next few days.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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7 December, 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 7450, U 380 CH 7820,
U 565 CH 8470, U 562 CH 8360,
U 443 CH 8440, U 73 CH 6320,
U 561 CH 7510, U 83 CH 7360,
U 593 CH 8480, U 375 CH 8150,
U 453 CH 9540, U 371 CJ 9520.

b) ./.

II. a) Western Mediterranean as far as radius of action allowed.

b) Probing reconnaissance of Nile Delta.

According to an agent's report, 5 destroyers, 1 corvette and 1 freighter of approximately 6000 G.R.T. put out from Gibraltar between 0015 and 0100, course not known.

0342 The boats were apprised of the fact that a large convoy consisting of 60 units, including 12 large, 28 medium-sized, and 19 smaller, and 1 possible aircraft carrier passed Ceuta after 2400 on 7 December.

A U-boat (probably U 565) was sighted submerging in CH 7384 at 2023 by British aircraft.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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8 December, 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 7450, U 453 CH 7660,
U 443 CH 7910, U 375 CH 7620,
U 593 CH 7590, U 565 CH 7370,
U 380 CH 7550, U 83 CH 7390,
U 561 CH 7510, U 371 CH 9380,
U 562 CH 7690, U 602 CH 7540.

b) U 73 put in to Spezia at 1230 on 8 December.

II. a) ./.

III. No further reports were received of the large convoy which passed Ceuta from 7 to 8 December.
According to an Italian agent's report, a convoy began to put to sea from Gibraltar at 1500.

IV. U 371 reported his position from CJ 7524 at 2236 and was directed to a new attack area CH 83 center and eastern thirds at 2358.
An enemy aircraft sighted one of our U-boats at 2202 in CH 7696; another transmitted at 0557 from CH 6724: "Have attacked enemy U-boat, observed direct hit". U 375 is in the grid square given.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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9 December, 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 7450, U 443 CH 7910,
U 593 CH 7590, U 380 CH 7550,
U 561 CH 7510, U 562 CH 7690,
U 453 CH 7660, U 374 CH 7620,
U 565 CH 7370, U 83 CH 7390,
U 371 CJ 8210.

b) ./.

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II. a) Western Mediterranean as far as radius of action allowed.

b) Probing reconnaissance as far as Nile Delta, reconnaissance against Malta convoy, also off the coast of Apollonia as far as Mersa Matruh.

III. According to a "Sabine" report, the "Otranto" and "Llangibby Castle" with troops aboard put out from Gibraltar on an unnamed course, escorted by 3 destroyers at 0430. According to a German agent, at 0900 1 Dutch transport of the "Tegelberg" class with troops aboard and the submarine depot ship "Maidstone" put out from Gibraltar bound for the Mediterranean.

2020 Both reports were passed on to the boats.

IV. 0806 U 602 reported that he had entered the Mediterranean and crossed 1° W;
0830 the boat was allotted CH 8410 and 8420 as his attack area.

VI. At 0845 U 375 was requested to report his position because of an attack report made by a British aircraft; the report was received at 2005. As it is possible that as well as U 375, U 602 was also in the grid square CH 7624 at the time of the attack made by the British aircraft, this boat was requested for a position report at 2020. The report was received.

British aircraft reported a U-boat submerging (U 565 ?) in CH 7384 at 1325.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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10 December, 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 7450, U 375 CH 7620,
U 561 CH 7510, U 453 CH 7660,
U 380 CH 7550, U 562 CH 7690,
U 593 CH 7590, U 602 CH 8420,
U 443 CH 7910, U 83 CH 7390,
U 565 CH 7370, U 371 CH 8350.

b) ./.

II. a) Western Mediterranean as far as radius of action allowed.

b) Reconnaissance off Nile Delta and inshore waters from Ungeila as far as Ras el Tin.

III. According to an Italian agent's report, the "Nelson", the "Rodney", the "Formidable" 6 destroyers and 3 gunboats put out from Gibraltar at 1500 for the east. A troop-ship, escorted by 2 American destroyers, was sighted off Tarifa at 1830. The report was passed on to the boats at 0350.

1 cruiser with 2 destroyers was sighted in CJ 7538, course 240°, speed 25 knots.

IV. At 0242 U 310 reported passing 1° W after proceeding through the Straits of Gibraltar. Since U 301 is no longer in full operational readiness because of damage from depth charges, he was ordered at 0434 to proceed to Spezia.

VI. 2 of our U-boats were reported during the day by enemy aircraft.

According to Naval War Staff 1 U (U-boats) S.O.s only Serial No. 2648/42 of 10 December, U-boats may attack supply traffic proceeding in the Eastern Mediterranean. Focal point remains in the Western Mediterranean however.

Plan is: To move 3 boats from the Western Mediterranean to the Eastern Mediterranean after the conclusion of the convoy operations at present in progress in the Western Mediterranean.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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11 December, 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 7455, U 561 CH 7510,
U 380 CH 7550, U 593 CH 7590,
U 443 CH 7910, U 565 CH 7370,
U 375 CH 7620, U 453 CH 7660,
U 562 CH 7690, U 83 CH 7390,
U 602 CH 8420, U 301 CH 5760,
U 371 CH 8350.

b) ./.

II. a) ./.

b) ./.

III. According to German air reconnaissance: 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers course 270°, in CH 9348 at 0900; and 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers course 270°, moderate speed, in CH 9542 at 1100. Both reports were passed on to the boats at 1645.

1430 A sighting report was received from U 443 of a westbound convoy with 14 large transports, high speed.

IV. 2012 the following boats were ordered to occupy new attack areas: U 561 CH 7810, U 380 CH 7850, U 593 CH 7860. Enemy traffic was not intercepted by the previous disposition. It is therefore suspected that it is running on the 200 meter line. The western U-boat patrol line has therefore been broken up in favor of stronger operations off the coast of Morocco. This disposition can only be maintained for a short time, as it will then be spotted by the enemy.

At 1630 U 443 reported that he sank an American destroyer with 2 hits out of an eastbound convoy in CH 7675, consisting of 15 transports, speed 14 knots.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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12 December, 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 7450, U 561 CH 7810,
U 380 CH 7850, U 593 CH 7860,
U 443 CH 7910, U 565 CH 7370,
U 375 CH 7620, U 453 CH 7660,
U 562 CH 7690, U 83 CH 7360,
U 602 CH 8420, U 371 CH 8350,
U 301 CH 6810,

b) ./.

II. a) Western Mediterranean.

b) Inshore waters from El Agheila as far as Mersa Matruh.

III. One of our aircraft reported: 7 merchant ships and escorts in CH 9546, mean course 270°, high speed; report was passed on to the boats at 1100.

It can be concluded from several agents' reports made lately that enemy traffic passes Tres Forcas at a distance of 10 - 20 miles, i.e. probably south of the Gibraltar-Cape Lindless line up to the 200 meter line. U 561, 380, 593 and 443 have therefore been ordered to extend their attack areas northwards to the line Gibraltar - Cape Lindless.

V. On 9 December U 602 fired a fan of three at a destroyer in CJ 8182; after 2 minutes 2 explosions were heard, 2 hits probable.

U 453 fired a fan which missed a Jervis search group in CH 7636 at 1446; he requested a short period in dock to repair damage caused by depth charges.

VI. During the day enemy aircraft reported 4 of our U-boats, 2 of whom were unsuccessfully attacked with depth charges.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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13 December, 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 7450, U 561 CH 7810,
U 380 CH 7820, U 593 CH 7830,
U 443 CH 7910, U 565 CH 7370,
U 301 CH 6610, U 375 CH 7620,
U 562 CH 7690, U 83 CH 7390,
U 453 CH 8150, U 602 CH 8120,
U 371 CH 8350.

b) ./.

II. a) Western Mediterranean as far as radius of action allowed.

b) Probing reconnaissance of Nile Delta.

III. Italian U-boat reported 4 destroyers, northeasterly course, high speed, in CJ 7585 at 1917.

One of our aircraft reported: at 1720 2 small merchant ships off Cape Ferrat, speed slight, northerly course. At 1735 4 medium-sized ships off Cape de Fer, course and speed not reported.

According to an agent's report, a convoy of 21 units put out from Gibraltar for the east at 1750 on 13 December. Escort: 1 destroyer, 3 gunboats, 1 patrol vessel. The boats were informed of the convoy at 2348.

IV. At 0944 U 83 was ordered to transfer his attack area to CH 7660. This was U 453's former operational area, which he has had to leave because he was ordered by radio at 0230 to proceed to Spezia owing to damage from depth charges (see 12 December).

V. Radio message to U 371 at 1109: According to radio intercept report, a British steamer was torpedoed by a U-boat in the Bay of Algiers at 0147 on 12 December. At 0455 the steamer reported an explosion, sinking. Query, Mehl's success ? The query was made because at the time in question U 371 was in the vicinity of the bay. At 2118 U 371 reported by short signal "No".

At 2238 a radio message was received from Naval Communications Officer Rome, according to which the following radio message was received there: (C-in-C U-boats 1381/ radio message). At 1851 the following short signal was picked up and acknowledged on the U-boat coastal service: Have still enough fuel for 9 weeks. U 81.

Since 1) U 81 was not requested by us to report, and 2) the contents are meaningless as far as the boat is concerned, (he put to sea on 24 November and is now in the Western Mediterranean), C-in-C U-boats was requested by telephone for an explanation.

The answer by radio produced the following:

Tone of transmission and the fact that a U-boat was transmitting short signals on the coastal service led us to suspect that the enemy was sending a decoy signal. No Atlantic boat was requested to report. The short signal was received quite clearly. C-in-C U-boats is taking further steps in the matter.

VI. An enemy aircraft sighted one of our boats in CH 7398.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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14 December, 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 7450, U 561 CH 7810,
U 380 CH 7820, U 593 CH 7830,
U 443 CH 7910, U 565 CH 7370,
U 301 CJ 1390, U 375 CH 7620,
U 83 CH 7660, U 562 CH 7690,
U 602 CH 8420, U 371 CH 8350,
U 453 CH 6840.

b) ./.

II. a) Western Mediterranean.

b) Reconnaissance of inshore waters from Mersa Matruh to Derna. Probing reconnaissance of Nile Delta.

III. According to the German Espionage Agency in Spain, a convoy of 18 freighters and 3 warships passed off Cape Tres Forcas at 1045 on 14 December on an easterly course. The boats were informed of this at 0054 on 15 December.

IV. The present U-boat disposition would expose them to too great a degree to the concentrated anti-submarine activity of the enemy air force during the coming full moon period. Since the boats have now been operating for about 8 days in close disposition, it is necessary to allocate them larger attack areas along the coast of Algeria from Cap Tres Forcas to Bone.

In accordance with Naval War Staff's orders, U-boat operations are to remain concentrated in the Western Mediterranean. Single boats may operate in the Eastern Mediterranean if so desired. It is intended to put 3 boats into operation in the Eastern Mediterranean on the basis of this directive. In pursuance of this plan, U 562 was ordered to proceed to the Eastern Mediterranean via Messina. The other two boats will be U 617 and U 73 which put out from Spezia on 17 and 18 December respectively.

The boats remaining in the Western Mediterranean received the following order:

"New attack areas: U 565, area south of the parallel from Moran to the coast between the meridians of CH 7574 and CH 7693. U 375 CH 76 northern and center thirds; U 561 CH 84 northern and center thirds; U 443 CH 81. U 83 CH 82. U 371 CH 83 and CH 94 western third. U 602 CH 59. U 380 CH 96 and CH 95 eastern thirds. U 593 CJ 57 northern and center thirds and grid square 78 western third. Southern boundary for all boats in the south is the coast."

U 83 reported at 1801 that there were 3 severe leaks in the main ballast tank, tubes 2 and 4 were leaky, the starboard Diesel was only working to a limited capacity as a result of aircraft bombs and that he was proceeding to Spezia.

U 561 reported at 2128:

"Bombs some distance away. Am in working order apart from Junkers compressor."

U 81 reported at 2350 that he has commenced a delaying return passage with 60 potash cartridges.

U 602 was ordered at 2350 to occupy the operational area vacated by U 83.

V. U 443 reported that he fired a fan of four at a medium-sized transport in a convoy at 2215 in CH 7679, and obtained a hit after 3 minutes. Sinking noises were heard. It may be assumed that the steamer sank.

U 562 reported at 2208: Hit on convoy, probably single-funnelled American destroyer on 9 December. He was requested for position and time when the shot was fired, as U 602 also fired at a destroyer on the same day (see 12 December).

VI. An enemy aircraft reported an attack with depth charges at 1254 on one of our boats.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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15 December, 1942

I. a) U 81 CH 7575, U 561 CH 7812,
U 380 CH 7820, U 593 CH 7830,
U 443 CH 7679, U 375 CH 7620,
U 565 CH 7690, U 602 CH 8420,
U 562 CH 8250, U 371 CH 8850,
U 83 CH 6810, U 453 CJ 4410.

b) U 301 put in to Spezia at 1010.

II. a) Western Mediterranean.

b) Reconnaissance of inshore waters from Ras el Tin to Sollum. Reconnaissance around Malta. Probing reconnaissance as far as Benghazi.

IV. At 0850 all the boats were requested to report their experiences with any Pi 2 which they may have used. The following reported:

U 453 (fan which missed fired at destroyer, depth setting 5 meters, seaway 0.)

U 562 (MZ (magnetic firing) fired at 0811 in 7696). This is at the same time the answer to the query about position and time of torpedo fired on 9 December (see 14 December). There can therefore be no question that this is the destroyer torpedoed by U 602, as the latter fired a torpedo in CH 8182 at 2330. According to radio intercept reports a unit was torpedoed at 2330 on 9 December. We therefore assume that the destroyer torpedoed by U 602 (especially since it was hit by 2 torpedoes) has sunk.

At 0926, the order issued on 14 December was modified and U 562 was not sent to Messina to proceed onwards to the Eastern Mediterranean since he has reported that he has 6 plus 3 torpedoes left and torpedoes cannot be replenished at Messina.

U 561, who has still 10 plus 2 torpedoes, was sent instead. U 562 was ordered to occupy U 561's former attack area (CH 84 upper and center thirds.)

At 0927 U 81 was ordered to return if the commander thought fit. (Repairs in Pola.)

At 1520 U 452 reported that he was 30 hours from the entrance point and was ordered to put into Spezia according to Standing War Order No. 32.

At 2109, U 375 and U 565 were requested to report their positions and U 380 to make a short weather report. U 375 reported at 2206 (CH 7661) and U 565 at 0408 (CH 7831).

At 0452 a short weather report signed U 444 was picked up by Naval Communications Officer Berlin on Mediterranean Service I. It was not heard by Rome and Athens. Presumably a short weather report from U 380.

At 2126, U 83 reported that he was 30 hours from the entrance point and was ordered at 0105 to steer directly from Entrance Point North to Point C.

Our boats sighted by enemy aircraft:

0022 in CH 8165 and 0431 in CH 8173 (probably U 443).

Captain U-boats went to Spezia for conferences at the base.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

16 - 31 DECEMBER, 1942

PG/30929

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16 December, 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 7910, U 375 CH 7660,
U 562 CH 8420, U 443 CH 8150,
U 602 CH 8250, U 371 CH 8360,
U 380 CH 9640, U 593 CJ 7760,
U 561 CH 8340, U 81 CH 5970,
U 83 CH 6350, U 453 CJ 4140.

II. a) Western Mediterranean.

b) Inshore waters, probing reconnaissance of Nile Delta.

III. c) According to an agent's report, the following units and warships are in the Western Mediterranean:

1. At 2340 on 15 December one probable light cruiser, one escort vessel, one gunboat passing from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean.

2. At 1800 on 15 December, destroyer H 84 put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

3. At 0855 on 16 December, British convoy of 13 steamers, 3 unidentified naval vessels off Cape Tres Forcas on a westerly course.

4. At 2135 on 16 December, convoy of about 12 steamers and 3 escort vessels from Mediterranean to Gibraltar.

IV. At 1032, U 380 sent a short weather report (see 15 December, IV).

Received from U 561 at 1545 and U 81 at 1629:

"Am 30 hours from Entrance Point West."

At 1832 both boats were given orders about the route to Messina to be selected.

U 81 will proceed from Messina to Pola for repairs, while U 561 is scheduled for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

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VI. Radio message to the boats at 1840 about markings on Red Cross ships after 1 January, 1943. At 2140 the boats were informed:

The "Nelson" group is in the Algiers area according to radio traffic.

Captain U-boats has returned from Spezia.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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17 December, 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 7910, U 375 CH 7660,
U 562 CH 8420, U 443 CH 8150,
U 602 CH 8250, U 371 CH 8360,
U 81 CH 9240, U 561 CH 9270,
U 380 CH 9640, U 593 CJ 7730,
U 83 CJ 1610, U 453 CJ 1390.

b) ./.

II. a) Western Mediterranean.

b) Reconnaissance of inshore waters of Ras Kanais and Ras el Hilal and probing reconnaissance off Nile Delta.

III. a) At 1643, U 81 reported smoke clouds and aircraft in CH 6953. The report was passed on to the boats, with the footnote that this was probably the "Nelson" group. This supposition was based on the sighting of aircraft, which led us to conclude the presence of units requiring special protection, and on the position, which did not indicate convoy movements. Since air reconnaissance did not find the heavy units in its concentration area - south of 38° N - it was already suspected that this formation was in the sea area between Sardinia and the Balearic Islands. No further reports were received, U 81 was forced to submerge by an aircraft attack. Our air reconnaissance has also failed to intercept the "Nelson" group.

b) One of our aircraft sighted 9 large ships, several escorts in CJ 7752 (20 miles northeast of Philippeville), course 90°, at 0000 on 18 December.

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IV. At 1055, U 593 was ordered to move the previous eastern limit of his operational area westwards to the meridian of CJ 7766. Reason is our minelaying operations by E-boats off Bone.

At 1737, U 561 reported his position 18 hours from Point M 2. Since he must have crossed Entrance Point West earlier than scheduled according to this report and there are doubts about the correctness of his report, he was requested to report his position by short signal. The report was received at 2006 (CJ 8212). The Italians have been informed that the boat will arrive at M 2 at 1200 on 18 December, and the boat that the pilot will be in readiness.

At 0233, all boats received an order about alteration of a keyword with regard to cipher material.

V. ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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18 December, 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 7910, U 375 CH 7650,
U 562 CH 8420, U 443 CH 8150,
U 602 CH 8250, U 371 CH 8360,
U 380 CH 9640, U 593 CJ 7750,
U 81 CJ 7330, U 561 CJ 9510.

b) U 453 put in to Spezia at 0900 on 17 December.
U 83 put in to Spezia at 1215 on 17 December.

II. a) Western Mediterranean.

b) Reconnaissance around Crete and north of Cyprus. Probing reconnaissance of Nile Delta.

III. b) During the course of 18 December, German air reconnaissance reported several sightings of merchant vessels with or

without escort in the Eastern Mediterranean, concentrating in the area between Tobruk and Malta.

At 1120, an Italian aircraft reported 1 battleship, 3 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 1 tanker, 4 - 5 transports with aircraft escort, course 320°, in CN 6639.

This report is hardly credible.

IV. At 1333, U 81 reported that he would arrive at M 2 at 0700 on 19 December and was informed (1609) that a pilot vessel would be in readiness for him.

At 2203, a radio message was received from U 443:

"Two fan miss fired at steamer with escort, easterly course, speed slight, in CH 8431. Tube 5 leaking as a result of bombs. 2 stern plus 2 torpedoes left. Request permission to return."

At 0025 on 19 December the boat was ordered to proceed to Spezia via CH 6825 and entrance point north. U 561 will put in to Messina at 1435.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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19 December, 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 7910, U 375 CH 7650,
U 562 CH 8420, U 443 CH 8150,
U 602 CH 8250, U 371 CH 8360,
U 380 CH 9640, U 593 CJ 7750,
U 81 CJ 9589.

b) U 561 put in to Messina at 1500 on 18 December.

II. a) Western Mediterranean as far as radius of action allowed.

b) Sea reconnaissance around Malta, inshore waters from Port Said to Sidi Barrani, sea area around Crete.

III. b) At 1352, one of our aircraft sighted a warship formation, high speed, mean course west, in CJ 7841. The boats have been informed.

Further enemy sightings by aircraft:

Unidentified naval units in CJ 7585 at 1820.

IV. ./.

V. a) U 565 reported sinking a British destroyer with one funnel from a search group on 18 December in 7677.

VI. In order to have as many boats as possible in the operational area, during the next new moon period at the beginning of January, another boat U 602, has been sent to Spezia for replenishing. The reason for assigning new operational areas to the boats is the looser disposition caused by the light nights and U 602's operational area being vacated. At 2125 they received the following order: 1) U 602 break off operations. Proceed to Spezia.....Fresh operations scheduled for end of month. 2) New attack areas: for U 565 CH 76, 78 and 79; U 561 CH 81 and 84; U 375 CH 82 and 85.

U 602 had already commenced his return passage because of lack of potash cartridges - U 375 commenced return passage at 0412 because fuel was low.

U 380 reported at 2131 that his port Diesel was working to limited capacity and that he had 50 potash cartridges left.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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20 December, 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 7910, U 562 CH 8180,
U 375 CH 8220, U 371 CH 8350,
U 380 CH 9590, U 593 CH 7750,
U 602 CH 6760, U 443 CH 6590,
U 81 CK 7240.

b) U 81 put in to Messina at 1000 on 19 December. U 81 put out from Messina at 1700 on 19 December.

II. a) Western Mediterranean south of 38° 30' N as far as 2° E.

b) Sea area southeast of Malta, inshore waters from Benghazi to Sollum.

III. c) According to an agent's report, a convoy of 15 ships with the carrier "Argus" and 3 destroyers put out from Gibraltar at 0830, on an easterly course. The boats were informed of this, also that the "Argus" later passed Gibraltar again on a westerly course.

IV. U 375 was ordered to return to Spezia because of his low fuel stock and to replenish torpedoes, U 380 because of the damage reported to the Diesel.

At 1150 the boats were reminded of the alteration to a key word with regard to cipher material.

At 1204, the boats were informed that according to air reconnaissance evaluation the enemy supply ships will put in to Bone in the forenoon up till midday.

At 1317, U 593 was ordered to occupy the attack area vacated by U 380.

At 1316, Naval Command Tunisia was requested to inform Captain U-boats in good time of plans for minelaying operations to be carried out by E-boats in the sea area west of the meridian of CJ 7736 because of the presence of our U-boats.

At 1800, U 371 was requested to report his position by short signal during the night. (Reason: U 371 is west of Algiers and has not reported since 13 December, although enemy traffic is running there at present.) No report has been received.

At 1810, U 81 reported that he would be at Point West (off Pola) at 1300 on 21 December.

At 2400, U 443 reported that he was 27 hours from Point North and received orders to put in to port.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

VI. The Commanders of U 81 and U 561 reported on their return that enemy aircraft carry out attacks on the boats during light nights even without previous location.

This experience has been transmitted to the boats by radio.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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21 December, 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 7680, U 593 CH 9610,
U 81 CJ 3440, U 562 CH 8180,
U 380 CH 9380, U 375 CH 6770,
U 602 CJ 1580, U 371 CH 8350,
U 443 CH 6350.

b) U 617 put out from Spezia at 1800.
U 81 put in to Pola at 1500.
U 602 put in to Spezia at 1500.

II. a) Western Mediterranean between 38° N and the coast of North Africa as far as 2° W.

b) Southeast of Malta as far as the African coast.
Probing reconnaissance of Nile Delta.

III. b) 1025 CH 8383 35 miles westnorthwest of Algiers. 2 merchant ships up to 5,000 G.R.T., 3 destroyers, course 90° with fighter cover.

1045 CH 8374 28 miles northeast of Cape Tenes. 4 merchant ships up to 10,000 G.R.T., 5 destroyers, course 90°.

1110 CH 7667 (22 miles north of Cape Sinleos) possibly one aircraft carrier, 3 medium-sized naval vessels, 5 light naval vessels and 6 merchant ships, course 80°.

IV. At 1752 U 443 was ordered to put in to Spezia.

At 0808, a success report was received from U 565.

At 1825, the position short signal requested from U 371 on 20 December was received.

At 2016 U 617 which put out from Spezia at 1800, was requested to report his position at 2400. Reason: He may meet 2 Italian cruisers and 5 destroyers which are proceeding from Spezia to Naples. As the position report was not received, the boat was again requested for a transmission at 0200, and at 0325 was notified that he might meet the Italian units.

At 0337 U 617 sent a position report (CJ 1992).

At 2200, a success report was received from U 562. Boat has commenced return passage as a result of damage caused by depth charges, and breakdown of the periscope, and requested permission to put in to Pola. Since the boat did not report serious breakdowns and can therefore be ready for operations again in a relatively short time, it was ordered at 2345

to return to Spezia in order to avoid the long journey to Pola.

At 0003, U 375 was ordered to put in to Spezia, to replenish fuel and torpedoes, as well as for a short overhaul.

V. a) 1. At 0202 U 565 sent a radio message about a successful torpedo attack with one hit on a transport with two funnels in an eastbound convoy in CH 7393, course 60°, moderate speed.

2. U 562 reported a success:

At 0220 two hits after 61 seconds on a large transport in 8171, eastern area; sinking noises. The steamer is presumed sunk.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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22 December, 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 7682, U 371 CH 8260,
U 593 CH 9640, U 562 CH 5890,
U 375 CH 6330, U 380 CJ 4470,
U 443 CJ 1390, U 617 CJ 5460.

b) U 443 put in to Spezia at 1115.
U 73 put out from Spezia at 2200.

II. a) Coastal reconnaissance in the area of Bougie, Philippeville, Bone and south of Sicily.

b) Reconnaissance of inshore waters of Sollum, Benghazi, probing reconnaissance of Nile Delta.

III. b) The following were intercepted: northeast of Bougie 2 merchant ships, 2 escorts, easterly course. Probably parts of the convoys sighted yesterday. According to Italian radio intelligence, convoys with courses not given are in the Alexandria - Mersa Matruh - Sollum area. In the Sollum - Benghazi area, northeast of Benghazi, 2 merchant ships, 4 destroyers bound for Benghazi. At 1800, parts of the eastbound convoy reported on 21 December were intercepted 6 miles north of Cape de Fer northeast of Algiers, on an easterly course.

c) According to an agent's report, a convoy of 15 freighters and some 6 warships passed Cape Tres Forcas on a westerly course at 0800.

Between 2110 and 2245, American aircraft sent sighting reports of Axis U-boats to the unit he was escorting (probably an aircraft carrier) in the area 25 miles northnortheast of Cape Loi (Oran).

IV. At 0800, U 380 was 30 hours from Entrance Point North and at 1650 was ordered to put in to Spezia.

At 1320, the boats were informed of our aircraft sighting report. At 1140, 2 large and 2 smaller ships in CH 9434 on a westerly course moderate speed.

At 1645, U 617 - proceeding from Spezia to Messina - was informed that he might meet a convoy proceeding from Naples to Ustica.

At 2040, U 593 was asked for a position report. (Reason: 1) According to radio intercept report, a unit, probably an important steamer, was torpedoed in the area between Algiers and Philippeville. U 593 is at present in the area concerned. 2) The boat has not reported since 14 December.) At 0605 the boat reported from CH 9531, without transmitting an additional firing report. The supposition that the boat torpedoed the steamer in question is therefore improbable.

At 0015, the boats were informed of the possible aircraft carrier roughly in CH 8432. (See under IIIc)

U 562 reported that he was 30 hours from Entrance Point North and at 0255 was ordered to put in to port.

3 U-boat sighting reports by enemy aircraft:

0840 CH 7656 (U 565 ?)
1515 CH 8266 (U 371 ?)
2110 CH 8432 (This could only be one of the boats previously sighted.)

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

VI. The number of boats operating in the Western Mediterranean has dropped sharply in the last few days, as they have had to break off operations as a result of damage or because of lack of fuel. In order to maintain the concentration for attacks in the Western Mediterranean, the intended transfer of U 73 to the Eastern Mediterranean has been cancelled. The boat will operate in the Western Mediterranean and at 2300 was ordered to make for CH 6865.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

23 December, 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 7680, U 371 CH 8350,
U 593 CH 9531, U 562 CH 6380,
U 73 CJ 1810, U 380 CJ 1580,
U 375 CJ 1380, U 617 CJ 9560.

b) U 617 put in to Messina at 1115.
U 561 put out from Messina at 1610.
U 380 put in to Spezia at 1605.
U 375 put in to Spezia at 0845.

II. a) Coastal reconnaissance in the Bone - Algiers area.

b) Reconnaissance over Malta (Valetta). Coastal reconnaissance around Crete and Tobruk. Probing reconnaissance of Nile Delta.

III. b) 1005 CH 9491 35 miles eastnortheast of Algiers, 7 merchant ships, 9 destroyers, westbound. 1 probable battleship, 10 - 12 merchant ships in Algiers harbor.
2 merchant ships, 2 escorts on a westerly course at 0730 eastnortheast of Tobruk.

c) At 1700 8 merchant vessels, 3 destroyers, 5 gunboats put out from Gibraltar for the east.

IV. At 1258 the boats received the enemy sighting report of 7 merchant ships and 9 destroyers (see III b).

At 1253, U 562 reported that he was attacked with depth charges and machine-gun fire at 1055 in CH 3838 by a German aircraft, despite giving recognition signals. One Chief Boatswain's Mate second class overboard. The boat was inside the anti-submarine hunt area allotted to Luftflotte III east of the Spanish and south of the French coast. The boat did not know that it is a forbidden area. The investigation in progress reveals that Captain U-boats is to blame. For reasons now obscure, the U-boats at sea were not informed - as had been intended - of the anti-submarine hunt area created at the end of November. The present form of the anti-submarine hunt area limits the boats' inward and outward routes too narrowly. The route north of the Balearic Islands cannot be abandoned. A new ruling must be given. U 562 has been ordered to leave the anti-submarine hunt area. Group West has been informed of the boat's position and requested to forbid anti-submarine hunts. At 1742 all the boats were informed of the limits of the anti-submarine hunt area. At 1907, U 562 was requested for a position report, the report was received at 1944 (CH 3694).

According to radio intelligence the "Nelson" group is in the sea area of Oran or in Oran harbor. At 2133, the boats were informed of this, and at 2133 that a convoy had put out from Gibraltar (see III c).

(Signed) Kreisch.

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24 December, 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 7680, U 371 CH 8350,
U 562 CJ 1380, U 593 CH 9610,
U 73 CH 6860, U 561 CO 1540.

b) U 617 put out from Messina at 1015.
. U 562 put in to Spezia at 1030.

II. a) Coastal reconnaissance as far as the Greenwich meridian, nothing sighted. Sicilian Channel.

b) Reconnaissance of inshore waters of Mersa, Sollum, nothing sighted. Probing reconnaissance of Nile Delta, nothing sighted.
Reconnaissance around Crete, nothing sighted.

III. b) According to photographic reconnaissance, Algiers harbor occupied by 2 light cruisers (probably of the "Dido" class), 2 destroyers, 2 escort vessels, 5 corvettes, 2 submarines, 10 motor launches, 1 apparent anti-submarine escort ship, 5 freight and passenger ships (45,000 G.R.T.), 44 freighters, 3 tankers, 3 harbor tankers, 70 - 80 skoots. Bone harbor (visual reconnaissance) 9 freighters, 5 escort vessels.

During the night 23/24 December, 7 merchant ships, course and speed not made out (probably bound for Benghazi) 30 miles north of Benghazi.

c) According to an Italian radio intercept report, the "Nelson" group put out from Oran on 23 December to escort a convoy (see III a) part of which is bound for Oran, part for Algiers.

d) According to an agent's report, 26 freighters, 1 tanker, 2 destroyers and 4 gunboats passed Ceuta on an easterly course between 0115 and 0220 today.

IV. U 73, which put out from Spezia on 22 December, has been given CH 81 and 84 as his attack area.

At 1131 and 1317, the boats were informed that the fairly large convoy has passed Gibraltar and Ceuta (see III d).

At 1732 the boats were informed that the "Nelson" group had put out from Oran (see III c).

At 1834, U 561 was ordered to proceed from CO 5165 to CO 5832 and thence eastwards on the 200 meter line. The boat is intended for operations on the coasts of Palestine and Syria.

At 1902, U 561 and U 617 were informed of an Italian U-boat with operational area south of the parallel of CO 5185 between the meridians of CO 5444 and CO 5466.

At 1900 the boats were apprised of mined areas northeast of Benghazi and Tobruk.

Investigation into yesterday's attack of a German aircraft on U 562 has revealed that the boat fired an incorrect recognition signal.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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25 December, 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 7680, U 73 CH 8180,
U 561 CO 5520, U 371 CH 8350,
U 593 CH 9610, U 617 CO 1540.

II. a) Western Mediterranean as far as approximately 3° E, intercepting an eastbound convoy.

b) Photographic reconnaissance of Malta, probing reconnaissance of Nile Delta, sea reconnaissance around Crete, aerial photographic reconnaissance of Cyprus, partial only.

III. a) At 0900 U 565 sighted a convoy in CH 8442, course 60°. If we assume a speed of advance of 9 knots, this could be the large convoy reported yesterday. (See III d)

b) At 0925, one aircraft carrier, 2 - 3 heavy, 6 - 8 light naval craft, on an easterly course in CH 8442.

Position was later amended to CH 8313. At 1330 the same formation was reported in CH 5977.

According to a photographic reconnaissance report received later, the carrier was of the "Illustrious" class. The "Rodney" and apparently one battleship are also with the formation.

At 0030, an aircraft sighted a convoy in CH 8385, course 80°.

At 0700 on 25 December, a sighting report from an aircraft of 3 destroyers, 3 steamers in CO 4888 (20 miles west of Benghazi) on an easterly course.

III. c) At 0100, on 25 December Ceuta sighted 5 apparent troopships, one medium-sized steamer.

At 1630, 4 fast steamers on an easterly course were seen off Cape Calaburras near Malaga.

IV. At 0920, U 593 was given the eastern half of U 371's former operational area, so that there should be stronger forces off Algiers. The latter will retain the western half.

At 1138, U 617 was allocated his operational area in the Eastern Mediterranean. (CO 45, 46, 48, and 49. Sea area around Benghazi.)

At 1149, the boats were informed of the forces in Algiers harbor on 23 December (see War Diary for 24 December, III b).

At 1145 the boats were given the position of the formation with the carrier (see III b) and at 1350 the amended position.

At 1312, U 565's enemy sighting was received (see III a). The boats have been informed. At 1413, the boats in the Eastern Mediterranean were notified of further mined areas.

At 1533, the enemy sightings from Ceuta (see III c) and at 1745 the enemy sighting from Malaga (III c) were transmitted to the boats.

At 2230, U 371 requested 82 as his operational area, since he considers there are no prospects of success in his present area because of extremely strong anti-submarine measures. He has been allocated the grid square requested as well as his former operational area, and, in addition, U 593's former operational area. U 593 commenced his return passage during the night, with 7 potash cartridges left. U 593 has been ordered to proceed to Messina. He is scheduled for repairs in Pola.

VI. Own boats sighted by aircraft:

1. 1055 34 miles south of Cartagena (U 73 or U 565).

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

26 December, 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 7680, U 73 CH 8180,
U 371 CH 8340, U 593 CH 9510,
U 561 CO 9220, U 617 CO 4670.

II. a) Air reconnaissance in the coastal area as far as and including Algiers.

b) Reconnaissance in Tunisian battle area. Reconnaissance over Malta (Valetta).

III. a) At 1857, U 73 reported 14 freighters, 1 tanker, 1 submarine, escort vessels and destroyers, barrage balloons, anti-torpedo nets, putting in to Algiers as it became light. Two fan miss fired at tanker. It may be remarked in addition to the report about anti-torpedo nets that an aerial photograph has recently come to hand which shows a 9000 G.R.T. transport with anti-torpedo net streamed. According to this, the problem has been mastered by the British and we can count on their general use at least in the Mediterranean. It remains to be seen what effect the Pi 2 will have.

b) Aircraft sighting reports:

0941, 12 medium-sized steamers in CH 9464 (bearing 62°, 34 miles from Algiers).

1100 CH 9481 (20 miles northeast of Algiers) 12 medium-sized merchant ships, 6 escort vessels, easterly course, speed 10 knots.

1730 CH 9561 3 merchant ships, 2 escort vessels, westerly course, speed 10 knots.

1800 CH 9561 9 merchant vessels, 6 escort vessels, easterly course (probably the convoy sighted at 1730).

2045 CH 9545 5 large ships on a westerly course.

2230 CH 9654 9 ships on an easterly course.

III. c) According to radio intercept service, a convoy was attacked by aircraft at 0506 in CJ 7728.

At 1815 the following put in to Gibraltar:

The carrier "Formidable", the battleships "Nelson" and "Rodney", 1 cruiser (of the "Charybdis" class) and 9 destroyers.

According to previous experience, greater convoy traffic is not expected in the immediate future after this heavy group has put in to port.

IV. At 1006, U 593 reported that he was 30 hours from Entrance Point West and at 1202 had his return route ordered. At 1237, U 561 was notified of an area in the Eastern Mediterranean where there are no Italian boats. U 561 has at present permission to attack submarines in this area. During the course of the day the boats received 2 messages concerning convoys sighted by German aircraft.

At 1812, U 561 was ordered to operate on the Beirut - Larnaca (on Cyprus) route, since, according to an agent's report, a fairly large convoy with troops and material is due to put out from Beirut for Larnaca on 28 December. At 2031 U 565 reported firing a three fan miss at a destroyer in CH 8418. The boat has still one bow and three FAT torpedoes. He asked if he might commence his return passage, as FAT shots offer no prospects of success at present (full moon on 22 December). As the boat is still in full operational readiness, and there are only two other boats in the Western Mediterranean, he was ordered at 2327 to remain in the operational area. Because of the heavy strain on boat and crew caused by long operations it is intended to withdraw the boat on about 30 December, after the present convoy activity dies down.

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

VI. Our boats were sighted as follows:

1. 0310 CH 8268 (U 371 ?)
2. 0441 CH 8126 (possibly U 73)
3. 0043 in CO 7422 (probably U 561).

(Signed) Kreisch.

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27 December, 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 8418, U 73 CH 8185, U 371 CH 8345, U 617 CO 4676, U 561 CP 4985, U 593 CJ 7451.

II. a) Coastal reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

b) Meteorological reconnaissance of Benghazi.

III. c) According to an Italian radio intercept service report, there are several eastbound convoys along the coast of Egypt.

At 1730 a "Leander" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar for the east.

IV. At 1805, the boats were informed that the "Nelson" group had put in to Gibraltar, with the supposition that the carrier "Argus" is still in the Mediterranean.

At 1805 the boats were notified of a minefield off Bone (German minefield laid by E-boats).

Our U-boats sighted by enemy aircraft;

0310 CH 8234
0833 also CH 8234 (U 371 or U 73 ?).

V. a) ./.

b) ./.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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28 December, 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 7650, U 73 CH 8420,
U 371 CH 8260, U 617 CO 4940,
U 561 CP 5390, U 593 CJ 8130.

II. a) Sea reconnaissance in the Western Mediterranean as far as 1° W, nothing sighted.

b) Probing reconnaissance of Nile Delta, sea area around Cyprus as far as Beirut, nothing sighted.

III. b) Submarine in CN 2242 at 0405.

c) At 0240 convoy Te 11 with 10 escort vessels put out from Gibraltar eastbound.

In the Eastern Mediterranean according to radio intelligence:

1. Convoy in the sea area north of Benghazi, course not known.

2. Fast convoy in Apollonia area about 1600, westerly course.

3. Convoy in Sollum neighborhood, westerly course.

e) Italian destroyer sighted a submarine in CN 8865 at 1955.

2 more submarine sightings:

2000 3 miles north of Pantellaria
0045 17 miles east of Cape Bon.

IV. U 593 reported that he would be at point M 2 at 0730 on 29 December. U 565 was informed that his return passage to Spezia is scheduled to start during the night 29/30 December. (For reasons see War Diary for 26 December, under III c) and IV).

(Signed) Kreisch.

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29 December, 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 7650, U 617 CO 4940,
U 73 CH 8420, U 561 CP 5360,
U 371 CH 8340, U 593 CJ 9590.

b) U 593 put in to Messina at 0945, put out from Messina at 1500.

II. a) Reconnaissance as far as Philippeville and Bone.

b) Reconnaissance over Malta, Nile Delta, west of Crete and in the Derna area.

III. b) Western Mediterranean:

1035 CH 8267 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers, westerly course.
1127 north of Oran 1 destroyer, southeasterly course.

Eastern Mediterranean:

1305 CN 6651 5 ships, course 320°.
1740 CN 6393 3 or 4 ships, course not given.

c) According to radio intelligence, a convoy put out from Malta in the afternoon, bound for Benghazi.

IV. U 593, who put out from Messina at 1500 to proceed to Pola, was notified that he might meet 2 Italian U-boats at 2200 on a northerly course. At 1750, U 592 reported that at 0700 on 30 December he would be at Entrance Point "Adriatic" and at 1921 was ordered not to cross Point "Adriatic" until 0800, (Amendment of the time fixed - 0530 - by Supermarina. Reason: passage of important Italian unit.)

The boats were informed of the various enemy reports during the day.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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30 December, 1942

I. a) U 565 CH 8150, U 617 CO 4940,
U 73 CH 8420, U 561 CP 5350,
U 371 CH 8340, U 593 CK 7540.

II. a) Sea reconnaissance of Western Mediterranean. No further particulars.

b) Probing reconnaissance of west and north coasts of Cyprus, nothing sighted. Crete.

III. b) Shipping in Eastern Mediterranean ports:

1050 Beirut: 1 merchant ship over 10,000 G.R.T.
1 torpedoboat.

Larnaca unoccupied.

Famagusta: 3 medium-sized freighters.

c) During the past night, convoy put out from Bone for Algiers and onwards.

During the forenoon, one convoy in the Tobruk area, which put out from Alexandria on 28 - 29 December.

One convoy in the Apollonia area (Tango) which put out from Alexandria on the evening of 26 December.

e) Italian destroyer: 0900 in CJ 8762, one submarine.

IV. At 0840 U 561 was given carte blanche in the new operational area east of 31° E. Operations on the suspected large convoy from Beirut to Larnaca (see 26 December IV) produced no results.

At 0812, U 593 - proceeding to Pola - reported that at 1500 on 31 December he would be at rendezvous W (off Pola) and at 1111 received orders concerning the arrangements for a pilot.

At 1501, U 561 was informed of shipping movements expected in Iskanderun and at 1656 about the forces in ports in the Eastern Mediterranean.

At 2106, U 565 reported that he was 30 hours from Entrance Point North and at 2202 received orders to put in to port.

Since U 617 had only one stern torpedo left after his success (see V a) he has commenced his return passage to Salamis and at 0502 received orders to return.

Admiral Aegean has been informed of intended arrival by a Most Immediate teleprint message.

V. a) At 0304 a report was received from U 617 reporting an ocean-going tug and lighter sunk in CO 4936 on 27 December, and a destroyer sunk in 4928. On 30 December, 3 steamers were torpedoed out of 4 large steamers escorted by 6 destroyers and flying boats in CO 4697. Their sinking could not be observed because of anti-submarine measures. Bulkheads were heard breaking.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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31 December, 1942

I. a) U 73 CH 8420, U 617 CO 4630,
U 371 CH 8340, U 561 CP 5350,
U 565 CH 6350, U 593 CJ 3760.

b) U 593 put in to Pola at 1830.

II. a) Sea reconnaissance as far as Bougie.

b) Inshore waters of Derna, sea area around Crete, probing reconnaissance off Port Said, nothing sighted.

III. b) 0943 CK 8975 submarine.
1306 CK 8986 submarine.
1105 CH 9655 1 merchant ship up to 10,000 G.R.T.
3 merchant ships up to 3,000 G.R.T.
4 escort vessels, easterly course, speed 10 knots.
1111 CH 9545 1 merchant ship up to 20,000 G.R.T., 4 destroyers, 2 escort vessels, moderate speed, (no details of course).

In Bone harbor in the afternoon:

23 ships, some over 10,000 G.R.T.

1130 CO 5467 3 freighters of 5,000 - 6,000 G.R.T. each,
2 freighters of 2,000 - 3,000 G.R.T.,
6 escort vessels, course 90°, moderate speed.
1730 CO 5459 5 freighters, 6 escort vessels.
1735 off Apollonia, 4 steamers, 6 escort vessels.

d) 1530 17 units, including 9 freighters of approximately 7,000 G.R.T. and 2 tankers, 6 escort vessels, passed Tangier bound for the Mediterranean.

1730 convoy "Hallem" 15 miles northeast of Cape de Fer.

IV. 1307 U 617 reported that he would reach 35° N at 2300. (The boat must have permission from Admiral Aegean to cross, who has first to arrange for the cessation of anti-submarine hunts).

At 1843 U 617 was notified that permission to cross 35° may be delayed, was given his route and informed of 2 enemy submarines sighted in CK 8986 and 8975. Admiral Aegean takes over further command of the boat. During the day several enemy sighting reports and good wishes for the New Year were transmitted to the boats from C-in-C U-boats and Captain U-boats.

At 0005 a success report was received from U 561 (see V a).

V. a) On 31 December, U 561 sank a "Jervis" class destroyer with 2 hits in CP 2669.

VI. At 0750, Captain U-boats went to Spezia base.

b) At present only 3 boats are operating in the operational area. 3 other boats are on return passage to bases at Spezia, Pola and Salamis.

The following survey shows particulars:

No. of boat	Into dock Date	In operational readiness 1st report Date	Reason for overhaul	Operational readiness delayed until	Reason	Probable total duration of dockyard period in days	Probable dockyard period after 1 Jan. 43 in days
U 77	8 Dec	13 Jan 43	large repairs	-----	-----	36	12
U 83	18 Dec	10 Jan 43	small repairs	12 Jan.	-----	25	11
U 97	3 Sept	10 Feb 43	large repairs, damage to pressure hull	-----	-----	160	40
U 301	15 Dec	14 Jan 43	large repairs	-----	-----	30	13
U 375	24 Dec	11 Jan 43	small repairs	-----	-----	18	10
U 380	24 Dec	1 Feb 43	large repairs	-----	-----	39	31
U 443	23 Dec	28 Jan 43	Stern tube dismantled	-----	-----	36	27

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No. of boat	Into dock Date	In operational readiness 1st report Date	Reason for overhaul	Operational readiness delayed until	Reason	Probable total duration of dockyard period in days	Probable dockyard period after 1 Jan. 43 in days
U 453	18 Dec.	6 Jan 43	small repairs	11 Jan	----	24	10
U 458	20 Dec.	23 Jan 43	large repairs	----	----	33	22
U 562	25 Dec.	25 Jan 43	large repairs	----	----	31	24
U 596	16 Nov.	7 Dec 42	large repairs	21 Jan	tubes to be changed	66	20
U 602	23 Dec.	21 Jan 43	small repairs	----	----	29	20
U 755	25 Nov.	12 Dec 42	large repairs	17 Jan	tubes to be changed	53	16

Proceeding to Spezia:

U 565.

No. of boat	Into dock date	In operational readiness 1st report Date	Reason for overhaul	Operational readiness delayed until	Reason	Probable total duration of dockyard period in days	Probable dockyard period after 1 Jan. 43 in days
		In Pola:					
U 81	24 Dec	24 Jan 43	Repairs after operation	----	----	31	23
U 205	26 Nov	12 Jan 43	Batteries to be changed	---	----	47	11
U 407	29 Nov	16 Jan 43	" "	---	----	48	15
U 431	24 Nov	2 Jan 43	Repairs after operation. Coupling fouled.	7 Jan	----	44	6

Proceeding to Pola:

U 593

The reasons for this accumulation of U-boats under repair are on the one hand the considerable damage sustained as the result of the specially strong anti-submarine measures in the Mediterranean, which in many cases have forced the breaking off of operations after only a short period in action, and on the other hand the delays in the completion of the boats. Almost all the fleet units which are not occupied directly in escort service for transports to Africa, have now been assembled in Spezia since the evacuation of the south Italian ports. Demands are therefore being made on the capacity of the arsenal and especially on the dockyard installations to an extent not previously made by Italian units. In addition, interest in the furtherance of German repair work has ceased since the German claim on the arsenal at Toulon was made with the intention of relieving the Italian dockyards completely of repair work for German U-boats. The measures to hasten U-boat repairs and to extend the capacity of Spezia and Pola, which were previously requested and also in part commenced by the Italians, have come to a standstill.

Constant representations are necessary to secure any tolerable date of completion.

Experience gained:

Since the Anglo-American landing operations in North Africa began, the conditions under which the boats have to operate in the Western Mediterranean have been intensified by the concentrated enemy countermeasures.

1. Anti-submarine hunts:

U-boats are hunted by aircraft and light naval forces.

a) by aircraft:

The enemy has air superiority in the area of the Western Mediterranean in which German U-boats are operating owing to the numerical strength of his air force and the excellent condition of its equipment and its efficiency, as well as to the fact that jumping off harbors are available all along the coast of Algieria. There is no area in the Western Mediterranean which enemy air forces cannot cover. These advantages are exploited to the full by the enemy. Some of his aircraft operate a systematic U-boat search and U-boat hunt and others escort supplies. He can allocate strong forces for this task.

This disadvantage is further increased by the fact that almost all aircraft, at least all those assigned to U-boat hunts, are equipped with location gear, and by the fact that the enemy is ahead of us in the development of his location gear. The value of our own radar interception gear is not denied.

b) by naval forces:

A systematic U-boat hunt by light naval forces has only been carried out on isolated occasions. The reason lies in the fact that the greater part of the vessels suitable for U-boat hunts are at present still acting as escorts for the more and more numerous convoys running, and that they cannot yet be assigned to systematic U-boat hunts. It must then however be taken into account that when no traffic is running the U-boats are hunted and attacked.

The effect of the location gear used by the light forces engaged in U-boat hunts is not highly estimated by the U-boats, as the interval for surprise is smaller than with aircraft. Prompt evasive action is possible in most cases through the use of radar interception sets.

2. Convoy escorts:

The convoys running in the Western Mediterranean are strongly escorted by naval and air forces. During November, convoys appeared in which there were twice as many escort forces as units to be protected. In additien, there was strong, close air cover. Even if the convoys are at present no longer so strongly escorted, the boats are still deprived of the freedom of movement, which they require for operations, by close air cover and by exhaustive reconnaissance and patrolling. In most cases it is not possible to haul ahead, cease steaming and improve the attack position. At night the boats have to contend with the additional difficulty that during these very months of November and December intense phosphorescence of the sea prevails in the Western Mediterranean area.

3. Anti-torpedo nets:

One further point, because of which chances of success have perhaps already been nullified, is the fact that some units have been confirmed to be carrying anti-torpedo nets. So far little has been known about this enemy countermeasure. Since it is not necessary for the nets to be manufactured from heavy wire - which would make

it difficult to handle the net or would make it impossible to stream nets reaching to any considerable depth - we must count on the nets which the enemy has also affording protection against shots fired under the nets.

4. Lack of our own reconnaissance:

The boats operating in the Western Mediterranean are forced by enemy reconnaissance and U-boat hunts to remain submerged for the greater part of the day and night. The area which is covered by each boat is thereby greatly diminished, or vice versa, the sea area is considerably increased for the enemy.

A submerged U-boat can survey only a very small portion of his operational area. It is therefore necessary that the visual range the boat lacks should be replaced by exhaustive reconnaissance (by the German Air Force) of the area in which our boats are operating. A single sighting report is not sufficient, effective help can only be afforded if the aircraft which intercepts the enemy traffic remains with the formation as a shadower.

The German Air Force cannot fulfill both demands to any satisfaction. Lack of forces is already preventing the German Air Force from carrying out reconnaissance over the whole of the Western Mediterranean. For this reason, the focal point of reconnaissance is moved to the area in which the enemy's main supply traffic is running. This is the area along the coast of Algeria. Here, however, the reconnaissance plane's task is made extremely difficult by strong enemy fighter forces which can take off from the numerous airfields on the coast of Algeria. Shadowing a formation once it is sighted is almost impossible. West of the area threatened by enemy fighters, lack of range - the result of the great distance from our jumping-off harbors - prevents the aircraft from shadowing. Handing the shadowing from aircraft to aircraft is again not possible because of lack of forces.

These are the reasons why in most cases only one report is received about a convoy once it has been intercepted. These reports frequently do not reach Captain U-boats for 3 - 6 hours, and are then often of no value to the boats. The reason for this is that it is often not possible for the aircraft to transmit the report at once because of the danger of having a bearing taken on it, and also sea reconnaissance planes have such little training that a check on the report cannot be dispensed with. The advantage of boats' switching on to the aircraft reconnaissance wave is being tested. One disadvantage of this is that the reports, which are frequently inaccurate, get to the boats without sightings, and the boats operate on bad reports and so get out of control in certain conditions.

5. Disposition of the boats:

Retrial of the disposition in closely occupied patrol lines produced no results. This is spotted by the enemy and permits him to force the boats to submerge and to keep them there with relatively small forces. When boats take evasive action as becomes necessary, gaps arise through which the enemy can slip unnoticed. Even when the disposition ought to intercept enemy traffic, only single boats succeed from time to time in getting close to the formation since in most cases the enemy anti-submarine defenses prevent other boats in the line from coming up.

Disposition of the boats in small closely adjacent attack areas has also not been a success for the same reasons.

6. The situation can be summarized as follows:

As a result of the present conditions in the Western Mediterranean, the boats have become static. Vision and freedom of movement, both prerequisites for "operations", have been taken from them. Support from the German Air Force which would counterbalance these disadvantages cannot be given. The boats are therefore disposed to the best advantage over the operational area in attack area of not too small dimensions - 60 mile squares. Operational headquarters transmits a picture of convoy traffic to the boats, gained from reports from the boats, air reconnaissance, agents' reports and the radio intercept service. It is indispensable that for this the boats should report their own observations of convoy traffic more than so far has been done. The boats hesitate to transmit a radio message because of the danger of bearings. The short signal is not exhaustive enough. Reporting procedure after the type of a meteorological code seems a feasible expedient. This matter will be followed up elsewhere.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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Comments

by

Flag Officer German Naval Command Italy

on War Diary of Captain U-boats Italy from

1 - 31 December

1. Concur with measures adopted by Captain U-boats.

2. With regard to experience gained:

a) In principle nothing to remark.

b) Paragraphs 5 and 6.

The difficulties described by Captain U-boats which led to the then loss of greater operational freedom for the boats and Captain U-boats, are not denied. In spite of this, efforts must be made - even under the present conditions - to find chances to attain greater freedom of movement for the boats and unrestricted operations for the Operational Headquarters again. It seems insupportable to be satisfied in the long run with the fact that the U-boat has become static in the Mediterranean and that the enemy is only intercepted when he crosses in front of a U-boat's periscope. Instead of closely occupied patrol lines in sea areas of equal size - which Captain U-boats refuses to have in view of his experience in Mediterranean operations - a chessboard-like disposition with a greater depth of sweep might be considered; this would then enable the missing air reconnaissance to be replaced by that of the U-boats, and the enemy once intercepted could be passed on to the boats disposed in quarterline one behind the other. Captain U-boats has already adopted this procedure in isolated cases. It also seems suitable to move the above named loose mesh net as a whole during spaces of time the U-boats can keep within, in order to evade the enemy air force's recognition of the situation and thereupon instituting a systematic U-boat hunt, or else to make such action more difficult.

It is clear that larger numbers of boats are necessary for such a procedure than are often available owing to the difficulties in repair work at present existing in the Mediterranean. It would then have to be put to the test whether rigorous control of operational periods might be necessary. If corresponding control of dockyard periods is not possible, or possible only to a limited extent, and if some boats had

to wait for some time before operating according to the foregoing plan, these periods could be utilized for practice attacks and shoots; this would be especially useful with regard to the frequent changes in personnel and the rejuvenescence of crews and commanders necessary for various reasons.

The loss of operational time connected with single boats perhaps being delayed would unquestionably be most regrettable, so that this must be weighed very seriously against the advantages hoped for.

The above ideas are at present only intended as hints for further consideration of the problem; C-in-C U-boats' comments are especially necessary in this connection.

(Signed) Weichold.

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